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INTRODUCTION
The emerging Common Market of Western Europe calls for new
organization planning by many American enterprises. Many who
have never before maintained a European organization will now
develop one; and those who have long had European organizations
will have to re-examine and revise them.
The subjects of planning-licenses to do business, liabilities of
owners, taxation, management, finance-are the same in the Common Market as anywhere else. But there are many ways in which
the European variables differ radically from those in the United
States; there are others in which the variables in the Common Market will be found to differ significantly from those which prevailed in
compartmented Europe.
In the following pages we will review some of the considerations
which affect business organization in the European Economic Community, emphasizing the considerations which, on this new business
frontier, are most different from corresponding considerations in
the United States.
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I. DOING BUSINESS FROM THE OUTSIDE
(WITHOUT "ESTABLISHMENT")

Most of the present essay will be concerned with the organization of branches and subsidiaries in Europe. But branches and subsidiaries are not the only means of doing business in Europe; some
of the largest exporters and importers may get along without them.
These traders may do business with no one at all representing them
in Europe; or with agents of various kinds who fall short of the
"branch" category-who do not create, in the European term, an
"establishment" 1 of the American company. In the next few pages
we will indicate the principal considerations which might lead an
enterprise to avoid creating a European "establishment," although
doing business with Europe; we will also indicate by what means the
enterprise could do business without "establishment."

A.

FREEDOM OF ENTRY
I. PROVISIONS DIRECTED ESPECIALLY AGAINST
FOREIGNERS

A good deal of attention is devoted in the Treaty of Rome and in
current European discussion of it to the right of a national of one
country to open a business establishment in another country on a
plane of equality with the latter's own nationals. A good deal of
this discussion is of very minor importance to Americans, because it
concerns the right of individuals to live and work in the second
country-a matter which Americans associate with the word "immigration." Among the European countries, the right of an individual Dutchman to operate a machine shop in Antwerp, or of an individual Italian to operate a tailor shop in Paris presents very important questions of economic and political policy.
The interest of American enterprises in the Common Market is
generally of a different kind. They do not seek primarily to employ
American citizens in Europe, but to employ American processes,
products, trade names, and money. Although they would often like
1
Although this word is not common as a legal term in American domestic law, it
has long been used in the English language version of treaties of "Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation." See Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805 ( 1958). It appears in the title of the recently
concluded "Convention on Establishment" with France, November 25, 1959, 41 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 829. The corresponding European terms are etablissement, Niederlassung,
stabilimento, and vestiging.
.
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to use a few Americans as resident executives or technicians in their
foreign subsidiaries, they can usually manage without.
We will notice briefly the rights of individual foreigners to conduct or work in a business in European countries, even though this
is not a matter of primary concern. In France and Belgium foreign
individuals must obtain a license to do business as permanent residents, called a carte de commer~ant hranger. 2 These are said to be
fairly easily obtained in France (although one must wait a few
months and wheedle a few officials), but traditionally difficult to
obtain in Belgium. In France, Americans can probably demand the
eventual issue of the carte under the terms of the newly signed Convention of Establishment between the two countries, 3 but the right
which this treaty creates will probably not cause the carte to pass
through official channels any faster than it did before.
The Convention of Establishment lists only the following lines of
business, in which Americans. shall not have the same rights as
Frenchmen to do business in France:
Comm'' nica tions
Air or water transport
Banking involving depository or fiduciary functions
Exploitation of the soil or other natural resources
Production of electricity 4
The Convention presumably supersedes the earlier French law
which purported to admit Americans to exercise private rights to
the same extent as the United States offers similar right to Frenchmen,5 with a limited number of exceptions.5a
Three other countries of the Market-Germany, Italy, and the
Nether lands, apparently have no rules affecting foreign individuals
differently from nationals in the matter of access to commerce,
• Le droit d'Etablissement dans le Marche Commun, [1958] JoURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANf:;;AISE 999 1 1004-1007 ( 1959).
•convention of Establishment with France, art. II, 41 DEP'T STATE BULL. 8z9 (1959).
The treaty was signed on November Z5, 1959, but has not been ratified at this writing.
'Id. art V, para. z. There is also a provision reserving the right to special regulation
of trade in gold and silver, fissionable materials, armaments, and anything else affecting national security (art. XII).
• France: C. Civ. art. II. There is a similar provision in Italy: CoDICE CIVILE, Disposizioni sulla Legge in Generale art. 16.
oa RIPERT, TRAITE ELllMENTAIRE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL (4th ed., 1959) II5, lists the
following businesses from which foreigners are specifically excluded: ownership of
French ships, of river boats, or of aircraft, hydro-electric power generation, public
utilities, highway transport, sale of beverages, travel agencies, and munitions. There
are also special restrictions on foreign activities in banking, brokerage, and itinerant
merchandising.
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except that Italy has a reciprocity provision. If these countries
should adopt discriminatory provisions, they would be inapplicable
to Americans because of the treaties of Commerce, Friendship and
Navigation ( "C.F.N. treaties") subsisting between them and the
United States. 7 All three treaties, like the U.S.-French Convention
of Establishment, guarantee American individuals the same rights
as nationals to carry on businesses in the respective countries. The
German and Netherlands treaties contain exceptions similar to those
in France, 8 but the Italian treaty makes no such exceptions.
When we turn from the rights of individual Americans to live
and work in European countries, and look at the rights of American
corporations, we find that they have no less rights than individuals.
The C.F.N. treaties give American companies as well as American
individuals rights to establish branches and carry on commerce, with
the same exceptions for key industries. With Belgium and Luxembourg, the United States has no C.F N. treaties, but these countries
do not attempt to discriminate against foreign enterprise.
If the problem of a license to do business proves troublesome in
spite of the rights conferred by treaties between the EufJpean Country involved and the United States, there are other treaties affecting the right of establishment which may prove helpful. The three
countries of the Benelux union are bound by treaty to admit the enterprises of each other. Therefore, if an American enterprise succeeds in establishing a bona fide subsidiary in one of those three
countries, it is entitled to do business in the others. Further, Belgium and Luxembourg have made treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with France, so that an entry into France
may serve as a means of entry to Belgium or Luxembourg, and vice
versa, subject to enumerated exceptions of a few particular lines of
business. 9
Further possibilities of entering one country through another
0

Op. cit. supra, notes 2, 5·
Germany: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties and Other International
Agreements Series (hereinafter cited as T.I.A.S.) No. 3593·
Italy: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Italian Republic,
Feb. 2, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1965.
Netherlands: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Netherlands,
March 27, 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 3942·
The press has reported that a treaty on the same subject is under negotiation with
Belgium.
8
One exception in the French treaty-production of electric energy-does not appear
in the German and Netherlands treaties, but the others appear in Article VII of both
treaties.
0
Op. cit. srtpra note 2, at 1006.
7
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arise from the terms of the Treaty of Rome, which created the
Common Market. The Council of the Economic Community is enjoined by the Treaty of Rome to "lay down a general program for
the abolition of restrictions existing within the Community on freedom of establishment" before the end of the first transitory stagethat is, before 1962. 10 At the beginning of the second stage (supposedly 1962) the Council will have power to order abolition by
majority vote.
The rights which the Council may grant, under the Rome Treaty,
to companies of other Community countries cannot be denied merely
because the companies are owned by Americans (or other outsiders). A company which is organized under Belgian law, managed in Belgium, and has its biggest plant there, must be treated
by France as a Belgian national, for purposes of "establishment." 11
A literal reading of the Treaty suggests that any one of these three
features would give the company Belgian rights, but a leading French
commentator has challenged this interpretation. 12 Hence we do not
think it is safe to assume that one can gain any formal advantage out
of merely filing corporation papers in Luxembourg, as Americans
do in DelawareY But a company with its true principal office and
operational base in one country is sure of the right to set up an establishment in the others under the terms of the directives on establishment which the Community Council may issue.
We conclude that laws which discriminate against Americans in
the matter of business licensing present a surmountable problem, or
none at all, outside of a limited group of businesses in most of which
American corporations are unlikely to be interested. This is not to
say that Americans will not encounter discrimination, but merely
that the important discrimination will not be in the form of a law
requiring special permission for foreign business enterprises. One of
the other obstacles may be, in France and Belgium, a law on the licensing of American individuals to be company executives.H More
serious obstacles will be presented by the laws on exchange of cur10
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [hereinafter cited as the
Treaty] art. 54(1).
11
The Treaty art. 58.
12
Loussouarn, Droit international du Commerce, 12 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
CoMMERCIAL 246, 250 (1959).
13
Article 58 of the Treaty invites some speculation as to whether national rights
can be obtained by maintaining a mere "registered office"; this question is examined
by Mr. Thomas L. Nicholson in another chapter of this book.
u Discussed later, in the sub-chapter on "Management."
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rency; they do not discriminate against American companies, but
only against American dollars. 15 Although the victim of the discrimination may be the same, the means of dealing with the discrimination may be quite different. Finally, there is the obstacle of laws on
business licensing which in terms apply equally to citizens and to
foreigners, but which may be administered to discriminate in fact
against foreigners. These non-discriminatory licensing laws will be
next discussed.
2. DOMESTIC LICENSING PROVISIONS

When an American enterprise surmounts the hurdle of foreign
nationality, it has only scratched the surface of the problem of establishing itself in Europe. It must still cut through the mass of
licensing requirements which apply equally to locally owned enterprises. In Luxembourg and the Netherlands every business establishment must be licensed, whether foreign or domestic. In Italy, a
permit is required for every retail trade, but not for manufacturing
or (apparently) wholesale commerce. In Germany, access to manufacturing and wholesale trades is free, but every retail establishment requires a license. In France, entry into commerce is theoretically free, but there are a host of kinds of business for which licenses
are required; a recent study reported the following list, which was
not claimed to be complete, of products in which dealers must be
licensed by one authority or another:
Matches, arms, and explosives
Drugs
Gas generating equipment
Transportation
Amusements and spectacles
Meat, milk, livestock, fish
Bakery goods
Wines
In addition, the following enterprises must be licensed, regardless
of products :
General stores
Single-price stores (comparable to "5 and 10 cent stores")
Stores specializing in close-outs
Brokerage of several kinds-e.g., stock, foreign exchange,
and ships
"'Discussed later, in the sub-chapter on "Financing," and also in the separate chapter
by M. Fern and J eantet, under the title "Exchange Control Regulations in France."
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Belgium is apparently the country with the greatest freedom of
commerce; but licenses are required for dealing in transportation
and in certain agricultural products/ 6 and a recent law requires
proof of professional qualifications in all forms of "small business." 17
Our information on how and why licenses are granted and refused
in European countries is very indefinite-as it would be with respect
to the United States, and for the same reasons. Lack of technical
and financial qualifications will doubtless impede licensing, but they
will rarely be the only impediments. Many of the French laws, at
least, have added to technical requirements a condition that the
proposed establishment should be in "the interest of the national or
regional economy." Probably this question would be answered
chiefly by reference to national and regional economic plans, either
published or nascent. Our French collaborator, Professor Houin,
warns that there is no effective judicial remedy against administrative discretion in denying the license for a foreign "merchant" which·
an American or other foreigner needs to serve as executive of a company or branch in France.
In Italy, the existence of factors other than technical ones is suggested by the membership of the committees which pass on retail licenses; they consist of the mayor, two local merchants, and two local
laborers. Although an appeal from the committee's denial lies to an
administrative court, the views of competing local interests are likely
to color the final decisions.
In the Netherlands, the licensing process involves the advice of
nation-wide trade associations which might be expected to view
dimly any competition with their own products. There are also reported to be in the Nether lands very widespread "tying agreements," whereby all kinds of concerns engage to buy from only certain sources, which in turn agree to sell only to certain outlets. Thus
there is a closed merchandising circuit, in which a newcomer can
penetrate only with the consent of the trade associations.
From these fragmentary observations, it is evident that entry into
the European market raises very complex problems. Entry is likely
to prove extremely difficult in businesses, like the retail trade, in
which a large number of local merchants fear new and powerful
competition, but quite easy in certain manufacturing industries,
16
This and most of the preceding statements on "domestic licensing provisions" are
based on Le Droit d'Etablissement, op. cit. supra note 2, at 999, roo4.
17
Loi permettant d'instituer des conditions d'exercice de Ia profession dans les
entreprises de l'artisanat du petit et du moyen commerce et de Ia petite industrie, 2 4
Dec. 1958, 1959 Recueil des Lois et Arrets Royaux de Belgique 108.
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where the new products may be exported to compete elsewhere, or
where they replace products which were primarily imported before.
None of these impediments to market entry-which apply in
theory to local enterprise as well as to American-will be automatically eliminated by the Treaty of Rome, or by treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation with the United States. These
treaties exclude only discrimination against foreigners.
The exclusive agreements between manufacturers and distributors which obstruct entry of newcomers into the market may be
contrary to the general principles enunciated in Article 8 5 of the
TreatyY But these principles, like those of American antitrust law,
are subject to widely varying interpretations. For the time being,
their enforcement depends on the initiative of the Member States,
none of which have much prior experience with "antitrust" law. In
view of the persistence of trade restraints in the United States 70
years after the Sherman Act, and the traditional stability of distribution patterns in Europe, we would guess that many years will pass
before actual penetration of European distribution systems becomes
easy.

B.

STAGES OF ENTRY

To speak of doing business with Europe from the outside is, of
course, a mere metaphor. An enterprise which does any business at
all with Europe becomes in some degree involved in European legal
problems. To examine our problem more closely we will look at the
problem of entering Europe as a problem of a timid bather getting
into the swim-he may stand on the shore throwing pebbles, he may
dip in his toes, he may wade, he may swim with his head out, or
he may take a deep dive. Each stage of immersion involves exposure
to added risks, and so does each stage of entry in the European
market. We will therefore look at the various degrees to which an
18
The Treaty Article 8 5 condemns agreements and practices which consist in( a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading
conditions; (b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development
or investment; (c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply; (d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent supplies,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or (e) the subjecting of the
conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of additional supplies which,
either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contract.
But the general condemnation is subject to an exception for agreement and practices
which do not "eliminate competition in respect of a substantial proportion of the goods
concerned," and which "contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic progress while reserving
to users an equitable share of the profits resulting therefrom."
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American enterprise may enter the European Economic Community, and note some of the legal involvements which attach to each
stage of entry.
The stages of entry must be carefully distinguished, because entry
for one purpose may not be entry for another. "Establishment" is
primarily a conception of commercial law; when an enterprise is
"established" by commercial law standards, it is required to file and
publish documents regarding its legal structure and its officers, and
to enter its name in the commercial register.
However, an enterprise which is "established" for purposes of
commercial law is not necessarily established for purposes of tax
law. The double-taxation treaties which bind most of the Common
Market countries to the United States have greatly restricted the
tax concept of establishment; it is now distinctly different from the
commercial law concept.
Because of these differences, we will consider the stages of entry
into the European market from three different points of viewcommercial licensing and registration, tax liability, and liability to
suits in European courts. These three incidents may serve to illustrate the host of others which time and space forbid us to examine.
Some of the other incidents-involving labor relations, restraints
of competition and exchange control-are examined by the authors
of other chapters of this book.
I. NO FOREIGN ASSETS

To separate itself as completely as possible from European entanglements an American enterprise may assure itself that it has no
assets, tangible or intangible, in Europe. It may, that is, sell only
by delivery at U.S. ports, and for payment in U.S. dollars on delivery. Clearly such a company need give no thought to European
tax laws or European commercial status. European duties and exchange restrictions may worry the company's European customers,
but not the company itself.
Oddly enough, the company might even then be sued in some
European courts. European courts do not generally condition jurisdiction on the "presence" of the defendant, as common law courts
do. In France and Luxembourg, the codes expressly provide that
suit may be brought against a non-resident defendant for contracts
undertaken outside the country; all that is needed is that the plaintiff should be a local resident. 19 Italy is only a little stricter, requiring
19

France: C. Crv. art. 14
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that the obligation sued on should have been made, or should be due
to be performed, in the country. 20
Fortunately for American enterprises, suits maintained against
a company under such circumstances may do it little harm. If there
are no assets in the country where the judgment is rendered, the
judgment cannot be executed there. If the plaintiff tries to sue on his
judgment in America, he will find that American courts consider it
unenforceable for lack of jurisdiction. 21 Even in Europe, the very
countries which grant such judgments refuse to give effect to similar
judgments rendered in other countries with similar laws; such
judgments are said to be nationally valid, but internationally invalid.22
2. EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ASSETS

The no-asset system may have merit for avoiding European entanglements, but it is not the best way to build up foreign business.
Most enterprises will find that, if they want to make money, they
cannot help acquiring foreign assets such as accounts receivable and
balances in the hands of agents.
Assets abroad, whether tangible or intangible, large or small,
will not subject the American owner to European income taxes.
Neither do they involve commercial licensing and registration. But
they expose the owner to effective suits in European courts. If the
defendant has assets in the jurisdiction, he may be sued whether
present or not, and the judgment may be executed on the assets that
are present. This means that when a company acquires foreign assets, it may be compelled to defend abroad suits arising out of its
business, or else abandon the assets.
This liability can be considerably reduced, if the company desires,
by employing contract clauses providing for litigation at some other
reasonable point, such as the state of the American company's home
office. Such clauses are honored generally in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, but not in Italy. 23 Whether
20

CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE art. 4(2).
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 77, 429-430 ( 1934).
As to France, see BATIFFOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE
836 (1955)·
22
/d. at 763-64.
Luxembourg: Our Luxembourg collaborator, Mr. Arendt, calls attention to an exception affecting patents and trademarks. The filing of a patent or trademark in Luxembourg constitutes a consent to litigation affecting the patent or copyright. This consent
will prevail over a contract providing for exclusive jurisdiction somewhere else.
21

22
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they will scare away more business than they are worth we cannot
say.
In addition to the possibility of being sued in Europe, a company
which has assets there must consider the possibility of having to
bring suit there. If it has assets, it may have to protect them. Receivables in particular must sometimes be collected by suit; patents,
processes, and trademarks require constant legal protection. Since
European laws and procedures are quite different from American,
American enterprise will have to rely on European legal counsel.
The possibility of having to find and retain such counsel, if the assets
are not to be lost, must be reckoned among the costs of owning them.

3·

EMPLOYEES IN EUROPE

In the six countries of the European Community a distinction is
drawn, much more sharply than in American law, between "salaried
personnel" and "commission agents." As their names suggest, they
are commonly differentiated by receiving (on the one hand) a regular weekly or monthly wage, or (on the other hand) a commission
based purely on the amount of business transacted. But there are
usually more fundamental differences. The salaried personnel are
normally full-time employees of the enterprise, owing an undivided
loyalty to it alone, and receiving instructions from its management;
the "commission agent" is normally free to represent various clients,
and chooses his own hours and his own ways of soliciting customers.
We will not speculate on the legal status of representatives who fall
between the stools; to employ such persons would be to invite juridical uncertainty. We will explore the results of employing persons
who fall clearly in one category or the other; and we will start with
salaried personnel.
a. Liability to Suit

The mere presence of employees will make no difference in the
suability of the employing company unless they hold general powers
of attorney to make contracts in the company's name. This conclusion, perhaps surprising to Americans, follows from the fact that
European courts do not base their conceptions of jurisdiction on
"presence" of the defendant. However, the presence of employees
will probably result in increasing the probabilities of suit. Employees
in Europe will probably make more contracts with Europeans, and
commit more torts against Europeans, than employees in the United
States; and so the probabilities of European litigation will increase.
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b. Liability to Commercial Regulation

The presence of employees will affect the incidence of commercial
regulations in varying ways, depending on the permanence of the
employees' stay, and the extent of their powers. We can say broadly
that the temporary presence of employees, even though they come
exclusively on business, will not in itself subject the company to European commercial licensing or registration. What is "temporary" is
not easily defined, but the periods for which an American may reside
as a tourist without visa-usually about three months-offer a general guide.
The consequence of employees' residing more permanently in
Europe are viewed differently by our different informants. Professor
Houin, speaking for France, observes, "It is hard to see how a company could have salaried personnel permanently in France and in
charge of the company's affairs without having a French establishment; a physical place of business is not the test of establishment."
His conclusion is that a company with employees in France-beyond
the duration of tourist visas-is obliged to register itself as "established" in France. Our Belgian and German informants, on the
other hand, do not see any commercial problem in the employees'
presence if they do not have powers of contracting for the company.
It would appear that in the latter countries permanent representatives could furnish information on products, especially technical information, and could supply maintenance service (without remuneration from customers) without commercially registering the
company. Probably they could do so even in France if the evidence
were sufficiently clear that that was all they were doing.
Commercial regulation becomes important when contractual negotiation-buying, selling, or licensing-is carried on by employees
on a continuing basis. Our collaborators indicate that commercial
qualification is definitely not required for casual and occasional representation; but it may be when a continuous practice of dealing
develops.
What is "dealing," for this purpose? Professor Heenen advises
that it does not include (in Belgium) giving and receiving information, even though this may be done through a fixed office; but it does
include signing of contracts, even though all agreements are subject
to confirmation in New York.
And when is it "continuous"? Professor Serick warns that trans-
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actions in Germany may result in an "establishment" when they are
designed to create an enduring source of income over a long period;
this might include negotiations for patent licensing, even though no
more transactions will take place in Germany after the initial one.
In summary, we think that a company may safely send its employees to Europe for short visits and even let them sell or buy for it
there in transactions having no long-term aspects. It may keep employees indefinitely in Europe to display wares and give technical
information and advice on its products. But if it has employees re..
siding in Europe, and if they negotiate contracts, it probably needs
to license and register itself (or a subsidiary) as the place where
the employees maintain their center of activities.
c. Liability to Taxes on Income and Capital
For tax purposes, the question of what constitutes establishment
is governed in five of the six countries of the Common Market by
tax treaties with the United States. 24 These treaties are very favorable, and take a much more tolerant view of what activities can be
carried on without "establishment" than does the commercial law.
The one country which has not ratified a U.S. tax treaty is Luxembourg. The failure to ratify the treaty is not generally ascribed to
any desire to tax American enterprises but to an unwillingness to exchange with the U.S. Treasury information on tax evaders. Luxembourg's non-ratification is therefore due to an excess of cordiality to
foreign enterprise, rather than to any tax-hunger. It is safe to assume that Luxembourg will not impose taxes in circumstances in
which neighboring countries would not.
All the tax treaties contain specific language which preclude the
levying of taxes on the enterprise merely because of the presence
of agents. The Belgian treaty, which is fairly representative, pro"'Convention with Belgium for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, (hereinafter cited as Treaty with
Belgium) October 28, 1948, 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1647, 173 U.N. Treaty Series 67.
Convention and protocol with the French Republic respecting double taxation, (hereinafter cited as Treaty with France) July 25, 1939, 59 U.S. Stat. 893, 125 U.N.T.S. 259·
Convention with the Federal Republic of Germany for the avoidance of double
taxation (hereinafter cited as Treaty with Germany), July 22, 1954, 5 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
2768.

Convention with the Italian Republic for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income (hereinafter cited as
Treaty with Italy), March 30, 1955, 7 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2999·
Convention with the Kingdom of the Netherlands with respect to taxes on income
and certain other taxes (hereinafter cited as Treaty with the Netherlands), April
29, 1948, 62 U.S. Stat. I757·
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vides that a "permanent establishment . . . does not include an
agency unless the agent has, and habitually exercises, a general authority to negotiate and conclude contracts on behalf of such enterprise, or has a control over a stock of merchandise from which he
regularly fulfills orders on behalf of such enterprise." 25 Thus it
appears that an agency may fall short of being an establishment for
tax purposes even though it would be deemed an establishment under the laws relating to licensing of foreign enterprises and registration of all commercial businesses.
Purchasing enjoys a special status under the tax treaties with five
of the Common Market countries. All these treaties provide that
an agency shall not be considered an establishment (for tax purposes) if its activities consist only of purchasing. Of course this
clause grants no exemption from the requirements of commercial
licensing and registration.
4·

THE COMMISSION MERCHANT

The six nations of the E.E.C. possess a well defined commercial
institution which is remarkably adapted to the needs of a foreign
enterprise which wants to do business in the community. This is the
commission merchant or commission agent, known in various European languages as commissionnaire, Kommissionar, commissionario,
and commissionnair.
As his name suggests, the commission merchant is normally paid
primarily in proportion to the business that he transacts. In addition-and this is perhaps the most important legal characteristic
-he does business in his own name. For this reason, he is sometimes
compared by legal writers with the American "agent for an undisclosed principal." The comparison is valid, but must not be understood as indicating that the commission merchant is concealing the
person for whose account he buys and sells. The important point
is that his letters and his invoices bear his own name, not the principal's; and in his dealing with third persons, he says, "I will sell
you," not, "My principal will sell you." In addition to these characteristics, the commission merchant is described by European lawyers as one who is in the business of representing several clients and
conducting his business according to his own independent ideas,
rather than under the direction and control of a single enterprise.
With a European commission merchant an American enterprise
25 Treaty with Belgium art. II (I). The law of Luxembourg, with which the U,S,
has no tax treaty, is similar. Einkommensteuergesetz art. 49 (z).
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can be continuously and conspicuously represented in Europe without incurring any more legal burdens than the firm which sits in New
York waiting for Europeans to come and buy. The American enterprise is not liable, under prevailing European legal doctrine, for
the contracts which the commission merchant makes (in his own
name) on the American concern's behalf. This is one of the celebrated contrasts between European and Anglo-American law relating to undisclosed principals.26 A recent essay of Dean Hamel (of
the Paris Law Faculty) casts some doubt on the future of this doctrine in France ;27 but in Germany and Italy the rule is firmly entrenched in an express provision of the Civil Code. 28
For purposes of commercial licensing and registration, it is clear
that the commission merchant insulates the principal under European law. The commission merchant must be registered as a merchant, but the principal need not be. Being a local resident, the commission merchant will not need the special license which the foreign
enterprise would require; but if any licenses are required, the commission merchant is the one to hold them. For purposes of exchange
control the commission merchant is local, the principal foreign.
For tax purposes the status of the commission merchant and his
principal are equally clear. Each of the five double-taxation treaties 29 provides specifically that a "bona fide commission agent"
shall not constitute an "establishment of the enterprise which employs him."
There is one important danger in connection with the commission
merchant. The employer may wish to switch from one commission
merchant to another; or, becoming more deeply interested in the
European market, may wish to supplant the commission merchant
with a branch or subsidiary which will be under more complete control. Even though the commission merchant has been promised no
specific tenure, the interruption of his profitable business, without
•• Miiller-Freienfels, The Undisclosed Principal, 16 MoDERN LAW REVIEW 299 ( 1953) ;
Id. Comparative Aspects of Undisclosed Agency, 18 MoDERN LAW REVIEW 33 (1955);
Jambu-Merlin, Le Droit Compare et les Conflits de Lois en Matiere de Commission,
in HAMEL ET AL., LE CoNTRAT DE COMMISSION 309 ( 1949).
"'HAMEL, LE CONTRAT DE COMMISSION 16 (1949) .
.. Germany: BGB § 164(2).
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 1705. Our Italian collaborator, Mr. Bruna, calls attention
to a qualification which may also apply elsewhere. If the undisclosed agent is in
charge of a business establishment that belongs to the undisclosed principal, he may
be regarded not as a "commission merchant" but as an institore, and may render the
principal liable even by a contract in the agent's name. CoDICE CIVILE art. 2208 .
.. Note 24 supra.

ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS

17

good cause or reasonable notice, entitles him to be paid damages
equal to his prospective profits.
Fortunately, this danger can generally be excluded by contract;
the initial contract may provide for termination of the representation without damages. This provision will be honored in all of the
Common Market countries except France. 30 In this respect, a commission merchant differs from a salaried employee, whose right to
severance benefits is generally a matter of public policy which cannot be modified by private contract.

5·

A BUSINESS OFFICE

Can an American enterprise maintain a business office in Europe,
and still contend plausibly that it does not have a European establishment? The general answer must be "no." If there is a fixed place
at which business activities are carried on on behalf of an enterprise, this is the very meaning of "establishment" in European law.
The office must be licensed as a branch, or incorporated as a subsidiary.
For tax purposes, however, there are some possible exceptions to
this generalization. The tax treaties with Belgium, Germany, Italy,
and theN ether lands provide that a place of business used exclusively
for purchasing shall not be considered an establishment. The tax
treaty with France has a slightly different provision with similar
effect. In Germany there is no permanent establishment for tax purposes by virtue of activities which persist for less than twelve
months.
An interesting question suggests itself in relation to the current
activities of various American companies in gathering information
on possible investments, or obtaining information on the progress of
existing investments. Must the company's representatives do their
business from hotel rooms, using always a personal address? Or
may they rent an office, hire a secretary, and write "New World
Mfg. Co." over the door? We cannot find that this question has been
the subject of either legislation or litigation in Europe. Our collaborators incline to the opinion that if the American company's
representatives neither make nor receive offers to buy or sell-leaving all such matters for direct correspondence between European
prospects and the home office in the States-, such an office can be
30
Decree No. 134-5 of Dec. 23, 1958, art. 3· Previously, French law recognized the
validity of exculpatory clauses.
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maintained without fear of involving an "establishment" in commercial or tax law.
I

6.

WITHDRAWING AN ESTABLISHMENT

Today, all eyes are on the opening of establishments. American
companies are hurrying to get sites and form business connections
with European firms; European officials in many countries are luring foreign investors with cheap real estate, tax concessions, and
low-interest loans. These are times for an investor to pinch himself
and ask what will be the problems in case the establishment proves
unwise and must be withdrawn.
Officers of a well known American factory in one European country told us that they are thinking of moving to another country, but
doubt if local officials will "let us." This is a figure of speech, since
local officials have no power to force companies to keep operating.
But all the ingenuity which they know how to use to induce a company to come in can be very effectively used to deter them from going
out. Large amounts of income tax may be found to be due because
of understated assets, overstated depreciation, and the realization
through sale of previously unrealized appreciation of fixed assets.
Friendly assessments of property may suddenly turn hostile; exchange licenses to withdraw the investment may be hard to get. Plant
may prove unsaleable because buyers are not assured of permits to
make alterations. Conceivably an easier means of withdrawal will
eventually be supplied by new uniform laws or treaty provisions
covering international mergers. The Member States have promised
to "engage in negotiations" looking to this end. 31 In the meantime,
any withdrawal of an establishment is likely to involve a greater
sacrifice of going-concern values than would usually be expected in
the United States.

C.

SuMMARY ON EsTABLISHMENT

If an enterprise wishes to avoid all European problems, the safest
course is, of course, to do no business with Europeans. But it need not
be quite so cautious; it may sell to Europeans for payment in the
United States without serious involvement in European law. The
important line of demarcation is that the enterprise must own no
property in Europe and be owed no money by Europeans.
Once the American enterprise has merchandise in Europe, or accounts payable by Europeans, it is potentially concerned with Euro81

The Treaty art.
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pean law and procedure; it may have to hire a European lawyer
to protect its interests. But this need is contingent on running into
legal difficulties. If all debtors pay up, and there are no arguments
about property, the American enterprise may coast along for years
without a thought of European law or litigation.
In this state of potential involvement, without actually feeling any
pain, an American enterprise may own goods in Europe, own accounts payable in Europe, license patents, and maintain personnel
temporarily or even permanently in Europe so long as they do not
buy or sell but perform only technical services.
If, however, the American enterprise decides that it wants to
keep people in Europe to sell for it, or solicit sales, during more than
short and casual visits, it must make a choice. Either it must "establish" in the countries involved-by branch or subsidiary-or it
must choose a registered European commission merchant to represent it. In the former case, the company's European activities become fully subject to European commercial and tax laws; in the
latter, they may remain completely immune. Companies which desire only to purchase in Europe-without selling-are more fortunate; in most countries, they can open an office without incurring
European tax burdens on their income or capital, although they are
required to conform to European commercial licensing and registration provisions.
ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS
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II. THE FORM OF ESTABLISHMENT

We turn our attention now from the enterprise which is deciding
whether or not to create a European establishment to the enterprise
which has decided to establish itself on the continent. This it may do
in two main ways-by setting up a European branch, or by incorporating a European subsidiary.
The distinction between a branch and a subsidiary is a legal one.
To production managers and sales managers it may seem unimportant. We have heard many executives refer to "our Swiss branch,"
or "our Italian branch," when further investigation reveals that
the Swiss or Italian operation is not in legal terms a branch but a
subsidiary.
To lawyers, the distinction is fundamental, and its legal consequences are great. A branch of an American company is an establishment whose property is bought and sold in the name of the American corporation; its supreme authority lies in the American board
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of directors, and its fundamental constitution is the articles of incorporation first filed in an American state. A European subsidiary
is a company whose fundamental constitution was first filed in a
European state; it has a name distinct from that of its American
parent, and its property is bought and sold in the European name;
its supreme authority in law (if not in practice) is exercised by the
shareholders of the European company.
The choice between branch and subsidiary presents itself at more
than one level. There is first the question whether the American company should maintain European branches, or form European subsidiaries. There is a further question whether one of the European
subsidiaries should have branches in various European countries, or
whether there should be a separate subsidiary for each country in
which the American company wants to conduct business operations.
We will take up these questions one at a time.

A.

BRANCH OR SUBSIDIARY

In discussions of European trade, it is common to assume without even discussing the matter that any European establishment
should take the form of a subsidiary company. We do not challenge
the correctness of this assumption in most cases, but there are certainly some situations in which it is inapplicable. For instance, American banks and transportation companies generally operate through
branch offices. One of the reasons is economic, not legal; their customers demand the responsibility of the entire enterprise, not of
some fraction of it. A legal reason is that the transactions of transferring money or goods or people cannot be severed in mid-Atlantic
so as to have a different corporation at each end. These examples
are sufficient to show that experienced international organizations
do not always choose the subsidiary form. We think that most lawyers will want to determine for themselves whether their enterprises
belong in the large class for which subsidiary organization is indicated, or in the smaller group for which branches are appropriate.
I. U.S. INCOME TAXES

For most American enterprises, subsidiary organization rather
than branch has been dictated by U.S. income tax considerations,
and may continue to be. However, the tax factors merit re-examination in the light of the characteristics of the particular enterprise,
and of possible legislative developments. Legislation which was proposed to the 86th Congress would have gone far to eliminate the
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U.S. tax disadvantages of a branch. Although most of the proposed changes were deleted before the bill was passed, the facts
that such legislation was proposed and that some remnants of it
were enacted suggest that a re-evaluation of branch advantages may
be appropriate for many companies.
Even if there are no legislative changes, some kinds of enterprises do not get the same tax advantage from subsidiary organization which others do. One principal advantage is the non-taxability
of subsidiary earnings which are allowed to remain in the foreign
subsidiary. If all the earnings of the foreign subsidiary are to be
immediately repatriated, there is no advantage from this source.
Consequently, enterprises which do not plan to reinvest abroad their
foreign earnings should consider carefully whether the subsidiary
arrangement has merits for them.
Subsidiary organization should be regarded even more dubiously
by enterprises which do not intend to earn net income abroad. In
this category fall companies which use Europe chiefly as a place to
buy supplies (like American watch merchants) or to perform services which have been paid for in the United States (like travel and
shipping companies).
2. EUROPEAN TAXES

The American enterprise will also want to consider what differences the choice between branch and subsidiary makes to European
taxes. It will be particularly interested in provisions of the double
taxation treaties which bind the United States to all of the Common
Market countries except Luxembourg. 33 For example, they all provide that American enterprises shall not be taxed on profits other
than those allocable to the permanent establishment in the taxing
country. 34 They all provide that there shall be no tax at all on the
profits of establishments whose only activities are purchasing. 35
•• H.R. 5, 86 Cong. (1959). See Prentice-Hall Federal Tax Report Bull., Mar. 3, 1960.
33
Cited .rupra note 24.
"'Treaty with Belgium art. III {1) ; Treaty with France art. III; Treaty with
t~ermany art. III{I); Treaty with Italy art. III{I); Treaty with the Netherland~
art. III(1).
The Belgian, German, and Italian treaties have added a clause not found in the
French and Dutch, providing that the local establishment shall be allowed taxable
income deductions for its allocable share of general administrative overhead, which
presumably refers to overhead incurred at the home office or parent company: Treaty
with Belgium art. IV (4), as added by Treaty with Belgium, Sept. 9, 1952, T.I.A.S.
2833; Treaty with Germany art. III (4) ; Treaty with Italy art. III ( 5).
86
Treaty with Belgium art. Ill (2) ; Treaty with- J<'rance art. III; Treaty with Germany art. III(z); Treaty with Italy art, II(1) c; Treaty with the Netherlands art.
IJ(i), and art. III(a).
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They all have an anti-siphoning clause, providing that the taxing
country may "rectify the accounts" of the establishment, if it is paying its American affiliate more for goods than would be paid to an
unrelated seller. 36
The general effect of these provisions is apparently to eliminate
any substantial advantage under European taxes which a subsidiary
might have over a branch, or vice versa. However, the apparent effect of such legislative provisions is not always the same as the practical effect. We have heard suggestions from some experienced businessmen that in practice it is easier to agree with European tax
assessors on the taxes due from a subsidiary than on those from a
branch; the assessors are less likely to "rectify the accounts" of the
former than of the latter. Other informants are dubious of this
difference, and we are una.ble to evaluate the respective reports. For
an analysis of European taxes on American-owned establishments
in Europe, we refer the readers to Chapter XI infra by Mr. van
Hoorn and Professor Wright.

3·

POLITICAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

Close in importance to taxes are political and public relations.
Some of our informants are extremely emphatic about the advantage
of operating a "local" company in each country. In France, executives of a large American-owned French subsidiary explained how
they must go to government officials for permission to expand the
plant, or to make a wage adjustment, or to obtain foreign exchange
for materials purchases, or for making a public offering of securities. Even borrowing money from a bank is in France a form of
dealing with the government, since most of the banks are stateowned; and the Credit National, which rediscounts intermediate
term loans, is a bank specially formed by the government to promote
national economic interests.
All these agencies base their decisions on the national interests of
France. Each decision depends on whether, in the officials' opinions,
the company's activities will benefit the French economy; whether
the long term gain outweighs the immediate inflationary effect of
increasing construction, increasing wages, spending foreign exchange and expanding credit. Inevitably, the building up of a
"French" company appeals more readily to these officials than the
building up of an "American" corporation, even though the former
is known to be American-owned.
86
Treaty with Belgium art. IV (2) ; Treaty with France art. IV; Treaty with Germany art. IV; Treaty with Italy art. IV; Treaty with Netherlands art. IV.
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Localization also helps to recruit the best types of executive personnel. To be the general manager of a French company gives a
sense of prestige and security which cannot be given to the manager
of a French branch which is a very small fraction of the American
company's entire operation.
These differences between subsidiary organization and branch
organization are more marked in some countries than others. Our
French and Italian informants have been very emphatic about them;
our Belgian and Luxembourg informants give them little weight.
We suspect that this disparity of opinion reflects real differences in
conditions in the various countries. So far as the differences relate
to dealings with government officials, they will obviously vary with
the extent of government intervention. France and Italy are countries in which government controls are extremely pervasive; Belgium and Luxembourg are countries with a high degree of economic
freedom. France and Italy have had a wall of protective tariffs and
exchange controls; Belgium is traditionally free-trading, with a
minimum of exchange regulation.
Although comments on national psychology are to be treated with
great reserve, we think there are genuine differences in the prevailing attitudes in different European countries toward foreign enterprise. The inhabitants of Benelux recognize without embarrassment the smallness of their economic sphere; association with foreign enterprise gives a sense of security, rather than insecurity.
Frenchmen are much slower to accept the idea that a foreign enterprise may offer them something which a domestic enterprise could
not.
We therefore accept the view that there are reasons of a psychological character, quite aside from any legal rules, which make a
subsidiary preferable to a branch, at least in France and Italy. In
the Benelux countries, the psychological factor is of doubtful significance, and the reasons for subsidiary organization (which prevails there as elsewhere) have been chiefly U.S. tax reasons. Our
German reports, although less explicit, are more like those from
the Benelux countries.

4·

COMMERCIAL FILING AND REGISTRATION

All the European countries require filing of the organic documents
of a company in the Commercial Register, the Court of Commerce,
or some combination of these. 37 Four out of six countries also reFiling of documents:
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. w, as amended by Law of July 9, 1935.
France: Decree No. 58-1355 of Dec. 27, 1958, [1959] JouRNAL OFF!CIEL
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quire newspaper publication. 38 In order to be filed the documents
must first be translated into the local language. The documents to
be filed vary somewhat from country to country. Universally they
include the articles of incorporation and any subsequent amendments. In Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg they also include annual
financial statements, statements of profit or loss, and changes in
directors and officers, so that re-filing and re-publication must be
made at least annually. 39 In France and the Netherlands the larger
of the companies which are listed on stock exchanges, and some of
their subsidiaries, must publish financial statements. 39 a
These requirements apply in rather parallel fashion to branches
of foreign companies, and to domestic companies. 40 However, the
same filing requirement may be quite different when it is applied to
different forms of organization. If the parent company has a long

PUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE 990 (requiring registration by domestic and foreign companies);
Decree No. 54-37 of Jan. 6, 1954, [1954] JouRNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA RfPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE
565 (registration to cover name, business, address, and personal information on manager or managers).
Germany: GESETZ UBER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN UND KOMMANDIT-GESSELLSCHAFTEN
AUF AKTIEN (AKTIENGESETZ) (hereinafter cited as AktG) §§ 2S-29 (registration of
company), § 35 (registration of branch of stock company); GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE
GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG (hereinafter cited as GmbHG) §§ 7-S
(registration of limited liability company), § 12 (branch of limited liability company);
HANDELSGESETZBUCH (hereinafter cited as HGB) § 13 (general provisions).
Italy: ComcE CIVILE art. 2506 (requiring deposit in commercial register of articles
of incorporation, financial statements, and names and signatures of managers). In
practice, filings are made with clerk of Court of Commerce, since Commercial Register
has never been set up.
Luxembourg: CoMPANY LAw art. 160 (foreign companies to file and publish as if
domestic).
Netherlands: HANDELSREGISTER-WET art. S (name and address of company, and
personal details on officers).
38
Publication:
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. So (names, professions, and addresses of members of
governing boards and auditors).
France: Law of 1867, arts. 56-57, as amended by Decree-law of Oct. 30, 1935 (extract of articles to be published).
Germany: HGB § 10 (commercial register entries to be published in official gazette
and a newspaper).
Luxembourg: CoMPANY LAW arts. S, 9, n, 48 (requiring publication in official journal
of articles and of financial statements of stock companies).
39
Repetition:
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. So.
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2506.
Luxembourg: COMPANY LAW § 4S.
••• France: Ordinance No. 59-247, Feb. 4, 1959; Journal Officiel, Feb. S, 1959, p. 1754;
L'Actualite Juridique 1959. Ill. 62.
Netherlands: W.K. art. 42 c.
•• Italy is an exception. Amendments of charter need not be filed, nor changes in
officers other than managers of the Italian branches.
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charter, the burden of translating and filing it may be considerably
greater than that of forming a subsidiary and filing its charter; the
burden is perhaps more likely to be felt with respect to filing amendments in the country of each establishment. When the Chase N ationa! Bank merged with the Bank of Manhattan, new articles of
incorporation had to be filed in Paris because of the Paris branch.
If the Paris establishment had been a subsidiary (which is not
practicable in the case of a bank), no such filing would have been
necessary.
Similar considerations may apply to publication of financial statements where, as in Belgium, they are required. Branches and subsidiaries are subject to the same requirement, but the branch must
publish the statements of the whole company to which it belongs
while the subsidiary needs to publish only its separate statement.

5.

THE FOREIGN MERCHANT'S IDENTITY CARD

In addition to registering the establishment, the laws of Belgium
and France require a permit for the general manager or president,
if he is a foreigner. This executive must have a "foreign merchant's
identity card" (carte d' identite de commerr,;ant itranger). In France
the card is issued after the prefect has been satisfied that the proposed commercial activity is useful to the economy and that the applicant has a good business record. The prefect satisfies himself on
the former point by consulting the trade associations of the industry
in which the applicant intends to be active. This might seem to give
the local merchants a veto on new competition; presumably it does,
as far as concerns businessmen like brokers, who pursue their occupations as individuals. As to corporations, the competitors have the
power only to force the company to have a local president, by rejecting the foreign one; the foreigner who is rejected as president
may serve instead as technical director. Therefore the foreign merchant's card is not likely to be denied on economic grounds. The
"good business record" of the applicant is commonly determined by
statements from chambers of commerce.
The practical difficulty presented by the foreign merchant's card
is only a matter of delay. Several months may elapse between application and issue, but eventual denial has not been, we are told, a
frequent problem for Americans.
In Belgium, the foreign merchant's card is harder to come by; in
practice, foreign concerns find it best to appoint Belgians as chief
executives of their Belgian branches and subsidiaries.
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In both countries, the "foreign merchant's card" is the same problem for a branch as it is for a subsidiary.

6.

LIABILITY FOR OBLIGATIONS OF BRANCHES AND
SUBSIDIARIES

In any vast commercial network, the responsibilities of one sector
of the network for the obligations of other sectors present a complex problem. We would like to divide the problem into two main
parts. The first part of the problem arises when the sector in which
the obligations were incurred becomes insolvent, and cannot pay its
debts; the question arises whether the other sectors can be made to
pay. Vve will call this the insolvency problem.
The second problem is quite different. We assume that the sector
in which the obligations were incurred is quite able to pay them, but
for some reason the plaintiff elects to bring his suit in some other
sector. A classic American illustration of this problem is the case in
which an individual was injured by a street car in the Philippine Islands, and elected to sue the parent company, which owned the street
car operating company, at the parent company's home in Connecticut; 41 one can imagine similar suits arising from subsidiaries in
Europe. Suits of this sort have acquired in the United States the
name of "migratory suits," and we will therefore refer in this connection to the migratory suit problem.
We do not think the insolvency problem will loom large in the
plans of American enterprise; they will plan to pay the debts which
their subsidiaries incur. But it is a hazard which merits some attention even though it is marginal.
a. The Insolvency Problem: Branch Organization

If a European branch of an American corporation proves unable
to pay its debts, there is no doubt of the European creditors' right
to sue the corporation in the United States, or wherever else it might
be found. It is a single legal person, regardless of the number of
its branches. If the suit had been first brought to judgment in Europe, any court in the United States would recognize its validity,
since the establishment of a European branch would give the European court "jurisdiction" by American standards. If the cause of
action had never been sued on in Europe, an original suit on it could
be begun in the United States.
"Costan v. Manila Electric Co., 24F. (2d) 383 (2d Cir. 1928).
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b. The Insolvency Problem: Subsidiary Organization

If an American corporation forms subsidiaries in Europe, rather
than branches, a very different problem is presented. In Europe,
as in America, different corporations are different persons. The fact
that one owns stock in another is not enough to make both liable
for the same debt.
But sometimes stock ownership is not the whole story of the corporate relationship. There may be IOo% ownership, or near it;
there may be intermingled management and intermingled property;
there may be such inadequate capitalization that insolvency should
have been foreseen; there may even have been an intention to incur
obligations which would never be discharged. Which, if any, of these
circumstances will lead to a judgment that the American parent is
liable for the European subsidiary's debts?
A preliminary question, in considering this problem, is what law
would govern. Since the European subsidiary is by hypothesis insolvent, the liability of the parent would most likely be litigated in
an American federal court. If so, a federal court would decide which
legal regime to apply. But the events which would determine the
legal regime would almost inevitably be distributed between two
continents, and a plausible ground could be found for applying the
law either of the European country most involved, or of the United
States.
Readers are already familiar with American judicial reactions to
the question of when a parent corporation should be made to pay
the debts of an insolvent subsidiary. They know that American
courts-especially federal courts-have held shareholders and affiliated corporations liable for debts contracted by a company which
is formed largely to acquire assets for its owners, but which has no
substantial independent existence, whether measured in terms of
capital investment or of management structure. 42 The court disregards "the entity," or "the fiction"; it "pierces" or "draws aside" the
corporate veil.
Germany has experienced a very similar development of legal
theory, in which Durchgriff der juristischen Persone, [piercing the
artificial person] and Missachtung der Rechtsform [disregard of
•• For authoritative summaries of American law, see BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS
298-303, 3II-321 (1946); LAITIN, CORPORATIONS 66-72 (1959); STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 85-95 (1949). For a case suggestive of the type of
problem which a foreign subsidiary might present, see Weisser v. Mursam Shoe
Corporation, 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942), involving a leasehold corporation.
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legal form] take the place of the American magic words. 43 Some
of the factors which have been determinative in American cases are
also influential in German cases; the mingling of personal and company assets is most prominent, but inadequate capitalization is also
recognized. 44 We cannot say whether German courts are generally
more or less disposed to "pierce the veil"; the comparatists' observation that American case-law is far more developed on this subject 45 suggests that our courts may be more disposed to "pierce."
In France, we encounter no theory of "piercing" or "disregard,"
but the same effects are achieved, and with a vengeance. The doctrinal basis is called "abuse of entity" [ abus de la personnalite], the
idea being that the establishment of a corporation may be a mere
pretense, designed to exploit unfairly (that is, to "abuse") the privilege of limited liability. When the courts detect the abuse, they
search for the real principal (the commer(ant de fait), and hold
him liable. This principle, which grew out of case law, is now a
clause in the French bankruptcy act, which provides,
When a company is declared bankrupt, the bankruptcy
may be declared to include any other person who, disguising his acts as those of the company, has carried on
business for his personal benefit, and has dealt with the
corporate assets as though they were his own. 46
Professor Houin offers the following comment on the application
of this rule :

If the subsidiary is a mere department of the parent
company, if the majority of its shares are held by the
parent company or its shareholders, if the governing
board members are the same, if the accounting is more or
less intermingled, if personnel pass freely from one company to the other,-then the court will say that the two
companies are really only one entity and one fund; their
debts are the same, and so the bankruptcy of either brings
in its train the bankruptcy of the other.
43
SERICK, REICHTSFORM UND REALITAT }URISTISCHER PERSONEN, (Beitriige zum AusJiindischen und Internationalen Privatrecht, No. 26, I955); SERICK, DuRCHGRIFFSPROBLEME BEl VERTRAGSSTORUNGEN (Juristische StudiengeselJschaft Karlsruhe, No. 42,
I959); DROBNIG, flAFTUNGSDURCHGRIFF BE! KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN, (Arbeiten zur
Rechtsvergleichung, No. 4, 1959).
44
DROBNIG, op. cit., supra note 43, at 28, 47·
45
ld. at 2S j cf. SERICK, RECHTSFORM UND REALITAT }URISTISCHER PERSONEN 65, 66.
•• Decree No. 55-583 of May 20, 1955, art. IO, [1955] JouRNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA Rf:PUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE 5086. Identical provisions were formerly part of C. CoM. art. 437,
as amended by a decree-law of 1935·
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Thus it appears that French and German courts are not unlikely
to impose liability on parent companies (to the extent that parent
companies are within their power) when subservient subsidiaries
become bankrupt. A subsidiary will not be a good "insulator"
against debts in those countries, unless it can be shown to be truly independent (within the varying standards of independence).
In the other countries of Europe, the imposition of liability on
these grounds is not yet a known peril. Our Belgian, Luxembourg,
and Netherlands collaborators report that the "abuse of entity"
and "disregard of entity" doctrines have not yet been used in their
countries, although analogous effects may be attained in relation to
enemy property.
However, parent corporations may easily incur liability in Italy
or in France because of failure to have the necessary number of
shareholders. The Italian code declares that a sole owner is liable
for debts contracted during his sole ownership. 46 a In France, one hundred percent ownership of a subsidiary's stock would probably make
the parent liable for all the subsidiary's obligations on the theory
that the subsidiary cannot be a "company" if it has only one member.
c. The Migratory Suit Problem: Branch Organization

The migratory suit problem, unlike the insolvency problem, is
one which may disturb an American company even though it is determined to pay all the just debts incurred in its operations. In fact,
the sounder the company, the more likely a victim it is for the
migratory suitor. This is the danger that a plaintiff with a cause of
action which arose in Honolulu will choose to sue in Frankfurt or
Paris.
The company's objection to such suits is not that it does not want
to pay Honolulu plaintiffs, but that it does not like to litigate with
them at a distance of several thousand miles from all the witnesses
and the documents.
This hazard may be viewed in two forms. One is the danger that
the European branches will be the victims of suits arising in the
United States (or in other continents where branches may be
found) ; the other danger is that European branches will give rise
to suits which may be prosecuted in the United States (or other
continents).
••• C. CIV. 2362 (stock companies). Experts disagree on the effectiveness of dummy
"shareholders" in fulfiiling the legal requirement,
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Taking first the problem of suits brought in Europe, it appears to
us that there is no legal defense against such suits. If the defendent
resides within the court's area, the court has jurisdiction, regardless
of the place of origin of the cause of action; and establishment of a
branch is regarded as equivalent to residence. European courts do
not seem to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
On the other hand, we have not encountered any American company which has experienced serious inconvenience from this source.
Three peculiarities of European practice offer possible explanations.
One is that the contingent lawyer's fee is unknown in Europe; probably most of the migratory suits in the United States are filed by lawyers on contingent fees. A second reason is that in European procedure, the parties are not allowed to testify. Therefore a Honolulu
plaintiff cannot transport his law-suit to Paris merely by transporting himself; he must bring witnesses, too; and this makes the suit
just as inconvenient for him as it is for the defendant. Third, the
plaintiff must pay the defendant's counsel fees if he fails to win his
case, and the foreign plaintiff must deposit security in advance to
assure this payment.
We take up next the problem of suits originating in Europe but
prosecuted in the United States. For instance, a European might be
injured by a defective machine manufactured by an American corporation's German branch, and might sue inN ew York. Conceivably
the court might refuse jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens; otherwise the suit would lie. If the injured plaintiff were
one of the hundreds of thousands of Americans who tour Europe
each summer, the plea would probably be rejected. Thus branch
organization increases a company's exposure to migratory suits.
In practice, this problem has not been an acute one for American
companies; but we do not find any explanation except that the branch
form of organization has been very little used. We are inclined to
think that migratory suits are a real danger for companies whose
activities may occasion personal injuries. It is a valid reason for
avoiding branch organization.

d. The Migratory Suit Problem: Subsidiary
Organization

If an American company operates in Europe only through subsidiaries, it appears to be relatively safe from migratory suits in
Europe. The European subsidiaries are different legal persons from
the parent, and there seems to be no danger that any of the Euro-

3I
pean doctrines would support the suit. These doctrines have sometimes visited the sins of the subsidiaries upon the parents, but never
v1ce versa.
A suit against the parent in the United States presents no great
dangers, either. If we look to the relevant European doctrines, we
find that they have never held the parent liable except when the
subsidiary has proved insolvent or has only one shareholder; the
migratory suit problem has not appeared. Thus the only danger lies
in the application of United States doctrines on disregard of corporate entity. Without fully exploring this engaging topic, we may
say that if the parent rigorously separates the operations of the subsidiary from its own, and the subsidiary avoids insolvency, danger
should be avoided.
ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS
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CHANGE OF FORM: INCORPORATING A BRANCH

In the United States, the choice between a branch and a subsidiary form is far from irrevocable. If a branch is opened, but
subsidiary organization later appears preferable, the branch may
be incorporated without serious tax consequences; the exchange of
stock for proprietorship is not regarded as a realization of taxable
income. Further, the taxes incurred by transferring the assets (for
example the documentary stamp tax on the deed of real estate) are
negligible.
In Europe, the opposite is true. The transfer of assets to a new
corporation in exchange for stock is regarded as a realization of income. If the stock is worth more than the incorporators' basis for
the assets, augmented by any retained earnings on which income
taxes have been paid, income is realized. European accounting commonly employs "hidden reserves" which understate annual income.
This practice, although perhaps improper, is so generally followed
that tax writers take for granted the appearance on liquidation of
previously unreported earnings. As a result of the practice, a very
large amount of income tax which had been postponed becomes
payable when a branch is incorporated, as well as when a subsidiary
is dissolved.
There are also taxes in some European countries on the transfer
of all kinds of assets to a company in exchange for stock. The Belgian rate, for instance, is 1.6%. The combined effect of these taxes
and the income taxes is to discourage formation of a branch with
the intention of later incorporating it as a separate subsidiary.
The deterrents to forming a subsidiary with the intention of turn-
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ing it later into a branch are even greater. The dissolution of a subsidiary generally results in a "sale" of the fixed assets, incurring
taxes reported as 8% in Italy, I I% in Belgium, and I 5% in France
of the value of the assets. Rates on transfer of the inventory are
lower-about 4 or s%. There are sometimes means of effecting a
tax-free merger, but such avenues of escape are the exception rather
than the rule in Europe.
8.

CLOSING OUT THE OPERATION

We have spoken so far of the relative advantages of a branch or
of a subsidiary in carrying on operations. But the investor must also
give some attention to their relative advantages in closing out operations; that is, disposing of it to outsiders. If the operation proves
unprofitable, it will have to be closed out. Even if it proves successful, the operation in a neighboring country may be so much more
successful that the investor will want to liquidate his German establishment (for instance) in order to concentrate his operations in
France. The formation of the Community has already produced
some such results, while the projected changes in tariffs and quotas
are still in their infancy.
One way to close out is to sell the assets for cash. This results in
the same taxes already discussed in relation to a change of form
from branch to subsidiary, or vice versa. There is a tax on previously
unrealized or unreported income, and transfer taxes on the assets.
The burden is the same for a branch as for a subsidiary.
Another way is to sell the shares owned in the European enterprise. This involves no tax at all, or taxes in very small amounts; for
instance, in Germany, less than one-fourth of one percent of the
par value of the shares.
Obviously the sale of shares is much more advantageous, at least
to the seller. But this option is available only if the European operation has been cast in a subsidiary form; one cannot sell shares in a
branch. This is one of many reasons why a subsidiary is so widely
preferred for European operations.
A third way to dispose of a European operation, which would
suggest itself to an American tax or corporation lawyer, is to merge
it with some outside company that wants to buy it. That is, the
American subsidiary could be merged with some other European
corporation which wished to acquire the assets. Our information on
this point is incomplete, but it appears that a merger normally has
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no tax advantages over a sale of assets. Heavy taxes on income and
on transfer of property are usually incurred.
There are limited exceptions to this rule. A merger between two
Luxembourg companies which maintain adequate accounting records is entirely tax-freeY In Belgium, there is a temporary exception, available to Belgian companies which merge during the "first
stage" of the European Economic Community-that is, before the
end of 196r. It is limited to mergers which "contribute to economic
rationalization, higher productivity, or greater employment." 48
France permits some taxes to be escaped in restricted types of
mergers. There have been press reports of similar legislation in
Italy. It is possible that further tax concessions to merger will result from the negotiations which the Member States have agreed to
undertake with regard to international merger. 49
Where merger has these advantages, they are advantages only
for those investors who have put their investment in subsidiary
form: there is no way to merge a branch.

9·

SUMMARY ON BRANCHES OR SUBSIDIARIES

For a few enterprises-chiefly banks-the choice of a branch
rather than a subsidiary is clearly dictated by the economic needs
of the business. For most enterprises, either form is equally functional, and the choice will be dictated by other factors. Among these,
U.S. income taxation is likely to prove dominant, and to favor
subsidiary organization; but it will have less significance for some
types of enterprise-notably purchasing organizations. European
taxes on current income are neutral for most enterprises, while the
establishment continues; but if the American investor finds it necessary to dispose of his European venture, a subsidiary is likely to
offer a much more economical means of getting out. Political relationships will dictate subsidiary organization for many enterprises,
especially those which encounter pervasive state regulation. Public
filing and registration rules seem fairly neutral, but favor the subsidiary in some cases. If there is a desire to avoid becoming involved
in the debts which may be incurred by the foreign operation, subsidiary operation is clearly indicated; but it may fail in its purpose
unless the subsidiary is truly independent in its financing and man" Loi sur l'impot sur les collectivites (Kiirperschaftssteuergesetz) art. 15.
Law of July 15, 1959, as reported by Belgian Industrial Information Service,
August 1959, p. I.
49
The Treaty art. 41.
48
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agement. Where the migratory law suit is a problem, subsidiary organization is clearly preferable.
In conclusion, subsidiary organization offers substantial advantages in a majority of situations, but not in all. The factors which
have been listed above may prove helpful in making the choice for a
particular venture.

B. How

MANY SuBsiDIARIEs?

We leave behind us now the problems of those enterprises which
will operate in Europe by means of branch offices of the American
company; we turn to the problems of those who have decided to
conduct their operations in Europe through one or more subsidiaries. The next question is, how many subsidiaries? There are six
sovereign nations in the Common Market; does an American enterprise need a separate subsidiary for each country in which it has decided to create an establishment? Or may it, for example, form a
subsidiary in Belgium which can operate as a single European company in Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy?
In the following pages we will discuss the possibility of such a Belgian company, as an illustration of the problems which would be
met by a single European company established in any one of the
Common Market countries, and operating through branches in the
others.
The question which we ask is somewhat like the one we have already asked about a U.S. company with branches in Europe. Foreign branches of a Belgian company present many of the same problems presented by foreign branches of a U.S. company. But the
problems are not quite the same, and we think the question of
branches versus subsidiaries should be re-examined with the hypothesis of a European home office. This we will do, with our Belgian
illustration.
I. ADVANTAGES OF A SINGLE EUROPEAN COMPANY

The potential advantages of having a single European company
are obviously great. Geography alone demands that an enterprise
be able to fill its orders indiscriminately from warehouses in Amsterdam or Aachen, Milan or Marseilles. The enterprise needs to be
able to use the same executives and technicians in Liege as in Verdun.
These advantages will appeal particularly to American businessmen, who are accustomed to plan their operations on a continental
scale. Indeed, experience in this sort of operation is one of the prin-
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cipal advantages which Americans may hope to bring to the European market, where they are in most other respects less experienced
than local businessmen. Attaining these advantages is one of the
very reasons for which the Common Market has been formed; if
they cannot be realized, the Market may be an illusion and a disappointment to many of the American enterprises which plan to
enter it.
To be sure, it is possible to operate a single enterprise through a
half dozen corporations which are separate only in form. But empty
forms are expensive at best, and they lead to more serious problems,
to which we will refer later.
2. THE PROSPECTIVE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNITY

A further impetus toward the single European company may be
found in the planned evolution of the European Economic Community under the Treaty of Rome. All of its provisions are designed to
make of Western Europe an area without barriers, and in which,
therefore, a single company can operate. Article 52 declares that
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals
of a Member State in the territory of another Member
State shall be progressively abolished in the course of
the transitional period. Such progressive abolition shall
also extend to restrictions on the setting up of agencies,
branches or subsidiaries by the nationals of any Member
State established in the territory of any Member State.
Many intra-Market impediments are to be substantially abolished
within the transitory period which should terminate in I 970 (with
possible extensions). In addition to restrictions on freedom of establishment, these include tariffs (Article I 3), quotas (Article 30), and
obstacles to movement of workers (Article 48), and the supply of
services (Article 59). In addition the members have promised to
coordinate their exchange controls (Article 70) and to "approximate" any other laws which directly affect the workings of the
market ( Arti de 100) •
Moreover, the reduction of these obstacles is expected to begin
well before I970. In the first few years rapid progress is likely to be
impeded by the requirements of unanimous agreement (establishment, Article 54; diplomas and certificates, Article 57; services,
Article 63; capital movements, Article 67). But directives by majority action of the council may be issued even in the first stage
(I 9 58- I 96 I) with regard to movement of workers; and in the sec-
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ond stage (r962-r965) with regard to establishment, diplomas or
certificates, services and laws which distort competition. Restrictions
on capital movements are subjected to majority rule in the third
stage (r966-r969).
J.

OBSTACLES TU A SINGLE EUROPEAN COMPANY

While the attractions of a single European company are great,
and will become greater as the Economic Community evolves, the
practical lawyer cannot overlook the obstacles which exist today,
some of which may continue to exist for a long time. We have already had occasion to examine the principal obstacles to use of
European branches of an American company in Europe; we must
look to see whether the same obstacles oppose themselves to the use
of branches of a Belgian company (for instance) in other European
countries.
We may start with taxation. This was found to be a principal obstacle to the operation of branch operation by an American corporation, and may prove to impede operation of branches by European
companies too. Without analyzing the tax structures of the various
Community countries, which are the subject of a separate study by
Messrs. van Hoorn and Wright, we can say that some discrepancies and overlaps are to be expected, and that they are not necessarily
eliminated by the "double taxation" treaties existing among several
of the Common Market countries, nor by the provisions of the
Treaty of Rome. Specific mention of taxation is found only in Articles 95-99 and 220. Articles 95-99 contain strong provisions, but
they apply only to "turnover" and similar taxes on goods. Article
1
220 is much broader ; it refers to "elimination of double taxation,"
with presumed reference to income taxes. But it does not even give
directive powers to the Community Council. It merely pledges Member States to "engage in negotiations."
A third possible avenue of attack on tax obstacles to Communitywide operation may be found in Articles roo and IOI. Article roo
empowers the Council to issue directives with respect to "such legislative and administrative provisions as have a direct incidence on
the establishment or functioning of the Common Market." Article
r or gives a directive power over provisions which "distort the conditions of competition in the Common Market, and thereby cause
a state of affairs which must be eliminated."
Tax deterrents to Community-wide corporate organization would
seem to be "indirect" rather than "direct" impediments to the
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Market; if they impede progress in all countries equally, they can
hardly be said to "distort" competition, although they may retard it
a good deal. Thus we would not hold high hopes for the elimination
of tax barriers which may presently enforce a policy of separate
subsidiaries in separate countries.
A second reason mentioned for setting up subsidiaries rather than
branches of the American corporation was to obtain a sympathetic
approach from government officials who may pass on the application
of an enterprise for a license to build a new plant, to adjust wage
rates, to exchange foreign currency, to obtain an import quota allocation, to make a public securities offering. These matters will continue for the forseeable future to be administered by national, not
by international officials. The Community will affect this problem
only insofar as the Community reduces the need for dealing with
government agencies (by increasing economic freedom), and insofar as the Community diminishes the nationalism of national officials. It may indeed have such effects, but they will be indirect, and
may be long delayed.
A final reason for preferring a European subsidiary, rather than
a European branch, of an American company was the desire to be
insulated from migratory suits, and from debts in case of insolvency
of the European enterprise. Both of these objectives are satisfied as
well by having one European subsidiary as by having six. As to
migratory suits, migration within Europe-for instance from Rome
to Brussels-has never been a problem. As to insolvency, the features of inadequate capitalization and domination of subsidiary affairs, which inspire the "piercing of the veil," are more likely to
appear in a number of small national subsidiaries than in a larger
market-wide subsidiary.
In summary, there are no strong legal obstacles to establishing a
single European subsidiary with branches in the other countries. By
I 970, this course may be clearly indicated. But in the meantime there
are likely to be many inconveniences-difficulties with taxes and with
all sorts of administrative regulations-which a single European
subsidiary will feel more sharply than separate national subsidiaries
would.
4·

HARMONIZING SUBSIDIARY OPERATIONS

One special problem of operating through multiple subsidiaries is
the necessity of harmonizing their policies to achieve the practical
benefits of unified operation. American lawyers are, of course, fa-
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miliar with means of operating subsidiaries as if they were mere
departments of the parent company. In American practice, the parent company holds all the stock of all the subsidiaries, and the parent's board frequently makes all major decisions for subsidiary
companies; the boards of the various subsidiaries carry out these
decisions. But several complications will be encountered in applying
this pattern in the Common Market.
On the purely technical plane, there is the rule against the sole
ownership of any company's stock by a single individual or company. This can be solved without much difficulty by issuing single
shares to chosen persons who will make up the necessary complement of two, five, or seven shareholders.
A more serious problem is involved in getting the most out of the
local directors. The parent company needs keen and devoted local
directors in each subsidiary, to solve distinctive local problems. Normally it will install such directors, and award them salaries from the
subsidiary's treasury, plus bonuses based on the subsidiary's profits.
They may be expected to devote themselves to the building up of
their company.
Unfortunately, the devotion of this group of local directors is
likely to collide with the objectives of the European operation seen
as a whole. It may become advantageous to transfer operations from
the French subsidiary (for instance) to the Italian subsidiary. The
change may cut the bonuses and imperil the salaries of the French
directors. Under these conditions, or the threat of these conditions,
it may be difficult to attract and hold French directors; or they may
lose the initiative and the sense of responsibility which would have
resulted from a truly independent French operation.
An ingenious solution to this problem has been suggested. The
American parent needs a European policy board, to which the top
executives of all the subsidiaries will belong. Part of their bonuses
might be based on profits of the subsidiaries as a group, rather than
solely on those of their own national subsidiaries. At the least, they
should meet together, and acquire a Common Market perspective,
and they should be made to feel that their futures depend not only
on the success of their national segment of the enterprise, but on
the success of the whole. This feeling can be given reality by moving
executives from one subsidiary to another. Language differences will
impose some limits on this shifting, but it will not be hard to find
French-speaking Italians who can work in France, Belgium, or Lux-
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embourg and German-speaking Dutchmen or Luxembourgers who
can work in Germany.
A European policy board will do more than develop European
thinking for the parent company. Western Europe now has a twelve
year plan for the evolution of its commercial institutions and its
economic life. If advantage is to be taken of the burgeoning opportunities which present themselves, there must be continuous thinking
about European operations by people who are close to them; decisions cannot be left for peripheral attention by an American board.
Various legal structures for the European board may be imagined.
There might simply be meetings among the directors of the various
European subsidiaries; this arrangement would probably fail to
supply the needed authority and cohesion. An outstanding solution
which has come to our attention is the one announced in the summer
of 1958 by the Ford Motor Company, which opened a European
office of its International Division. Such a branch would not need to
buy or sell, and could therefore escape all the legal effects of "establishment"; at the same time, it could furnish a center of harmonization, and a pole of loyalty.
Whatever structure is adopted, one peril of harmonization must
be noticed. It may involve violation of European laws on "restraint
of trade." Article 8 5 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits agreements
which result in " (a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading conditions; (b) the limitation or
control of production, markets, technical development or investment; [or] (c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply."
These provisions purport to be self-operating but will have to be
enforced by Member States until implemented by action of the
Council.
What should be expected from these provisions is not yet known;
another chapter of this book, by Professor Riesenfeld, discusses the
problem. Obviously there is some possibility that the harmonization
of subsidiaries' policies may run afoul of the Common Market's
"antitrust" laws. If this should occur, an enterprise might be better
off operating as a single company with branches; a single company
cannot make an illegal "agreement" with itself.
A single European company might also violate the competition
rules of the Treaty. Under Article 86, a single enterprise with a
dominant position in the Common Market is forbidden to limit
"production, markets or technical developments to the prejudice of
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consumers." But this article does not outlaw a single company's
market-wide price policy, or marketing plan, as Article 8 5 outlaws
them for a combination of different companies.

5·

A EUROPEAN HOLDING COMPANY

Many writers in the past year or two have advocated the formation by an American enterprise of a European holding company to
possess the enterprise's shares in foreign operating companies in
European countries.
One function of such a holding company is to serve as coordinating
agency for the policies of the various operating subsidiaries. But
this can be done by establishing a European policy board without
the added complication of a holding company.
A second function of some European holding companies has been
to conceal the identity or nationality of the investor. This factor has
been of great importance in a continent which has been twice in the
last half-century tormented by wars, and parts of which have suffered political or racial purges. But concealment is quite impossible
for most of the investors whose problems are considered in this
paper-that is, American manufacturers who want to exploit in
Europe their well known products, processes, or trademarks.
This leaves as the principal function of a European holding company the supplying of a financial conduit, through which the profits
of one European subsidiary can be passed to another without passing through any U.S. company. For if the profits pass through an
American company, they emerge minus taxes. Such a conduit will
be of special interest in the Common Market, because of the possibility that operations now conducted in several of the Market
countries may later be concentrated in one of them.
However, a holding company is not the only conceivable means
of passing funds from one company to another. Where all the operating subsidiaries are wholly owned, the funds can perhaps just as
well be loaned from one to the other. The need of a holding company
for European subsidiaries is likely to arise chiefly when the European nationals hold a substantial minority, or a majority, of the
company in which the American enterprise has invested. In such
cases, the European shareholders will not share the Americans' enthusiasm for transferring the company's resources to an affiliated
company in another country.
Three European countries have been widely mentioned as sites
for European holding companies-Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and
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Luxembourg. We are advised that arrangements can be made
with the Nether lands government to exempt from tax income received from subsidiaries in other countries, although there is no express statutory exemption. 51
Although all these four countries may serve equally well as tax
havens, they are not likely to serve equally well as profit conduits,
because of differences in their positions with regard to exchange
restrictions. If European currencies become soft again, there will
be a tendency for countries to protect themselves by restricting withdrawals, or restricting the terms on which new investments may be
made. Within the Common Market, the countries have committed
themselves to maintaining a high degree of liberality, and their restrictive measures can be reviewed and overruled by the Community Council. 52 The commitments on exchange control between Switzerland and the Common Market countries are much less effective.
Hence a holding company located in Luxembourg or Netherlands
has a probability of being able to invest and disinvest in other Common Market countries with a good deal more assurance than a
holding company in Switzerland or Liechtenstein.
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6.

MERGING SUBSIDIARIES

The momentary advantages in having several subsidiaries within
the Market, and the prospective later advantages of having a single
Common Market subsidiary suggest to an American that subsidiaries should be formed now and merged later with other European
companies. There are many obstacles to this course, and it should
not be planned.
Merger between companies of different countries is presently impracticable. One cannot merge a French company with a German
one as he can merge a Delaware corporation with a Pennsylvania
one. There are some prospects for future legislation which will permit international mergers; this is one of the subjects on which the
Community members promise to "engage in negotiations." 53 But
one cannot be certain of it.
50

Luxembourg: Law of July 31, 1929, "sur le regime fiscal des societes de participations financieres"; see DELVAUX AND REIFFERS, LES SOCIETES "HoLDING" AU GRANDDUCHE DE LUXEMBOURG (1953).
51
See Chapter XI infra.
52
Treaty, arts. 67-73. By its first directive under this article, the Council has ordered
all member states to grant a general licenses for purchases of securities traded on the
stock exchanges of member states, and to grant all licenses that may be required to permit direct investment, and offerings of new securities, among member states. See
Directive No. I under Article 67, May II, 1960.
53
The Treaty, art. 220.
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There are also some temporary exemptions from the income taxes
which would normally be incurred on merger, in order to permit
companies to adjust themselves to the Common Market. But these
exemptions are not sure to persist to the time when merger may be
desired, and when international agreements may have made it possible.

7·

SUGGESTED CONCLUSIONS

We have offered a host of considerations for examination in the
light of the circumstances of each individual enterprise. What conclusions should be drawn? We will offer a few.
In the Benelux group of three countries, a single company operating across national lines is already practical. For some years General Motors has been operating a Belgian company (General Motors Continental) with a branch factory in Netherlands; their officers
report complete satisfaction with the arrangement. They feel that
Dutch officials give their branch just as favorable treatment as could
have been expected for a purely Dutch company. Most companies
appear to be still operating with separate subsidiaries in these nations (Ford Motor has separate subsidiaries for its Dutch and Belgian plants), but we discovered no opinion that this offers any great
advantage today.
Outside of Benelux, we know of no instance of international
branch operation of factories, although there are many branch
banks, transportation offices, and purchasing agencies. We are prepared to accept the conclusion reached by most enterprises that the
time has not yet come when it is most convenient to operate an
Italian or German factory as a branch of a Belgian company.
On the other hand, we think that the time will come, and very
probably within the transitional period of the Common Market. It
may be accelerated not only by the abolition of restrictions and by
the harmonization of laws, but also by "antitrust" laws which impede the harmonization of policies of separate companies.
The one thing certain is that the best form of organization today
may not be the best form tomorrow. This means that in deciding to
establish in any country the cost estimates should include the expenses of a probable reorganization within a few years. If the combined costs are too. high, the decision should be to defer establishment in the countries where it can most practicably be dispensed
with. The market in those countries may be exploited through the
use of commission agents, or merely by exports from a foreign base.
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We will hazard one more opinion. As the Common Market
evolves, conditions will become progressively more favorable to
operations of a single European company, and less favorable to
operations of a number of European subsidiaries. If the choice between one subsidiary and many is a close decision under today's
condition, the single subsidiary should be favored; the future is
more likely to increase than to decrease its advantage.

III. FORMING A EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY

A.

THE EuROPEAN CoMPANY LAws
I. FAMILY RESEMBLANCES

(AND DIVERGENCIES)

When we make the decision to form a European company, we
find ourselves face to face with the European company laws. For
the six countries of the Community, there are six systems of company law-ail different. And there are not six, but eight sets of legal
texts, since two of the countries present their laws in two official
languages (Belgium in French and Flemish; Luxembourg in French
and German) .
That is taking the worst possible view of the matter. On the
brighter side, we may notice that four languages cover all eight of
the legal texts (French, German, Italian, and Dutch). Furthermore,
a knowledge of the French language will permit the reader to examine official texts of three countries (France, Belgium, and Luxembourg), and to examine the translated texts, with latest amendments, of the other three nations. 54 Texts of the relevant laws of all
six countries will probably soon be available in German, also. 55
Moreover, all of the six company law systems reveal strong
mutual resemblances, as seen from an American perspective. One
discovers again and again concepts which are common to the six
countries but unfamiliar in any of the fifty American states. All of
the legal systems share basic concepts which were enunciated in the
"'A Paris publisher, Editions Jupiter, prints a loose-leaf service containing the company laws of the six countries, together with analysis and practical suggestions, under
the title RECUEILS PRATIOUES DU DROIT DES AFFAIRES DANS LES PAYS DU MARCHE COMMUN. (Hereinafter Rec. Prat. du M.C.) In this collection everything not originally in
French is translated into that language; Italian and German legal texts in their original languages are also included.
.. The publishers of the Rec. Prat. du M.C. have advised us that they will shortly
issue a German language edition. German language translations of company laws of
foreign countries are also published by the Gesellschaft fur Rechtsvergleichung at
Frankfurt, Germany.
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Napoleonic Civil and Commercial Codes. 56 The company laws of
Luxembourg, Belgium and Italy also reflect a strong influence of
the French Company Law of 1867, which is still in effect in France
although considerably amended. German company law contains
more radical differences from the French pattern, reflecting in part
its independent historical development. While all the European
company laws will strike an American lawyer as rather rigid, perhaps even old-fashioned, he will come closest in the Netherlands to
discovering the liberty of organization and finance to which he may
have been accustomed within the hospital boundaries of Delaware.
Some day, perhaps, there will be uniform company laws throughout the Common Market. A committee in France, and perhaps
others elsewhere, are studying the possibility. But the Common
Market members are not committed, even in theory, to uniformity
in this area. So the six regimes of company law are likely to be with
us for some years to, come.
2. WHERE TO FIND THE LAWS

Few of the European company laws can conveniently be studied
in English. 56a Most of the English translations which have been
made are hopelessly out of date; only the Netherlands 57 law and
Italian 58 laws have recent translations which have come to our attention. For neither is there any service in English to keep it up to
date.
When we turn to the original sources, we find a confusing variety
of arrangements. The famed "codification" of European law,
whereby all laws are integrated in a single, compact, consecutively
numbered collection, applies to business company laws in only three
of the six countries-Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. In Belgium and the Netherlands the principal company laws are cited as a
part of the Code of Commerce. 59 In Italy, surprisingly, they are
66
For a short discussion of the evolution of Dutch commercial and company law, see
Correa, La Pratique des Societes aux Pays-Bas, r Rec. Prat. du M.C., Pays-Bas, Part r.
66
' For a bibliography of sources which can be studied in English, see Szladits, International and Foreign Law Sources for the Business Lawyer, 15 Bus. LAW. 575 ( 1960).
57
Internationaal Juridisch Instituut, Netherlands legal provisions of companies limited by shares (Netherlands 1957); VANDERMEER, DUTCH CORPORATION LAW (1959).
68
An English translation of Italian company law was published in 1957 by Mediobanca, under the title THE AMERICAN INVESTORS' DIGEST OF ITALIAN CoRPORATE LAW.
.. Belgium: CoDE DE CoMMERCE, Liv. I, Tit. IX; WETBOEK VAN KoOPHANDEL, Boek I,
Tit. IX.
Netherlands: WETBOEK VAN KooPHANDEL, art. 15-56h. There are, of course, general principles applicable to companies in many parts of the Civil Codes, especially in
the parts on contracts of associations. There are also special corporation acts, like
the Netherlands Act on cooperative associations, which are not integrated. The state-
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60

cited as a part of the Civil Code, because of the achievement in
I942 of a long-sought-after unification of civil and commercial law.
Even more surprisingly, they are found in the division of the civil
law dedicated to labor law ;61 this oddity reflects the "corporative
state" concepts of fascism which were in vogue in the Italy of I 942,
.but it has no significant bearing on the content of the company law
nor on the system of citing it.
In the other three countries the principal laws 'applying to companies have become quite separate from the commercial codes, as
economic change has forced radical revisions of company laws
while other portions of the commercial code retained more ancient
dress. Of all the countries France has the most uncodified collection
of company laws, reflecting the vicissitudes of national history almost as picturesquely as the architectural face of Paris. 62 Some of
the principles which underlie company law are still to be found in
the Civil Code (Articles I832-I873), although they yield, in commercial matters, to other general rules found in the Code of Commerce (Articles I 8-46) . For specific questions of French company
law one must usually turn to particular laws which we will call the
"Stock Company Law" and the "Limited Liability Company Law."
But the French have no such handy names for them; they call them
(respectively) the Law of July 24, I867, and the Law of March 7,
I925.
The Stock Company Law has been greatly amended, so that not
much more than its skeleton remains to witness the will of the I 867
legislator. The later legislators have sometimes despaired of hanging any more on the old skeleton, so we have further laws which
certainly modify the effects of the law of I 867, but which are not
framed as amendments to it, and must be separately cited. Notable
examples are the laws of November I6, I940, and March 4, I943
-both products of the "collaborationist" government at Vichy.
Although neither the Stock Company Law nor the Limited Liability
Company Law are formally parts of the Commercial Code, they
are always contained as annotations in popular editions of the Code,
along with the Vichy overlays and other supplementary legislation.
ment in the text applies to a set of rules on business corporations which is approximately
as comprehensive as, for instance, the American "Model Business Corporation Act."
60
ComcE CIVILE arts. 2247-2510.
., Libro V "Del Lavoro."
62
See Houin, Reform of the French Civil Code and the Code of Commerce, 4 AMERICAN JoURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 48 5 (1955). Professor Houin advises that a new
codification of French company law is in an advanced stage of preparation, and might
even be promulgated in 1960.
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The legal situation in Germany and Luxembourg is somewhat
less confusing. Both have relatively modern and comprehensive
company laws which are entirely separate from the Civil and Commercial Codes. Germany has a Stock Company Law, dating from
I937, and a separate Limited Liability Company Law dating from
I 892. Luxembourg has a single Companies Law, separate from
its codes, containing provisions on stock companies, limited liability
companies, and other types of business association. The German
company laws are contained in popular editions of the German
Code of Commerce (Handelsgesetzbuch or H.G.B.), but the Luxembourg laws are available only in a separate booklet. 63
The principal company laws to which we will refer repeatedly
are shown on page 47 with the usual term of citation in the country
of origin, and the abbreviated citations which we will use here.

B.

THE CHOICE OF COMPANY FORM
I. THE KINDS TO CHOOSE FROM-AND THEIR NAMES

In five of the six Community countries-all but the Netherlands
-the American lawyer who has decided to form a "corporation"
will confront an initial puzzle. Each of these countries has not one,
but two forms of business organization which may fairly be called
corporations. Both are widely used, both are legal entities, both are
taxed in essentially the same way, and both insulate their shareholders from liability for company debts.
These two forms bear witness to the European legislators' desire
to provide separate legal structures for the entities which Americans call "publicly held corporations," and those which we call
"close corporations." One type of European company is empowered
to offer its shares to the public, and list them on stock exchanges
and is obliged to endure the glare of publicity on its financial affairs.
The other type of European company is confined to offering its
shares to a select few, has shares unsuitable for trading, and enjoys relative privacy. In these respects the European dichotomy
appears much like the American.
But the American dichotomy is a differentiation of fact-a difference in how the shares are actually held and traded. Legally both
kinds of companies (close corporations and publicly held corporations) belong to the same category ("business corporation," or
63

Recueil des lois concernant les Societes Commerciales ( 1956).
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Cited in
Cited here
country of origin as:
Law
C. Com. I-IX
Code of Com- Code de Commerce,
merce Book I, Liv. I, Tit. IX; Wethoek van Koophandel,
Title IX
Boek I, Tit. IX.
Stock Company Loi du 24 juillet I 867, Law of I867
France
Law
sur les societes
Law of I925
Limited LiaLoi du 7 mars I925,
bility Company tendant a instituer des
Law
societes a responsabilite limitee
Stock Company Gesetz iiber Aktienge- AktG
Germany
Law
sellschaften ( "Aktiengesetz")
Limited LiaGesetz betreffend die GmbHG
bility Company Gesellschaften mit beLaw
schdinkter Haftung
(GmbH Gesetz)
C. Civ.
Codice Civile, art.
Civil Code,
Italy
art. 22472247-2574
2574
Company
Luxembourg Company Law Loi du Io aout I9I5
concernant les societes Law
commerciales; Gesetz
vom IO August I9I5,
betreffend die Handelsgesellschaften 64
W.K.
Netherlands Code of Com- W etboek van Koopmerce art. I 5- handel, art. I5-56h
Country
Belgium

56h
"corporations for profit"), they add the same distinguishing words
or letters to their corporate name (Co., Corp., Inc. and the like),
and they are formed under provisions of the same statute (for example, the Delaware General Corporation Law, or the Illinois
Business Corporation Act). To pass from the "close" form to the
"publicly held" form requires, at most, minor charter amendments,
and the filing of securities registration statements. 6 fi
.. The provisions governing limited liability companies, although not adopted until
1933, are framed as an amendment of the law of 1915. Hence, we cite the "Law of
191 5" for provisions which were not in effect until many years after that date.
""The distinctions between the American close corporation and the European limited
liability company have been brought out in a series of articles advocating that American states should adopt separate close corporation laws; see the following (in historical
order): Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 MICH. L. REv. 273
( 1928-29) ; Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WAsH.
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In Europe, on the other hand, these two kinds of company signify
different legal categories, add different words or initials to their
corporate names and are formed under different statutes. 66 To pass
from one legal form to the other requires the adoption of a completely new charter, through a procedure called "transformation."
American and English writers have used many different translations for these.kinds of companies, frequently varying according to
which European country is involved. 67 For simplicity we will use the
U.L.Q. 305, 338-339 (1937); Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the
One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1406 (1938); Winer, Proposing A New
York· "Close Corporation Law," 28 CoRNELL L.Q. 313 ( 1943) ; O'Neal, A Plea For
Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 700 (1958).
66
An English language introduction to the limited liability company in various European countries may be found in the following articles: Eder, Limited Liability Firms
Abroad, 13 U. of PITT. L. REV. 193 (1952); Israels and Taubenblatt, The Close Corporation in Foreign Law, (1948) STATE OF NEW YoRK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION
CoMMISSION 416; Schneider, The American Close Corporation and its German Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAw. 228 (1958); Treillard, The Close Corporation in French and Continental Law, 18 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 546 ( 1953).
"'I have chosen the term "stock company" for the A ktiengesellschaft or societe
anonyme, and the term "limited liability company" for the Gesellschaft mit beschrdnkter
H a/tung, or societe a responsabilite limitee. The affirmative reasons for these choices
are the following: (1) Neither term has a strong positive connotation in American law,
such as to imply a greater parallelism than the laws justify. (2) Both terms are literal
translations of the European terms in use in some or most of the countries surveyed.
"Stock company" translates the German and Italian terms; "limited liability company"
translates the French, German, Italian, Luxembourg, and Dutch terms, and barely
misses the Belgian. ( 3) The two terms, both using the word "company," emphasize
that they designate species of a single genus.
More compelling, however, than these affirmative reasons, are my objections to alternative terminologies which have been occasionaJly used or suggested: (1) "Anonymous
company" or "nameless company" as a translation for "societe anonyme" is the nadir
of namesmanship. It connotes nothing. (2) "Corporation" as a translation for "Aktiengesellschaft" or "societe anonyme" leads into a trap. If the SA-AG is also calJed corporation, we have got nowhere. If the SARL-GmbH is called some kind of "company,"
while the SA-AG remains a "corporation," the difference in terminology implies a
greater difference in kind than really exists. The use of the term "corporation" leads
into endless other difficulties. On the American side, the term properly includes such
entities as municipal corporations, which are never signified by the corresponding
European terms of societe and Gesellschaft. On the European side, the "corporation"
has cognates (corporation, corporazione, Korperschaft, corPoratie) with quite different
denotations. (3) "Close corporation" as a translation of GmbH or SARL is bad because the question whether a corporation is "close" or not is a matter of fact; whether
it is a GmbH or an AG is a matter of law. An AG or SA can be closely held in fact,
so that it corresponds functionally to an American "close corporation." (4) "Public
company" and "private company" are perfectly usable terms with which to describe
the European SA-AG and SARL-GmbH, respectively. They have disadvantages in
suggesting an exaggerated parallelism between British and continental institutions.
Further, the word "public" strongly suggests "governmental" to the American reader.
The following incomplete bibliography on others' usages may be of some interest:
"Limited Liability Company" (for SARL-GmbH): FRIEDMANN et a!., LEGAL ASPECTS
OF FoREIGN INVESTMENT (1959).
"Stock company" (for SA-AG): Eder, Spain: New Law of Stock Companies, 1 AM.
J. CoMP. LAW 117 ( 1952) ; Eder, Spain: Law of Stock Companies, 2 AM. J. COMP. LAW
234 (1953)·
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same two translations, regardless of country. Our terminology is
compared with the national originals as follows:

Belgium:

"Stock Company'' "Limited Liability Company"
societe anonyme (SA) societe de personnes a responsabilite Iimitee ( SPRL)
naamloze vennootschap (NV)

personenvennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijheid

France:

societe anonyme (SA) societe a responsabilite limitee
(SARL)

Germany:

Akti engesellschaft
(AG)

Gesellschaft mit beschrankter
Haftung (GmbH)

Italy:

societa per azioni
(SpA)

societa a responsabilita limitata (SARL)

Luxembourg: societe anonyme (SA) societe a responsabilite limitee
(SARL)
anonyme Gesellschaft Gesellschaft mit beschrankter
(AG)
Haftung(GmbH)
The Netherlands is like the United States, and unlike the rest of
Europe, in having only one statute under which both closely held
and publicly held companies are formed. Companies of both types
are legally called "naamloze vennootschap," just as both are legally
called "corporation" in the United States. The initials "N.V." appear before or after the company name. If the company happens to
be closely held, it may be described by bankers as "besloten," which
means "closed." But the appellation of "besloten naamloze vennootschap" (like "close corporation") denotes a factual distinction,
rather than a legal one. There is no widely used Dutch term for a
"publicly held corporation."
Of course there are many other kinds of business associations, beside the stock company and limited liability company. In every country there are partnerships and limited partnerships, just as in the
"Limited Liability Firm" (for SARL-GmbH): Eder, op. cit. supra note 66; Eder,
Colombia: Control of Limited Liability Firms, 2 AM. ]. CoMP. LAw 70 (1953); Eder,
J! enezuela: Commercial Code, 5 AM. ]. CoMP. LAw 628 ( 1956).
"Close corporation" (for SARL-GmbH): Reverdin and Hamburger, The American
Close Corporation and Its Swiss Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAw. 263 (1958); Israels and
Taubenblatt, op. cit. supra note 66 at 416.
"Corporation" (for SA-AG): FRIEDMANN et al., op. cit. supra; but cf. FRIEDMANN
rt al., THE PUBLIC CORPORATION ( 1954).
"Public companies and private companies" (for SA-AG and SARL-GmbH, respectively): Treillard, op. cit. supra note 66, at 546.
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United States. 68 There is also in most of the European countries a
"limited partnership with shares," 69 and there are a number of
special purpose companies such as mutual insurance companies, cooperative associa.tions, and credit unions.
None of these business associations seem likely to be of much
interest to American traders and investors. Cooperatives and credit
unions are inherently local. The limited partnership with shares is a
survival of the slow evolution from partnership to stock company,
comparable in its role to the American "joint stock company." Today it seems to offer no advantages which are not exceeded by those
of the more usual stock company or limited liability company. The
general partnership seems to be excludable as an avenue of American investment, since the participants become fully exposed to all
the financial risks of a European businessman.
68

Partnerships:
Belgium: societe en nom collectif (vennootschap onder gemeenschappelijken naam),
CODE DE COMMERCE (hereinafter cited as C. CoM.) Livre I, Titre IX, §§ 15-17.
Germany: Offene Handelsgesellschaft, Handelsgesetzbuch (hereinafter cited as
HGB) §§ 105-160.
France: Societe en nom collectif, CoDE DE CoMMERCE (hereinafter cited as C. CoM.)
§§ 2o-22.
Italy: Societa in nome collettivo, ComcE CIVILE §§ 2291-2312.
Luxembourg: Societe en nom collectif-offene Handelsgesellschaft, loi du 10 aout 1915
concernant les societes commerciales (hereinafter cited as Company Law) §§ 14-15.
Netherlands: Vennootschap onder eene firma, WETBOEK VAN KooPHANDEL (hereinafter cited as W.K.) §§ 16-18.
Limited Partnerships:
Belgium: Societe en commandite simple-vennootschap bij wijze van enkele geldschieting, C. CoM. I-IX, arts. 18-25.
Germany: Kommanditgesellschaft, HGB §§ 161-177.
France: Societe en commandite simple, C. CoM. §§ 23-28.
Italy: Societa in accomandita semplice, CoDICE CIVILE §§ 2313-2324.
Luxembourg: Societe en commandite simple-einfache Kommanditgesellschaft, Company Law §§ 16-22.
Netherlands: Vennootschap bij wijze van geldschieting, or vennootschap en commandite, W.K. §§ 19-35.
60
The organizations referred to resemble limited partnerships in that some members
are liable for firm debts, while others are not, but they differ from limited partnerships
in their power to issue transferable shares. They have had a historical role as precursors of the modern stock company and limited liability company, somewhat like
the role of the "joint stock company" in American Ia w; but it would be quite misleading to call them "joint stock companies."
The following table indicates their various national names, and the laws applicable:
Belgium: Societe en commandite par actions-Vennootschap bij wijze van geldschieting op aandelen, C. CoM. I-IX, §§ 105-115.
France: Societe en commandite par actions, Law of 1867, §§ 1-20.
Germany: Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, Aktiengesetz (hereinafter cited as
AktG) §§ 219-232.
Italy: Societa in accomandita per azioni, ComcE CIVILE §§ 2462-2471.
Luxembourg: Societe en commandite par actions-Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien,
Company Law §§ 102-112.
Netherlands: Commanditaire vennootschap op aandelen.
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The limited partnership may deserve some consideration from a
few American investors. Conceivably an American company could
be a limited partner, while an individual (American or European)
might be the general partner in Europe. European limited partnerships are very much like American limited partnerships under the
Uniform Partnership Act, for the simple reason that the AngloAmerican limited partnership is a business form which was directly
and consciously copied from a European modeP 0 However, the
number of American enterprises which would wish to particip-ate in
a European limited partnership would be very small, and we will
not, in this paper, give further attention to this form.
The "holding company" has also received a good deal of attention in recent years from European writers and American observers.
It is not, however, a distinctive form of organization; it is rather,
as in the United States, the adaptation of one of the other forms of
company (usually stock company or limited liability company) to a
particular purpose. 71
2. THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY-ITS PROS AND CONS

Most American corporations seem to have cast their European
subsidiaries, except in Germany, in the mold of stock companies. 72
On the other hand, European businessmen choose the limited liability much more often than the stock company; the ratio of preference in France was recently about 3 Y2 to I and was apparently
even higher in Germany. 73 Although many of the reasons why Eu70

See Crane, Are Limited Partnerships Necessary? 17 MINN. L. REV. 351 (1933).
The only European country of the Six which has a special holding-company statute
is Luxembourg:
Loi du 3 r juillet 1929 sur le regime fiscal des societes de participations financieres
(holding companies), reprinted in Recueil des lois concernant les societes cpmmerciales (1956); Gesetz vom 31 Juli 1929 iiber die Besteuerung der Holdinggesellschaften, reprinted in "Gesetze betreffend die Handels, Holding-, und andere Gesellschaften" ( 1956).
However, the holding company is widely used in the Netherlands and other countries of the Common Market, without benefit of special legislative provisions.
""A casual survey of well-known American subsidiaries in Europe has revealed no
limited liability companies except in Germany. General Motors and Standard of New
Jersey both have German sub-subsidiaries which are limited liability companies:
Frigidaire GmbH, which is a subsidiary of Adam Opel AG (sub of General Motors);
and Vereinigte Asphalt-und Teerproduktion Fabriken GmbH, which is a subsidiary
of Esso AG (sub of Jersey Standard). Moody's Industrial Manual (1959) 1648, 2734·
But Mr. Dieter Schneider, a lawyer of Cologne, states that "foreign subsidiaries in
Germany are generally established in the form of a GmbH." The American Close
Corporation and its German Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAW. 228, 249 ( 1958).
'"I Rec. Prat. du M.C., sub. tit. Indications pratiques for France states that in 1957,
3270 SARL were formed, compared with 952 SA. The ratio of total companies in existence favors the SARL even more strongly.
71
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ropeans might prefer the limited liability company do not apply to
Americans, we believe that this form deserves more consideration
than it has commonly received. We suspect that its unpopularity
among Americans results partly from the fact that it looks strange
and unfamiliar. We will, therefore, try to outline some of its distinctive features in various countries, starting with its disadvantages,
bases for preferring it.
and proceeding to some
:•
a. Non-Negotiability of Shares

One feature of limited liability companies which will probably
deter some investors is the non-negotiability of their shares. Stock
companies in all the countries but Italy normally issue bearer certificates, which are transferred from one investor to another without any entry on the corporate books; 74 the bona fide purchaser
prevails over all prior claimants. In Italy stock companies no longer
issue bearer shares, but registered shares are considered "negotiable" just as in the United States. 75 Limited liability companies
shares are never considered negotiable; they must always be transferred on the books of the company; in Germany the transfers must
even be notarized; 76 in Italy no certificates of ownership are issued.
The buyer of a limited liability company share (with or without a
certificate) takes it subject to any adverse claims of title, any claim
of the company for unpaid share subscriptions, and any restriction
on transfer, to which the transferor was subject.
In some, but not all, countries, there are further impediments to
In Western Germany, figures of companies in existence in 1955 showed 34,254 GmbH
against 3,060 AG. Rec. Prat. du M.C., Indications pratiques for Germany.
74
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 45·
France: C. CoM. art. 35·
Germany: AktG § 10.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 37·
Netherlands: W.K. art. 38c.
75
Company Law (C. CIV. 2355) permits bearer shares as in other countries, but royal
decrees have suspended the permission since 1941 (decrees of Oct. 25, 1941, and Mar.
29, 1942). Hence, all share transfers must be registered and are governed by C. Civ.
arts. 2021-2027. But there is no provision, as in the limited liability company law,
that transfers are ineffective even between the parties until registered.
7
" Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 125 (share transfer not effective until registered).
France: Law of 1925, arts. 21 (shares not negotiable), 23 (transfer incomplete until
the company is formally notified).
Germany: Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung (hereinafter cited as GmbHG) § 15. (requiring that all tranllfers be made with judicial or
notarial formality).
Italy: CooicE CIVILE art. 2479 (transfer ineffective until registered).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 190 (transfer incomplete until the company is formally notified).
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free trading in shares. In Belgium, France, and Luxembourg shares
in a limited liability company cannot be sold to non-members without the consent of a specified majority of the other shareholders. 77
This provision puts a minority shareholder at the mercy of the controlling group. It has been found so burdensome that Frenchmen
often form a stock company in preference to a limited liability, even
though they intend the company to be closely held.
This rule requiring consent to transfer does not apply in Germany and Italy, unless it is voluntarily inserted in the corporate
charter. 78
b. Exclusion from Financial Markets
A second disadvantage of the limited liability company is the fact
that it cannot raise money by public issue of stocks and bonds, nor
can its securities be traded on the securities markets. Some of the
countries have a specific prohibition against public issue or trading. 70
In others the same effect is achieved by prohibitions against issuing
the kinds of securities which outside investors would want to buy.
One of these prohibitions is the one on issuing negotiable shares,
explained in a preceding paragraph. A further prohibition, effective in Belgium, France, Italy, and Luxembourg, prohibits the issue
of bonds-that is, debt securities in forms designed for sale to
small investors. 80
These prohibitions do not prevent limited liability companies
from financing themselves from private sources. The rules about
stock would be no impediment to shareholding by a select group of
individuals nor, except in Belgium, by a parent or a consortium of
investing companies; only the general public are excluded. Likewise
loans can be "privately placed" with banks and insurance companies.
Since public issues of bonds are relatively less important in Europe
than in the United States, the inhibition on public bond issues will
probably not make much practical difference to a company until it
becomes very large and well-known.
77

Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 126.
France: Law of 1925, art. 22.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 189.
78
Germany: GmbHG § 15(5).
Italy: C. Civ. art. 2479·
79
Luxembourg: Company Law. art. 188.
France: Law of 1925, art. 37·
so Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 131.
France: Rec. Prat. du M.C., France, Expose juridique no. 14.33.
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art 2486.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 188.
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c. Other Disadvantages
A few other special features of the limited liability company
which may deter its use at particular times and places must be mentioned. Belgium has a peculiar rule requiring that all shareholders
be natural persons and not corporations. 81 Our Belgian collaborator
regards this as a rule of substance, not form. Hence the limited
liability comp~ny must be written off as a form of corporate subsidiary in Belgium; but it might make a good affiliate for an American close corporation, whose principal shareholders could also
hold shares in the Belgian limited liability company.
France has a rule of income taxation whereby the salaries paid to
majority shareholders of a limited liability company are regarded
as profit distributions, rather than as wages, and incur a 22% basic
tax (before the progressive surtax) instead of the 5% payroll tax
which falls on salaries of stock company officers. This has driven
many French businessmen to desert the limited liability company in
favor of a stock company; but it will not be any problem to American-owned limited liability companies, since it is unlikely that their
salaried officers will be majority shareholders. We presume that
shares will be held by corporations rather than individuals.
Italy has a set of unfavorable tax rulings which have been applied to the limited liability company. On the one hand, its profits
are subjected to the corporation income tax, which partnerships and
individual enterprises escape; on the other hand, its share transfers
are subjected to a business transfer tax which corporation shares
escape. Thus it has double disadvantages. Until one of these inconsistent rulings is abandoned, the limited liability company must
be avoided in Italy; but our collaborators view this problem as temporary. When it is solved, the Italian limited liability company may
be a relatively attractive form of enterprise.
Most of our collaborators report that the limited liability company is viewed with suspicion by creditors, because it has been so
often used for under-capitalized enterprises which eventually failed;
the stock company on the other hand enjoys a presumption of financial responsibility. We suppose, however, that the presumption
against the limited liability company is readily rebutted by evidence
of adequate capitalization, or by the parent company's willingness
to guarantee particular undertakings.
81

Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. II9.
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d. Restrictability of Share Transfers
We referred above to restrictions on transfer as possible disadvantages in the limited liability company. Restrictions are a disadvantage to a capitalist who wants to induce maximum financial participation in his company by outside investors.
But we have found that many American corporations, contemplating investments in foreign countries, are much more concerned
with keeping investors out than with getting them in. Such corporations issue a very minimum of shares to others than the parent
corporation itself, and require each recipient to agree in writing to
make no disposition without consent.
Where the desire is to minimize public participation in the company's equity, the limited liability company offers definite attractions. In Belgium, France, and Luxembourg the shares are automatically non-transferable unless a specified majority of the other
shareholders consents. 82 In Italy and Germany the law does not impose this restriction, but permits its insertion in the company
charter. 83
It is true that some degree of non-negotiability is also attainable
in stock company shares. Professor Houin believes that the numerical majority of French stock companies would be found to have
rules restricting stock transfer. But restrictions on transfer are not
expressly authorized by the stock company laws of most countries, 84
and the extent to which transfers may be validly restricted is not
clearly defined either by case law or by legal theory. 85
82
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 126.
France: Law of 1925 art. 22.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 189.
83
Germany: GmbHG § 15 (expressly stating that transfers may be restricted by
charter provisions).
Italy: C. Civ. art. 2479 (stating that shares are transferable in the absence of contrary provisions in the articles of incorporation) (salvo contraria dispozione dell'atto
constitutivo) .
.. Germany expressly authorizes charter restrictions on transfer: AktG § 61 ( 3). But
many desired forms of restriction are beyond the statutory authorization: See ScHLEGELBERGER-QUASSOWSKI, KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 71, Anmerkung 9 (1939).
85
An interesting exchange of views of the subject in Belgium is contained in a pair
of comments by Coppens, 64 JouRNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 215 (Belgium 1949), and de
Rouvreux, 55 REVUE PRATIQUE DES SoCIETES CIVILES ET COMMERCIALES 54 (Belgium
1956); cf. VAN RYN, PRINCIPES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, Part I, at 364 ( 1954); for Germany see Schneider, op. cit. supra note 66, at 233.
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e. Number of Shareholders

A second feature of the limited liability company which may attract some Americans is the smaller number of shareholders required. In Belgium, France, and Luxembourg a stock company
requires seven sha:reholders, 86 while a limited liability company requires only two. 87 According to the prevailing view of lawyers in
these countries, the shareholders must be bona fide in that they
must pay their own money for their shares. But they need not hold
more than one share a piece; and they may be bound by contract to
assign the share to someone else on demand of the parent company. 8 x
European lawyers generally do not consider shareholder requirements as a weighty consideration. Even if they are violated, the
principal consequence (in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg) is
liability to an annulment proceeding, which in France can be arrested by restoring the number of shareholders to seven (provided
they have never dropped below two). 89 Since a shareholder's derivative suit cannot be brought by less than five percent of the shareholders, European lawyers have no such fear of small shareholders
as American lawyers generally do.
Whatever the merits of this European view may be, we believe
that most American parent companies in fact will be extremely
cautious in the selection of the other six shareholders, and in maintaining amicable relations with them. The time and trouble involved
in finding six such shareholders and keeping them happy can be cut
down by using the limited liability company form, which requires
only one shareholder in addition to the parent company.
The difference in required number of shareholders has less significance in the other countries. In Italy two shareholders are enough
for either type of company. 90 Even if there is only one, the company
does not cease to exist; it merely ceases to insulate the sole shareholder from personal liability for debts of the company. 91 In Germany there is a difference in the number of incorporators required
"'Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 29.
France: C. CoM. art. 23.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 26.
87
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 119.
France: Law of 1925, art. 5·
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 183.
88
Cf. Lepaulle and Jeantet in FRIEDMANN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
( 1959) at 214, 22o-221.
80
00

01

Ibid.
Italy: C. CIV. art. 2247·
/d. art. 2362.
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92

(five against two) , but there is no objection to IOO% ownership
by a single shareholder after the company is once formed. 93 Hence
the selection of the extra incorporators does not demand much attention in either Germany or Italy. The Netherlands has no limited
liability companies, but two incorporators are enough to form a
stock company, and the number of shareholders after incorporation
does not need to be more than one.

f. Number of Officers and Directors
A third attractive feature of the limited liability company is the
simplicity of management structure permitted by law. A small
limited liability company can operate with no board of directors,
no president, no auditors and only a single manager. 94 It is not even
necessary to hold a shareholders' meeting to elect the manager; he
may be named in the articles, and hold office indefinitely without the
necessity for annual elections. 95
This simple arrangement is not recommended as a permanent
structure in any company; but it may be extremely convenient in
the early years of a foreign venture. The parent company may not
know to whom it can wisely entrust the decision-making power in a
European country; it will hope to avoid naming board members
whom it may later wish to remove and replace.
In contrast, the stock company is required by law to provide itself
with a panoply of officialdom which is sometimes quite premature.
The requirements are most elaborate in Germany, where every
92

AktG

§:~:Five

members; GmbHG

§:~:Specifying

no number, but implying plural-

ity.
93
HAUMBACH-HUECK, AKTIENGESETZ § 30 (9 ed. 1956).
"'Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 129. But a board of auditors must be named, if there
are more than five shareholders. ld., art. 134. The single manager is called a glrant,
or beheerder.
France: Law of 1925, art. 24. But if there are more than 20 shareholders, a board
of supervision (counseil de surveillance) must be named, id. art. 32. The single manager is called gerant.
Germany: GmbHG § 6. But there must be a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) if there
are over 500 employees, by the terms of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of Nov. 10, 1952,
§ 77· The single manager is called a Geschiiftsfiihrer.
Italy: C. Civ. art. 2487. But an auditing committee (colle{lio sindacale) is required if
the capital is over 1,ooo,ooo lire (about $1500). Id., art. 2488. The single manager is
called an amministratore unico ..
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 191. There is no limit on the size of the company
which may be governed by a single manager, called gerant or Geschiiftsfiihrer.
""Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 129.
France: Law of 1925, art. 24Germany: GmbHG § 6.
Italy: C. Crv. arts, 2487 and 2383.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 191.
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stock company must have a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) of
three or more members, none of whom are either executives or employees of the company, and who must hire one or more executives
( Direktoren). 96 In other words, the investor in a stock company
must find three policy-makers whom he trusts enough to put them in
charge of his business, but who are not employed in it, plus one fulltime executive. In a limited liability company he needs to find only
the executive.
A similar number of persons must be found in Italy-at least
three auditors ( sindaci) who are neither employees of the company
nor relatives of the manager, and at least one manager ( amministratore) .97 But the choice is a little less momentous, since the three
auditors do not have the extensive powers of the German supervisory board.
In France and Belgium, four persons must also be found to fill the
necessary positions-three managers ( administrateurs) and at least
one auditor ( commissaire) .98 The directors may be employees of
the company, but the auditors must be strictly independent-not
employed by the directors or by the company, and not related by
blood or marriage to the directors. 99 The requirements are the same
in Luxembourg, except that there are no express prohibitions of
other relations between the auditor and the company or its directors.100
The privilege of operating a limited liability company with a
single manager is available only to ''smaller" enterprises, but the
criteria of smallness vary greatly. In Italy, the line is drawn at the
meager capital of I million lire (about $ r ,soo) ; above that, auditors are required. 101 In Germany, the line is drawn at soo employees;
with more, a 3-man supervisory board is required. 102 In Belgium and
France, the line is drawn in terms of number of shareholders; such
a line need never be crossed by a typical corporate subsidiary. The
penalty for crossing is a three-man board of auditors. 103 Only Lux.. AktG §§ 70, 86, 90.
C. Crv. arts. 2380, 2397, 2399·
98
France: Law of Nov. I6, I940, art. 1 (administrateur); Law of 1867, art. 32 (commissaires).
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, arts. 55 and 64.
09
France: Law of I867, art. 33·
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 64 quater (as amended by law of Dec. I, 1953).
100
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 61.
101
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2488.
"""Betriebsverfassungsgesetz § 77 (Hereinafter cited as Betr VerfG).
108
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. I 34·
France: Law of I925, art. 32·
97
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embourg sets no statutory size limit to the companies which may
use the single-manager system: perhaps size limits in Luxembourg
are imposed by geography.
The weight which should be given to these personnel requirements
varies somewhat among the countries. A few officers, like the executives (Direktoren) in a German stock company, cannot be removed
from their position without proof of unfitness for the office. Most
officers-including the members of the highest governing boards in
France and Germany (conseil d'administration, conseil de surveillance, Aufsichtsrat) are removable at the pleasure of the shareholders.104 As to officers of the latter type, the investor can if necessary authorize his European counsel to fill the positions with docile
individuals who will vote as instructed, and resign when requested;
that is, with "dummy directors." Certainly the difficulty of filling
positions should not stand in the way of selecting a form of organization which is strongly indicated by the financial requirements of
the enterprise. But, other things being equal, useless cogs in the
administrative machinery are to be avoided for the same reason as
are useless parts in the power plant.
g. Labor Representation
In Germany a unique factor favoring the limited liability company is encountered. In every stock company, regardless of size, onethird of the supervisory board members (who choose the executives) must be labor representatives. This requirement does not
affect limited liability companies until they have 500 or more employees.105

h. Privacy
A few American investors may also be attracted to the limited
liability company by1:he greater financial privacy permitted in some
countries. In Germany and Luxembourg stock companies must publish their annual financial statements, 106 while limited liability companies do not have to. But the resulting disclosure is no greater, and
usually less, than unlisted American corporations' statements in
Moody's or Standard and Poor's.
""For a fuller discussion of "governing boards" see the next part of this chapter,
under the title "Management of a European Subsidiary."
""' Betr VerfG § 77·
106
Germany: AktG § 143.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 75· In France, the duty to publish financial statements falls only on those stock companies which are listed on a stock exchange. Ord.
59-247, Feb. 4, 1957; J.O. Feb. 8, 1959, p. 1754; L'AcTUALITE JuRIDIQUE 1959, III. 62.
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i. Other Advantages
There are other advantages in the limited liability company form
which contribute to its popularity among small businessmen in Europe. One of these is a smaller minimum capital; in Germany a
stock company mu~~ have minimum capital of about $25 ,ooo, while
$5,000 will do for a limited liability company. 107 Another is the
simplicity of the papers to be filled out; they are such that a European businessman may feel safe in preparing them without a
lawyer. Some laws permit publishing an extract of limited liability
company articles, while stock company articles must be published in
full at greater expense. These advantages will not be of much interest to American investors in Europe; they are pin-prick in relation to the major expenses and difficulties inherent in a trans-Atlantic
plunge.

3.

TRANSFORMATION

The choice between stock company and limited liability company,
once made, is not irreversible. In each country which offers the
choice, there is also a procedure for changing from one to another,
called "transformation." 108 Like incorporation, it involves drawing
up new articles, and depositing and publishing various copies or
extracts; the expenses are probably about the same as for incorporation.
However, transformation is not necessarily a "tax-free reorganization," in the American sense. In Belgium and Germany, at least,
it is viewed under tax laws as a sale of assets unless it comes within
certain strict limitations. If it is not within these limits, it incurs
transfer taxes based on the value of the assets transferred, and income tax on previously unrealized or unreported gains. In Germany,
the limits are fairly wide; it is sufficient that both companies (the
submerging, and the emerging) are German, that 100% of the
assets pass in exchange for stock in the new company and that the
107
AktG § 7 (1oo,ooo DM minimum for a stock company), GmbHG § 5 (zo,ooo DM
minimum for a limited liability company).
The minima are even lower in other countries; Italy requires 1,ooo,ooo lire (about
$1500) for a stock company and 50,000 lire (about $75.00) for a limited liability
company. C. Civ. art. 2327, 2474.
108
Belgium: The procedure is nonstatutory.
France: Law of 1925, art. 21 (Transformation).
Germany: AktG §§ 26}-277 (Umrwand/ung).
Italy: CODICE CIVILE arl:. 2498 ( Trasformazione).
Luxembourg: Procedur'e is nonstatutory.
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book entries be such as to negative any concealment of tax liability.
In Belgium there is no statutory exemption, but only a practice of
the treasury not to claim taxes in those cases in which both the members and the assets of the company remain the same after the transformation as before. In France, on the other hand, transformation
seems to be tax-free by general rule.
We understand that the burdens and risks of transformation are
enough to deter the ordinary incorporator from forming a limited
liability company with the intention of transforming it to a stock
company a few years later, or vice versa. The form is chosen for
"keeps," although Ia ter events sometimes lead the choosers to reverse their original choice. The situation is not like that of England
or the United States, where every company is born as a "private
company" or "close corporation," and becomes a "public company"
or corporation of "public issue" by virtue of later acts. In Europe,
it is usual for the lawyer to attempt to foresee the ultimate character
of the enterprise, and to incorporate in the form which is appropriate to that ultimate character.

C.

THE CHOICE OF A STATE OF INCORPORATION
I. THE DETERMINING FACTORS

One of the features of European incorporation which differentiates it most sharply from incorporation in the United States is
the absence of freedom of choice of the state of incorporation. The
European lawyer who is forming an operating company does not
incorporate in the country whose tax or corporation laws are most
favorable, without regard to where the company's headquarters
are going to be. His choice is already made by the client who has
decided, for other reasons, where he wants to locate the "central
office" of the business. 109
The reasons for this absence of freedom are connected with two
rules of law. One of these is a rule found in the corporation statute
for each country, which provides that the articles must designate a
central office (siege, Sitz, sede, zetel) which must be, at least inferentially, in that country. 110 In this respect they differ from the
109

I adopt for use in comparative law the term employed by

RABEL, 2 CoNFLICT OF

LAWS 31 ff. (1947). Since this concept is not used in Anglo-American law, there is no

precise legal parallel, although it is much like the "home office" of an insurance company.
110
All the laws require that the articles of incorporation be filed at the commercial
court or commercial registry, or both, of the district in which the company has its
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Delaware act, which requires designation only of "the principal
office . . . within this state," 111 or the Illinois act, which calls for
"the address . . . of its initial registered office in this State." 112
A classic view among European theorists is that if the actual central
office is in a country other than that of the office designated in the
articles, the COll}pany is in violation of its charter, and is exposed to
various undesirable (if unspecified) consequences.U 3 A few contemporary writers have questioned whether there are really any
serious consequences to be feared, 114 and a Dutch authority declares
that the Dutch Minister of Justice often ignores known violations
of the rule. 115 The Italian law specifically permits a company to
adopt, by amendment, of its charter, a foreign central office. 116 But
in companies other than the Netherlands and Italy, an Americanowned enterprise would be unwise to make a deliberate test of the
rule.
The second rule which inhibits freedom of choice of place of incorporation is a rule of conflicts of laws. According to prevailing
European opinion, a corporation's internal affairs and its legal
existence are governed by the law of the place where the central
office is locatedY7 This seems to mean the actual central office, not a
"central office," in terms which leave no doubt that a court or registry in the country
of the legislator is intended. See, for instance:
France: Law of 1867 art. 55·
Germany: AktG § 28.
The Netherlands law specifically states that the central office (plaats van vestiging)
must be within the Netherlands. W. K. art. 36c. There are exceptions in the Netherlands
and elsewhere, enacted in contemplation of enemy occupation, which permit temporary
removal of the central office for emergency reasons which will not enter into the planning of American investors.
111
General Corporation Law of the state of Delaware§ 102(g) (2). The wording
admits the possibility of other "principal offices" in any number of other states.
m Illinois Business Corporation Act. § 47b, ILL. STAT. ANN. § 157-47 (b) (Smith-Hurd,
1954).
118
RIPERT, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 268 (France 1954).
VoN GoDIN-WILHELMI, AKTIENGESETZ § 5, Anmerkung 6 (Germany).
KOLLEWIJN, AMERICAN-DUTCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, No. 3 Bilateral Studies
in Private International Law 16 (1955). Kollewijn is somewhat sceptical of this view,
but recognizes it as "prevailing."
m See BEITZKE, }URISTISCHE PERSON EN IM INTERNATIONAL PRIVATRECHT UND FREMDENRECHT 104 (Germany 1938).
115
See Kollewijn, op. cit. supra note 54, at 16.
116
C. C1v. art. 2437·
117
RABEL, 2 CoNFLICT oF LAws 33-37 (1947).
BATIFFOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 232, 453 (France
1955).
WOLFF, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT DEUTSCHLANDS 115 (Germany 1954). Kollewijn op. cit. supra note 113, at 16.
This view was crystallized in a uniform law contained in a treaty signed by the
Benelux countries, but which never came into effect because it was never ratified by
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fictitious one stated in the articles. This contrasts with the prevailing
American rule that the corporation's existence and internal affairs
are governed by the state of incorporation, wherever it may establish its central office.U 8 Following this theory it is said that a company which is organized under the laws of one country, and then
sets up a central office in another, is invalid at the situs of its central
office, because it has not organized in accordance with the laws prevailing there. 119
Professor Ernst Rabel, discussing this question in terms of a
Delaware corporation doing business in Europe, declared:
A corporation constituted in Delaware with headquarters in Amsterdam will be considered subject to
Dutch law on the whole European continent, and therefore on principle as non-existent. . . .
While the essence of the rules has often been misunderstood especially in the English literature and by German
writers too, the policy behind the rules has not always
been appreciated. The most important viewpoint from
which to consider the rule is of a state that does not want
an organization to establish its principal office in its territory and yet derive its existence and legal character from
a foreign state. Thus, in the oldest decisions of the German Supreme Court on this matter, a company incorporated in the state of Washington, United States, for the
purpose of exploiting Mexican mines, but which was controlled by a board of directors in Hamburg, Germany,
the Netherlands, as the Hague Treaty of May II, 1951. It stated in Article 3, "The
existence of a legal person and its organs or representation shall be determined by the
country of its seat . . . . For the purposes of this Article, an artificial person shall be
considered to have its seat at the place where its central control is located."
These provisions, which have no legal force, are regretted by Kollewijn. According
to our informants, these provisions are a major obstacle to ratification, and may be
dropped.
The rule that the company is governed by the law of its central office is apparently
codified by the laws of Belgium and Luxembourg, both of which provide in identical
terms that "every company whose principal establishment is in Belgium (in the
Grand Duchy) is subject to the Belgian (Luxembourg) law, even if the incorporation
took place in a foreign country." Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX art. 197;
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 159. This seems to be understood as referring to
the central office, rather than to the site of exploitation.
Italy: The code declares that all companies are subject to Italian company law if
they have their central office or principal activity in Italy (C. Cxv. 2505), although
inconsistently declaring that Italian law applies to companies formed in Italy, but
active principally abroad (C. Crv. 2509). See also Loussouarn, Droit International du
Commerce, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 246, 2 50 ( 1959), commenting
on art. 58 of the Treaty of Rome.
118
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 155, 182 ff. j RABEL, op. cit. supra note 109, at
31.
no Wolff, op. cit. supra note n7, at ns-n6.
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was denied recognition as an American legal entity; having failed to fulfill the German requirements for incorporation, it was treated as a German non-corporate association. When a domestic company transfers its domicil to
a foreign country, it loses its personality. 120
In the view of our Dutch collaborator, Professor Rabel's choice
of Amsterdam as a hypothetical site was unfortunate. Mr. Deelen
concurs in Kollewijn's view with respect to a corporation formed
under foreign law but having its actual central office in Holland, that
It is out of the question that a Dutch judge would ever,
on this sole ground (there being no fraud or public policy
considerations) declare a corporation null and void, and
no decision to that effect has ever been rendered. 121
Conversely, he b.elieves that corporations could be formed in the
Netherlands, and operate their affairs from headquarters in Germany or France without objection from the Dutch government or
courts.
However, an investor cannot safely take advantage of this Dutch
liberalism unless he is assured of equally tolerant views in the
neighboring countries in which the other part of the play would have
to be acted. Despite intimations of similar tolerance by occasional
writers in other countries, 122 the weight of authority (and of our
collaborators) cautions against experimenting with these rules of
law. The safe course is to organize where the central office is to be,
and to centralize management unambiguously at that office.
Although there is no freedom to choose a state of incorporation
which is different from the state of the central office, there is no
prohibition against choosing a central office location which is outside the country of the principal business operations. 123 For instance,
a company could establish its main office in Luxembourg, although
its principal business consisted of exploiting coal mines in the N etherlands or operating steel mills in France. The "central" office is
1
'"'
121

RABEL, op. cit. supra note II7, at 37-39.
Kollewijn, op. cit. supra note II3, at 16.
The result seems to be precluded also by the Netherlands-U.S. Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, which provides in Article XXIII, § 3, that <~Companies
constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either
party ~hall be deemed companies thereof, and shall have their juridicial status recognized within the territories of the other party." T.I.A.S. 3942.
122
E.g., Beitzke, op. cit. supra note II4.
123
Ripert, op. cit. supra note II3, at 396.
Battifol, op. cit. supra note II7, at 232.
Wolf, op. cit. supra note 117, at 115.
Rabel, op. cit. supra note II7, at 40.
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identified by reference to activities of management and supervision,
rather than activities of manufacture and sale. 124
According to our information, little use is made, and little should
be made, of this technical freedom. It is quite unlike operating a
Hoboken refinery from a Manhattan executive office, because there
are between any two European countries a flock of actual or potential barriers which have not existed since 1865 between American states. There are passport clearances impeding travel from
one to the other, differences of currency, possible exchange restrictions, and customs (until 1972). All these barriers impede the
intimate contact between management and operations which is just
as essential to optimum efficiency in Europe as it is in the United
States.
There is another reason for not separating management from
operations which is peculiarly European. European managers with
whom we have spoken emphasize the necessity of constant contacts with government, since price changes, wage changes, and
major building programs must frequently be approved by an official
of a national ministry. It is reliably reported that the notoriously
uneconomic concentration of French industry in the Paris area is
influenced by the need of managements to be simultaneously near
their plants and near their ministers.
Consequently, it is unlikely that a company organized to mine or
manufacture solely in France would locate its central office in Germany or vice versa. However, if a single company were formed to
mine and manufacture in both France and Germany, it might locate its central office in either of the countries, and would not need
to move because the activities in the foreign country grew larger
than those in the country of the central office. Or it might choose a
central office in Luxembourg, which is between the major countries.
2. THE "DELAWARES OF EUROPE"

If we may judge from our conversational contacts, the views expressed in the preceding paragraphs will surprise many American
lawyers, who have been told that Lichtenstein or Switzerland or
Luxembourg is the "Delaware of Europe."
Such metaphors convey more falsity than truth. In so far as they
suggest that these countries furnish a convenient place for incorwLoussouarn, in Les Conflits de Lois en Matiere de Societes 135 (1949) contends that
a central office which did not coincide with any important operations would be presumptively fraudulent,
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porating a company which will have its central office and principal
operations in other countries, they are false both in law and in practice. None of these countries is commonly used, or could be advantageously used, for such purposes, for the reasons already given.
A second connotation of such a metaphor might be that the laws
of these countries permit great freedom in financial operations, for
instance, the payment of "nimble dividends" when capital is impaired, or the assignment of most of the share consideration to
surplus which can be freely paid out as dividends. These suppositions would also be baseless, at least as to Switzerland and Lux··
embourg.
Or it might be supposed that these countries have lower incorporation fees than neighboring countries, as Delaware's franchise
tax is lower than that of most industrial states. We do not have
complete information on the incorporation fees in these countries,
but we understand that incorporators are not drawn to them by cost
advantages of this kind.
However, it is true that certain investors have sought out these
countries as places in which to incorporate and manage their companies, in preference to neighboring countries; but the companies so
formed have been, in almost all cases, holding companies, not operating companies. They have been truly localized in the country of
incorporation, because their securities are kept there.

D.

THE EuROPEAN LAWYER's RoLE IN INCORPORATION

The procedures of incorporating in the countries of the European
Common Market are basically like procedures in the United States.
They start with some rather mechanical documents, filled with the
proper number of names and addresses, indications of the corporate
purposes, statements of kinds and amounts of capital stock, and a
good many paragraphs about directors and officers, their powers and
their pay. The papers must be filed, some sort of publication made,
fees paid, organization meetings held, and certificates of completion
of one or another formality carefully executed.
In Europe, as in the United States, these formalities are for the
local practitioner. There is no point in the American investor's
learning their details, because he cannot perform them anyway.
Hence, we do not present checklists of incorporation steps.
\Vhat the American investor can do is to make an intelligent selection of a European practitioner, explain his general objectives, and
review the documents which the practitioner proposes to file and
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publish. The following observations explain some of the differences
in European practice which an American investor will encounter in
his dealings with European legal representatives.
I. THE ADVOCATE

The American who looks around the Common Market for a
"corporation lawyer" encounters a puzzling situation. It is difficult
to find any expression in. any of the four languages involved which
would accurately translate the term "lawyer," 125 much less the term
"corporation lawyer."
The American may, however, ask for a "member of the bar," and
be led without hesitation to an "advocate" (avo cat, A nwalt, avvowto, advocaat). The advocate is primarily a courtroom lawyer
and is often compared to the English barrister. 126 But, unlike the
barrister, he does not have to be approached through a solicitor,
nor does he expect the facts to be gathered and the case appraised
before it comes to him. Perhaps the advocate is best explained by
saying that he is like one of the great general practitioners of
America's nineteenth century, who could try a tort case, argue a
constitutional law appeal, and advise a corporation on its tax liability, all without partners or junior associates.
Many European advocates, including some of the very best, are
solo practitioners, except. as they may have apprenticed assistants.
In France group practice among advocates was forbidden until
127
I 9 54.
Since solo practitioners are not likely to be highly special125
See BURDICK, THE BENCH AND BAR OF MANY LANDS (1939), for genera) observations on the legal professions in Germany, France, and Italy. For France, see Lepaulle,
Law Practice in France, so CoLUM. L. REv. 945 (1950); Brown, The Office of Notary
in France, 2 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 6o ( 1953); Tunc,
Modern Developments in Preparation for the Bar in France, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 71
( 1949-50) ; Simmons, French Lawyers' Special Fields, 30 TuLANE L. REV. 101 ( 1955).
For Germany, see Weniger, The Profession of the Bar in Germany, 34 ILL. L. REV.
85 (1939-40). For Italy, see Sereni, The Legal Profession in Italy, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1000 ( 1950).
The plurality of possible interpretations is illustrated by the fact that Frenchman
Tunc (above) treats avocats and avouh as the only classes of French lawyers, while
Frenchman Lepaulle (above) described avocats, avouis, notaires, and agents d'affaires
as varieties of "lawyers."
108
For instance, by Brown and by Tunc (see note 125 supra). With respect to France,
there is some point in the barrister-advocate comparison because neither has power
to "represent" (i.e., make binding agreements for) his client; that belongs to the
solicitor in England and the avoue in France. But the comparison may prove misleading, since the French advocate does not have to be briefed by a solicitor (as the English barrister does), and cannot file written pleadings (as the English barrister can).
In other countries, the advocate may bind his client.
127
HAMELIN, ABREGE DES REGLES DE LA PROFESSION D'AVOCAT art. 207 (1954), citing
decree of April 10, 1954, art. 49·
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ized, in corporate matters, many advocates will not draft the incorporation papers in their own offices. Some, of course, will do so.
Others may accept the responsibility, but delegate the work to an
outside office to prepare the documents-especially if the American
client seems to expect that the advocate should himself produce the
papers. An equally normal procedure, in most of the Common
Market countries, is for the advocate to discuss the principal problems, advise the client on some of the preliminary questions (what
form of company, where to incorporate, what kind of management
structure) and then send the client on to a notary to get the drafting
done. In some of the German states (Lander) the offices of advocate and notary are combined; in these states it is most probable
that an advocate will be found who is both a counselor on corporate
matters and a draftsman of corporate documents.
2. THE "ATTORNEYS-OF-RECORD"

In France there is a special kind of lawyer called an "avow?'-a
title whose etymological connotations recall the English "attorney."
We mention the avoue only because the identification of French
"advocates" with English "barristers" leads so easily to the identification of French avouis with English "solicitors." 128 Since a
prospective American investor in England would properly consult
an English solicitor, the conclusion might be drawn that an American investor in France should consult a French avoue.
Nothing could be further from the mark. The job of the avoue
is to appear of record for a litigant, to file written pleadings, to
receive notices, and to make on behalf of the client any commitments and elections which are incident to the procedure of litigation.
The pleadings which are filed by the avoue may be drawn either by
himself or by the advocate, but oral advocacy is the job of the advocate. An American translation for this peculiar intermediary
might be "attorney-of-record."
These functions of this "attorney-of-record" are much like some
of those performed by an English solicitor. But the French "attorney-of-record" performs none of the functions of business counseling, property management, and drafting of non-litigious documents, which probably occupy the larger part of an English solicitor's
128
The distinguished comparatist Tunc compares them for certain purposes. Op. cit.
supra note 125, at 71, n. r. Tunc emphasized that the French avoue, like the English
solicitor, has the power to "represent" his client.
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time, and which qualify him to advise an American investor. Most
of these functions are performed in France chiefly by notaries. 129
The "attorney-of-record" is a professional who is peculiar to
France, and is not even found in all districts of that Country. There
is some recognition in other countries of the attorney-of-record's
distinct functions, but they are generally performed by a person who
bears the title of "advocate." 129 ~
3·

THE NOTARY

The European notary is also a lawyer. 130 That is, he is a man
who has a university law degree, or who has at least passed professional examinations for his position, and who makes his living
strictly by professional work. But he generally does not appear in
court, except when, as in some German states, he is also an advocate.
Since notaries handle almost all aspects of the administration of
decedents' estates, marriage settlements, and conveyances of real
estate, they might remind an Englishman of a family solicitor; an
American colleague might call them "office lawyers." But the European notary has a dignity which distinguishes him from either an
English solicitor or an American lawyer. Like an American justice
of the peace, he exercises a public trust, even though his income depends on private fees. He holds an "office" which he has either inherited from an ancestor or purchased at a high price, and he is a
custodian of records of property ownership. When he takes acknowledgments of documents, he is not satisfied by knowing that
the signature is genuine; he will read or explain the entire document
to the client, and refuse to take the acknowledgment unless he is
quite sure that the client understands every line. In fact, the notary
is normally the draftsman of documents whose acknowledgments
he takes. 131
Urban notaries frequently become specialists in corporate pracuo Cf., Brown, op. cit. supra. note 125, at 6o.
uoa In Italy, a young lawyer is first admitted to practice only as an attorney-ofrecord (procurazione), but later becomes an advocate (avvocato), and thereafter
performs both functions. See Sereni, supra note 125.
In Luxembourg, most lawyers describe themselves as being both advocates and attorneys, using the hyphenated title, avocat-avoue.
130
See Schlesinger, The Notary and the Formal Contract in Civil La<u-', NEw YoRK
STATE, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION 403 ( 1941) (observations on France,
Germany, and Switzerland).
Brown, op. cit. supra note 125, at 6o.
131
Our Netherlands collaborator says that in his country the notary invariably drafts
any instrument which is required to be notarized.
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tice. It is no accident that some of the best French treatises on company law have been written by the editor of the "Notaries' Journal." 1s2
4·

UNLICENSED LAWYERS

Various classes of people who are not members of any legal profession, and perhaps not of any licensed profession, also participate
actively, competently, and lawfully in advising on incorporation
problems. Frequently tax problems are important, and these will
probably be referred by lawyers or notaries to tax specialists, who
are not usually lawyers; they are sometimes, but not necessarily,
accountants.
Accountants may also assume the main work of planning the
corporate organization and drawing the papers; an Italian advocate
has advised us that his accountant competitors are perfectly competent in corporate matters, while another doubts it.
There are also, at least in France, wholly unlicensed business
agents (agents d'affaires or conseillers commerciaux) who will undertake to arrange an incorporation, acting partly as advisers and
partly as intermediaries for notaries and tax specialists who may be
needed. 133
Some of these unlicensed advisers have organized themselves into
an association of "company legal advisers" ( conseils juridiques de
socihes). The existence of these unlicensed operatives in a semilegal field seems to be an indirect result of the fractionation of the
French legal profession in terms of formal procedures-formal
appearance and filing of written pleadings (by the avoue) ,1 34 oral
argument (by the avo cat), and drafting of nonlitigious documents
(by the notaire). As an incident of this fractionation, counseling has
become nobody's profession.
This interesting lacuna in French professional regulation explains the role of the many American lawyers in Paris who have no
license for any kind of practice in France. So long as they only give
advice, referring formal procedures to licensed attorneys-of-record,
'""'Moreau, Editor-in-chief of the JOURNAL DES NOTAIRES, is the author of LES
Socnhfs CIVILES (France, 1954), LA SOCIETE ANONYME (France, 1948), LA SOCIETE
A RESPONSABILITE LIMITER (France, 1952).
133
See Lepaulle, op. cit. supra note 125, at 947; Simmons, op. cit. supra note 125.
,... In discussing French procedure (in English) one must distinguish between the
written contentions, technically called "pleadings" in Anglo-American law (see BoUVIER,
LAw DICTIONARY, tit. "Pleading"), and oral persuasion, colloquially called "pleading."
Confusion is promoted by the cognation of the English word "pleading" (with its two
meanings) and the French Plaidoirie (whose technical meaning is oral advocacy).
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advocates, and notaries, they may lawfully carry on activities which
would be considered the "practice of law" if carried on in the
United States. 135
There is no doubt that some of these unlicensed counsellors are
thoroughly competent, nor that there are some who are not. One
can only say that the care which should always be used in selecting
a professional adviser is even more vital if an unlicensed one is
chosen.
5·

WHICH KIND OF LAWYER?

The only professionals whose participation is required by law for
a European incorporation are the notaries. They are needed for the
execution of articles of a stock company in every country but
France; 136 and they are necessary in France to complete the company organization. 137 In the formation of limited liability companies
they are required in Belgium, Germany, and Italy/38 but not in
France and Luxembourg.
Experienced European businessmen frequently use no more outside professional service than the law requires. They incorporate
without the advice of an advocate, and use a notary only in the
situations where the law requires it. They do not consult an advocate, an accountant, or a tax specialist, unless the incorporation
presents unusual technical problems.
American investors, on the other hand, have generally consulted
European advocates, and obtained through them such services as
might be needed from notaries, accountants, and tax specialists.
Perhaps this has frequently been done under a belief that an advocate, like an American lawyer, is the only qualified adviser on
""'An English solicitor and law teacher, Mr. L. Neville Brown, informs us that in
England also "the lawyers' monopoly . . . has been eaten away as far as counseling
in tax and corporation matters is concerned by the professional accountant and various
business consultants. . . ."
180
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, arts. 29, 3 I, 33·
Germany: AktG § I6. The law requires notarial or judicial execution; but notarial
is the practical choice.
Luxembourg: Company Law arts. 26 and 30.
Netherlands: W.K. art. 36.
37
'
The cash subscriptions must be originally paid in either to the N a tiona) Deposit
Bank (Caisse de depots et consignations), or to a notary; when the required fraction
of subscriptions has been paid in, the proceeds can be released to the company officers
only on a notarial affidavit that the conditions have been fulfilled. Law of 1867, art. I.
We are advised that the simpler and most preferred procedure is to use a notary for
both functions.
138
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX art. 4·
Germany: GmbHG § 2.
Italy: CoDicE CIVILE art. 2475.
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corporate matters. Although such a belief would be false, the
practice of consulting an advocate is probably sound. It is safe to
say that a European investment by an American enterprise always
involves problems which are unfamiliar to the investor. It seems to
be the European consensus that the advocate is the professional
most likely to have a sound perspective concerning the ensemble of
problems likely to arise, and the one best qualified to draw in others'
talents.
With this comment we would like to pass on two warnings from
our European informants. The American investor should not expect
his advocate to produce in his own office all the expertise and the
documentation'·required; he should be prepared to have the advocate
draw on other professionals or to send the American to them.
It should also be clear that the American does not always need a
European advocate. If he is reliably referred to a French or German
notary, it is probable that the notary is just as competent as any
advocate to decide when other professional collaboration is called
for. Likewise, an American lawyer practising in Europe (without a
European license) may be perfectly competent to supply the perspective which is commonly obtained from a European advocate,
and to call on the other professionals (notaries, tax specialists)
who may be useful.

E.

THE ORGANIC DocUMENTs
I. DRAW THEM IN EUROPE!

The late Professor Ascarelli once remarked that it is of secondary importance whether the American investor asks an advocate, an
accountant, or a notary to draw his European articles of incorporation. The thing of primary importance, he said, is this: don't draw
the articles in New York and send them to Rome or Hamburg.
Not only are such articles invariably far from the demands of local
law and practice, but they impose on a European lawyer an impossible job of explaining to the American client why they must be
changed. What the American client should send to Rome or
Hamburg is a statement of what activities he wants to conduct,
where he expects to get his money, whom he expects to employ as
managers, and other information on operational plans; the drafting
he should leave to the European adviser.
In the light of this advice-which appears to us to be very sound
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-there is not much to say on this side of the water about the organic
documents. We will offer a few observations designed chiefly to improve communications between transatlantic and cisatlantic lawyers.
2. ARTICLES ANO RY-LAWS

One does not, of course, ask a Europe"an lawyer to prepare a set
of articles and by-laws. The Europeans do not use these two sets of
organic documents; their functions are combined in one document.
Telling him to draw a set of "articles" may also contain elements
of confusion; the more English he knows, the more likely he is to
be confused. For instance, he may know that the basic document in
Delaware and New York is called the "certificate of incorporation," and in England (from which many Europeans surprisingly
take their English), "memorandum of association." What then are
"articles of incorporation?" It may be helpful to have at hand some
European names of the formative documents-acte constitutif,
Griindungsvertrag, atto constitutivo, akte van oprichting.
These European names are not the end of the matter, either. We
have in America one set of names for the basic document, when we
think of it as something signed and filed during the formative
process of the corporation; these are "certificate of incorporation"
or "articles of incorporation" (varying by jurisdiction). We have
another set which we use after the corporation has been fully organized, to refer to the contents of the docume11t, and to include amendments to it; thus we speak of the limitations of the "charter."
Likewise Europeans have a set of names which signify the organic
law of the company, as derived from the articles and amendments.
The principal terms are statuts, Satzung or Gesellschaftsvertrag,
statuti, and statuten. 139
Many of the elements found in European articles of incorporation are the same as those in American articles. They indicate the
statutory type of company (stock or limited liability), the purpose,
the name, the duration, and the amount of capital.140 In all limited
139
Gesellschaftsvertrag is generally applicable to all commercial companies, including stock companies, limited liability companies, and partnerships. Satzung is a special
name for the Gesellsclzaftsvertrag of a stock company (used also for the partnership
limited by shares, Kommanditgesellschaft auf II ktien). See, for instance, usage in

HUECK, GESELLSCHAFfSRECHT 24, II6 (1958).

""For the principal statutory sections on contents of the articles of incorporation see
the following:
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 30 (stock companies); arts. I2Q-I2I (limited liability
companies).
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liability companies, and in stock companies except in France, the
incorporators are named in the articles. To the practiced American
eye, nothing essential is lacking except that the purpose clause is
much shorter.

J. PURPOSE CLAUSES
There are considerable variations in the laws and practices of
the various countries with respect to purpose clauses. The law and
practice in France is liberal. A popular form book advises the incorporator, after stating the objects which he has in mind, to add as
additional object.s,
Investment by the company, by any form or means, in
any business and any company now existing or which may
come into existence.
And all industrial operations in general. 141
Professor Houin considers this bad practice, but notes that it is
widely followed, and that the undesirable consequences are uncertain.
While this approach will remind an American lawyer of some of
the clauses seen in Delaware and other American charters, there is
an important difference. One never encounters the three-page list
of purposes and powers which are customary in Delaware, and often
used in other American states, and any European lawyer would
probably resist any suggestion that he imitate it. There are at least
two reasons. One is that the law authorizes the articles to state
purposes, not powers. The other is that the ultra vires doctrine,
whose ravages in the United States brought forth the inflated American purpose clauses, never received such extreme applications in
countries of Europe.
Broad purposes clauses are apparently tolerated also in Germany,
Italy, and Luxembourg, so long as some real purpose exists. 142 In
two nations-Belgium and the Netherlands-vague or omnibus
purpose clauses are inadmissible. The Belgian company law was
France: Law of 1867 art. I (S.A.), Law of 1925 art. 14 (SARL).
Germany: AktG § 16, GmbHG § 3·
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2328 (S.p.A.), art. 2475 (SARL).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 27 (S.A.), art. 184 (SARL).
Netherlands: W.K. arts. 36b, 36c, 36d.
ul LEMEUN!ER, POURQUOI ET COMMENT CONSTITUER UNE SOCillTE ANONYME p. I-7
(19<8).
1
.. Our German collaborator warns that a company might be successfully attacked
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amended in I 9 58 to require a "precise designation of the purpose
of the enterprise." 143 In the Netherlands the Ministry of Justice is
likely to refuse a permit to incorporate if the declared objects go beyond the potential of the company's capital.
4·

RULES OF INTERNAL GOVERNMENT

Any brevity which European articles acquire through the shortness of their purpose clauses is soon lost by the length of their
provisions for internal government. The articles contain innumerable details on shareholders' meetings-when they are held, how
they are called, who may be admitted, how the agenda is made up,
how minutes are kept, how votes are counted. Many of these provisions will be found to restate propositions of the company law of the
particular country. These portions of the articles are much like the
by-laws of a typical American corporation.
It is obviously inconvenient to have to include all this material in
the formally filed articles; it is of no interest to the state, or the
creditors, or anyone other than the shareholders. But since there is
only one organic document in European company law, these necessary provisions must be put in it.
The burden of including these internal matters in the articles is
recognized by some of the publication laws. In France and Germany
publication is required only of an extract of the articles; the extract
corresponds roughly to American articles, and excludes most of the
"by-law" items.l44 In Belgium the extract procedure is used for
limited liability companies, 145 hut not, unfortunately, for stock
if it were formed without any specific purpose in mind, but merely to serve some
later need which might appear; that is Gesellscha/t auf Vorrat.
1
.. C. CoM. I-IX, art. 30 (r), as amended by Law of January 6, 1958.
144
France: The extract for the societe anonyme requires: ( r) type of company (e.g.,
stock company or limited partnership with shares); (2) name; (3) purpose; (4,) central office; (5) names and addresses of members; (6) names of managers and auditors;
(7) amount of capital, value of shares, and description of property (if any) exchanged
for shares; . • • ( 9) provisions (if any) for special reserves; ( ro) whether there are
any shares with double vote, or any founders' shares; (II) when the company begins
and expires; ( 12) the court in which the complete articles and other documents were
filed. Law of r867, art. 57· The extract for the SARL is substantially the same. Law
of 1925, arts. 13 and 14.
Germany: The extract for the stock company must contain the company name, central office, purpose, date of organization, names of managers, and also (if applicable)
any provisions which may exist limiting the duration of the company, or limiting the
agency powers of the managers or liquidator, or limiting the "authorized" capital.
AktG. § 32. The limited liability company extract is similar. GmbHG § ro. The cited
sections refer. to the entries in the Commercial Register, but these entries must be published by the court, by virtue of HGB § ro.
""C. CoM. I-IX, art. 7(b). The Belgian publication requirement includes two items
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companies.14 6 Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands require publication of complete articles in all cases. 147

F.

INCORPORATORS

One of the striking peculiarities of European incorporation, from
an American viewpoint, is the insistence on numerous incorporators.
The laws do not generally state a minimum number of signers of
the formative documents, but they do specify the minimum number
of shareholders, and European lawyers generally conclude that
the full benefits of incorporation are not attained until that number
of shareholders exists. For stock companies, the minimum number
is seven in Belgium, France and Luxembourg, 148 and five in Germany.149 In Italy and the Netherlands two will suffice for a stock
company/ 50 and two will do for a limited liability company in all the
countries where such a company may be formed. 151 But no member
of the Common Market has followed the example of a few American states which permit a single investor to incorporate. 152
Requirements of this sort give little difficulty to an American
lawyer on his home grounds; any group of clerks will do for incorporators, and shares can be subscribed and paid for in their
names. But many European lawyers will object to this kind of
practice. Our Belgian, French, and Dutch collaborators all warn
against the unpleasant legal consequences which might result from
procedures of this sort; only the German colleague sees no problem.
which would probably be found in American by-laws-the fiscal year, and the date of
the annual shareholders' meeting.
""C. CoM. I-IX, art. 9·
mLuxembourg: Company Laws art. 8.
Netherlands: W.K. art. 367.
148
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 29.
France: Law of 1867, art. 23.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. z6.
149
AktG § z.
150
Italy: CODICE CIVILE art. ZZ47·
Netherlands: No statutory provision requires more than one member; but all sections
speak of the members in plural terms, and Dutch legal theory regards incorporation as
a group action (our Dutch collaborator uses the German term Gesamtakt) which requires more than one participant.
""Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 119.
France: Law of 1925, art. 5·
Germany: GmbHG § z.
Italy: C. CIV. art. ZZ47·
Luxembourg: Company Law art 183.
"'"IowA ConE § 491.z ( 1958).
KENTUCKY REV. STAT. § 271.025 (Baldwin's, 1955).
MICH. CoMp, L. § 450.3 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN,§ ZI.3 (1937).
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Our Luxembourg collaborator, while disapproving the use of straw
incorporators, reports that this is the usual thing in foreign-owned
companies, especially holding companies.
The precise nature of the dangers incurred by using straw incorporators are not very clear. One of the consequences is said to be
liability for losses occasioned by the pretense; but if the straw man's
subscription is actually paid, there would seem to be no loss. In
Belgium a statute provides that shareholders are liable for debts
of the company until the required complement is reached. 153 Our
Belgian collaborator warns that the straw man commits a crime by
falsely representing himself to be a subscriber, which he is not; 154
but admits that the probability of prosecution is slight.
The most serious probable consequence applies only to the situation in which the various incorporators are all nominees of one
investor, so that the new company is in reality a one-man company,
or a wholly-owned subsidiary from its very inception. In this
situation European theorists (unlike American) are inclined to
regard the company as having no legal existence. One theory behind
this view is the classic principle of continental law that a company
is the result of a contract; and a contract with only one party is
just as impossible in European law as in American.
Contemporary European jurists are well aware that the modern
company is much more an institutional entity than it is a contract,
and a few of them would be willing to discard entirely the contractual view. 155 But the contractual theory is deeply ingrained in the
statutory system, and jurists cannot disregard it just because they
are tired of it. In the law of France, the law of "associations"
( s ocihes), which include all kinds of business corporations, as well
as partnerships and non-profit organizations, appears in the Civil
Code as a subdivision of the law of contract; the French Civil
Code's first words on company law are, "An association is a contract. . . ." 156
Many Europeans also adhere to the view, not unheard of in
158

Belgium: ConE CoM. art. 35·
To the same effect, see van Ryn, op. cit. supra note 85, at 496.
,.. For a comparison of contractual and institutional concepts, see Hamel and Lagarde,
I TRAITE DE DROIT CoMMERCIAL 468-469 (France 1954).
156
C. Crv. art. 1832: "La societe est un contrat par lequel deux ou plusieurs personnes conviennent de mettre quelque chose en commun dans Ia vue de partager Ie
benefice qui pourra en resulter." This is the first section of Title IX-"of the Contract
of Association" (du contrat de societe). This title follows titles on sale, exchange, and
bailment, and the title on loans. The same conceptual arrangement is met in the civil
codes of Belgium and Luxembourg. It is only slightly different in Germany, where
we need only substitute the word "obligation" (Schuldverhiiltnis) for "contract."
1

"'
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America, that the debt-escaping functions of a corporation can be
justified only if the corporation also promotes true group activity.
For these and other reasons, European theorists are accustomed
to say that a company in which there was only one bona fide investor
at its inception is a nullity. The theory has been put into effect in
various ways. In the Netherlands a series of tax cases attributed
company income directly to the company's real owner, whose fellowincorporator had been a mere nominee for himY'; In France heirs
were allowed to claim the property of a bank incorporated by their
ancestor in league with straw co-investors. 158 In Italy a statute
which makes a sole shareholder liable for the company debts incurred while he is sole stockholder 159 might be applied to one who
holds some of the shares through straw men. 160
The burden .. of procuring incorporators who meet European
standards will probably not prove very heavy. For ordinary incorporations there is no requirement that the incorporators be
Europeans; 161 they can be Americans. Neither do they have to be
present; they can act by attorney-in-fact. Finally, they do not have
to be natural persons; except in a Belgian limited liability company
and a French stock company, all the incorporators can be corporations. Hence, an American corporation and one of its American
subsidiaries could be the incorporators of a limited liability company
in France, Germany, Luxembourg, or Italy, or of a stock company
in Italy or the Netherlands. Seven American corporations, or seven
corporations and individuals in any combination, could incorporate
a stock company in Belgium or Luxembourg. Six American corporations and one individual could form a French stock company.
The test of bona fide investment is also easily met. One of our
French informants, who is most positive about the danger of straw
men, assures us that there is no danger in taking from each of the
other incorporators a written agreement to sell his shares of stock
at par on demand. A Dutch decision has held that a company was
157
Decision of the Hooge Raad of Nov. 30, 1927, 3067 Weekblad vor Privaatrecht,
Notaris-ambt en Registratie (hereinafter W.P.N.R.) 645 (Netherlands 1928).
Decision of Jan. 12, 1927, 3023 W.P.N.R. 8so.
Decision of May 30, 1928, Beslissingen in Belasting Zaken (hereinafter B.) 4279.
Decision of April 15, 1931, B.4965.
158
Court of Cassation, decision of May 19, 1926, Dalloz, Recueil Periodique et Critique, I at 25 (France 1929).
159
C. ClVIL art. 2362.
100
Mr. Bruna, one of our Italian collaborators, states that prevailing Italian opinion
permits holding through strawmen, unless there were a subjective intent to escape
obligations.
101
There are very few exceptions, such as, in France, petroleum extraction companies,
newspaper publishing companies, travel agencies, which must have a majority of
French shareholders.
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not proved to be invalid merely by evidence that one of the two incorporators sold his shares to the other on the very day of incorporation.162
We do not pretend to appraise the importance of having bona fide
incorporators, or the risks of not doing so. We think, however, that
the American investor should be prepared for the request that he,
not his European lawyer, produce incorporators in the required
number, and that each of these incorporators should pay separately
his original subscription for shares. We have the impression that
most American companies comply with this request, when made;
and we think that it is wiser to comply than to become a party to a
test case on an unsettled point of European law.

G.

CAPITAL AND ITS pAYMENT
I. STATEMENT IN THE ARTICLES

In five of the six Common Market nations the amount of "capital" stated in the articles is quite a different thing from the "authorized capital" which is stated by the articles in most American states.
"Authorized capital" means, in America, the amount which may be
issued before amending the charter; some of it may not be subscribed for some time to come, and some may never be subscribed.
Americans like to have a "cushion" of uncommitted stock to meet
unforeseen needs.
In the Common Market (outside the Netherlands) the capital
contains no uncommitted cushion. The "capital" means the subscribed capital, and the corporation is not fully organized until the
stated amount is 100% subscribed. Some of the statutes say expressly that the company is not perfected until it reaches this
point; 163 even when the statutes are silent, the law is probably the
same.
In consequence, the stated capital should be set at an amount for
which present subscribers are readily available.
If the incorporators foresee that future capital demands will exceed the amount for which present subscriptions are available, they
can sometimes make charter provisions for future increases by
"''Decision of the Hooge Raad of Dec. 14. 1932, B.5339.
163
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 29 (2) (stock companies).
France: Law of 1925 art. 7 (limited liability company).
Germany: AktG § 22 (I) (stock companies).
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2329 (1) (stock companies).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 26 (stock companies), art. 183 (limited liability
companies).
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means simpler than getting a shareholder's vote on a charter amendment. Italy and Germany permit stock companies to adopt charter
clauses which authorize the managers to increase the capital. 164
But the authorized increase must also be fully subscribed within a
limited time-five years in Germany, one in Italy. In this respect,
it is quite unlike American "authorized capital." 165 France also has
some statutory provisions permitting "variable capital," but they
are somewhat inconvenient, and are little used. 166 Other kinds of
companies can increase their initial capital only by charter amendment; this applies to limited liability companies in all five countries,
and to stock companies in Belgium and Luxembourg.
The requirement that all capital be subscribed when the company
is formed does not imply that it must all be paid in at that time. All
the stock company laws specify some minor fraction of the stock
which must be paid in; the fraction is 20% in Belgium and Luxembourg, 25% in France and Germany, and 30% in Italy. 167 The
limited liability laws in France and Luxembourg require payment of
100% of the amount subscribed, 168 but elsewhere permit the same
fractional payments as in stock companies. 169
The fractional payment provisions are primarily directed at payments made in money. When shares are to be paid for in property,
different rules may apply. French law specifically provides that
payment in property must be made in full at the formation of the
company, 170 and the Belgian law is the same. 171 Elsewhere, the rules
,.. Germany: AktG § I69; The increase is limited to so% of the stock before the
increase.
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2443·
'""Law of I867 arts. 48-52.
, .. Some of the inconveniences are that the stock cannot be made negotiable, either in
bearer or registered form (art. so}, and that members can resign and withdraw their
share, or be expelled (art. 52).
w Belgium: C CoM. I-IX, art. 32.
France: Law of I867 art. I, para. 2. The balance must be paid within five years.
Law of March 4, I943 art. I.
Germany: AktG § 28 (2).
Italy: C. C1v. 2329.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 26.
108
France: Law of I867, art. 3, § 4·
Luxembourg: Company Law art. I83.
1
.. Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 120. However, at least so,ooo francs (about $ 1000 )
must be paid in, whatever fraction of the whole it may be.
Germany: GmbHG § 7·
Italy: C. CIV. art. 2476 (cross-referring to stock company requirements).
1
"' Law of I867, art. 4tn As to limited liability companies, full payment of property contributions is expressly required by C. CoM. I-IX, art. Izo.
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for payments in property are no stricter than for payment in mOtley,
and perhaps less so. 172
The result of these requirements is that the capital to be stated
in the articles should be determined in this way:
in a French, Italian or Luxembourg limited liability company, it
should be an amount which known persons are willing immediately
to subscribe and pay in full;
in a Belgian, French, German, Italian, or Luxembourg stock company, and in a Belgian or German limited liability company, it
should be an amount which known persons are willing immediately
to subscribe in full, and pay to the extent of 20 to 30 percent.
In stating the matter in this way, we are greatly oversimplifying the theory. In theory it is possible to have an incorporation "by
stages," 173 in which incorporators subscribe for part of the capital
in the first stage, and then sell the rest of the shares through a
public offering; the incorporation is complete at the end of the public
offering stage. But this procedure exposes the whole venture to the
danger that the public will not subscribe to 100% of the offered
shares; in that event, the incorporation would collapse unless the
subscribers consented to a charter amendment. As a practical matter, well advised investors seldom if ever would launch a company
in this way. They might seek to avoid the risk by obtaining an investment banker to subscribe for the shares not taken by incorporators; but this stratagem is hardly practicable in a newly formed
company. It may well be used in a later increase of capital.
The situation in the Netherlands is quite different. Only one fifth
of the capital stated in the articles needs to be subscribed forthwith,
and there is no time limit on subscriptions to the remainder. 174 Of
the fifth subscribed, only one tenth needs to be paid on each subscribed share; 175 a company could properly carry on business with as
ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS

As to stock companies, the requirement of full payment rests on the opinion!t of commentators. See van Ryn and Heenen, 2 DROIT CoMMERCIAL II (1957).
172
See GODIN-WILHELMI, AKTIENGESETZ § 28, Anmerkung II ( 1950).
173
Known to French commentators as fondation successive and to Germans as
Stufengriindung. Special statutory provisions to deal with the phenomenon are found
in the French Law of x867 art. 4, and in the German AktG § 30.
174
Netherlands: W.K. art. 36c. The subscriptions are a prerequisite to issuance of
the Certificate of Incorporation, without which companies are forbidden to do business.
175
W.K. art. 36g. If the amount has not been paid in, the board members are individually and jointly liable for all the debts of the enterprise. However, the company
can lawfully do business without the payment if the board members are prepared to
bear the risk.
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little as a fiftieth of the declared capital paid in. The declared capital thus appears to be nearly as flexible as the "authorized capital"
of a typical American corporation.
The minimum amounts of declared capital which are required
by some of the European company statutes are not likely to deter
investors who are prepared to cross the ocean to open a business; the
highest are Germany's-about $25,000 for a stock company, and
$5000 for a limited liability company. 176
2. SHARES OF STOCK; PAR VALUE

Some difficulty in talking about shares in European companies is
occasioned by the'" fact that all the European countries have two
terms, where we have only one. While we may speak indifferently
of a man's "share" in a partnership, or his "share" in a corporation,
the Europeans have one set of terms for a share in a partnership
(part, Teil, parte, deelbewijs) and another set (action, A ktie,
azione, aandeel) for a share in a stock company. This difference has
to be noticed because in connection with the limited liability company Europeans always use the partnership term rather than the
stock company term. Hence, the American investor will get a
share called a Teil if he invests in a German limited liability company but will get a share called an A ktie if he invests in a German
stock company.
This is the European jurists' way of emphasizing that the limited
liability company share is non-negotiable, while the stock company
share may be negotiable. For purposes of the incorporation process,
the two kinds of shares are much alike. Both are normally stated in
units of identical value, and the investor acquires a given number
of such shares, as in an American corporation, rather than an undivided fraction of the equity, as in an American partnership. He
buys 200 out of 1000 shares, not merely a "2o% interest."
176
Belgium: No minimum for a stock company; Bfr 5o,ooo (about $10oo) for SPRL,
C. CoM. I-IX, art. 120.
France: No minimum for stock company.
I,ooo,ooo (old) Ffr (about $2,ooo) for SARL, Law of 1925 art. 6.
Germany: IOo,ooo DM for stock company. AktG. § 7·
2o,ooo DM for GmbH. GmbHG § 5·
Italy: I,ooo,ooo IL (about $1500) for a stock company. ConiCE CIVILE art. 2327;
reported due to be increased to 25,00o,ooo IL (about $4o,ooo). 5o,ooo IL (about $75)
for an SARL. CoDICE CIVILE art. 2474; reported due to be increased to 1,5oo,ooo IL
(about $2500).
Luxembourg: No minimum for stock company.
r,ooo,ooo Lfr (about $zooo) for SARL. Company Law art. 182.
Netherlands: No minimum.
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The shares are stated in money values, such as 500 francs or 100
marks, 177 except that Belgium and Luxembourg permit stock companies to issue shares without par value. 178 The other countries do
not authorize no-par shares.
In Europe, as in America, shares cannot be issued for less than
par, 179 but there is no law against issuing them above par, p·erhaps
ten or twenty times above par. 180 Many European minimum par
values are fairly low-for limited liability company shares about
$1.50 in Italy, and $10 in France; for stock company shares only
$x.oo in Luxembourg. 181 Hence it would be theoretically possible
to introduce the "low-par" system in vogue in the United States.
However, no one has done so, and we doubt that it would result
(as in Delaware) in creating a large "surplus" which would be
free of the restriction placed on capital. 182
3·

PAYMENT FOR SHARES-MONEY OR PROPERTY

The Common Market countries have a curious collection of
provisions regarding the payment of consideration for shares. They
are rather different from any regulations known in the United
States, but their origin is not hard to guess. It is evident that the
free-booting promoters of the late nineteenth century, there as here,
issued themselves shares for which they never paid at all, or for
which they paid in property taken at gross over-valuations, with
disastrous results for innocent investors and creditors.
177

There are minimum share values in some countries:
France: sooo Ffr (about $1o) for SARL, Law of 1925 art. 6.
Germany: 100 DM (about $25) for AG. AktG § 8.
500 DM (about $125) for GmbH. GmbHG § 35·
Italy: rooo IL (about $z.5o) for SARL. Comes CIVILE art. 2474·
Luxembourg: 50 Lfr (about $1.00) for SA. Company Law art. 37· 500 Lfr (about $1o)
for SARL. CoMPANY LAW art. 182.
178
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 41.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 37·
179
In the Netherlands, this is expressly provided, subject to the exception that the
underwriter may receive a discount of 6%; W.K. art. 38a. In other countries, this rule
is not expressly stated, as in many American corporation laws, but results from the
requirement that the stated capital must be 100% subscribed. See note 163, supra.
'""Liberty to sell for more than par is specifically granted in German stock companies. See AktG §9 (2 ).
181
See note 177 supra.
182
German stock company law requires that any premium over par value be stated
in the publicly filed documents of organization (AktG. §§ 16(2) and 28(2) ), and that
the premium should form part of a legal reserve which is not available for dividends
(AktG § 130).
Italian law requires that premiums should not be disbursed until a reserve equal to
one-fifth of the stated capital is accumulated from earnings (C. Crv. 2430), but apparently permits disbursement after that time.
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To these evils American courts responded, as we know, with
doctrines making subscribers liable for any deficiency in the value of
consideration received for their shares. 183 Later, legislatures reacted
with Blue Sky laws, designed to enable government officials to determine whether the initial investments in the company had been duly
made. 184 European courts responded in different ways, and their
responses explain some of the regulations on payment for shares.
For cash payments there are regulations of special interest in French,
German, and Italian stock companies, which concern the 25 or 30
percent of the stock subscriptions which must be paid in at or before the completion of incorporation. In France and Italy they must
be deposited in a bank, or with a notary, where they are not available to the company and its promoters until the incorporation is
complete in every respect. 185 Presumably these safeguards are designed to guarantee to creditors that the minimum capital has
actually been paid in; or perhaps to guarantee to shareholders that
their fellow shareholders have also made a proportionate contribution. In Germany they do not have to be banked, but if they are,
the bank must certify that the deposits are unrestricted. 186
For the payment of subscriptions in property, the special regulations are more complicated and more widespread. In the first place,
payments in property may have to be roo% paid in the course of incorporation; in France and Belgium the payments on account which
are sometimes permissible for cash subscriptions are inadmissible
for subscriptions payable in property. 187
Second, the property which is to be exchanged for stock must, in
many instances, be stated in the articles, so that every other incorporator knows about it, and every creditor can learn about it.
This is the rule in Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg both for
stock companies and for limited liability companies. 188 It is the rule
188
Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143, 26 L. Ed. 968 (1881); STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 183 ( 1949); BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS §§ 343 ff.
(1947)·
1B< Loss and CowETT, BLuE SKY LAw r-xo ( 1958); Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 7-16
(1951).
lB5 France: Law of 1867, art. 1; the funds must be deposited in the official national
depositary-Caisse des Depots et Consignations-or with a notary.
Italy: CODICE CIVILE art. 2329; the payments must be made to a special account in
any bank.
180
AktG §§ 28(2), 29(1).
187
See note II4. Supra.
188
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 30 (stock company), art. 121 (limited liability company).
Germany: AktG § 20; GmbHG § 5 (4).

ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS

ss

89

for limited liability companies in France/ and for stock companies
in the N etherlands. 190
A third regulation sometimes encountered is a requirement of
appraisal, the most complicated plan for which is met in the French
stock company. 191 After the stock has been subscribed, a first meeting of subscribers is held, at which auditors are appointed. The
meeting is adjourned, the auditors appraise the property, and a
second subscribers' meeting is held to hear and to accept or reject
the auditors' report. At this meeting, if the property transfer is approved, permanent officers may be elected, and the incorporation
completed. In German stock companies, there is no second organization meeting, but independent auditors must be appointed to
value the property, and the company must not do business until after
the appraisal is made and reported to the court. 192 In I tali an companies of both types, a court-appointed auditor makes the appraisal
which is attached to the incorporation papers; after the company is
organized, the elected directors and auditors must review the
appraisal. 193
A fourth precaution of the legislator is to impede transfer of the
shares received for property. In French stock companies such shares
cannot be represented by certificates, and hence are non-negotiable
for two years after incorporation; 194 in Belgium and Luxembourg
they are not freely negotiable for approximately two years; 195 in
Italy they are non-transferable until the directors and auditors have
made the post-incorporation appraisal.1 96
A fifth hazard is reserved for the property-subscribers in a
French limited liability company. 197 Instead of having an appraisal
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 27 (stock company), art. 184 (limited liability
company).
189
Law of 1925, art. 8.
11
" W.K. art. 40a. Netherlands, of course, has no limited liability companies.
191
Law of 1867, art. 4·
100
AktG §§ 25, 26, 34·
""ComeR CIVILE art. 2343 (stock companies), art. 2426 (limited liability companies).
Deficiency in the value of the assets does not avoid the formation of the company, but
merely requires a reduction in the stock allotted to the subscriber, and consequent reduction of the company's stated capital, unless the subscriber pays up the deficiency in
money. The subscriber may elect to withdraw entirely, resulting in a still greater reduction in the stated capital.
, .. Law of 1867, art. 3(5).
"'"Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 47· The shares can be transferred, but only if they
are in registered form, and the transfer is made with specified formalities.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 44196 ComcE CIVILE art. 2343; the code declares the shares inalienable (inalienabili)
during this period.
""Law of 1925, art. 8.
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at the incorporation stage, the subscribers are made jointly liable
to the company's creditors for any deficiency which may later appear
to have existed between the value of the contributed property and
the par value of the shares. Only when ten years have passed is this
threat lifted.
These various regulations are not only burdensome; they are also
rather fearsome beartraps, since any failure to comply may result
in some sort of invalidity of the corporation, or liability of the
incorporators, or both. The French legislator, in particular, seems
to have prepared ambuscades for any little businessman who might
think of turning his business over to a corporation in exchange for a
portion of the sh~res.
This situation calls for careful study by the American corporation
which plans to establish subsidiaries in Europe. If the subsidiary
has been preceded by any sort of operations in the area, the parent
will be expecting to contribute money and property which was used
in the pre-incorporation business. And if no thought were given to
the matter, these assets would naturally be transferred in exchange
for stock.
If the resulting formalities are found, on investigation, to be
insufferable, there is sometimes a way of avoiding them. Imagine,
for instance, an American corporation which was planning to transfer its stock of goods and intangibles, with its current bank account,
to a forthcoming French subsidiary. Imagine further that the parent
corporation planned to loan the subsidiary additional funds which
might be useful in further development.
The parent can greatly simplify its problem by reversing the roles
of property and cash. Instead of contributing property and loaning cash, it can contribute cash and loan property. That is, it may
buy shares for cash, and transfer the property on a deferred payment plan. The financial risk is the same (assuming the amounts are
equal), but the juridical risks which result from the special incorporation formalities are escaped. There may be some new formalities to be observed in regard to interested directors; but these are
less burdensome.
In Germany this simple reversal of roles would not help much.
There the special formalities which apply to exchanges of stock
for property also apply to property purchases contemplated at the
time of incorporation, 198 or made within two years thereafter. 199
108
AktG § zo. See also § 45-purchases of property amounting to one-tenth of the
corporate capital.
199
AktG. § 45·
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H.

FILING AND APPROVAL

The procedures do not usually involve long waits for administrative action. In all the Common Market countries except the Netherlands, the ancient theory that incorporation is a privilege to be
granted at the sovereign's discretion was discarded decades ago.
For local citizens, incorporation is a matter of right; when the correct formalities have been executed, the papers deposited, there is
nothing to wait for.
Even for foreigners, there are no administrative waits in connection with ordinary incorporations. 200 Under international law
they can lawfully be excluded from incorporation if they are not the
beneficiaries of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation;
but in fact they are not excluded. They do indeed encounter administrative obstacles in getting licenses to be merchants or corporate
executives, or in getting licenses to exchange money for the purpose
of investment, or in getting licenses to enter certain trades. But
these obstacles are not connected with incorporation procedure.
In the Netherlands incorporation is not a matter of right, either
for citizens or for foreigners. It is a privilege granted at the discretion of the Ministry of Justice. In considering whether to grant
an application, the Ministry will consider all kinds of factorswhether the industry will further complicate an over-supply of
goods or services, whether it will hurt or help the Netherlands'
foreign exchange position, whether the proposed capital is adequate,
and whether the financing plans offer any threat to the investment
market. Presumably, a wise investor will explore all these matters
before preparing incorporation papers. If major policy questions
have been cleared in advance, less than a month will usually be required to obtain approval of the application to incorporate.
IV. MANAGEMENT OF A EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY
The most elusive problem in all companies everywhere is probably
management. If the right men can be given the right powers, they
will solve the other problems. In foreign subsidiaries the problem
is naturally complicated by different languages and different conceptions of teamwork, as well as by the special ambiguities of a
subsidiary position.
200 The principal exceptions are (I) specially regulated types of enterprise, such as
banks and insurance companies; (2) enterprises in which foreign participation is
limited, such as (in France) petroleum extraction and newspaper publication.
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In attacking these problems an American lawyer will need some
conception of the legal structures of management in European
countries, and some appreciation of how they differ from American
legal structures.

A.

THE PARALLEL ORGANS OF MANAGEMENT

The European corporate scene presents a surprising variety of
organs of management. None of the organs corresponds exactly to
American institutions, and the similarities in names are often more
misleading than enlightening. Before we can discuss (in the English
language) the European institutions, we will have to explain the
European institutions which we are designating by our English
terms.
I. SHAREHOLDERS

In Europe, as in the United States, we start logically with the
holders of ultimate power-the shareholders. In Europe a sharp
distinction is often drawn between holders of the normally negotiable shares of stock companies (who are called actionnaires,
A ktionare, soci or aandelhouders) and holders of the non-negotiable
shares of limited liability companies and partnerships (who are
called associes, Gesellschafter, soci, or vennooten). Since we have
no such choice of terms in America, we will have to use the word
"shareholders" to designate the holders of both types of European
shares.
2. GOVERNING BOARD

After the "shareholders," the most important title in the American corporate hierarchy is the "directors," 201 and one is naturally
tempted to search for the European institution which can be fairly
translated by the same term.
The search is doomed to failure. The first problem is a linguistic
one. The Europeans have corporate officials called by a name which
looks like "director,"-directeur, Direktor, or dirretore-but they
are in many ways the opposites of American directors. While the
ordinary American "director" is almost always elected by the shareholders, the European directeur, Direktor, or dirretore, is never so
elected. While the American title implies a deliberative, part-time
'm Typical of the provisions indicated is the Delaware provision, "The business of
every corporation . . . shall be managed by a board of directors, except as hereinafter
or in its certificate of incorporation otherwise provided." 8 DEL. ConE§ 141 (1953).
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position, the European title implies an executive, full-time position.
While the American title implies a position on the highest hierarchical level (after the shareholders) the European title implies subjection to a superior board. Consequently, it is best to avoid entirely
the word "director" in referring to European corporate officials.
When we turn from names to substance, the problem is still
baffiing. There are commonly not one, but two, boards which divide
the functions of management and control. In the face of this duality,
we can speak collectively of European boards only by making an
arbitrary classification which achieves consistency on one plane at
the price of inconsistency on another.
In the discussion which follows, we will adopt the name of
"governing board" for that board which resembles the American
board of directors in that (I) it is chosen by the shareholders and
( 2) it chooses other executives and managers to perform subordinate functions. This is the conseil d' administration in France and
in French-speaking Belgium and Luxembourg, the Aufsichtsrat in
Germany, the consiglio d' amministratione in Italy, the Verwaltung
in German-speaking Luxembourg, the raad van bestuur in Netherlands, and the raad van beheer in Flemish-speaking Belgium. The
members of this board are variously known as administrateurs,
Aufsichtsradmitglieder, amministratori, V erwalter, bestuurder, and
beheerder.
This board is not the only group chosen directly by the shareholders, for the same is true of the auditors ( commissaires aux
comptes, Bilanzpriifer, sindaci, commisarissen). Neither is it the
only group which may name subordinate executives; in Germany, at
least, this may be done by another board, the Vorstand. But it is
the only group which is both chosen by the shareholders, and invested with authority to name managerial officers.

3·

EXECUTIVES

Successful European companies, like their American counterparts,
generally have a chief executive in whom all reins of authority are
concentrated. We need not pause over a rare exception like the great
Italian Montecatini Company, which concentrates executive power
in two men of equal authority, like the ancient Roman consuls.
However, we must avoid assuming that the executive power is
held by the presiding officer of the governing board, as it usually is
in the United States. Although a European governing board usually
elects a president, the presidency of that board signifies something
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more like being an American "chairman of the board" than being
an American "president." There are other titles which we will translate as "general manager" ( directeur general, direttore generale,
algemen bestuurder, algemen beheerder, and occasionally Generaldirektor) and "managing director" (administrateur deligue) which
signify the concentration of executive power. Even in France, where
the president is re'quired by law to assume responsibility for the
company's management, he has the choice of delegating the authority to a subordinate general manager, or exercising it himself under
the compound title of "president and general manager" (prisidentdirecteur-general).
In Germany, the president of the "governing board" (that is, the
board elected by the shareholders) is forbidden to be an executive;
the executive power must be wielded by a subordinate board (the
J7 orstand), or its president (German stock companies having two
boards and possibly two presidents) .
There is also the possibility of having an executive officer elected
· directly by the shareholders, with no intervention of any board at
all; this is possible in limited liability companies in all countries, and
in stock companies of Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg.
Hence we will speak of "executives" to designate those functionaries who hold the reins of authority under any of a great variety of
titles, and by any of a great variety of methods of appointment.
4·

AUDITORS

While American corporation laws leave directors free to choose
the auditors of their books, European laws commonly provide
formally for the election of officials to review the accounts and the
performance of the management. The titles of most of these
officials would be literally translated as "commissar"-commissaire,
Kommissar (in Luxembourg), commissaris. 202 Since this word
would probably evoke in most American readers visions of Stalinist
agents, we will call these officials "auditors."
5·

CONTROL

One other word which we cannot help using requires a little explanation. We will use "control" in the sense which has become
fairly standard in America through Berle and Means' Modern
Corporation 203 and the rules of the Securities and Exchange Com202

The German and Italian terms-Bilanzpriifer and sindaci-are less misleading.
BERLE and MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY especially
at 69 ff. (1933).
203
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mission; 204 we use it to mean the ability to exercise a decisive influence on the management of the company-the relation which the
U.S. government contended (and the companies denied) existed
between General Motors and duPont de Nemours. 205
We mention this only because the cognate European words (controle, Kontrolle, controllo) are usually used in the more limited
sense of the power to inspect accounts and review operations. 206
This meaning is reflected in the American office of "controller," and
is sometimes met in English-language discussions of foreign company law; it will not be used here.
For convenience of reference, on pages 92-93 we offer a table of
English terms which we will use, and the indigenous names of the
various institutions to which we will be referring.

B.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN EuROPEAN
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The difficulty of naming the officials in European management
reflects much deeper differences in their roles. We will sketch some
of the more obvious differences, and show how an American investor
may take advantage of these differences or, at least, minimize their
.mconvemences.
.
I. SUPREMACY OF THE SHAREHOLDERS

A striking peculiarity of European management structures is the
power of the shareholders in the statutory plan. The legislator has
not designed them to be a mere electoral college, to choose the
leadership to which the company shall be entrusted. The shareholders are generally the supreme governing body, and the governing board is merely their agent, responsive to their will. Even in
Germany, where the reforms of 1937 were intended to give increased independence to the executive board, 207 the shareholders
have distinctly greater powers than are usual in the United States.
This conception expresses itself in many ways, such as the rule that
dividends must be declared or at least confirmed by the shareholders 208 rather than by the governing board alone, as in America.
""'See Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 453 ff. (1951).
:mcf. Berle, Jr., Control in Corporation Law, 58 CoLuM. L. REV. 1212 (1958);
"Control may be defined as the abili!y to choose directors."
206
Cf. van Ryn who equates controle with "a mission to determine the necessary
facts (about the management) and report the results to the shareholders." (This
author's translation.) I PRINCIPES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 416 (Belgium 1954).
207
HUECK, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, 125, 126 (Germany 1958).
208
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 79 (right to adopt financial statement in stock companies); art. 137 (same in limited liability companies).
(Continued on p. 94)
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The most important aspect of shareholder supremacy is the power
to remove top management, which may be stated as a general principle of European company law, subject to some qualifications. Even
in French limited liability companies, where the statute declares
that the managers are never removable without cause during their
terms, 209 case law sanctions reservation in the articles of a power of
removal. A qualification must be noted in Germany, where the
shareholders' removal power affects the highest board (Aufsichtsrat) but not the subordinate executive board ( J7 or stand) .210 In
some limited liability companies, managers who are named in the
articles of incorporation are removable only for cause or as provided in the articles (or an amendment of them) .211 Subject to these
limited exceptions, European shareholders have the power to remove the board members without cause. 212
Another kind of qualification must be noted in Belgian and Luxembourg stock companies. Although the shareholders as a group
are supreme, no one shareholder is allowed to vote more than twofifths of the votes cast at any meeting, nor more than one-fifth of
the outstanding shares. 213 An American parent company owning
99% of a Belgian subsidiary's stock might therefore find itself unable to oust a management, if the other 1% were held by the managers to be ousted. This eventuality should be foreseen and sidestepped by dividing the 99% between the parent and two other
subsidiaries.
The shareholders' supremacy means a great deal to American
France; HAMEL, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL no. 720 ( 1954) j in limited liability
companies, the manager may determine the dividends himself; id., no. 812.
Germany: AktG § 126; GmbHG § 46 ( 1).
Italy: ComcE CIVILE art. 2433 (stock companies) ; art. 2492 (limited liability companies).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 75 (stock companies); Cf. art. 197, para. 5 (limited
liability companies).
200
Law of 1925, art. 24, para. 3·
210
AktG. §§ 75(3), 87(3). A commentator suggests that a shareholders' vote of no
confidence in the executive board might be "cause" for removing them. GoDINWILHELMI, AKTIENGESETZ § 75, Anmerkung 7· But the decision would lie with the Aufsichtsrat.
211
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 129. Luxembourg: Company Law art. 191.
212
Belgium: C. CIV. I-IX, art. 53 (stock companies).
France: Law of 1867, art. 22 (stock companies).
Germany: AktG § 87(3); GmbHG § 38 (limited liability companies).
Italy: ComcE CIVILE art. 2383 (stock companies; removal subject to member's right
to damages); art. 2487 (limited liability companies same as stock companies).
Netherlands: W.K. art. 48b.
213
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 71(2).
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 76.
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parents of European subsidiaries and offers an escape from a prevailing dilemma. On their first entry into Europe, American parent
companies are faced with the alternative of staffing the subsidiary
with Americans, who do not know much about Europe, or with Europeans whom the parent company does not know much about.
The parents are understandably apprehensive of the possibility of
runaway policies of European managers, because they do not know
the Europeans' personal qualities so well, and they sense that their
European employees are not so tightly tied as Americans would be
to the parent company. In consequence, one finds many European
governing boards in which a majority of seats has been reserved
for Americans who can make only short and fleeting visits to
Europe.
This reservation of a safe majority would be quite essential in an
American corporation, where removal of directors is seldom provided for by statute and is generally presumed to be permissible
only for cause. It is generally unnecessary in Europe, where the
governing board of managers can be removed without any cause as
quickly as a shareholders' meeting can be called. The hasty transAtlantic flights of American board members to make up a European
company quorum are largely unnecessary. A single proxy-holder for
a majority of the stock, living in Europe and keeping himself informed of the actions of the European board, could assure the board
of immediate dismissal if they should disregard parent company
wishes. This device is used successfully by at least one experienced
American corporation in Europe.
Shareholder supremacy is also important to an American company which is buying control of a European company. When making
a similar purchase of an American subsidiary, it would possibly
bargain for resignations of the incumbent directors, so that it could
make its newly acquired control effective. Such bargaining is unknown and unnecessary in most European companies because the
power to dismiss the governing board or managers comes automatically with the ownership of shares.
2. ONE-MAN MANAGEMENT

A second major distinction of European management is the
legality of one-man management, as opposed to the three-man
board which comprises the usual minimum tolerated by American
corporation statutes. Although one-man managements sometimes
exist in U.S. practice, they exist only because no one bothers to en-
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force the law requiring the election of additional directors, and
their participation in management.
In Europe, on the other hand, one-man management is specifically
authorized for limited liability companies in all countries, 214 and
impliedly permitted even in the stock companies of Italy and the
Netherlands. 215
The sole manager option was doubtless designed, at least in
limited liability companies, to permit the incorporation of business
enterprises which formerly had been sole proprietorships, and where
the investors concurred in a desire to keep the same man at the
helm. This may also be the reason why some laws facilitate the irremovability of the manager. 216
The convenience of one-man management for a company which
is new in Europe is evident. An American investor may enter the
European market with very slight acquaintance among European
businessmen. If he does not have more than one American employee whom he wishes to keep in Europe, or no more than one
European whom he trusts to run his business, he would have difficulty in naming a three-man board. Fortunately, he does not need
three men. He can give all powers to the one man he trusts, until
longer acquaintance enables him to broaden the managerial base
with confidence.
The investor who takes this option must, of course, watch out
for other risks. The one-man management may be irremovable except on proof of misconduct or incompetence unless proper reservations have been made in the articles of incorporation. 217• 218 In addition to this, there are legal provisions which give the manager almost unlimited authority to bind the company. 219 Finally, there is
the human danger that one head will make mistakes which three
heads would have avoided.
21
'

Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 129.
France: Law of 1925, art. 24.
Germany: GmbHG § 6.
Italy: CoorCE CIVILE art. 2487.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 19r.
215
No number is specified by these stock company statutes:
Italy: COD!CE CIVILE art. 2380.
Netherlands: W.K. art. 47a.
In one sense, one-man management is permitted by the German stock company law,
since the executive board ( f7 or stand) may have only one member. But since there must
be a three-man supervisory board (Aujsichtsrat) above him, this is not the kind of oneman management which simplifies a parent company's personnel problems.
216
See notes 209, 210, 2II supra.
217 218
'
See notes 209, 210, and 211 supra.
219
In Belgium, France, and Luxembourg, the manager of a limited liability com-

ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS

3·

97

ONE-COMPANY MANAGEMENT

Even more surprising from the American point of view is the
rule which permits one company to occupy a position as manager, or
governing board member, in another. Statutes forbid a company's
filling certain positions, such as president of a French stock company, 220 or any managerial office in a German company; 221 the interpretation of prevailing legal opinion is to a similar effect in Italy.
European lawyers believe that managerial positions in the Benelux
countries, and positions other than president in France can be filled
by an artificial person as well as by a natural one.
Hence, the possibility arises of appointing another European
company-perhaps an affiliated one-as sole manager of a European subsidiary. Of course, such an arrangement should be only
temporary. As a matter of practical psychology, it is a good idea to
have a board of living men with a lively interest in the company and
sense of responsibility toward it. But the use of an incorporated
manager may bridge difficult initial gaps. Since the corporate manager can appoint anyone it wishes to act as its human agent, the
problem of managerial tenure is side-stepped.
4·

GOVERNING BOARDS AND EXECUTIVES

We have already mentioned two peculiarities of European governing boards-the fact that in some kinds of companies there need
not be a board and that, if there is one, its members can be removed
at the unfettered will of the shareholders. A third peculiarity of
European boards is that, with a few exceptions, the board members
may act as a joint executive. They do not need to act through officers; they may, by virtue of their positions, act to negotiate and
sign contracts. In short, most of the European laws make no provisions for the separation of policy-making and executive functions
which are basic to American thinking about management structure.
In small enterprises this may be all to the good. Many American
writers have been suggesting that we should in America provide for
boardless management in "close corporations," and have cited Eupany has unlimited power to bind the company unless limitations are contained in
the duly published articles. Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 130; France: Law of 1925, art.
24, para. 2; Luxembourg: Company Law art. 191. In Germany, the manager has full
power to bind the company, and there is no means of limiting it. GmbHG § 37.
"""France: Law of March 4, 1943 (on stock companies) art. 12.
.., AktG § 75 (I)-executive board; § 86 (2)-supervisory board. In the limited liability company, the prohibition of corporate managers is not express, but is inferred
from various provisions, SCHOLZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GmBH § 6, Anmerkung III.
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ropean experience to support their contention. But it is obvious that
larger concerns need a plural board, with a systematic delegation of
executive functions.
The significance of this state of affairs for the American investor
-is that in many European company forms he may and he must create
the management structure that his business requires. The law does
not furnish him a pattern into which he must fit. If he wants a oneman management, he can probably have it. If he wants a governing
board, with a president, secretary, and treasurer, his lawyers will
have to draw the articles of association so as to provide for them.
We will now deal with some of the exceptions to the general rule
-exceptions which impose some standard pattern of organization
on the European company. These mandatory patterns are found in
the stock companies of Italy, France, and Germany.
The Italian law of stock companies requires the election of a
president (presidente), but nothing is said about his powers or responsibilities; 222 the delegation of executive functions is therefore
as unfettered as anywhere else. If the president is to have power to
make contracts of purchase, sale, and employment, the articles of
incorporation should say so. There are no ·requirements for a secretary or treasurer, and such officials are never used in purely
Italian companies. American owned companies can and often do
name such officials, but there is no great merit in the practice since
the offices have no meaning for the Italians who deal with the company, and probably very little even for the Italians who fill the
offices.
In France, the law has caught up with good business practice. It
not only requires that each stock company have a three-member
board, but also requires that the board elect a president, and that
the president assume responsibility for the management of the
company. 223 Other board members must refrain from exercising
executive functions unless they are appointed to them. 224 The president may be the general manager or may appoint someone else to
the job, but he is responsible for the management in either event.
The qualifications of board members and of the president are
specific but not particularly onerous. The board members may not
occupy similar positions in more than seven other French companies.225 The president cannot be simultaneously president of more
"""C. Crv.
to do so, he
223
Law of
,.. Ibid.
226
Law of

art. 2380. The president may be elected by shareholders but if they fail
is chosen by his colleagues on the board.
Nov. 16, 1940, art. 1-2; Law of March 4, 1943, art. 14·
Nov. 16, 1940, art. 3, as amended by Law of July 7, 1953·
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than two companies; 226 but since the statutory office of president
exists only in stock companies, this rule seems not to inhibit his
serving as a manager of a limited liability company, or as a managing partner in a partnership. The president must be a natural
person, but there is no rule against the other board members being
compames.
These provisions of French law were adopted by the "collaborationist" government at Vichy, while northern France was occupied
by Germany during World War II. They were precipitated by the
disruption of management resulting from the division of the country by enemy occupation and the absence of board members who
were either prisoners of war in Germany or with the outlawed Free
French forces in Africa. The promulgation of these provisions as
separate laws rather than amendments to the company law probably
reflected the legislators' conception of them as emergency legislation, rather than permanent reform.
Probably no one wants a return to the amorphous pre-war law,
but the present provisions are widely regarded as poorly designed.
Dean Hamel of the Paris law faculty has written, with characteristic
Irony,
The law of 1940 gave companies a choice of two formulae,-that of the president-and-general-manager, or
that of the nonexecutive president who is liable for the
acts of his general manager. Several commentators
thought they detected here a reflection of the German
law of 1937, and of the famous Fuhrer-Prinzip. The
president was to be the head-man of the stock company.
He does indeed occupy a fine position in the statutory
text; but what a peculiar head-man-who can be removed
at pleasure by his peers (the other board members), and
even indirectly by the shareholders; whose powers depend on the authority which the board has given him, and
can at any time amend. The president has only one characteristic of a head-man-increased liability. This feature
is his best argument in deliberations, and it does increase
his influence, if he knows how to use it.
What the law expresses is primarily the desire to put
a stop to the parceling out of responsibilities between the
president and the managing director, or worse, among
several managing directors or general managers. It has
concentrated responsibility on the president. That way,
there is always someone to hold responsible. 227
220

227

Law of Nov. 16, 1940, art. 3·
HAMEL, op. cit. supra note 208, no. 652 (1954).
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5.

THE GERMAN BOARDS

The organization of management in German stock companies is
so distinctive that it calls for a special description. There are normally two boards, 228 instead of one, which might be called "governing," and which divide between them the features and the functions
of an American board of directors.
The one which we have grouped with other "governing boards"
in the preceding discussion is more accurately called the "supervisory board., (Aufsichtsrat; literally, "board of oversight"). It
resembles the American board of directors in that a. majority of its
members is elected by the shareholders, 229 and in that it in turn
elects the executives. 230 It differs from an American board of directors in that its decisions do not bind the company in dealings with
outsiders, 231 but it does make binding decisions to hire and fire
executives 232 and set their pay; 233 it elects the executives from persons who are not its own members; 234 and its members include labor
representatives, who must comprise one-third of the board's membership.235
The other German board we will call the "executive board," although its German name (For stand) apparently signifies something
like "chairmanship" (literally, "those standing in front"). It resembles an American board of directors in that its decisions bind
the company to outsiders, 236 that its president, if any, is the chief
executive of the company, 237 and that each of its members is usually
known as a Direktor. 238 It differs from an American board of directors in that its members are not elected by the shareholders, but by
the supervisory board; 239 it is not necessarily a plural board, but
may consist of only one man; 240 if plural, it cannot elect its own
228

AktG §§ 70, 86.
/d. § 87(1).
=u. §75(r).
2ll1 The statute provides that "conduct of business
(Massnahmcn der Geschiiftsfiihrung) cannot be taken over by the supervisory board." AktG § 95(5).
232
AktG § 75·
232
!d. §§ 77, 97·
284 /d.§ 90(1).
225
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of Oct. 11, 1952 (hereinafter cited as BetrVerfG)
( 1952) 1 Bundesgesetzblatt 68r.
236
AktG § 71.
237
At least, he holds the power of decision (AktG § 70(2) ), although he does not
automatically gain authority to deal with outsiders (§ 71 (2) ).
232
By prevailing practice, not law.
""" AktG § 75(1).
!WI !d. § 70( 2 ).
229
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president but must await the supervisory board's decision as to
whether there should be one and, if so, who he shall be; 241 if the
board has a president, the other members cannot overrule him, but
can be overruled by him; 242 its members are rarely outsiders, because they cannot be at the same time managing officers or general
partners in any other commercial business. 243
In the presence of these diversities, it seems futile to debate
whether the American board of directors is more like the German
supervisory board or the German executive board. The discussion
would be like that of the blind men around the elephant. It would be
further complicated by the fact that American boards are so disparate-some of them consisting largely of outsiders who review
the executives' work, others consisting entirely of insiders, who
carry on the work of the company under the guiding hand of the
president. 244 The former type of board is more like the German
supervisory board; the latter type, more like the German executive
board.
For an American enterprise which is first entering Germany, the
staffing of the two boards presents problems. The supervisory board
is a powerful group in which one would want to place only trusted
and competent persons, but the persons must be "outsiders," holding
no managerial office iri the enterprise. Such persons are not easily
found.
The choice of the executive board members also appears to be a
very serious matter. Like most American directors, and unlike governing board members in some other countries, the German executive board members cannot be removed except for "good cause." 245
The executive board's power to bind the corporation to outsiders
cannot be limited by charter provisions. 246
The problem of choosing members for the two German boards
cannot be evaded by naming another company as a board member;
""Id. §75(2).
242
I d. § 70(2).
243
/d. §79(1).
,.. See BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS, 11-27 ( 1945).
245
"Good cause" is not defined in the statute. Various commentators suggested soon
after adoption of the statute that "good cause" might include such matters as a nonconfidence vote by the shareholders, but the Federal Supreme Court has warned that
such a vote would not be "good cause" if it were based on insubstantial grounds, or
if it were adopted merely for the purpose of justifying the executive's dismissal. Decision of Apr. 28, 1954, Bundesgerichtshof (II Zivilsenat) 13 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen (hereinafter cited as BGHZ) r88, at 193.
246
AktG. § 74 (2). There is some dispute as to the effect of limitations on an outsider
who has actual knowledge of them. HUECK, GESELLSCHAFTSVECKT 130 (1958).
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the law specifically excludes this. 247 The best one can do is to reduce
the necessary number to one by incorporating in the limited liability
company form, instead of the stock company. A limited liability company does not need to have a supervisory board unless it has 500 or
248
mo~e employees.
Although the German two-board system is undeniably complex,
it is not necessarily a system to be shunned. A distinguished Belgian
writer compares it favorably with the Belgian system. 249 German
companies seem to have the reputation of being very well managed,
and we think the system presents more advantages than obstacles to
a company which is well-established, and which has ample resources
of managerial man-power. But the system must be frankly regarded
as burdensome for small, new companies, and probably contributes
to the fact that limited liability companies are preferred to stock
companies more frequently in Germany than in any other Common
Market country.
6.

LABOR PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT;
CO-DETERMINATION

In Europe as in the United States, the last decades have seen a
phenomenal growth in the rights of labor representatives to influence the decisions of management. But the European developments
have taken different forms from those which we have seen in North
America.
One of the principal developments in Europe has been the labormanagement councils, where representatives of labor and management meet together to discuss and resolve problems affecting both.
These are not like American collective bargaining sessions, at which
plenipotentiaries trade commitments binding each side to the other.
They are more in the nature of forums at which representatives of
each side try to persuade those of the other that it would be best
for all parties if the other side's desires were met.
This institution has gone furthest in Germany, with its celebrated
"co-determination." This term is coupled with another to make the
title of Part IV of the German Plant Management Law of 1952 250
-Cooperation and Codetermination (Mitwirkung and Mitbestimmung). Every business establishment (subject to a few exemptions)
247 !d. § 75 (I )-executive hoard § 86 (2).
248
BetrVerfG § 77·
"''VanRyn, op. cit. supra note 6, at 381, 382.
250
BetrVerfG, see note 48 supra.
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has to have a plant council, elected by the employees. They consult
with the management on nearly every phase of operation. Their
orbit includes specifically "group interests" ( soziale Angelegenheiten) such as working hours, pay periods, and vacations, 252 and
"individual interests" (personelle Angelegenheiten), such as hiring,
firing, transfers, and promotions. 253 Workers in larger enterprises
also consult indirectly on "business matters," which embrace manufacturing methods, the production program, the financial status of
the business, and market conditions. 254 For these matters, there is
an "economic committee" (Wirtschaftsausschuss) composed of at
least four members named by management and four named by the
plant council. 255
The capstone of the German program is representation of labor
in the supervisory board. One-third of the supervising board members are elected by the employees. 256 That leaves two-thirds to be
chosen by the shareholders; of these, one-third may be appointed
by particular shareholders specified in the charter, while only onethird is required to be elected by the general body of shareholders. 257
But usually the body of shareholders elects two-thirds.
The representation of employees in the supervisory board applies
only to companies which have a supervisory board on which the
employees can be represented. For this very purpose, the law of
limited liability companies was amended in 19 52 to require that
they, too, should have supervisory boards, if their employees exceed 500. 258 On the other hand, stock companies with fewer than
500 employees are exempted from the requirement if they are
"family companies," owned entirely by one person or by a small
group of closely related persons. 259 Hence, employees have to be
represented today on the boards of all non-family stock companies,
and on the boards of limited liability companies which have more
than 500 employees.
But exemption from board representation does not imply exemption from other phases of "co-operation and co-determination." 260
2151

BetrVerfG §§ 6-26.
BetrVerfG § 56.
•oau. § 6o.
'"" ld. § 67.
"'"'Id.§ 68 .
... Id. § 76.
257
AktG § 88.
208
BetrVerfG § 77(1).
"""Id. § 76(6).
"""Id. §§ 49-75·
2
"'
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It is difficult to say whether the influence of employees in Germany
is due chiefly to the plant councils alone (the Betriebsrate), or to the
joint economic committees ( Wirtschaftsausschussen), or to representation on the supervisory board. Many companies which escape
the requirement of labor representation on the supervisory board
must still establish plant councils or joint economic committees or
both.
France also has a law designed to enlarge the voice of labor in
compa,ny management, dating from 1945, a few months after
liberation. 261 This law provides for "enterprise committees" which
consist of the chief officer of management and a delegation of
worker representatives varying according to the number of employees to be rep.resented. The enterprise committee is authorized
to express its opinions on all questions which effect the organization
of the business, or the distribution of profits; and has rights to be
consulted on all matters affecting the management of the business,
and its progress, and to receive the same financial statements which
are given to shareholders. In stock companies, two labor representatives have the right to attend governing board meetings, with a right
to speak but not to vote. 262
According to our information, the voice of labor in German industry has been a good deal stronger than in France. We are told
that French enterprise committees concern themselves chiefly with
the pay and working conditions of the employees, while German
employee representatives exercise a considerable influence on decisions affecting production.
In neither country do employee representatives dictate to company executives. Much less do they participate in the executive
functions of management. 263 The most that can be said is that in
certain classes of German companies, employee representatives hold
the balance of power in the election of executives when any substantial division arises among the shareholders' representatives.
In other Common Market countries, as in the United States, employee representation is less formalized, but employers are obliged
by legal or extra-legal pressures to listen to their employee's desires
and complaints. Luxembourg law provides for employee "delegations" to consult with management in the larger enterprises. In
261

Ordinance of Feb. 22, 1945, instituting the. "comites d'entreprises."
I d. art. 3·
268
See AktG § 95 ( 5), forbidding members of the governing board to take over
conduct of the business (Massnahmen der Geschiiftsfiihrung).
262
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Italy, "internal commissions" with consultative powers are commonly set up by collective bargaining agreements.

7·

QUALIFICATIONS OF BOARD MEMBERS:
NATIONALITY AND STOCKHOLDING

The laws of European countries are generally very liberal with
respect to who may be members of the governing boards of companies. In two countries-France and Belgium-prior conviction of
various heinous crimes will disqualify. 264 In France, some or all of
the board members must be French nationals in local railroad companies, hydroelectric companies, public utility companies, petroleum
production companies, and companies formed for mining in French
colonies. 264 a In the Netherlands, a proportion of a shipping company governing board must be Dutchmen in order to permit the
company to fly the Dutch flag. 265 And in both French and Belgian
companies, members of the governing board must obtain a "merchant's license." In France this is said to be obtainable by any foreign
businessman who has no criminal or bankruptcy record; in Belgium
it is said to be more exceptional. Aside from these requirements, European boards may legally be composed partly or wholly of
Americans.
Only in French stock companies is it required that the board
members be shareholders. In both French and Italian stock companies there are requirements that shares be deposited as security
for the potential liability of the board members; in France these
shares must be registered in the names of the members whose good
conduct they secure. 266 This probably means that the French board
members should be beneficial shareholders; but in practice, "quali"""In France, there is a long list of offenses which disqualify for any office of management; the offenses include any common law felony, plus theft, embezzlement, violation
of criminal provisions of bankruptcy law, including abortion or "contraceptive propaganda," and violating the laws on keeping of poisons. More accurately, it is not the
offense but the prior conviction which disqualifies. A person may also be disqualified
if he was a board member in an earlier company which entered bankruptcy, if the
judge in that case made an order excluding him from managerial positions in the
future. Decree-Law of Aug. 8, 1935, art. 6, 10; Law of August 30, 1947, art. 1-2.
There are somewhat similar provisions in Belgium; none have been cited to us from
other countries.
"""• RIPERT, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CoMMERCIAL 545 (4th ed. 1959).
"""W.K. art. 3I I . If the necessary number of Dutch board members and managers is
lacking, the company may still operate, but cannot fly the Dutch flag on its ships.
266
France: Law of 1867, art. 26 (stock companies).
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2387 (stock companies). An Italian informant says that
the shares may be endorsed and deposited by some other shareholder.
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fying shares" are transferred by the real owner into the name of the
French board member. In Italy, shares are deposited for the nonowning board member without even putting them in his name.
The choice between foreign (American) or local (European)
board members must be based less on legal than on practical considerations. We have encountered companies with the greatest variation in practice. One successful company with many foreign subsidiaries followed the practice of having the same three Americans
serve as president, secretary, and treasurer, and also as directors,
of more than a dozen foreign companies; they were also a majority
of the board in most cases. At the other extreme, we have found
subsidiary companies which take pride in having a board of exclusively "local" personnel. On examination of the facts, we sometimes found that some of the "all-French" boards were American
citizens, but they were at least permanent residents of France.
Choices in these matters must depend on many factors, of which
the foremost will be how many local people the investors know well
enough to trust their integrity, ability, and judgment. But we wish
to register the observation that the companies with the longest and
most successful experience in foreign countries are those which tend
most strongly to compose their boards exclusively of local residents,
of whom a majority are local citizens.
This policy is not to be confused with that of permitting participation of local capital. Many of the companies which have gone
the farthest in engaging local management are strictest in regard to
holding substantially all the shares.
The reasons for employing local management are not based on
apprehensions of hostility to Americans. So far as we can determine,
neither banks nor regulatory agencies have any hostility to American managers. The main reason is that Europeans can do the job
better. They are better guessers about the psychology of European
buyers, sellers, laborers, and landlords. They are also better analysts
of the objectives and the standards of European bankers who must
lend money, and of the European officials who must grant permits
and licenses. Their advantage in this respect cannot be bought from
them in consultations as effectively as it can be evoked by giving
them the responsibility for decision.
A second reason for employing local management is cost. We
start from the fact that, in terms of official exchange rates, American
salaries are higher for comparable jobs than are European. Europeans may live just as well or better on their nominally lower
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salaries; but Americans going to Europe will demand the nominal
equivalent of their American salaries, plus overseas benefits and
travel expenses which will make their total cost about twice the cost
of Europeans. A bull market for European managerial talent is reported to be narrowing the gap; but it will remain substantial.
Hence, we are inclined to believe that every investor in a European subsidiary should aim to reach the point where his entire
governing board and executive personnel are European residents.
8.

AUDITORS 267

The position of auditor in European companies is quite unlike
anything known to the American corporation. Auditors in these
countries are not mere outsiders hired by the board to report to it;
they are officials of the company, elected by the shareholders to report on the managers. They are seldom optional; they are generally
required by law.
Auditors are required for stock companies in Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, and Italy; 268 in some of these countries they
are also required for certain limited liability companies. 269 In the
Netherlands, where auditors are not required by statute, they may
be imposed by the company's own articles, and frequently are. 270
The various European legislatures have entrusted to their company auditors functions of varying scopes, but all of them are much
broader than the functions of auditors in the United States. Stock
company auditors in Belgium, France, Italy, and Luxembourg have
..,.We use the term "auditor" for the following European company officials:
Belgium: "commissaires, commissarissen."
France: "commissaires" in stock companies; members of "conseils de surveillance"
in limited liability companies.
Germany: "J ahresabschlusspriifer" in stock companies, "Bilanzpriifer" in limited
liability companies.
Italy: "sindaci," or members of "collegia sindacale."
Luxembourg: "commissaires" or "Kommissare" in stock companies; members of
"conseil de surveillance" or "Aufsichtsrat" in limited liability companies.
Nether lands: "commissarissen."
268
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 64France: Law of 1867, art. 32.
Germany: AktG § 135(1).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 61.
Italy: CODICE CIVILE art. 2397•
... Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 134 (over five shareholders).
France: Law of 1925, art. 32. (over twenty shareholders).
Italy: ComcE CIVILE,art. 2488 (capital over one million lire-about $rsoo).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 200 (over twenty-five shareholders).
There is no corresponding requirement in Germany; but the limited liability company requires a governing board if its employees exceed soo,
""'W.K. art. 50.
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authority to call shareholders' meetings, 271 and those in Luxembourg have "the unlimited power of supervision and inspection of
all operations of the company." 271a The title of "supervisory board"
( conseil de surveillance, Aufsichtsrat) borne by limited liability
company auditors in France and Luxembourg suggests the breadth
of their authority. 272 In Italy, the auditors are obliged to attend all
shareholders' and governing board meetings, 273 and to investigate
shareholders' complaints against the management, 274 and are liable
along with board members for company losses which their due care
should have prevented. 275
In spite of these extended powers, the auditors are not in the line
of command, as are the organs which we have called "governing
boards." The decisive difference between them and the governing
boards is their lack of power to choose the executives who run .the
company. 276
Although auditors have been required in stock companies for
many years, they have not always been very effective. Profes·sor van
Ryn of Brussels wrote of the Belgian situation before the legislation
of 1953:
As for the auditors, the situation is still more peculiar
(than for the governing board) ; nearly everyone agrees
that they never, or hardly ever, effectively do the job of
investigation ( controle) which is their only excuse for
existing. The job of auditor is generally a moderately
lucrative sinecure, or a waiting room at the entrance of
the governing board. 277
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 73·
France: Law of 1867, art. 32.
Italy: CODICE CIVILE art. 2367 (implication).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 70.
The absence of a similar power in German auditors is probably explained by the
grant of a similar power to the governing board (Aufsichtsrat), which is presumed
to be as independent of management as the auditors.
=• Company Law art. 62.
""'France: Law of 1925, art. 32 (limited liability companies). Stock company auditors
in France exercise a much narrower authority.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 200 (limited liability companies).
278
C. C1v. art. 2405.
274
C. C1v. art. 2408.
275
C. Civ. art. 2407.
276
See A. A. Berle, "Control in Corporate Larw, 58 CoLUN. L. REV. 1212 (1958);
"Control" may be defined as the capacity to choose directors. As a corollary, it carries
capacity to influence the board of directors· and possibly to dominate it.
277
VAN RYN, I PRINCIPES DE DROIT CoMMERCIAL 382 (1953). See also VAN RYN,
LA REFORME DU CoNTR6LE DES Socuh:Es COMMERCIALES ET L'EXPERIENCE ANGLAISE
(Belgium 1945).
:m
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Similar remarks could probably have been made 1n France before
1935·278
To eliminate subservience to the management, most of the countries now have laws designed to assure that the auditors will be completely independent. With some variations among countries, they
are disqualified if they are employed by the company, or by the
managers of the company, or by affiliated companies, and if they
are related by blood or marriage to managers of the company which
they audit.m
In Italy the law attempts to insure independence still further by
giving the auditors tenure for at least a three-year term unless cause
can be shown for their removal, and requiring that their pay be fixed
in advance of their term. 280 In other countries the auditors' tenure
apparently remains subject to the will of the shareholders, even
though they are elected for various terms ranging from three to
six years. 281
There are also provisions in some countries requiring that the
auditors be qualified accountants. Germany now requires that all
auditors be certified public accountants. 282 In Belgium and France
at least one of the auditors must be a certified public accountant in
stock companies which have offered their shares to the general public.283 In Italian stock companies, at least one and sometimes two of
the auditors must be certified. 284 On the other hand, French limited
278
The Belgium company laws in the Commercial Code were amended in 1953 to
tighten the auditing requirements. French laws had been revised in 1935 to assure
independence of the auditors.
279
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 64, as amended in 1953.
France: Law of 1867, art. 33·
Germany: AktG § 137; there are no interdictions here on relationship by blood or
marriage.
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE 2399; auditors are also disqualified by a prior bankruptcy, or
certain criminal offenses.
Luxembourg: Has no statutory disqualifications.
280
C. Civ. arts. 2400, 2402.
281
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 64 his (expressly removable at will of shareholders).
France: Law of 1867, art. 32 (provides 3 year term but is silent on tenure).
Germany: AktG. § 136(1) and (6).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 61 (expressly removable at will).
""" AktG § 137 (offentlich bestellte Wirtschaftspriifer oder Wirtschaftspriifungsgesellschaften).
"""France: Law of 1867, art. 33 (dans les societes par actions faisant appel it l'epargne
public).
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 64 his, 2 (dans les societes ayant fait ou faisant appel
it l'epargne public).
""'CODICE CIVILE art. 2397; the requirement depends partly on the number of auditors
( 3 or 5) and partly on the capital (over or under 5 million lire).
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liability company auditors are required to be shareholders, which
makes it unlikely that they will be experts. 285 Luxembourg and the
Netherlands make no statutory requirements for either type of
company.
To the American investor in a European subsidiary, the audit
requirements will not seem very burdensome, but the naming of
auditors for a term of years will call for some study, even though
the appointment is revocable. A single auditor is all the law requires
except for the requirement of shareholder-auditors in French
limited liability companies, and a five-man requirement wherever
auditors are ne~ded in ltaly. 286 In Germany the appointee may be a
qualified auditing firm, rather than an individual. 287 Since the auditors' functions are supervisory rather than executive, qualified accountants can be safely named, even though they know nothing of
the company's methods and objectives.
9·

COMPENSATION OF BOARD MEMBERS AND EXECUTIVES

In Europe, as in the United States, a variety of systems of payment are in common use-fees for attendance at meetings, fixed
salaries and profit shares. The only common form of American
compensation which is never encountered in Europe is the stockoption.
The stock option seems to hold no attractions for Europeans.
Whether it would have any tax advantage, as it does in the United
States, is dubious; at least there are no special provisions favoring
it. There are many obstacles to its introduction. In the first place,
many kinds of companies are forbidden to have authorized and
unissued shares, or to hold treasury shares, against which the options could be allowed. Furthermore, most controlling stockholders
in Europe are extremely jealous of their voting percentages, so that
they would not be prone to issue new shares changing them. This
jealousy is even more marked among American owners of stock in
European subsidiaries, so that they would be much less willing to
issue stock options in their European subsidiaries than they would
in the parent companies. Mandatory preemptive rights, which give
every shareholder a right to subscribe proportionately to new shares,
would be an additional obstacle. The cumulation of obstacles to
... Law of 1925, art. 32.
286
CoDICE CIVILE art. 2397· The law says that the auditing board (collegio sindacale)
may have either three or five members; but in either case, there must be two substitute
members .
..., AktG § 137·
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stock option compensation in Europe leads us to exclude it from
further consideration.
In Europe, as in the United States, there are procedural problems in awarding compensation to governing board members, because of the conflict of interest involved in payments by the board
to itself. As any American lawyer would expect, one way out is to
submit the compensation arrangements to the shareholders for their
approval, and this is expressly permitted by statutes in Italy and
the Netherlands. 288 But the American usage of inscribing the compensation plan in the by-laws cannot be used since there are no bylaws. Instead, we find many European compensation provisions in
company charters. 289
There is no necessity for shareholder action, or inclusion in the
charter, where there is no conflict of interest. For instance, the
German supervisory board can fix the compensation of the executive
board. In France the governing board can fix the salaries of the
president and of the general manager (whether the jobs are separate or combined), and can award compensation to other board
members for specific services. Furthermore, when the shareholders
have fixed the fraction of the profits which the board members may
receive, the board members decide how to distribute it among
themselves. 290
A second problem .is the percentage of the profits which can be
awarded as compensation. In French stock companies this is limited
to ro percent. 291 In German stock companies, it is limited more generally to an amount which is "reasonably related to the expenditures
made for the benefit of subordinate personnel, or for the common
good." The public prosecutor is empowered to take action if this
vague standard is violated, and the Minister of Justice may issue
regulations to make it more specific. In both France and Germany
the statutes require the setting aside of proper reserves before the
profit shares are calculated. 292
The deduction of profit shares in calculating taxable income is
severely limited. ,In Italy they are never deductible. In France and
"""Italy: Come£ CIVIL!! art. 2389 (stock companies), 2487 (limited liability companies).
Netherlands: W.K. art. 48c.
289
This is expressly authorized by the Italian and Netherlands statutes cited in the
preceding note, and in Germany, AktG § 98(1). The Italian law (C. Cxv. 2389) permits
the articles to authorize the governing board to fix the compensations of those members who have particular duties (cariche particolari)-a very vague phase.
"""Law of March 4, 1943, art. 11.
""'I hid•
... See the immediately preceding citations.
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Luxembourg a distinction is drawn between profit shares paid to
the executive member of the board (president in France, administrateur delegue in Luxembourg), and to other members. The
profit shares of the former are deductible; the other members'
shares are not. As a consequence, profit shares are seldom awarded
to non-executive board members; they are compensated in meeting
fees, or salaries, which can be used to reduce the company's taxes.
There are other fine distinctions in the French taxation of executive compensation, which determine whether the compensation is
taxed to the retipient at the basic rate of s% or 22%. Only one of
these is worth mentioning in relation to over-all planning. In the
French limited liability company, a distinction is drawn between
"majority managers," and "minority managers." The "majority
managers" are those who hold a majority of the company stock, and
their salaries are taxed at a higher basic rate, presumably on the
suspicion that the salaries may be interchangeable with dividends.
The tax can be escaped by turning the company into a stock company, where the same distinction is not applied. This difference has
led to the common statement among French lawyers that the limited
liability company is disadvantageous, from a tax point of view. This
observation may be true for individual Frenchmen, but it will not be
true for American parent corporations, which we presume will not
wish to become the managers of French subsidiaries.
10. CIVIL LIABILITIES OF MANAGERS AND BOARD MEMBERS

The same duties which lie on American officers and directors to
manage the business with reasonable care and skill fall on the
shoulders of European managers and governing board members,
and the same civil liability to indemnify the company or the unpaid
creditors for the losses caused by these officials' sins of omission
and commission. 293
The law of France offers a very interesting addition to this
burden. If a stock company becomes bankrupt, the trustee in the
bankruptcy may petition the court to saddle the board members not
293
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 62 (stock companies), art. 132 (limited liability companies).
France: Law of 1867, art. 44 (stock companies); Law of 1925, art. 25 (limited
liability companies).
Germany: AktG §84 (executive board), §99 (governing board); GmbHG §43·
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE, arts. 2392 (stock companies), 2487 (limited liability companies).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 59 (stock companies), 192 (limited liability companies)
Netherlands: W.K. art. 47 c-d.

ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS

I IJ

only with the losses traceable to their own conduct, but with all the
debts of the company. Apparently, the trustee needs to present no
evidence in support of his petition; the burden is on the president
and the other board members to prove that they applied "the energy
and the diligence of a full-time employee to the manageJ1?ent of the
company's business." 294
This unusual provision was another of the innovations of the
Vichy regime. In an interesting case decided in I95I, the Court of
Commerce for the Seine made each of the non-executive board members liable for 5% of the total company debts, and three persons who
had served as president liable for rs%, rs%, and 35%, respectively.295
Like some other Vichy embroideries on the fabric of company
law, this one seems to be accepted as a permanent addition; the
principle was extended in 1953 to French limited liability companies.296 But it does not seem to have spread to other countries.
V. FINANCING A EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY

A.

~ONETARY PROBLEMS

Every investment in European facilities will involve difficult
choices between insid~ and outside sources of money. By "inside,"
we mean sources of money existing in the same country in which the
facilities are to exist. "Outside" is more inclusive, because it may
include (a) sources outside the country of investment but inside the
Common ~arket, (b) sources which are outside the ~arket, but
still inside Europe, or (c) sources outside the European continent.
To be more concrete, a factory in France might be financed from
the "inside" by French funds, or from the "outside" by funds from
Belgium or Switzerland, or the United States.
I. THE LICENSING OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
TRANSACTIONS

297

As we write these lines, early in I 960, foreign exchange control
laws are still in effect in all the Six Common Market countries. This
294
Law of Nov. r6, 1940, art. 4·
""'Decision of January 19, 1957, Tribunal de Commerce de Ia Seine (1951), r Gazette
de Palais 239·
200
Law of 1925, art. 25, as amended by Decree-Law of August 9, I953·
m This subject is more fully explained in Chapter IV supra-"Foceign Exchange
Controls in France," by M. Fernand Jeantet. See also Frank W. Swacker, The Free
Movement of Capital within the Common Market, 15 Bus. LAW. 565 (1960).
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means that a governmental agency-which we will call the "exchange control"-has power to forbid any foreign exchange transaction. If a French factory is to be built with money not now in
France, the exchange control may by issuing an order (or refusing a
license) forbid the purchase of French francs to build it. If the factory has been already built with foreign capital, the exchange control
may by like means forbid the owner to turn his French profits into
foreign currency in order to repay the foreign investor.
In practice, the Draconian powers of the exchange control are
exercised in ways which are generally very favorable to foreign
capitalists. In Belgium and Luxembourg, there is today a "general
license" for all foreign capital investments; the foreign investor
does not even have to get permission before investing, or before
repatriating profits and capital. In France, which is currently the
strictest of the Six in exchange control, a license is required both for
original investment and for repatriation, but is now readily obtained. The license procedure survives chiefly in order to let the
government assure itself that Frenchmen are not exporting their
own capital (which they are still forbidden to do), and that capital
movements are not made for illegal purposes (like supporting the
Algerian rebellion) .
The survival of the foreign exchange laws and (in some countries) of the licensing procedures also serves to remind the American investor that the present ease of investment and disinvestment
is not necessarily a permanent feature of the European scene. Although the history of exchange control in Europe since 1945 is a
story of progressive relaxation, there have been periods of renewed
restriction as well as periods of relaxation; if future currency
crises occur, they are likely to be accompanied by revivals of exchange restrictions.
Some protection against the effect of future restrictions may be
obtained by obtaining from the exchange control agency a guarantee
of the right to repatriate earnings and capital. In France, where a
license to invest is still required, the control agency has an announced policy of permitting repatriation of licensed capital investments and of the profits produced by them. In Belgium and
Luxembourg, where no license is required, the exchange control
agency may on request give a special guarantee of future repatriation. In Italy, the control agency will guarantee repatriation of
capital and unlimited earnings from investments which are deemed

15
particularly beneficial to the Italian economy, but only capital and
earnings at 8% on other investments. 298
In addition to the guarantee of repatriability which may be obtained from the exchange control agency, the investor may be interested in examining the guarantees which result from treaty obligations of the European powers. As a part of the plan to unify
their economies, the Common Market countries have undertaken to
"coordinate" their exchange controls with respect to the outside
world, including the United States. 299 This presumably means some
increase in the strictness of controls in the countries which are now
"wide open," and some relaxation in countries now strict. The objective is not an arithmetic average, as in the case of customs, but
"the highest possible degree of liberalization." 300 This presumably
means the highest degree on which agreement .can be obtained; and
the agreement must be unanimous, before directives may issue.
Thus it appears likely, as Mr. Jeantet's essay reveals, 301 that differences between the strictness of the exchange controls which the
various European countries apply to Americans and other outsiders may persist at least through the 196o's. Some will license investment and disinvestment very readily, and consistently. Others,
with less stable currencies, may be more strict. To complicate· the
matter, the more strict countries will probably have waves of liberality, when they attempt to emulate the permissive habits of their
neighbors, but will later retreat to longer or shorter periods in
which repatriation of capital, or even of profits, is restricted.
These probabilities affect the financing plans of American enterprises in two ways. First, the prospect of a liberal foreign exchange
policy in any given country increases the attractiveness of investing
there; it decreases the risk that the investment will become temporarily or permanently unproductive of American dollars. Second,
the prospect of restrictions on repatriation increases the importance
of minimizing the investment of outside funds (e.g., dollars) and of
maximizing the use of inside funds (e.g., French francs). Even
though the parent company has no shortage of money to invest, it
ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS
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"""Law No. 43 of Feb. 7, 1956, and Presidential Decree No. 758 of July 6, 1956.
The investments which benefit from the unlimited guarantee are those called "productive," whieh are generally characterized by the purchase of tangible fixed assets. See
BANCO D1 ROMA, I FOREIGN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN ITALY 23-27 (2nd ed. 1959).
2119
Treaty art. 70.
800
301

Ibid.
Supra, note
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may wisely refrain from placing more than necessary in a country
from which repatriation may prove difficult.
2. TREATY LIMITATIONS ON EXCHANGE CONTROLS

When and if currency controls are revived, inhibiting the repatriation from European countries of American capital and profits,
Americans may notice that the controls are not erected against all
equally; Americans may be unable to repatriate while residents of
countries in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
( O.E.E.C.), and residents of Common Market countries, are less
handicapped.
With respect to their fellow members in the O.E.E.C., each of
the Common Market countries is somewhat limited in the extent
to which it may restdct currency exchanges. The O.E.E.C. includes
not only the six Common Market countries but also twelve others,
including the "Outer Seven"; of these, England and Switzerland
are of particular interest as possible bases of operation for American enterprise. At this writing, the United States is not a member. 302
In 1953, the O.E.E.C. added to the Code of Liberalisation 303
provisions by which the seventeen members bound themselves to
each other to relax reciprocally their exchange restrictions on "invisible transactions," including, among other things, the following
items:
Participation by subsidiary companies and branches in
overhead expenses of parent companies situated abroad
and vice versa . . .
Dividends and shares in profits.
Contractual amortization (with the exception of transfers in connection with amortization having the character either of anticipated repayments or of the discharge
of accumulated arrears) .304
With respect to all of these, the eighteen countries of the
O.E.E.C. bind themselves to license transfers made pursuant to
"""There are currently in process negotiations for a reorganization of the O.E.E.C.
which would include the United States and Canada as full members.
808
The Code is strictly speaking a "decision" of the Council of the O.E.E.C., adopted
in two official languages (English and French), and known in these languages as "Code
de Liberation" and "Code of Liberalisation." The original code, adopted in 1950,
dealt only with quotas on goods.
•
..,. These items are identified in Appendix B of the Code by references numbers
Ch. I, B/7; Ch. II, B/r; Ch. III, B/2. They are only three out of several dozen kinds
of "invisible transactions," so-called in contradistinction to "visible" international shipments of goods. Other invisible transactions include payment for ocean freight, repairs,
liability for damages, travel, wages, royalties, etc.

ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS

rq

prior licensed undertakings. If a Swiss investment in F ranee was
made in 1947 under an exchange license, France undertakes to
license payments of the interest and dividends which may become
due as a result of that licensed investment. However, the Code of
Liberalisation enunciates no policies on the licensing of original investments which may give rise to future overhead expenses, dividends, interest or amortization. As to that, the member countries
are presently free to choose. The Organization might wnceivably
broaden the Code to require freedom of investment among members; but this would require unanimous consent, 305 and looks unlikely.306
Among Member Countries of the Common Market, currency
controls are much further reduced. In the matter of "current payments" (on account of interest and dividends), all restrictions
among member countries are to be lifted by the end of the first stage
-that is, presumably by the end of 196r. 307 Since current payments
on licensed investments were already freed under the Code of Liberalisation, this provision promises an advance only in that it is not
limited to current payments on investments which may have antedated the imposition of exchange controls.
What is more important, the Member Countries bind themselves
to abolish by 1970, to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market, "restrictions on the movement of
capital belonging to persons resident in Member States." 308 This
means new investments. Legislative power to effect this end is given
to the Council of the Community, which acquires the right to legislate by majority' vote at the end of the second stage (December
1964). 309 By 1970 money accumulated in a Belgian enterprise (for
instance) can be invested in France to the extent that a majority of
the Community Council thinks appropriate. To be sure, there are
escape clauses permitting suspension of the liberties promised; but
they are subject to decision of the Council of the Community. 310
306
See Elkin, The Organization for European Economic Co-operation-its Structure
and Powers, 4 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 96, at II5 ( 1958).
306
At present, the growth of the activities and powers of the O.E.E.C. seems to be
arrested by the diversion of the leading powers' interest to the "Common Market" and
the "Outer Seven."
""'Treaty art. 67(2).
808 Treaty art. 67 ( 1).
"""Treaty art. 69. For the kind of "majority" required for this and other legislative
acts, see Mr. Stein's study in this symposium.
810
Under art. 73 (2) a state may on the ground of urgency take unilateral measures
to arrest "disturbances in the capital market," but the Commission of the Community
must be informed, and may modify or abolish the measures unilaterally taken.
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As a matter of historic fact, the privilege of free investment by a
national of one Member Country in another, which was promised
for I970, has already been granted in I96o. On May I 1, 1960, the
Community Council issued its Directive Number One on the subject
of exchange control. It declared that nationals of one state were
free to invest in another by purchase of operating properties (investissements directs), by purchase of securities which are traded
on .stock exchanges, and by purchase of new security offerings, and
by various other financial means.
We will try to turn these principles into examples. An American
company which wishes to form a French subsidiary must first get
a permit to bu.y francs, and must later get further permits to turn
its francs back into dollars to pay interest or repay capital. Currently, both permits may be readily obtained, but the permit to invest might become much harder to obtain on any slight change in the
international financial climate; similar circumstances are likely to
close down on permits to repay capital. Permits to pay interest and
dividends to Americans are likely to survive until a severe crisis; but
they enjoy no express treaty protection, 311 and may be expected to be
sacrificed before the permits to pay interest and dividends to other
European countries-co-members of the O.E.E.C., or of the E.E.C.,
with whom France has treaty obligations to maintain freedom of
exchange.
The position of a Swiss company is slightly better. As to permits
to pay dividends and interest, it has the protection of the provisions
of the Code of Liberalisation. As to permits to invest or withdraw
capital, it is no better off than a Delaware corporation.
The position of a Belgian company is radically different. Procedurally, it has the advantage that there is an executive organ of
the Community charged with issuing orders ("directives") to carry
out the reciprocal liberalization to which the Member States are
pledged. 312 Substantively, it is guaranteed, after I 969, such freedom
su Various Treaties of Commerce, Friendship and Navigation, or of E~tablishment,
promise Americans equal rights with nationals, and rights equal to those of the most
favored nation, in regard to exchange control. But since exchange control laws are
generally most restrictive on nationals, and do not let them take out any profits except
for special requirements, there is nothing to be desired about "national treatment."
The most-favored-nation clause will raise a more difficult question, when and if
the Community Council exercises its powers to relay controls on capital movements
between Member Countries. However, it is clear that European officials regard the
Community as creating an exception to the most favored nation clause. Although
American diplomats may argue to the contrary, we will consider this question on
the basis of the law as it is now interpreted by the officials who apply and enforce it.
812
Treaty, art. 69.
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to invest in France and in other countries of the market, and to withdraw its investments, as the Community Council decrees. That
guarantee has already been put ( revocably) into effect.
The marked advantages of a Belgian investor in the European
market, and the lesser advantages of a Swiss investor, suggest the
question whether a Belgian or Swiss company can qualify for the
same advantages when it is American-owned. We have already
noted that European law regards a company as a national of the
country where it keeps its main office; hence one might fairly expect
French exchange control officials to give O.E.E.C. treatment to all
companies with home offices in Switzerland, regardless of who owns
them. But there is one well-known exception to this view of nationality; in respect to seizure of "enemy property," French courts,
like American, have recognized ultimate ownership of voting stock
as the determinative criterion of nationality rather than location
of the home office. That is, a German-owned Swiss company is German under the laws on enemy property. 313 French writers, describing this phenomenon, have referred to the home office test of nationality as the "private law test," and to the ultimate ownership
test as the "public law test." 314 Since exchange control is undoubtedly a matter of "public law," the distinct possibility appears that
American ownership would prevent a Swiss-based company from
claiming the advantages of the Code of Liberalisation. This danger
is particularly great in France, where the "control" test of corporate
nationality attained great popularity, and was applied to deny
foreign-owned companies any compensation for war damages, and
even the protection of the new concept of "commercial property." 315
If we think of a Belgian subsidiary instead of a Swiss one, the
effect of American ownership involves various provisions of the
Treaty of Rome. In Article 58, the control test of company nationality is clearly rejected. It provides,
Companies constituted in accordance with the law of
a Member State and having their registered office, central
management or main .establishment within the Community
818

RABEL, 2 THE CoNFLICT oF LAWS, A CoMPARATIVE STUDY, 57 (1947). This view,
which was rejected in the United States following World War I, (Behn, Meyer & Co.,
v. Miller 266 U.S. 457 (1925) ), was adopted after World War II (Clark v. Uebersee
Finanz-Korporation 332 U.S. 480 (1947) ).
014
ESCARRA, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL No. 63 (1950).
815
Rabel op. cit. 59-62. The new U.S.-French Convention of Establishment guarantees
Americans equal rights with Frenchmen in leasing real property; this may entitle
Americans to "commercial property" in the future. Convention of Establishment between France and U.S.A., art. VII, 41 Dept. St. Bull. 828, 831 (1959).
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shall, for the purposes of applying the provisions of this
Chapter, be assimilated to natural persons being nationals
of Member States.
But the article contains the tell-tale words, "for purposes of applying the provisions of this Chapter," and the article is found in
Chapter 2, entitled "Right of Establishment." "Establishment" is
defined as including "the right to engage in and carry on non-wageearning activities, and also to set up and manage enterprises . . .
subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital." 316 The
"movement of capital" is the subject of another Chapter. 317 Thus
the Treaty clearly differentiates between "establishment" and
"movement of capital." 318
We have spoken so far in terms of bona fide Belgian (or Dutch,
or Luxembourgeois, or German) companies, owned by Americans,
which might wish to expand their operations, or reinvest their
profits, in operations in another country (such as France or Italy).
If such Belgian companies prove to be free from the exchange restrictions which confront direct American investments, some American would probably attempt to form a Belgian company which had
no real Belgian activity, but was formed only to gain entry to
France.
In response to any such scheme, France would have a clear right
under the treaty to take preventive measures. The Treaty expressly
provides that if residents of one Member State makes use of "transfer facilities within the Community . . . in order to evade the
rules of one of the Member States in regard to third countries,"
the Member State may take appropriate counter measures. 319 It
must consult the other Member States before acting, but does not
316

Treaty art. 52 § 2.
Chapter 4, entitled "Capital," comprises articles 67-73, of which the first provides
that "Member States shall, in the course of the transitional period and to the extent
necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market, progressively abolish
as between themselves restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to persons
resident in Member States . . ."
318
Chapter 2, Right of Establishment, and Chapter 4, Capital, are both parts of
Title III, The Free Movement of Persons, Services, and Capital. But there are notable
differences in the applicable provisions. Establishment is to be freed without qualification (art. 52) but capital movements are to be freed "to the extent necessary for the
proper functioning of the Common Market." (art. 67(1) ). On matters of establishment,
the Council can act by majority vote after the end of the first stage (art. 54(2) ), but
on matters of capital movements only after the end of the second stage (art. 69).
However, M. Jeantet seems, in his discussion of "Probable Evolution under the
E.E.C. Treaty," to believe that "investments" are entitled to the freedom promised
by article 52 to "establishment." (See Chapter IV supra.)
319
Treaty art. 70(2), par. r.
317
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need to get their agreement; the Community Council can later annul
the action, but only on finding that it went "beyond what is r·equired." 320
With respect to freedom of capital movement, the right which
each Common Market country guarantees to the others is a right of
"movement of capital belonging to persons in Metnber States"
without "any discriminatory treatment based on nationality." 321
The most obvious interpretation of this clause would be that Belgian
companies would have freedom to invest in France (to the extent
decreed by the Council) regardless of the ownership of their shares.
It is not difficult to conjure up an opposing argument, to the effect
that if the Belgian company belongs to Americans, its capital is not
capital belonging to Belgians; but this argument is likely to be resisted by most of the Common Market members, and French officials
might encounter some difficulty in determining just who owns the
Belgian company anyway.
Our conclusion is that if France, for instance, should revert to a
regime of severe exchange restrictions, companies situated in other
Common Market countries (for instance, Belgium) would be much
more favorably situated to effect currency exchanges than would
Swiss-based or U.S.-based companies. The French might attempt
special restrictions on Belgian companies which are owned by nonmembers of the Common Market; but their attempts to do so would
confront practical problems in determining the facts of ownership,
and legal problems as to their right to discriminate among Belgian
companies based on their ownership. Some of the legal obstacles
would be based on the Rome Treaty provisions which we have discussed above; others might be based on various treaties, especially
treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, which we have not
mentioned.
Because of the complex of exchange regulations, and the possible
effects of the Rome Treaty upon them, there appear to be important
potential advantages in establishing an operating company in one
of the Common Market countries, capitalizing it sufficiently so that
it can engage in branch or subsidiary operations in other Common
Market countries, and permitting earnings to accumulate to the extent that they may later be wanted for reinvestment in the other
countries. It may prove a good deal easier to reinvest such earnings than earnings which have been remitted to the American parent
"'"'!d. art. 70(2), par. 2.
821
Id. art. 67(1).
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or to a Swiss holding company. There is the incidental advantage
that such earnings will escape the corporate income which they might
incur if remitted to the American parent.

3·

FLUCTUATING EXCHANGE RATES

Assuming that permits to invest can be obtained, the investor confronts the problem of minimizing (or maximizing) the risk of currency fluctuation. If lire have been bought with dollars, and the lire
decline in exchange value, obviously the same number of lire will not
repurchase the same number of dollars. Conceivably, the lire decline
will be accompanied by an increase in nominal lire profits, so that
more lire will be earned, and the same number of dollars can be
repurchased. But there is no certainty that this will happen.
Considerations of this order apply differently to equity and to
debt investments. To a foreign subsidiary, a dollar debt will be a
dangerous thing, if the subsidiary is in a country whose currency is
likely to fall more than the dollar; in terms of the local currency, it
is a debt that grows. A dollar equity is quite different; since no fixed
obligation is incurred, it does not matter so much if the dollar dividends shrink.
Considering these factors, American parent companies will not
ordinarily want their European subsidiaries to borrow dollars, nor
will the parent companies want to borrow dollars, to invest in the
subsidiaries. They will want to invest equity capital from America,
and to borrow money, if at all, in the country where the business is
to be operated. If the rates of interest in that country are too high
to permit advantageous "trading on the equity," the correct conclusion will be to refrain from borrowing; it will not usually be wise
to borrow money in another country (such as the United States or
Switzerland) where interest rates may be lower, because such
countries are likely to have currencies which will become dear in
terms of the country where the interest must be earned.
One may be tempted to offset the potential loss from a foreign
currency decline against the potential gain from a decline in American currency. An investor in Germany might contemplate the possibility that the German mark will be revalued against the dollar,
and that his dollar debts will grow lighter, like a load of salt in a
rainstorm. This is a dubious offset. In equity investments, the possibilities of loss may be offset against the possibilities of gain; but
in fixed obligations, the possibility of loss is the possibility of
disaster.
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From these considerations, it follows that American investors will
often be very much interested in the European market for loans,
even though they are not interested in the European market for
equity investment. This will probably be true even though all the
European currencies now appear to be fairly stable; investment
plans must contemplate the possible developments of future decades.

B.

EQUITY FINANCING
I. DIVIDED OWNERSHIP

Most American companies, we have found, have little interest in
sharing their equity interests in foreign subsidiaries with other
persons. We think the reasons are generally well-founded, and will
become progressively more apparent during the transitional period
of the Common Market. Any company which has a French subsidiary and a German subsidiary, each making pins and needles, will
find increasing occasion to concentrate the pin-making activity in
one, and the needle-making activity in the other; or to close both and
build a new plant in Luxembourg. Decisions of this sort which are
very clear from the viewpoint of the parent company may be directly
against the interest of any one of the subsidiaries. If so, these decisions will also be against the interest of the minority holders in
the subsidiaries. The parent must then make the unpleasant choice
between losing operating economies, and losing the confidence of a
group of local investors. Foreseeing this problem, it will probably
prefer to retain all the shares except the few that must be held by
others in order to maintain the minimum number of shareholders required by European company laws.
There are very few legal impediments to 99% ownership of a
European affiliated company. Our French collaborator advises that
France has laws requiring majority or complete ownership by
nationals in French companies which operate a travel agency, an
accounting business, or a bank, or which claim compensation for war
damage. 322 There may be other categories, but they are exceptional
rather than typical.
The effect of these restrictions on Americans will be limited by
the new U.S.-French Convention on Establishment, which permits
exclusion of American interests only in "communications, air or
water transport, banking . . . , exploitation of the soil or other
322
But cf. Ripert, op. cit., 454, stating that the law regarding travel agencies is the
only one which makes an issue of the source of capital.
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natural resources, and the production of electricity." 323 This treaty
will forbid any direct prohibition on ownership, although it will not
necessarily prevent the French from refusing to license currency exchanges for the purpose of buying interests in particular kinds of
business. 324
A more important undermining of these restrictions arises from
the Treaty. Under Article 2 2 r, each Common Market Country
must permit investment by nationals of other countries to the same
extent as investment by its own nationals. Under this clause, an
American-owned Dutch subsidiary may own stock in a French company, even though the American company is forbidden to own
directly. The sweeping terms of the directive of May I I, I96o, 325
indicate that exchange control will not be used as a means of blocking Dutch company investment in France.
Consequently, a 99% ownership of a European subsidiary seems
to be legally attainable. However, there may be practical difficulties.
If the American investor finds the right enterprise, its owners are
not likely to be eager to sell out. If the American investor attempts
to build a new enterprise, he must find a site, build a plant, buy
equipment, hire labor and executives, and organize a distribution
system, in a country where sites are generally more scarce, labor
less mobile, trained executives less numerous, and distribution systems more tied up than in the United States-and in a country
where he has to speak through interpreters.
American investors frequently decide that the perils of building
a new enterprise are less than those of divided ownership. If they
are able to find a European going concern which has plant and
personnel and outlets, and which is willing to sell a substantial
323
Convention of Establishment between France and the United States, Nov. 25,
1959, art. V(2), 51 Dept. State Bull. 829 .
.,. Even if 99% ownership is permitted by law, it may be a factor which makes exchange control officials reluctant to grant investment licenses, as M. J eantet suggests
in his essay on exchange control. We have no similar reports from other countries of
the Market. With respect to joint investment, a distinction may generally be drawn
between European countries, which are themselves exporters of capital, and the "underdeveloped countries" of other continents, where there is a heightened sensitivity to
foreign domination of ownership. The reasons which may dictate joint investment in
those countries do not apply significantly to the member states of the European Economic Community. We have been privileged to see pre-publication manuscripts of an
extraordinary series of studies directed by Professor Wolfgang Friedman of Columbia
University on Joint International Business Ventures, which concerns joint investment
in various countries by the United States and local interests. Among the countries discussed as investment locations are Burma, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Philippine Islands,
and Turkey. There is a volume on Japan, but it concerns foreign investment by Japan
·. in other countries.
325
European Economic Community, First Directive under Article 67, May II, 1960.
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portion, but not all, of its shares, many American investors will
quite properly be attracted by this alternative. In the course of time,
they will probably be trying to buy out the local interests, but this
does not prove they did not make the best choice in joining with
local interests rather than starting from scratch.
Which choice is to be preferred obviously depends on the characteristics of the particular choices that are available. We think it
is safe to say that the building of a foreign business from scratch
is for those American investors who have extensive prior foreign
experience, who already have significant commercial contracts in
the country where the enterprise is to be created, and which need
facilities that are considerably different from any already available
in the country in question. Investors without these advantages
should generally seek to acquire existing enterprises, and settle for
divided ownership if they cannot obtain 99%.
2. CONTROL DEVICES

In many cases, the American investor will want to know whether
he can reserve voting powers which are proportionately greater
than his equity investment. The first answer is that one cannot do it
by any method so simple as the issue of non-voting common stock.
The general rule in all six countries is that all shares vote. 326 There
are statutory exceptions in two countries-Germany and Italyfor preferred stock; 327 but preferred stock is no more fashionable
in today's German and Italian capital markets than it is in America.
Another familiar American device that is not likely to work in
Europe is to have two Classes of shares-one worth a dollar, and
the other worth a hundred dollars-which have equal votes per
share. Italy and Luxembourg require that all shares in stock companies have equal value!l 28 Belgian, French and Dutch laws expressly
provide that shares shall vote in proportion to the capital which they
320

Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 74, as amended by Arrete Royal No. 26 of Oct. 31,

1934, art. 3 (stock companies); C. CoM. I, IX, art. 135 (limited liability companies).

France: Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. 1 (stock companies) ; Law of March 7, 1925, art. 28.
Germany: AktG § II4(r); GmbHG §47.
Italy: C. Crv. 2351 (stock companies), 2485 (limited liability companies).
Luxembourg: Company Law arts. 71(2) (stock companies), 195 {limited liability
companies).
Netherlands: C. CoM. art. 44b.
327
Germany: AktG § IIS ( r); the shares must be cumulative without limit; and
cannot exceed half of the voting shares.
Italy: C. Crv. art. 2351; the non-voting shares must not be more than half of all
shares.
a2s Italy: C. CIV. art. 2348.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 37·
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represent; 329 in other countries which have no similar statutes,
this stratagem would probably be regarded as a violation of the
general rule that all shares vote.
So far as European laws permit departure from the principle of
voting in proportion to investment, the departure tends to dissipate
control, rather than to concentrate it. Belgium furnishes an extreme
example, with her law that a majority owner can never cast a
majority of votes; a single voter cannot vote more than one-fifth of
the shares outstanding, nor cast more than two-fifths of the votes
cast at any meeting. 330 This is a rule of public policy, not alterable by
the charter. Owning fifty-one percent of the stock is therefore no
gua,rantee of control, unless the fifty-one percent is distributed
among three different shareholders, who vote in harmony. Happily,
this provision is not mandatory in other countries; the German law
mentions it, but only as a permissible clause in the charter. 331
At the same.time, France and Belgium offer a very interesting institution for recognizing investment without a grant of proportionate voting power. American lawyers will recall the problems which
arose in the days of high-par stock with regard to mines or patents
or good will exchanged for stock; if later events showed the property to be worth less than the par value of the stock, the contributors
were in danger of liability. 332 This problem was solved in France
and Belgium by invention of "founders' " and "beneficial" shares; 333
they are also known in Italy. 334 These do not purport to be contributions to capital, and do not share in capital distribution on liquidation; hence the specific value of the property contributed becomes
immaterial. But these shares do receive dividends, just like other
shares.
We have mentioned them at this point, because they do not neces... Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 74, as amended by Law of Nov. ro, 1953, art. r, § 4·
France: Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. r.
Netherlands: C. CoM. art. 44b.
830
C. CoM. I, IX, art. 76.
331
AktG art. II4 ( 1). See also N eth. C. CoM. art. 44b.
882
BALLANTINE on CORPORATIONS, 789 (Rev. ed. 1946); LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, 399 ff. (1959); STEVENS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 842 ff,
(2nd ed. 1949).
833
See HAMEL, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL No. 566-68 (1954).
For statutory recognition of these types of shares, see:
Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 75·
France: Law of Jan. 23, 1929, art. r.
Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. I •
... Beneficial shares ( azioni di godimento) are mentioned by the statute only in connection with reductions of capital (C. CIV. 2353), but are believed to be usable in a
variety of other circumstances,
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sarily have voting rights. In Belgium, they may be given votes, but
the total votes ascribed to such shares must not exceed half the votes
ascribed to regular ("capital") shares; in counting ·votes, theirs
must not be counted for more than two-thirds of the total counted
for regular shares. 33 ~
These special shares can be used in various ways to adjust voting
power in a jointly-owned enterprise. If voting power is to be divided
in a different ratio from profits, most of the shares (e.g., 9990)
may be "beneficial shares," in the ratio desired for profit division,
with a very small number of ordinary shares (e.g., 10) divided in
the ratio desired for control.
There remain two more vote-shifting devices in French law
which hold some interest for an American investor. One is the permission to create shares which have a double vote, when they have
been held in registered (not bearer) form for two years. 336 Although this device was probably originated as a means of keeping
American speculators from gaining control of French enterprises at
times of currency devaluation, 337 and the charter may exclude
foreigners from acquiring the double vote, 338 there is nothing now
to prevent its being used to protect an American plurality. Another
device is to exclude from attendance at meetings holders of less than
a given number of shares, which may be set as high as 20, or onetwenty-thousandth ( .ooo 5) of the total capital (whichever is
higher) .339 We mention these without any recommendation as to
when they might be used, because we suspect that under most circumstances they would do more harm than good.
Various other devices employed in the United States to stabilize
management in the presence of divided ownership are unavailable
in the Community countries, and the voting trust (like other varieties of trust) is unknown, except in the Netherlands.
Voting agreements between different groups of security holders
are evidently in use, but their enforceability is dubious at best. In
France, any agreement which limits the voting freedom of a stock
company shareholder is declared to be invalid. 340 However, the law
is not thought to forbid caucuses in which groups of shareholders
agree as to how they will vote, without actually binding themselves;
335

C. CoM. I, IX, art. 75·
Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. I.
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See HAMEL, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL No. 547 (1954).
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Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. 1.
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Ibid.
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Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. 4, as amended by Decree-Law August 31, 1937·
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nor does it apply to agreements among governing board members.
The law does not purport to apply to limited liability companies;
voting agreements as to them are presumably valid, and may be
further cemented by the previously mentioned restrictions on share
transfers, 341 and appointment of a manager for an indefinite or a
long term who cannot be removed without cause. 342
In Germany, there is no law against voting agreements, but there
is a criminal law against giving a consideration for a stock company shareholder's vote. 343 Presumably this does not forbid an exchange of voting promises among shareholders, but penalizes the
takiqg of some extraneous monetary consideration.
In Belgium, a leading commentator believes that all voting agreements are invalid. 344 An earlier Italian view to the same effect has
recently given way to the view that agreements among shareholders
as to how they will vote their own stock are legal; but they will not
be specifically enforced, and a shareholder cannot separate himself
from the voting power.
Possibilities of proxy control may also be considered. In France
and Germany it appears that proxies can never be irrevocable; 345
a Belgian commentator believes they can be irrevocable there,
within reasonable limits. 346 There are no such rules about proxy
solicitation as we have in the United States under section I4 of the
Securities Exchange Act, but the Netherlands forbid solicitation
by members of the governing board. 347 In other countries, management solicitation of proxies is apparently untrammeled, and "proxy
control" exists in many large European companies. But this would
seem to be of little interest to American investors in subsidiaries or
affiliates, since the shareholders are unlikely to be so dispersed as to
make proxy control effective.
Only in the Netherlands do we find clear judicial approval of
voting agreements among public shareholders, 348 and common usage
of a well-recognized medium for company control by agreement of
the investors-the voting trust. This operates much like an Ameri1
"'
2
"'
348

Law of March 7, 1925, art. 22.
I d. art. 24.
AktG § 299·
au VANRYN, I PRIN. DE DROIT COMMERCIAL No. 707 (1954).
845
France: HAMEL, op. cit. supra note 337, No. 533·
Germany: AktG § 114(4).
840
VAN RYN, op. cit. supra note 344, No. 689.
347
W.K. art. 44a.
348
Hooge Raad, June 30, 1944, Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie 1944, No. 465.
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can voting trust. It is of considerable interest to American participants in a "joint investment" with Dutch investors; they might agree
on a board of voting trustees which contained representatives of
each investing group, plus some neutral party chosen from a Dutch
bank (for instance), or even from another country.

3·

KINDS OF SHARES: DEGREES OF NEGOTIABILITY

In the matter of shares, European companies have a variety of
forms which have no parallel in America. Our kind of sharesregistered in the name of the owner, but negotiable by indorsement
and delivery-does not exist in Europe. Instead, they have three
other kinds of shares, one of which is found in limited liability companies, and the other two in stock companies.
For simplicity, we will start with the limited liability company
share (called part, Anteil, parte, and deelbewijs, in the various
languages) . It is more like a share in an American partnership than
like a share in an American corporation. It is never negotiable,
never eligible for public issue, never listed on stock exchanges, and
frequently transferable only with consent of the company or the
other shareholders. 349 It resembles a share in an American corporation only in that it is a unit of stated value, identical with others
in the same company.
In stock companies, the share is so differently conceived by
Europeans that they give it a different name from the limited
liability company share. It is an action, A ktie, azione, or aandeel,
and it is so distinctive that in Germany and Italy this kind of
company is named for the kind of shares it issues-A ktiengesellschaft or societa per azioni. The outstanding feature about the
stock company share is the fact that it can be put in a negotiable
form, which can be transferred endlessly from owner to owner
... Not all these negative characteristics are explicitly stated in the limited liability
statutes; more often they are implied from the fact that the statute used the word which
applies to partnership shares, rather than the word which applies to stock company
shares, and fails to authorize negotiable features. See the following:
Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 124-25 (shares not transferable even between parties
without entry on company books).
France: Law of March 7, 1925, art. 22-23 (shares not transferable without consent
of fellow-shareholders; transfer ineffective for any purpose until registered).
Germany: GmbHG § 15 (share transfers must be notarized).
Italy: C. Crv. art. 2479 (no special provisions, but no such authorization for bearer
certificates as is made for stock companies).
Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 189 (no transfer without consent of other shareholders).
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with no registration, just like money; this form is the "bearer
share" (action au porteur, lnhaberaktie, azione al portatore, aandeel aan tonder) .350
The bearer share is the typical share in publicly held European
stock companies, with many interesting consequences. One of these
is that when war breaks out, shareholders who are nationals of an
enemy country, but whose identity is unknown, may be able to sell
the.ir holdings in Switzerland, rather than having them seized as
enemy property at the home of the company. Another consequence
is that the principal holders of shares in large companies may
readily remain unknown, so that questions of "control" which have
become prominent in proceedings of the American Securities Exchange Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, or AntiTrust Division can hardly be even discussed in Europe. Likewise,
there is unlikely to be any knowledge of the ''insider trading" which
has given rise in this country to statutory liabilities under Securities
Exchange Act section 16 (b) or Securities Exchange Commission
Rule X-ra-b-5.
The absence of a record of ownership has necessarily led to
other practices which are unknown in the United States. Share
certificates have attached to them coupons which are deposited in
banks for collection of dividends, like American interest coupons,
even though the amount of the dividend varies each year, or may be
nothing. The company has no idea as to who is the recipient of the
dividend, and cannot report him to the income tax collector. In
order to establish the right to vote, certificates may be deposited
with a bank, which certifies as to the number deposited, and generally exercises the owner's proxy. 351 If the owner does not give directions, the banker exercises his own judgment. In this way, shareholder apathy in Europe gives great power to bankers instead of,
as in the United States, to company management.
The other kind of sha-re in a stock company we will call qy the
familiar American name of "registered share," although some
writers prefer to call it "nominative share" (action nominative,
850

Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 45·
France: C. CoM. art. 35·
Germany: AktG § ro.
Italy: C. Crv. art. 2355·
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 37·
Netherlands: W.K. art. 38c, g8d.
351
The proxy-holder must disclose that he votes as agent, in Belgium and Luxembourg. It is forbidden to vote "as owner" shares belonging to another. Belg. C. CoM.
I, IX, art. 200; Lux. Company Law art. 162.
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N amensaktie, azione nominativa, aandeel op naam). Although
bearer shares are generally preferred by European investors, registered shares play a considerable role.
In Italy, there are currently no bearer shares. Measures of economic warfare, adopted almost twenty years ago, required that all
shares be put in registered form. 352 These have been kept in effect,
presumably for the aid which they give to enforcement of taxes,
exchange control, and other legislation.
In other countries, too, shares are sometimes required to be
registered for financial reasons. Everywhere, shares must be registered until their full value has been paid in to the company. 353
Under the codes of French inspiration, shares which are issued in
exchange for property are required to be registered for a "cooling
off period," 354 or else (in Luxembourg) deposited in the company
treasury. 355 The objective is to delay speculative trading until the
securities are adequately "seasoned." Where governing board
members are required to be shareholders, the required shares must
be registered in their names. 356
How great a disadvantage it is to have a share in registered, instead of bearer form, we have not been able to tell. It seems clear
that outside of Italy, shares must be in bearer form in order to be
acceptable to buyers on organized security markets. But in Italy,
share trading seems to have revived on and off the exchanges without the aid of bearer shares. Since the registered share has not long
been an article of commerce, we suspect that the European law ts
852

Decree-Laws of Oct. 25, 1941, No. 1148; March 29, 1942, No. 239·
Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 46.
France: Law of r867, art. 3, as amended by Decree of Dec. 7, 1954 {all shares registered until fully paid for).
Germany: AktG § ro{2).
Italy: C. CIV. art. 2355.
Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 43·
Netherlands: W.K. art. 38c.
354
Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 47 (until ten days after the company's second annual
report is published).
France: Law of r867, art. 3, as amended by Decree of Dec. 7, 1954 {shares "not
negotiable" and certificates not to be issued until two years after incorporation).
Italy: Cf. C. C1v. art. 2343 {shares issued for property not transferable at all until
property is appraised by an expert, and appraisal reviewed by board members and
auditors).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 44 {shares not negotiable until ro days after the
second annual report of the company is published} 47·
"""Company Law art. 47 § 2.
356
Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 57·
France: Law of 1867, art. 26 (further, certificates must be deposited in company
treasury, and stamped to show that they are not transferable).
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 54·
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much like that of the United States before adoption of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act; that is, somewhat unsettled, but not wholly incompatible with reasonable stock trading.
4·

FORMALITIES REQUIRED TO INCREASE CAPITAL

We have mentioned before that the capital stated in the articles
of association must have been 100% subscribed at that time. And
unless it has all been paid in, no more may be offered. Consequently,
the governing board cannot casually sell some additional shares
":hen the market seems favorable, and when the company needs the
money.
In most kinds of companies, any addition to equity capital must
start with an amendment of the charter, accomplished by a statutory
majority of the shareholders. The increased capital must also be
100% subscribed before the increase is fully effective. There may be
further requirements to ensure that all the subscriptions are fully
paid.357 The principal exception is the Netherlands, in which the
liberty of forming a company with only one-fifth of its capital subscribed applies also to capital increases. 358
Two countries-France and Germany-permit the original charter to contain authorization for the capital increase. In France, a
company with this power is called a stock company "with variable
capital," (societe anonyme a capital variable) and must so describe itself. It can revise its capital downward as well as upward. 359
In Germany, there is an arrangement known as "authorized capital" (genehmigtes Kapital) ,360 but it works quite differently from
"authorized capital" in the United States. 361 When the decision to
increase is made, the increased capital must be 100% subscribed
and 20% paid in, just like the original capital. The only advantage
over an amendment to increase capital is that the decision may be
made by the executive board, rather than by the shareholders.
The necessity for roo% subscription of the capital which a company has power to issue is a very real one. If less than roo% is
357
All the limited liability laws, and some of the stock company laws are silent on
increase of capital; in these circumstances, lawyers apply by analogy the provisions
for original issue of capital, which have been described earlier in connection with
corporate formation. Specific provisions on increasing the capital appear in Germany:
AktG art. 149-158. Cf. Neth. C. CoM. art. 45d, para. 2.
"""W.K. art. 36e; 45d, para. 2.
359
Law of 1867, art. 48-54. Most lawyers see no practical advantage in the use of
these provisions; they prefer to form a company with fixed capital, and amend later.
360
AktG ~ 169-173.
'""See P.UECK, GF.SELLSCHAFTSRECHT 17o-I7I (2nd. ed. 1948).
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subscribed, the increase is not effective; those who have subscribed
are not bound to pay (unless the capital is formally reduced), and
the board members are forbidden to issue shares to them. 362
Naturally, European businessmen have learned to avoid any
such fiasco. The simplest way is to canvass the prospective subscribers b_efore the capital increase is authorized, so that the amount
authorized may coincide with that which they will actually ·subscribe. This method is practical only where the new shares are to be
issued to a small, known group.
A second way to escape the rigidity of the 100% subscription requirement is to put a clause in each subscription agreement that the
amount of the total capital increase may be reduced without effect·
on the subscription. Then, when the subscriptions are all in, and
their amount known, the shareholders may amend their former
amendment, to adjust the capital increase to the subscriptions obtainable.363 This method is cumbrous, and may tend to cloud the
atmosphere of confidence in which share subscriptions are best
solicited.
A third method is to obtain 100% subscription in advance from
investment bankers, who thus underwrite the risk that the investment public will not take the entire issue at the price proposed. 364
This is the standard device used in large public financing operations.
The importance of having a firm bid seems to be considerably
greater than in the United States.
Although the underwriter must promise the issuer to take the
entire issue, the issuer can never promise the underwriter that he
will get it. The first opportunity to take the new shares generally belongs to the old shareholders. The company laws confer unconditional pre-emptive rights only in France and Germany, 365 but these
rights appear to exist in all countries, at least unless specifically
negatived, as permitted by Italian law. 366 Pre-emptive rights adhere
to preferred shares as well as to common-a factor which aggravates companies' reluctance to issue preferred shares. Because of
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the European recognition of indefeasible pre-emptive rights, underwriting arrangements generally have a contingent element; what
the underwriter agrees to take is what the shareholders reject. 367

C.

FINANCING WITH BORROWED FUNDS

Most American investors will be much more interested in obtaining outside financing in the form of borrowed funds than in the form
of stock subscriptions. Aside from the problems of divided ownership, there is the important fact that debt interest is generally deductible from taxable income (just as in the United States), while
dividends on stock (even preferred stock) never are. We have been
warned of only a few exceptions to the deductibility rule. In France,
interest is not deductible when paid to shareholders under circumstances that lend themselves to disguised equity investments; 368 in
the Netherlands, contingent interest is sometimes non-deductible. 369
I. TRADING ON THE EQUITY;
OBSTACLES TO THE USE OF "LEVERAGE"

Some other classical advantages of borrowing money-summed
up in the phrase, "trading on the equity, "-are probably also
present in Europe, but with qualifications which must not be
ignored. One of the presuppositions of "trading on the equity" is
that interest rates are lower than dividend rates. Here we must
notice that the same kind of inversion recently observed in the
United States may exist in Europe. That is, the interest rate may
become higher (or at least as high as) the dividend rate. In 1959,
the German Central Bank Discount rate fluctuated between 2-%,%
and 3%, which would mean a rate of at least a percent higher to
commercial borrowers. In August, the average yield on stocks
listed on German stock exchanges was 2-%,%. 370 Hence, the cost of
equity capital was apparently lower than the cost of borrowed
capital.
Perhaps the modern. theory of "trading on the equity" rests not
so much on a difference in contemporaneous income rates, as upon
867
For an interesting account of an international underwriting of a European share
offering, see Bross and Alpern, International Equity Financilig, 13 Bus. LAW. 440
(April 1958).
368
Professor Houin advises that deductibility is denied as to interest paid on debts
owed to shareholders when ( r) the interest exceeds a certain rate, or ( 2) the debts
so owed amount to more than half the equity capital.
369
In cases of "participating" bonds, whose "interest" rate rises in proportion to
company profits, the tax collector asserts a right to regard part of the participation as a
distribution of profit, rather than a payment of interest.
370
First Nat. City Bank of N.Y., For. Inf. Serv., Feb., Aug., Oct., 1959.
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a supposition that dividend rates will rise (in relation to the initial
investment), while interest rates will not. This supposition would
also be belied by important features of the European financial scene.
The most important of these is the decline of fixed interest obligations, and their partial replacement by obligations which "inflate."
The inflatable securities are of three types. One type is the bond
convertible into stock; it is essentially like the well known convertible debenture of American finance (although the problem of
providing the shares for conversion presents special legal difficulties
because of the European limitations on "authorized stock"). 871 A
second type is the "participating" bond, on which the interest to be
paid varies with the income of the company. It should not be regarded as equivalent to the "contingent interest" bonds which were
issued chiefly in reorganizations of insolvent American companies,
and which had a fairly low top limit on the maximum interest to be
paid (for instance, 2% fixed and 3% contingent). The European
variable interest bond generally permits an unlimited increase in
the income rate as the company income rises, the objective being to
let the purchasing power of the interest escape from the deadly
embrace of the sinking franc (or other currency). 372
A third type of inflatable bond-and the most unlike any investment familiar to Americans-is the "indexed" bond, in which
the interest to be paid, and the principal to be repaid, rise in proportion to increases in some official index, such as the index of wholesale prices, or the cost-of-living index. 313
Obviously, all these forms of debt security diminish greatly the
possibility of "trading on the equity." The convertible bond tends to
limit the leverage to the time before conversion, after which the
advantage disappears. The "variable interest" bond tends to take
away all leverage. The indexed bond may even have a reverse
leverage, if the company's profits have the misfortune to rise less
than the increase in the relevant price index.
Naturally, the flight from fixed interest has been most marked
in the countries where currency devaluation has been felt most
sharply. In 19 54, French nationalized industries borrowed 3 billions
on fixed income securities, against 67 billion on participating or
indexed securities, according to a study of European finance. Private
industries borrowed, respectively, 9 billions and 35 billions in the
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same categories, respectively. 374 Writing in January of I959, our
French collaborator declares, "For practical purposes, the only debt
securities presently being issued by companies in France are either
securities with variable interest, or convertible securities; fixed
interest securities of the classic type are becoming more and more
scarce." He reports that in 1957, only one billion out of 59 billions
of bonds were of non-inflatable types.
However, there has been a change in the choice of inflatable
media. While the earlier reports emphasized the use of what we
call "indexed" bonds, the most recent issues are of the "participating" type. A financial regulation issued at the close of I 9 58 (contemporaneously with the relaxation of currency controls) forbade
the issue of bonds indexed to the minimum wage or cost of living,
but imposed no obstacles to bonds whose interest varies with the
fort~nes of the enterprise, as measured by revenues or profits. 375
Apparently there has been no comparable development in other
European countries. In Italy, which has also experienced severe
currency depreciation, there has been little use of inflatable debt
securities. Equity financing has displaced debt financing to a marked
extent; in I 9 55, the ratio of private share issues to private bond
issues was I 62 to 9; and it had been growing steadily. 376
The O.E.E.C. report on Germany also pointed to a tremendous
predominance of equity issues over debt issues (I 56 to 9 in
19 55) ; 377 convertible offerings disappeared after a brief flurry in
195 I and 1952.378 In the Belgium-Luxembourg Monetary Union,
which has had the stablest of the European currencies since I 94 5,
there have been no notable developments of any of the three types of
inflatable debt securities. 379
2. LIMITS ON DEBT OBLIGATIONS

As in America, the principal forms of debt obligations are (I)
bonds, designed for sale to a variety of investors, and ( 2) bank
3
" O.E.E.C., THE SUPPLY OF CAPITAL FUNDS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE
So (1957). This report appears to use "indexed" to include interest varying with factors
extraneous to the enterprise (like the cost of living), and "participating" to designate
interest varying with the gross revenues, operating income, or net profit of the enterprise.
Some later figures appear in Vasseur, LE DROIT DE LA REFORME DES STRUCTURES 181
(1959).
5
"' Ordinance of Dec. 30, 1958, portant loi de finances pour 1959 7 art. 79·
376
O.E.E.C., op. cit. 97·
377
!d. 82.
308 !d. 83 •
..,. /d. 92-93·
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loans, which may be discounted among banks, .but which are not
available to a broad investing public.
However, many companies are incapable of issuing bonds. This
is true of limited liability companies in Belgium, France, Italy and
Luxemhourg.aRu This limitation is apparently based on the belief
that the streamlined organization of limited liability companies
deprives the investor of the protection which he has in buying the
bond of a stock company. When limited liability companies borrow money, they must borrow it from banks, which are professional
lenders; the rule against issuing bonds is not construed to forbid
giving notes to banks. This does not mean that limited liability
companies have access only to short term credit; bank loans in
Europe include "medium term" and even "long term" credits.
Another distinctive limit on the use of bonds is the Italian provision which, with certain exceptions, limits the bonds which a stock
company may issue to the amount of its capital stock. 381
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SOURCES OF CREDIT

Observers of European finance over the past fifteen years stress
the scarcity of investment funds during most of this period in relation to the exaggerated demands of post-war reconstruction. In
addition to these factors, which operated equally on equity capital
and borrowed capital, there was a special aversion to lending, inspired by the experience of inflation and the expectation of more of
the same. 382
Because of these factors, the European governments were obliged
to create or encourage new institutions with the specific function of
supplying credit to industry on a longer term than commercial banks
were prepared to do. 383 Most of this credit is what is called "intermediate term," ranging from one to five years, but often with an
expection of renewal so that it fulfills the economic function of true
long-term credit.
In France, the outstanding institution of this type is the Credit
""'Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 131.
France: Law of March 7, 1925, art. 4·
Italy: C. Czv. 2486.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 188 (forbidding public issue).
381
C. Czv. art. 2410.
382
See O.E.E.C., THE SUPPLY OF CAPITAL FUNDS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN
EUROPE (1957), and Supplements I and II, containing detailed studies of Finance in
Austria, Germany, United States, Belgium, France, Greece, and Italy; VASSEUR, DROIT
DE LA REFORME DES STRUCTURES INDUSTR!ELLES ( 1959) 178 ff.
383
See O.E.E.C., op. cit. note 382, at 45 ff.

38
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET
National. 384 It acts by discounting notes taken by commercial banks,
and rediscounting them to the Bank of France or another central
bank. The net cost of the loan is based on the Bank of France discount rate plus the discounts and commissions of intervening agencies. A 1958 report indicated that the rate to a borrower would be
7.6% at a time when the Bank of France discount rate was 5%; a~
the latter rate was reported in 1959 as low as 4?i %. 38
In addition to the Credit National, which extends intermediate
credit, France has the Credit Foncier, which extends long term
credit secured by real estate, and some smaller semi-public credit
institutions with various specialities. These institutions, including
the Credit National, are tremendously important; they are the
principal source of fixed-interest credit. 387 In a year in which private
and nationalized companies succeeded in borrowing only 12 billions
from the public in fixed-interest obligation, the Credit N a tiona!
rediscounted 46 billions in fixed-interest notes. In the same year 64
billions were raised by private and nationalized industrial companies
by participating or indexed bonds. 388 The activities of the Credit
National may decline if the recent stabilization of the French
economy results in a revival of private lending at fixed interest.
But at our last reports, private industry's needs for finance depended
very heavily on the Credit National.
Semi-public and public lending institutions play a prominent role
also in most of the other countries of the Market, although statistics
on their activities are not equally available. In Italy, the most important three are the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano ( I.M.I.), which
makes direct loans to industry, and the Mediocredito which discounts industrial loans made by private banks. Both are owned by
the state. 389 In Germany, there is the state-owned Kreditanstalt
fur Wiederaufbau ( KfW) which had outstanding loans or loan
commitments of 5,790 DM in 1954, compared with 741 DM loans
by the largest private long-term lender, the Industriekreditbank
( I.K.B.). 390
In Belgium, the principal resource available for intermediate
I
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I d. 54 ff. Alamigeon, op. cit., note 372 at n6 ff. Vasseur, op. cit. note 282 at 253 ff.
Alamigeon, op. cit. note 372, at 120.
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388
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and long-term credit since I 946 has been the semi-public loan companies, of which only one-the Societe N ationale de Credit
l'Industrie-makes loans to industry. 391 Not only has it been the
principal source of such funds, but it also offers subsidized interest
rates as low as 2% for the development of facilities designed to
relieve unemployment in depressed areas. Private banks also extended intermediate credit, but under substantial handicaps. 392 An
avenue for increased industrial financing by private banks was
opened by measures taken in 1959, permitting private banks to make
long term loans, subsidized or guaranteed by the government.
So far as we can determine, the facilities of these public and semipublic lending institutions are just as available to American-owned
enterprises as they are to locally owned ones; we know of some
American-owned enterprises who have had no difficulty in using
their facilities. If their attitudes differ from those of purely private
lenders, it is chiefly in insisting that the borrowing enterprise should
be of apparent benefit to the national economy. Although there may
be a gradual expansion of the market for private financing in the
coming years, we believe that many American owned enterprises
will continue to find their cheapest and most satisfactory source of
financing in government-owned credit institutions.
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4·

INTERNATIONAL CREDIT SOURCES

We have spoken of credit entirely in national terms-French
credit institutions for France, Italian credit institutions for Italy.
Such is certainly the existing pattern of European credit; the
reasons are many and obvious. For one thing, most of the credit is
not spontaneous profit-seeking activity, but is supplied directly or
indirectly by the government to help the industry in the country
whose government supplies the credit. The hazards of fluctuating
currencies have offered a further obstacle to international credit. 393
But it is obvious that if there is to be a truly European development of industry and commerce, there must be a truly European
supply of credit. Two possible forerunners of a European credit
supply are now visible on the horizon.
One of these is the European Investment Bank, provided for by
891

ld. 6z-6 5·
"""!d. 35-36.
3911
Bye, Localisation de l'lnvestissement et Communaute Economique Europeenne,
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the Treaty of Rome. Its members, and the contributors of its capital, are to be the six countries of the Community. Its purposes are
stated as follows:
The task of the European Investment Bank shall be to
contribute, by calling on the capital markets and its own
resources, to the balanced and smooth development of the
Common Market in the interest of the Community. For
this purpose, the Bank shall by granting loans and guarantees on a non-profit-making basis facilitate the financing
of the following projects in all sectors of the economy:
(a) projects for developing less developed regions;
(b) projects for modernising or converting enterprises
or for creating new activities which are called for by the
'progressive establishment of the Common Market where
such projects by their size or nature cannot be entirely
financed by the various means available in each of the
Member States; and
(c) projects of common interest to several Member
States which by their size or nature cannot be entirely
financed by the various means available in each of the
Member States. 394
In its first two years of operation, the bank made seven loans,
all of which had some special appeal to the interests of the Community. Six of these were in under-developed areas-two in southern
Italy, two in southern France, one in Sicily, and one in Sardinia.
The other was in Luxembourg. Four of the loans were for electric
power generation, and three for chemical plants. 395 An American
company-Union Carbide-was an indirect beneficiary of one of
the loans, through its part ownership in the new Italian company to
which the loan was made. 396 So far as conclusions can be drawn from
so short a history, American investors are not barred from benefitting from European Investment Bank loans (at least, not when
they are joint investors). But priorities will go to projects which
promise to beget further productive products. The Bank's Board of
Directors reports,
The projects to which the Bank has agreed so far,
belong to the category of development investments intended for increasing basic productions which, in turn,
contribute to increased demand, production, and invest... Treaty art. 130.
895
European Investment Bank, Annual Report (1959) 16-19.
896

/d. ( 1958) zo-zz.
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ment in many related fields. They are nearly all situated
in the less developed areas of the Community, require
fairly large amounts and are by their very nature, highly
capital-intensive. 397
In the private banking sector, the commercial banks of the
various countries have recognized the probable call for international
loans. They are preparing for it to the extent of making contacts
between banks, so that coordinated loans can be made in (for instance) francs and marks. 398 But there is no present prospect of a
single private bank which will make a loan to a wholly out-of-state
company, as is done every day inN ew York or Chicago. 399

D.

SECURITIES REGULATION j PUBLIC OFFERINGS
OF SECURITIES

It is commonly said that European countries, except Belgium,
have no securities or "blue sky" laws, and no securities commissions.
This is true. But this does not mean that Europe is like America
would be if all the securities and blue sky laws were repealed.
European countries have a considerable number of laws and regulations which restrict security offerings, and which we will briefly
explain.
397
I d. ( 19 59) 14. For further comment on the possible role of the European Investment Bank, see Vasseur, op. cit. supra note 382, 351 if.
398
Vasseur (op. cit. note 382, at 357) reports the following international organizations
to promote international loans:
Societe Europeenne de Developpement Industriel, a stock company formed by one
French and one German bank (the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, and the Deutsche
Bank) to investigate and arrange cooperation between banks and other companies of
the two countries.
Societe Franco-Italienne de Developpement Industriel, a stock company formed by
one French bank and two Italian banks (the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, and the Instituto Mohiliare Italiano) for parallel purposes.
Groupement Franco-Allemand pour le Marche Commun, an informal association of
several French and German banks to consult on concurrent participation in loans to
Common Market enterprises. The banks include (for France) Banque Fran(aise du
Commerce Exterieur, Banque Louis-Dreyfus et Cie, Banque de !'Union Parisienne,
Credit Lyonnais, Societe Generale, Societe Generale Alsacienne de Banque, and (for
Germany) Bankhaus Hardy and Co. GMBH, Bankhaus Sal. Oppenheim Jr. and Cie.,
Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank, Dresdner Bank AG.
Another informal association groups banks of five countries, comprising Berliner
Handelsgesellschaft, Credit Commercial de France, Compagnie Financiere de Paris,
Banque Lambert (Brussels), Banca di Credito Finanziario Mediobanca (Milan), Compagnie d'Outremer pour l'Industrie et la Finance (Brussels), Pierson Heldring et Pierson (Amsterdam), MM. de Rothschild Freres (Paris).
399
Vasseur (op. cit. note 382, at 357-358) prognosticates hopefully, but without detail,
direct appeals by companies of one country to investors of another.
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I. EXCLUSION OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES

The law about public offerings by limited liability companies is
very simple. No public stock offerings of limited liability companies
are permitted in any country, and no public bond offerings except in
Germany. 400 The theory of these laws is that the simplified structure
permitted for limited liability companies-a single manager, with
no watchdog auditors-affords so little investor protection that the
solicitation of investment by strangers cannot be permitted.
2. REGISTRATION OF STOCK OFFERINGS

The absence of separate "securities laws" in most European countries is somewhat illusory because there are certain features built
into the European stock company laws which contain the basic
elements of American "securities registration," as well as features
which may recall the reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act.4ol
We will start with the German stock company law, which is the
most elaborate. When new stock is offered, each buyer must write
his signature on a declaration which discloses the number of shares
of each class offered and their offering price, and names a date on
which subscribers will be released if 100% of the capital has not
been subscribed. 402 If shares are to be exchanged for property, the
declaration must also show the name of the person making the exchange, the identity of the property, and the par value of the shares
for which it is being exchanged. 403 When all the stock has been subscribed, the company managers must file as a public record copies of
400
Belgium: As to shares, deduced from C. CoM. I, IX, art. II9 (limiting number of
shareholders to so, and excluding corporations), 126 (restricting transfer) etc.; as to
bonds, expressly stated by art, 13 I.
France: Law of March 7, 1925, art. 4 (forbidding public issue of securities of any
kind).
Germany: GmbHG § 3, 5 (requiring that entire capital be subscribed by incorporators).
Italy: As to shares, the result is deduced from C. Crv. art. 2472, which forbids issuing
"azioni," meaning negotiable shares. As to bonds, C. Crv. 2486 forbids their issue.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 188 .
..,_For some general comparisons of the regulation of security issue in United States
and Europe, see Kessler, The American Securities Act and Its Foreign Counterparts,
44 YALE L. J. II33 (1935); LEVY, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AND THEIR CONTROL 408-428
(1950); Neff, A Civil Law Answer to the Problems of Securities Regulations, 28 VA.
L. REV. 1025 (1942).
•oa AktG § 152.
<OS Id. arts. 152(1), 150.
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the subscription certificates, of the contracts for issue of shares in
exchange for property, a statement of the expenses of the flotation,
and the governmental authorization (if required) for the offering. 404
They must also publish a notice of the completed stock subscription, which includes a statement of the subscription price and of the
property exchanged for shares (if any) .405
In France, capital increases are treated just like the original
formation of the company. Subscribers must sign a subscription
contract which discloses the name, purposes, and home office of the
company, which shows how many shares will be paid for in cash and
how many in property, and which tells where subscription payments
are to be escrowed until the required sum is completed. 406 If property is exchanged for shares, there must be an auditors' report and a
meeting of shareholders to approve the exchange. 407 The amendment which authorized the capital increase, and a certified copy of
the subscribers' list, must be publicly filed, and a notice published in
the Bulletin of Compulsory Legal Notices. 408
With variations in detail, there are similar provisions in the company law of Italy and Luxembourg to assure that the subscribers
know what they are buying, and to make a public record of the fact
of subscription. 409
Only in the Netherlands is the solicitation of subscriptions substantially unregulated by law, like intra-state solicitation in Delaware and New Jersey. But the absense of legislation is supplied, at
least in part, by rules on registration of securities for trading on
stock exchanges. These are rules imposed by the brokerage fraternity, which, like many other professional groups in the Netherlands,
exercise substantial powers of economic control. The significance of
stock exchange regulations is considerable; since there is no welldeveloped "over the counter" market outside the exchanges, the
exchanges comprise the only market that exists.
ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS
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LICENSING OF PUBLIC OFFERINGS

In spite of the absence of "Securities Commissions," it is necessary in every country but Luxembourg to obtain either the authori""'I d. art. 155·
too I d. art. 157.
•o• Law of 1867, as amended by Decree of Aug. 4, 1949, art. 28.
""'Law of 1867, art. 4·
08
'
Law of 1867, art. 55-57, 59·
""'Italy: C. Crv. art. 2333-2336.
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 33-36.
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zation or the acquiescence of some public official before a public
offering is made, at least for very large offerings. 410
The principal difference between these systems and those of
American security commissioners lies in the criteria of the authorization. In Europe, the main purpose is to prevent "disturbance of the
market." 411 Only in Belgium is the regulation of public issues
avowedly designed partly to protect investors. The prevailing
theory is that if too many securities were offered at a time, the
market would be glutted, to the damage of all the concurrent
offerors. European commentators emphasize the "thinness" of the
European investment market-the limited amount of funds looking for placement. In most of the years since I 94 5, European
markets have been "thin" as a result of the devastation of war,
complicated by narrow national boundaries, which funds cannot
pass without exchange permits. With financial recovery, and the
recovery of vigor in European capital markets, licenses have become quite freely obtainable.
Consistent with the purpose of maintaining market equilibrium,
licenses are not generally refused, but merely postponed. But they
are not necessarily postponed in order of application. On the contrary, the finance ministries authorize offerings in their order of importance to the national economy. Under this test, government bond
issues always come first; other issues must wait until government
bond issues are fully subscribed. After that, priorities are granted
on a wide variety of economic grounds; an offering which will tend
to increase facilities of production for export is more desirable than
one which will merely satisfy domestic consumer demands. An
offering to finance a plant in a distressed area is more important
than one for the same purpose in an area of labor scarcity. If there
410
Belgium: Arrete Royal No. 185 of July 9, 1935, art. 26-34.
France: Law of Dec. 23, 1946, art. 82.
Germany: Gesetz iiber den Kapitalverkehr, Dec. 15, 1952.
Italy: Law of May 3, 1955, No. 428 (offerings over 500 million lira-about $7so,ooo).
Netherlands: No statute requires licensing, but ( 1) by a gentleman's agreement brokers
will not handle the shares unless the offering has been approved by the Nederlandse
Bank, and (2) the Minister of Justice will withhold permission for any incorporation
or charter amendment until he is satisfied with respect to the financing plans.
411
The Belgian law discloses two purposes; the offering can be postponed because of
a tendency to "desequilibrer le marche des capitaux" (art. 28) Arrete Royal of July 9,
1935, or to "induire les souscripteurs en erreur." (art. 29), Arrete Royal, No. 185 of
July 9, 1935. The French law declares no purposes, but it is attached to a government
budget bill, and is reportedly administered chiefly to protect the market for government
bonds.
Under the German law, "Die Genehmigung kann versagt werden, wenn Zinssatz,
Ausgabe- und Riickzahlungsbedingungen bei gleichartigen Wertpapieren wesentlich
abweichen und bei einer Genehmigung eine nachhaltige Stiirung des Kurs- und Zinsgefiiges am Kapitalmarkt zu befiirchten ware."
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is a national plan of industrial development, as m France, conformity to the national plan will be important.
Another difference in result which flows from the difference in
purpose is that when money is "easy," licenses are granted with
great freedom, or a "general license" is granted, which means in
effect a suspension of the regulationY 2
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THE BELGIAN BANKING COMMISSION

Two years after the adoption of the federal Securities Act in the
United States, Belgium created a "Banking Commission," with
powers over the public issue of securities. 413 Probably the primary
object of the creation was the supervision of banks, and enforcement of the divorce, ordered by the same law, of investment functions from commercial banking functions. 414 In any event, the
Belgian Banking Commission, as its name suggests, supervises banking in general as well as securities issues.
The powers of the commission over securities issuance rest on
the narrow basis of the power to postpone for a maximum of three
months the issue of securities, and to publish its decision (with
reasons). 415 When one thinks of the great power wielded by the
American Securities Exchange Commission through granting or
withholding the acceleration (by a maximum of 20 days) of the
effective date of registration statements, 416 one can perhaps appreciate better the de facto influence of the Belgian commission.
The Commission's decision to prohibit (temporarily) may be
based on either of two grounds-that the offering is likely to unsettle the capital market, 417 or that it is likely to mislead investors as
to the character of the business or the rights conferred by the
securities. 418 In order to inform itself, the Commission is entitled to
a dossier which might be called a short registration statement, and
such further information as it may request which may be useful to
it.419
Through its power to delay a license, or compel disclosure, or
"" Alamigeon, op. cit. note 371 supra, at 76.
Arrete Royal No. 185 of July 9, 1935; for a full examination of this decree and
the operations under it, see PoNLOT, LE STATUT LEGAL DES BANQUES ET LE CoNTRliLE DES
EMISSIONS DE TITRES ET VALEURS (1958).
414
See the Report accompanying the decree, printed in Ponlot, op. cit. supra note 413,
at 314-324; see also O.E.E.C., THE SUPPLY OF FUNDS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, 35-36 (1957) .
.,. Arrete Royal No. 185, July 9, 1935, arts. 28, 29.
416
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 175-178 ( 1951).
411
Arrete Royal No. 185, July 9, 1935, art. 28.
418
I d. art. 29.
419
I d. art. 27, 28.
413
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both, the Commission has exercised a profound influence over many
phases of corporation financial practice which have no immediate
relation to public offerings. Believing that the purchase of treasury
shares is a dubious practice, the Commission has induced one company to adopt provisions (presumably charter amendments) to prevent repetition; another company was induced to cancel treasury
shares, to preclude reissue. 420 Where affiliated companies had bought
shares in each other, the Commission induced both to liquidate their
holdings. 421 Where shares are issued over par, the Commission requires that the surplus be placed in a reserve, unavailable for
dividends. 422
The Commission has taken a very lively interest in profit-sharing
plans· of executive compensation, which have had great post-war
popularity in Belgium. Many profit sharing plans are based, it
appears., on the excess over some quantity of profit established many
years ago, and now outdated by inflation or other factors. In these
cases, the Commission believes that the compensation plan should
be revised to raise the profit base above which the profit-sharing
plan operates. 423 Taking a leaf from American practice, the Commission has decided to require a listing of the compensation of the
governing board members and top executives, with the compensation of each, and each one's qualifications. 424 However, the registration statement is not a public document, and the prospectus is not
required to do more than show the total remuneration to the governing board members as a group.
The Commission engages in a host of other activities, none of
which will amaze an American familiar with the activities of the
S.E.C., but most of which are foreign to European practice. It requires the disclosure of underwriting arrangements and underwriting expenses. 425 It requires disclosure that the company has paid a
board member's expenses of legal defense, or that board members
have conflicts of interest with the corporation. 426 In one case it influenced a company with subsidiaries to present a consolidated
balance sheet-a rare practice in Europe. 427 It has also introduced
420

Ponlot, op. cit. supra note 413, at 231, 232.
I d. 237.
422
I d. 235·
"""Id. 239-41·
421

... I d. 264.
426
Id. 251-52 •

... I d. zss-s6.
""[d. 267. Officials of Esso-Standard (France) advised us that they had introduced
a consolidated balance sheet in France in the late 1950's, hoping that other companies
would follow suit; but no others did.
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the use of comparative profit and loss statements covering a period
of years. 428
These items will suffice to show that the Banking Commission,
with a relatively small staff and small statutory basis, has an influence in many directions which recalls securities regulation in
Washington. The fact that it is alone in doing so will emphasize, at
the same time, the absence of similar securities regulation in the
other countries of the mark~;t.
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E. A

COMMON MARKET FOR CAPITAL?

Our dominant impression, as we look at the prospects for European investment, is very different from our impression of the prospects for trade in commodities. For commodities, we envision by
1970 a truly common market, in which the same kinds of typewriters will be sold and used in Hamburg as in Palermo, with no
more difference in price than the cost of commerical freight. They
cannot be scarce in Amsterdam and plentiful in Venice, nor can the
available kinds and qualities vary greatly.
The capital markets are quite different. We start out with different company laws, which limit the kinds of securities which companies can issue. German and French companies can make the same
kinds of typewriters, but German limited liability companies can
issue bonds, while French cannot. French stock companies' preferred stock must have voting rights, but German need not. Besides, even the tastes of investors have changed; French investors
demand inflatable bonds; Germans and Belgians will (to a greater
extent) accept fixed interest.
The prospects are also different. While there is a definite
schedule for eliminating customs and quotas at an arithmetic rate, 429
there is no such formula for eliminating barriers to capital movement. There is not even a firm promise to eliminate them entirely,
but only "to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of the
Common Market." 430 These weasel words invite wide differences of
opinion as to what kind of functioning is "proper" in the capital
markets; if such differences had not existed, it would not have been
necessary to use such weasel words.
Although the nations pledge themselves to "co-ordination of
exchange policies," 431 they say nothing about the licensing of investment offerings, except what may be implicit in the promise to
... I d. 27o-'JI.
<29 Treaty arts. 12-17, 3o-3 7•
•oo I d. art. 67.
mId. art. 70(1).
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"approximate" laws of all kinds which "distort the conditions of
competition." 432 We must therefore reconcile ourselves to a longterm continuance of the present diversity of the measures and
policies of regulation.
However, diversity alone need not block the development of an
international market. There is an interstate market for capital
in the United States, despite the rigors of, and the irrational differences between, the blue sky laws of Illinois and Michigan. It
exists partly because the companies can escape to Delaware, and
the money can escape to New York, where the requirements of only
one state and of the federal government must be met.
To draw a parallel in Europe, we might ask whether European
investors' money can escape to Luxembourg-a country of notorious
freedom from exchange regulations, and whether companies which
operate in Italy, Germany, and Belgium would turn to this market
for money on similar terms of investment?
To answer this question, we will start by saying that we think
that to some extent this is already happening. The curtain of exchange control is not a curtain of iron, and it will become less and
less effective as commerce among the nations of the Market expands.
An official of the Belgian Banking Commission told us that he
thought the Commission's controls were evaded in a number of
cases by investments effected in Luxembourg; this is particularly
easy, because there is no exchange control at all between these two
countries. (They have a monetary union.)
But we think that the growth of a Community-wide capital market
will be very slow, and will depend on the solution of many problems
which are not envisaged by the Treaty of Rome. There will first
have to be a unanimous desire, which evidently did not exist when
the Treaty was signed, to establish a common capital market. Next,
there will have to be a total and permanent relaxation of exchange
controls.
Before that will come to pass, we think there will have to be a
general agreement on what kinds of controls over investment are
necessary and proper, and there will have to be confidence among
the investors of the various countries that the investments available
in other countries are as safe as those in their own. This kind of
confidence is not likely to arise until similar controls, or common
controls, exist in the various countries. Perhaps this will come about
through "approximation of laws." But an American finds it difficult
••• !d. art. ror.
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to imagine uniformity in investment standards without the existence of an interstate agency with direct regulatory powers, like the
Securities Exchange Commission. Since the Treaty of Rome does
not provide even a skeleton for such regulation, a European common capital market as Americans know it appears to be along way
off.
For the American businessman, this means that if he wants to
raise money in Europe, he will probably have to raise it in the
country where he plans to use it. Even though some of the ultimate
investors may reside in other countries, the money will be raised
according to the usages and regulations of the country where the
industrial operation is located. Hence the choice of site of operation
will be made with an eye on investment conditions as well as on
merchandise and labor markets.
A good location, from a financial point of view, is one in which
investment capital is fairly plentiful, the usual investment media
(e.g. convertible bonds, fixed interest bonds) are acceptable, and
in which money once invested, and its profits, can be freely withdrawn and invested in other countries of the Community, or returned to the United States. The choice is the more difficult to make
because it depends on future controls, rather than present ones.
According to common knowledge, Belgium and Luxembourg have
enjoyed the longest monetary stability (since 1946), with accompanying freedom of exchange control. Germany has been in the
same group since about 1950. Netherlands currency has been stable,
but exchange control has been fairly tight. Italy and France, in that
order, have most recently attained monetary stability, and have the
strictest currency controls today. The investor must guess what
the respective advantages of the various countries will be tomorrow.
ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS

POSTSCRIPT

The lawyer's job in planning a business operation-whether foreign or domestic-may be thought of as involving two parts: conception and communication. The lawyer must first form a mental
picture of the company structure that he wants to set up, and of
the roles which the various officials will play, individually and in
relation to each other. Next, he must somehow communicate these
ideas to the officials who are to do the acting.
On the domestic scene both parts of the job may be carried out
almost unconsciously, because the lawyer conceives of a structural
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pattern which is completely traditional, and anyone who is named
as president of a parent company, or president of a domestic subsidiary, has the same conception as the lawyer of how he is supposed
to act.
When the American lawyer turns to a foreign business operation,
both processes are greatly complicated. The complication of the
communication process is obvious. An American "director" is not
the equivalent of an Italian dirretore. Even if the "director" is
equated with the more nearly comparable amministratore, the
problem is not solved, because the amministratore also thinks of
himself rather differently than does an American "director."
But the difficulty is one of conception as well as of communication. The European institutions, and the roles which people play
within them, are just a little different from the institutions which
exist, and the roles which are played, in the United States. The
American lawyer is in the position of a composer writing music for
people who not only use a different system of musical notation but
also play different instruments on different scales than those which
he knows.
Many American lawyers-of necessity-probably ignore these
differences. They make their plans in terms of Delaware certificates
of incorporation, Delaware boards of directors, and Delaware capital and surplus. Their instructions may be quite impossible of execution within a foreign legal system. Most of this impossibility
will go undetected on both sides, because the faithful foreign agents
will carry out (in Italian) whatever seems to them the most plausible interpretation of the American wishes. They will then report
their action (in English) in the terms of the instructions.
So long as this system works, there is no reason to change it. It
probably is much better than it would be if the American lawyers
succeeded in recreating on the Italian scene a corporate structure
duplicating precisely the one in Detroit.
But the stiffer competition of the emerging Common Market is
likely to demand something better. American enterprises will reach
their full potential only if some of their management know-how is
effectively transferred to Europe, and if errors in management are
efficiently located and corrected. This means that the American
lawyer who bears responsibility for the organization of a European
business operation needs to know-like a composer-something
about the musicians who will perform his piece, the instruments
they play, and the notations which they recognize. Learning these
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things is an endless task, and the American lawyer will never know
them all. But every bit that he learns about the laws and the institutions of Common Market countries will contribute a little to his ability to design and control the Common Market operations of an
American enterprise.

Chapter IX

The Significance of Treaties to the
Establishment of Companies
Thomas L. Nicholson*
I. INTRODUCTION
A study by an American lawyer of laws relevant to an American
corporate client which is to be established in the Common Market
area must take some account of international legislation-·the bilateral or multilateral treaties involving the United States and the
six members of the European Economic Community, those between
or among Community countries, and those involving Community
members and third countries other than the United States. A number of the international agreements to which the United States
and Common Market countries are parties-the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1 and the International Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, 2 for example-are discussed
in other chapters. The principal treaty among Community members of relevance is, of course, the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the central focus of this book. A review of the treaties between or among Community members and
non-members other than the United States is generally beyond the
scope of this discussion.
Attention will therefore be centered on the effect of "treaties of
commerce" 3 between the United States and various Community
members, and of the E.E.C. Treaty, on conditions of doing business
within the Community. Some areas in which treaties may be signifi*J.D., M. Comp. Law; formerly Assistant and Acting Public Affairs Officer, U.S.
Consulate General, Algiers, Algeria; Associate, Isham, Lincoln & Beale, Chicago,
Illinois.
1
See Ouin, The Establishment of the Customs Union, Chapter III supra.
• See Ladas, Industrial Property, Chapter V supra.
3
The phrase "treaties of commerce" has been coined to embrace both the traditional
treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (F.C.N. treaties) and those exemplified by the Convention of Establishment with France.
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cant to an American corporate investor are considered-in general
areas not touched on in other chapters of this book. 4 The aims are:
( 1) to suggest, by a detailed discussion of one treaty of commerce,
the potential importance of such treaties to the establishment by
an American corporation of branches or subsidiaries in the Community; ( 2) to point up comparisons between the treaty discussed
and the E. E. C. Treaty which are of general relevance; ( 3) to
indicate the interrelationship of the relevant treaties of commerce
and the E.E.C. Treaty; and (4) to indicate the possible significance
of the E.E.C. Treaty to the subsidiary of an American corporation
established in one Community country and doing business in some
or all of the other Member States.
II. TREATIES OF COMMERCE

Treaties of commerce betwe<!n the United States and Italy, the
Netherlands, and Germany respectively are already in effect, and
the Convention of Establishment between the United States and
France was recently signed, although it has not yet been ratified. 5

A.

TREATIES OF CoMMERCE IN GENERAL

The basic aim of treaties of commerce is to establish a standard
of conduct which each signatory owes to the nationals and companies 6 of the other. "National treatment" is in most provisions
the measure of each signatory's duty-neither may discriminate
against the nationals or companies of the other state in favor of its
own. The "most-favored-nation" clause-neither state may discriminate against the nationals or companies of the other in favor of
any other aliens or alien companies-sometimes applies, 7 however,
4
Chapter VIII supra, Organizing for Business by Professor Conard (hereinafter cited
as Conard, ch. VIII) is sometimes a point of departure, however.
• Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Italian Republic (hereinafter cited as Italian F.C.N. Treaty) (effective Aug. 5, 1949), U.S. Dep't of State,
Treaties and Other International Agreements Series (hereinafter cited as T.I.A.S.)
No. 1965; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter cited as German F.C.N. Treaty) (effective July 14, 1956),
T.I.A.S. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Netherlands
(hereinafter cited as Dutch F.C.N. Treaty) (effective Dec. 5, 1957), T.I.A.S. 3942;
Convention of Establishment with France (hereinafter cited as the Convention with
France) 41 Dep't of State Bulletin 828 (Dec. 7, 1959).
• Companies are mentioned only in U.S. treaties of commerce concluded since the
Second World War. See Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, so AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1956).
1
E.g., with respect to payments, remittances, and transfers of funds or financial
·instruments between the United States and France. Convention with France, art. X,
para. x.
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and, in a few instances, both standards must be met or some third
criterion is applicable. 8
A number of areas of activity are regulated, 9 but treaties of
commerce "are above all treaties of establishment, concerned with
the protection of persons, natural and juridical, and of the property and interests of such persons." 10
To indicate the general nature and scope of this protection, but
more particularly to suggest some practical differences a treaty of
commerce can make, only the Convention with France will be discussed because a full-scale consideration of the four relevant treaties
would be both unwieldy and unwarranted. The choice of the Convention with France is essentially arbitrary, although in part dictated by the fact that it was the last of the four to be elaborated.

B.

THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE

The Convention with France is generally representative in content of the three other treaties of commerce here relevant, with one
obvious difference which is reflected in its name. It is called "Convention of Establishment" rather than "Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation" because it excludes rules concerning
trade and shipping and focuses on questions of investment or, more
broadly, on the protection of persons and property.U
I. THE PROTECTION OF ESTABLISHMENT GENERALLY

By virtue of Article V of the Convention with France, U.S. companies "shall be accorded national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other
activities for gain" in France "whether directly or through the intermediary of an agent or any other natural or juridical person."
Included in the activities of American companies which are accordingly permitted in France are: (I) the establishment and maintenance of "branches . . . and other establishments appropriate to
the conduct of their business"; ( 2) the organization of "com• E.g., "fair and equitable treatment" is the enunciated standard of Article z. of_ the
Dutch F.C.N. Treaty.
• See Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN.
L. Rl!v. 8os, 8o8 (1958) for an outline of their usual content.
10
I d. at 8o6.
u Walker, Convention of Establishment Between the United States and France, 54
AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 394 (1960). In the following discussion only the protection of
American companies in France will be referred to although the Convention with
France of course protects French companies in the United States and natural as well
as juridical persons in both countries.
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panies under the general company laws"; (3) the acquisition of
"majority interests in [French] companies"; and (4) the control
and management "of the enterprises which they have established
or acquired." The Convention further assures American corporations with interests in France: ( r) that their property, enterprises,
and other interests will be accorded "equitable treatment," and that
they will be granted "full legal and judicial protection" (Article I) ;
( 2) that their "lawfully acquired rights and interests . . . [will]
not be subjected to impairment [within France J ... by any measure of a discriminatory character" (Article IV, paragraph 1);
( 3) that their "offices, warehouses, factories and other premises
. . . [located in France] . . . [will] be free from molestation and
other unjustifiable measures" (Article IV, paragraph 2); and (4)
that they will "not be subject to any form of taxation or any obligation relating thereto . . . [within France], which is more burdensome than that to which . . . companies [of France J . . . in the
same situation are or may be subject" (Article IX, paragraph 2
(c) ) , nor "to any form of taxation [within France] upon capital,
income, profits or any other basis, except by reason of the property
which they possess within those territories, the income and profits
derived from sources therein, the business in which they are there
engaged, the transactions which they accomplish there, or any
other bases of taxation directly related to their activities" within
France (Article IX, paragraph 4).
In addition American corporations may claim national treatment
in respect: (I) to "leasing and acquiring, by purchase or otherwise,
as well as with respect to possessing, personal property of every
kind, whether tangible or intangible" (subject to exceptions concerning ships and public safety) (Article VII, paragraph 2) ; and
( 2) to "obtaining and maintaining patents of invention and with
respect to rights appertaining to trade-marks, trade names and
certification marks, or which in any manner relate to industrial
property" (Article VIII, paragraph I).
There are obvious omissions in this general outline of the rights
accorded by the Convention with France to an American corporation doing business in France. The most significant omissions will
be discussed in some detail because they afford examples of the
importance which the Convention may have to the American corporate investor. They will be discussed in a rough chronological
order-beginning with those which might first in time be of interest

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TREATIES

I

57

to an American corporation establishing branches-or, m some
cases, subsidiaries-in France.
2. THE COMPANIES PROTECTED

Article XIV, paragraph 5 of the Convention provides: "Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations . . .
[of one of the states of the United States] shall be deemed companies . . . [of the United States] and shall have their juridical
status recognized . . . [in F ranee]."
Under this provision a corporation formed in any state of the
United States will be recognized in France as an American company and therefore a juridical entity even if its central office 12
(siege riel) is located in Paris-and this is true despite the French
conflict rule under which a company's "nationality" is determined
by the location of its central officeY In other words, the "Delaware" of France (and of the Common Market countries other than
Belgium and Luxembourg) 14 could be-tax and other considerations aside-Delaware.
But the place of formation is not the sole factor determining
which companies are to be given protection in France by the Convention. Article V, paragraph r (last sentence) provides:
. . . the enterprises which . . . [American nationals or
companies J control . . . whether in the form . . . of a
company or otherwise, shall, in all that relates to the conduct of the activities thereof, be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded like enterprises controlled by nationals and companies of . . . [France J.
This provision means in effect that some French companies-that is,
those formed in France by American nationals or corporationscan claim protection under the Convention against discrimination
by French laws or administrative acts. Its intent, of course, is to
prevent discrimination against those French enterprises in which
Americans have invested and which are not protected by the provisions relating to American companies or nationals.
,. This is understood to mean the place where ultimate decisions are made. See
Conard, ch. VIII, text at notes II7 and u8, supra.
18
Ibid. Although strictly speaking, a company has no nationality (see e.g., SAVATIER,
COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 34 (2d ed. 1953) ), that term will be hereinafter
used as shorthand to denote the country whose laws determine such things as its
validity, whether it has juridical personality, its powers, and the rights of its stockholders.
"See Italian F.C.N. Treaty, art. II, para. 2; German F.C.N. Treaty, art. XXV,
para. 5; Dutch F.C,N, Treaty, art. XXIII, para. 3·
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A third criterion, residence, may sometimes be relevant. Article
XIV, paragraph I, in defining "national treatment" limits it to
nationals and companies "in like situations," and paragraph I6
of the Protocol to the Convention provides: "Residence criteria
may be applied for purposes of determining whether or not nationals and companies . . . are in 'like situations' . . . . "
In sum, a corporation formed in one of the United States will be
recognized in France as American and a juridical entity wherever
its central office or center of activity (for example, its main manufactUring plant) is located. It, or its subsidiaries formed in France,
may claim national treatment under the Convention, but location
of the central office, or of the center of activity, of it or its subsidiary-presumably the "residence criteria" of a company 15-may
determine what national treatment means.
3· EMPLOYMENT OF NON-NATIONALS

American corporations or their subsidiaries are generally free to
employ non-French personnel in France, but the persons employed
are subject to regulations which could result in significant restrictions on them.
Every foreigner who wishes to remain more than three months
in France must have the authorization of the Ministry of Interior. 16
In addition, if he wishes to act as President of the supervisory
board (President de Conseil d' administration) of a stock company,
as manager (gerant) of a limited liability company, or as the manager (directeur) of an agency or branch of a foreign company, he
must have a carte d'identite de commer~ant (hereinafter "foreign
merchant's identity card") .17
This foreign merchant's identity card is: (I) good only for the
occupations authorized and only for the departments ( departements) of France mentioned therein; ( 2) temporary, being limited
in duration by the duration of the authorization to remain in France;
( 3) a concession of the state, which the administration may refuse
15
It is possible, however, that the location of a branch might be determinative of a
company's residence for certain purposes, if such a conclusion were advantageous to
the beneficiary of the treaty right
18
Carte de sejour (hereinafter referred to as "authorization to remain"); see
Ordonnance No. 45-2658 (hereinafter referred to as "Order") of Nov. 2, 1945, art. 6,
[1945] Journal Officiel de Ia Republique Fran<;aise (hereinafter cited as "J.O.") 7225;
Decret 46-1574 (hereinafter referred to as "Decree") of June 30, 1946, art. 3, [1946]
J.O. 592o-21 and 6169.
11
See Decree of Feb. 2, 1939 (relatif
la delivrance des cartN d'identite de commerfant pour les etrangers), [1939] J.O. 1645•
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in its discretion, not a right (and if the identity card is refused, the
applicant has no recourse) ; ( 4) renewable; and ( 5) subject to
cancellation under certain conditions (bankruptcy, conviction of a
crime, false declarations) . 1 s
Moreover, failure to obtain the required foreign merchant's
identity card can result in fines, the closing of the enterprise involved, and even, apparently, the nullity of certain acts (for example, the formation of a limited liability company with alien gerants
who have no foreign merchant's identity card may be held null and
void) .19
The reason for the existence of identity cards has been indicated
by Professor Savatier of the Paris Law Faculty:
[I]t soon [in the 1930's] became clear that workers were
not alone in demanding protection against all excessive
foreign competition. The principal occupations [professions J were no doubt already reserved to Frenchmen by
more or less strict monopolies. . . . But it was necessary,
outside this restricted area, to give thought to the protection of Frenchmen against various foreign heads of
business enterprises [chefs d' entreprises J.20

If one adds the fact that local chambers of commerce and professional organizations play an advisory role in the issuance of foreign
merchants' identity cards, 21 it is clear that the position of U.S.
corporations which desire to put Americans in charge of their
French operations could be a difficult one. In fact, it apparently
has not been; and their legal position will be significantly improved
once the Convention with France has gone into effect.
The Convention contains a number of provisions which are relevant. Article II, paragraph I (a) and (b) create a "treaty trader"
and a "treaty investor" class of American nationals who must be
permitted to enter and remain in France 22 for the purpose of carrying on trade between the two countries or of "developing and
18

See Chaine, Le Statui Professionnel de l'Etranger en France, in LE STATUT DE
L'ETRANGER ET LE MARCHE CoMMUN (57• Congres des Notaires de France, 1959) at I57·
19
!d. at 188.
""Savatier, A Propos des Cartes de Commer(ants, RECUEIL DALLOZ DE DoCTRINE DE
JURISPRUDENCE ET DE LEGISLATION (hereinafter cited as D.) CHRONIQUE 21, 22 (1953].
(Translation by this author.)
21
Decree of Feb. 2, 1939, art. 8, [Feb. 4, 1939) J.O.
""'Subject to the "laws relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens" (art. II, para. I)
(e.g., to the requirement in France that aliens obtain an authorization to remain) and
to measures of public order, health, morals, and safety (art. II, para. 3). As to "treaty
traders and investors," see Wilson, "Treaty-Investor" Clauses in Commercial Treaties
of tke United States, 49 AM.]. INT'L L. 366 (1955).
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directing the operations of an enterprise in which they have invested, or in which they are actively in the process of investing, a
substantial amount of capitaL" Moreover, by virtue of Paragraph
2 (c) of the Protocol, Americans proceeding to France "for the
purpose of occupying a position of responsibility in an enterprise"
on behalf of "treaty investors" must also be permitted to enter and
remain in France.
The significant point here is contained in paragraph 2 (a) and
(b) of the Protocol. Under paragraph 2 (a) "the laws and regulations in force . . . [in France J which govern the access of aliens
to the professions and occupations, as well as the exercise of such
callings and other activities· by them, remain applicable . . . [to
American nationals and companies J."Under paragraph 2 (b), however, "the procedures provided for by the above-mentioned laws
and regulations, as well as those provided for by laws and regulations governing entry and sojourn of aliens, must not have the effect
of impairing the substance of the rights set forth in Article II, paragraph I (a) and (b)" (that is, of the rights of "treaty traders"
and "investors" or of Americans going to France to occupy positions of responsibility in the enterprises of "treaty traders" or
"treaty investors").
The result of these provisions is threefold: ( 1) authorizations
to remain in France and foreign merchants' identity cards will still
be required; ( 2) the issuance and renewal of foreign merchants'
identity cards to American nationals wishing to exercise a company
function for which such identity cards are required will no longer
be subject to the discretion of the competent prefects-or to the
adverse recommendations of competitors: qualifying Americans
will have a right to identity cards; ( 3) in cases of abuse, American
nationals will have recourse to French administrative tribunals,
and should their decisions, in the view of the United States government, violate the Convention with France, the United States State
Department may make complaint to the French Government, and,
if need be, the United States may bring action against France in
the International Court of Justice.
Other American personnel to be employed in France-whether
technicians or executives-must have a work permit, 23 and if they
""Carte d'identite professionelle de tra'Vailleur or carte de tra'Vail, see Order No.
45-z658 of Nov. z, 1945, [1945] J.O. 7Z25; Decree No. 46-1340 of June 6, 1946, [1946]
J.O. 5018-19.
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are accountants, technical experts, or lawyers, they must, subject
to one exception, have fulfilled the conditions "necessary to the
exercise of their calling under the applicable [French] legislation." 24 The exception is stated in the succeeding paragraph which
will permit:
. . . [American] companies . . . to engage accountants
and other technical experts, who are not nationals of . . .
[France], without regard to their having qualified to practice a profession within the territories of . . . [France],
but exclusively for conducting studies and examinations
for internal purposes on behalf of such . . . companies. 25
The significance of this provision is emphasized by the fact that
Article II of the French Civil Code permits nationals of another
country to exercise rights in France only to the extent that Frenchmen are permitted to exercise similar rights in that country. Moreover, a Joint Declaration appended to the Convention states the
intention of the United States and France to facilitate "to the greatest possible extent and on a basis of real and effective reciprocity
. . . the establishment of . . . qualified personnel who are indispensable to the conduct of the enterprises created by nationals and
companies" of either country within the territory of the other.
4· OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY

Article VII, paragraph r of the Convention with France guarantees national treatment to American nationals and companies "with
respect to leasing, utilizing and occupying real property of all kinds
appropriate to the exercise of the rights" accorded them by the Convention.
This will have at least one consequence of significance. A concept
of "commercial property" (propriite commerciale) has developed
in French law according to which the lessee of commercial property
has a right to an eviction indemnification if renewal of his lease is
refused by the lessor. The applicable law 26 has the effect of denying
this renewal right to foreigners unless, inter alia, they enjoy national treatment by virtue of an international treaty. 27 Article VII
""Convention with France, art. VI, para. 1.
20
ld. para. 2. Paragraph 9 of the Protocol to the Convention adds that the provisions
of paragraph 2 are adopted "until such time as it may have become possible to conclude
an agreement concerning the exercise of . . . [accountancy]."
""Decree 53-943 of Sept. 30, 1953, [1953] J.O. 8602.
27
See Richemont, Les Ressortissants des pays, faisant partie du M archC Commun,
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of the Convention with France plainly fulfills this requirement as
far as American nationals and companies are concerned.

5.

RIGHT TO SUE IN FRENCH COURTS

28

Article III, paragraph I of the Convention with France ensures
American nationals and companies national treatment with respect
to access to French "courts of justice as well as to administrative
tribunals and agencies." 29 This provision will not affect, however,
the duty of American corporate or individual plaintiffs as aliens to
post bond (donner caution) to guarantee the payment of costs and
damages assessed against them in actions they initiate. 30
,6,

VOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY

An American company which decides to terminate its activities
in France is guaranteed by the Convention with France national
treatment in regard to the right to dispose of property of all kinds 31
and to taxation. 32 More importantly, the Convention subjects
France to four duties concerning repatriation of funds: ( r) it must
accord to an American company the same treatment with respect
to payments, remittances, and transfers of funds or financial instruments between France and the United States or any third country as it would to a French company in a like situation (that is, for
example, to one "residing" in the United States) ; 33 ( 2) it must
accord to an American company the same treatment in this respect
as it would to the company of any third country in a like situation; 34
( 3) it must make "reasonable provision for the withdrawal of earnings"; 35 and ( 4) it must "make every effort to accord in the greatest possible measure . . . [to an American company J the opporpeuvent-ils btfneficier de la propriite commerciale en France,

LE DROIT EUROPEEN 380

(No. Io, May, I959).
""Cf. Wilson, Access-to-Courts Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties,
47 AM. J. lNT'L L. 20 (I953).
29
Moreover, American companies not engaged in activities in France may not be
required to register as a condition of the exercise of this right (art. III, para. I)
and right of access to the courts and recognition of juridical status (unlike other advantages of the Convention) may not be denied to companies formed in accordance
with the laws of any one of the United States merely because they are controlled by
non-Americans (art. XIII).
00
See art. I6 of the Civil Code of France. Foreigners who own real estate of sufficient
value in France to assure such payment are exempted.
31
Art. VII, para. 3·
32
Art. IX, para. I (c).
33
Art. X, para. I.

"'Ibid,
35

Art. X, para. 3·
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. [of
tunity
to repatriate the proceeds of the liquidation
its branches in France J." 36
These four duties are subject to three limitations. France may:
( 1) impose exchange restrictions "to the extent necessary to prevent its monetary reserves from falling to a very low level or to
effect a moderate increase in very low monetary reserves"; 37
( 2) impose "particular restrictions whenever the [International
Monetary J Fund specifically authorizes or requests" 38 it to do so;
and ( 3) treat different currencies differently as may be required by
the state of its balance of payments. 39
An American company which liquidates a branch or subsidiary
in France will be able, in summary, to count with some certainty
on a repatriation of its earnings, and it will have important guarantees that repatriation of its capital will also be possible.

7·

EXPROPRIATION

The Convention with France will also afford significant protection to American corporate branches and subsidiaries in France
against expropriation of their property. Expropriation is prohibited
by Article IV, paragraph 3 "except for a public purpose and with
payment of just compensation." More importantly, just compensation is defined as "the equivalent of the property taken . : . in
an effectively realizable form." Compensation must be accorded
"without needless delay," and "adequate provision for the determination and payment of the said compensation must have been
made no later than the time of the taking." If compensation so
measured is less than that afforded French nationals whose property has been similarly expropriated, or if payment to them is more
prompt, American companies may invoke the national treatment
clause of paragraph 4 of Article IV; they may, in short, invoke
whichever of two standards is, in fact, the more advantageous.
France is, furthermore, again under a duty "to make every effort
to accord in the greatest possible measure the opportunity . . . to
repatriate the proceeds. . . . " 40
The Protocol adds two important clarifications. Paragraph 5
states that "expropriation" means, inter alia, "nationalization"; and
paragraph 6 extends the protection of Article IV, paragraph 3 to
•• Ibid.
Art. X, para. 2.
Ibid.
•• Protocol, para. 1 3·
•• Art. X, para. 3·
37
38
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interests held directly or indirectly by American companies in expropriated property.

III. THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE AND THE
E.E.C. TREATY COMPARED
At this point the perspective of the discussion shifts: the assumption is that the American parent company has formed a Common
Market subsidiary; for the sake of example and to facilitate comparisons with the Convention with France, it is further assumed
that the subsidiary is located not in France but in Belgium (hereinafter this assumed company will sometimes be referred to simply
as the "Belgian subsidiary"). Most of the questions considered relate to treaty protection of the operations and branches of this assumed Belgian subsidiary in other Common Market countries and
usually in France.

A.

GENERAL CoMPARISONS

Before comparing in detail the provisions of the Convention with
France with their counterparts in the E.E.C. Treaty 41 some general comparisons are useful.
(I) The provisions of the Convention with France are in the
main self-executing and will therefore become applicable in France
without legislation or executive action as soon as the Convention
goes into effect. The right-of-establishment provisions of the E.E.C.
Treaty with few exceptions 42 require implementation by directives,
and by a general program to be given effect by directives, adopted
by the Council before December 31, 1961. 43
( 2) The Convention with France spells out a number of specific
rights which American companies will enjoy in France. The E.E.C.
Treaty is directed at protection of th~ "freedom of establishment,"
defined in very general terms and illustrated by only some specific
examples. This difference may result in broader-although perhaps
less certain-protection under the E.E.C. Treaty.
(3) National treatment in regard to the establishment of an
American enterprise in France may be claimed under the Convention
with France only where it is provided for specifically. National
treatment under the E.E.C. Treaty may be claimed not only in
"Arts. 52-58.
•• E.g., arts. 53 and 58.
48
See Stein, The New Institutions, Chapter II supra.
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areas where it is guaranteed by the relevant right-of-establishment
provisions, but also, subject to special provisions, within the area
of application of the entire Treaty. The first paragraph of Article
7 of the E.E.C. Treaty provides:
Within the field of application of this Treaty and without
prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein, any
discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall hereby
be prohibited.
( 4) Rights arising under the Convention with France may be
vindicated in domestic French courts or, by the United States government, in the International Court of Justice. Rights arising under
the E.E.C. Treaty may be vindicated in domestic courts of the
Member States or, in some circumstances, in the Community Court
of Justice. 44 In addition, a supranational administrative agencythe Commission-is obligated to supervise the application of the
provisions of the Treaty 45 and to bring Member States who persist
in violating a Treaty obligation before the Community Court of
Justice. 46
(5) The Convention with France will have an initial term of ten
years and is subject to termination thereafter on one year's notice.
The E.E.C. Treaty is of unlimited duration 47 and makes no provision for termination. It may even be questionable that the Member States have a legal right of unilateral withdrawal from the
Community, however unlikely an armed struggle to preserve the
union might be.
The provisions of the E.E.C. Treaty which are comparable to
those, discussed in detail above, of the Convention with France
are with a few exceptions contained in Articles 52-58 of the Treaty.
These provisions will first be considered separately; they and their
counterparts in the Convention with France will be compared in a
concluding section.

B. THE CoMPARABLE PROVISIONS oF THE E.E.C. TREATY
Articles 52-58 concern the right of establishment of Community
country nationals and companies in countries other than their own;
the basic purpose of these provisions is to remove legal discrimination in each of the Six against economic activities of nationals of
Member States, other than wage-earning activities.
•• See Stein and Hay, Chapter VII supra, New Legal Remedies of Enterprises: A
Survey.
'"Art. 155.
•• Art. 169.
"Art. 240.
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I. THE COMPANIES PROTECTED

Article 58, defining the companies protected, provides in part:
Companies constituted in accordance with the law of a
Member State and having their registered office, central
management or principal establishment within the Community . . . shall be assimilated to physical persons being nationals of Member States. . . .
The essential element is that the company be constituted in accordance with the laws of a Member State. In addition, one of three additional requirements must be met: ( 1) its registered office, ( 2) its
central management, or ( 3) its principal establishment must be
located within the Community.
Another international agreement in this area of law is helpful
in understanding the significance of this rule. All of the Common
Market countries, along with some others, were parties to the
negotiations relative to the Convention Concerning the Recognition
of the Juridical Personality of Foreign Companies, Associations
and Foundations elaborated at the Hague in 1951.48 Moreover, it
could be argued that Article 220 of the E.E.C. Treaty implicitly
recognizes the existence of this Convention in providing for negotiations to ensure mutual recognition of companies "in so far as
necessary." If the Convention is signed and ratified by all Member
States, such negotiations will be unnecessary (Germany, Italy, and
Luxembourg have not signed, and Belgium, France, and the Netherlands have signed but not ratified).
Article I of the Hague Recognition Convention provides in part:
The juridical personality acquired by a company . . . by
virtue of the law of the Contracting States where formalities of registration or publicity have been fulfilled and
where the registered office (siege statutaire) is located,
will be recognized as a matter of right (de plein droit),
provided that it has, in addition to the capacity to sue and
be sued (ester en justice), at least the capacity to own
property and to make contracts [and] to perform other
juridical acts.
Article

2

adds :

Nonetheless, the personality, acquired in conformity with
the provisions of Article I, may be denied recognition
48

See Dolle, Die 7· Haager K onferen'Z, 17 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INr6r, r85 ff. (1952). This Convention is hereinafter referred
to as the "Hague Recognition Convention."
TERNATlONALES PRIVATRECHT
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(pourra ne pas hre reconnue) in another contracting state
whose law takes the true central office (siege reel) into
consideration, if the true central office is deemed to be
located on its territory. . . .
The company . . . is deemed to have its true central
office at the place where its central administration ( administration centrale) is established. . . .

For the immediate purposes of this discussion, the provisions
of the Hague. Recognition Convention are significant in three respects: (I) they recognize the possibility of a geographical divorce
between the registered office (siege statutaire) and the true central
office (siege reel); (2) they make clear that siege statutaire (the
term used in Article 58 of the E.E.C. Treaty) means "registered
office"; and ( 3) they define "true central office" (siege reel) as the
place where the central administration (administration centraleanother term which Article 58 uses) is located.
Since all Six took part in the Hague Recognition Convention
negotiations, the terms used presumably mean the same in both
instruments. If they do, two questions about Article 58 arise.
1) Will Companies with only a Registered Office Within the
Community Qualify Under Article 58? Article 58 seems to make possible the creation by third-country nationals or companies (and this,
of course, means nationals and companies of Eastern as well as Western countries) of Community companies which will qualify under
Article 58 although they have no substantial material connection
with the Community; that is, it seems to recognize as beneficiaries
of the right-of-establishment provisions companies which are
formed under the law of a Member State even though they have
only a registered office within the Community. This prospect is so
distasteful that one commentator has suggested that Article 58
should be understood to create three rather than two requirements
for a qualifying company: (I) it must be formed according to the
laws of a Member State; and ( 2) it must have its registered office
(siege statutaire) in the Community; and (3) it must have either
its central management (administration centrale) or its central
establishment (principal hablissement) within the Community. 49
(Central establishment means, presumably, and among other things,
the main store of a retail business or the main plant of a manufacturing concern.)
•• Audinet, The Right of Establishment in the European Economic Community, 1959
JoURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (No. 4, Oct.-Nov.-Dec.) 983, 1017.
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Another commentator, Mr. Hubert Ehring, a legal counsellor of
the E.E.C. Commission, pointing to the fact that Article 52 provides
for abolition of the restrictions on the establishment of agencies,
branches, or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State "established in the territory of any Member State," argues:
A company which has only its registered office within the
territory of a Member State, while its administration and
plants are located within the territory of a third country,
is no less to be considered a part of the economy of this
third country than is an enterprise situated in that third
country whose owner is a national of a Member State
(dessen lnhaber eine die Staatsangehorigkeit eines Mitgliedstaates besitzende natiirliche Person ist), and, (such
a company] should therefore be treated in the same way. 5°
Mr. Ehring therefore concludes that companies must also be established in a Member State. He suggests further that this requirement
is fulfilled "when the central management of a company, but not
when its registered office alone, is located in a Member State." 51
Other commentators, although they accept the necessity that companies be established in the Community, interpret "establishment"
somewhat differently. In their view a company need have neither its
central administration nor its central establishment in the Community, provided a substantial part of its business is carried on in
the Common Market and that it therefore has meaningful connections with the Community. 52
2) May One of the Six Become the "Delaware" of the Community? The first requirement of Article 58 is that a company be
constituted under the law of one of the Member States. A first question in determining whether a "Delaware" of the Community is a
possibility is, therefore: What is a validly constituted company under the company laws of each of the Six? More specifically, the
question is whether or not the domestic company laws of each Community country require that the true central office of companies
constituted thereunder be situated within its territory.
This is not, apparently, a requirement of Dutch law,"a and Section 5 of the German Stock Company Law provides:
50
Ehring, Das Niederlassungsrecht, in Groeben, Boeckh, KoMMENTAR ~UM EWGVERTRAG (hereinafter cited as KoMMENTAR) 183. (Translation by this author.)
51
Ibid. (Translation by this author.)
52
WoHLFARTH, EVERLING, GLAESNER, SPRUNG, DIE EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEME!N·
scHAFT 189 ( 1960) (hereinafter cited as WoHLFARTH, DIE EWG).
53
See KOLLEWIJN, AMERICAN-DUTCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, No. 3 Bilateral
Studies in Private International Law 16 (1955); and, generally, Conard, ch. VIII, text
at note uz supra.
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The place where the company has an office is as a rule to
be designated as the seat, or the place from which the business is directed or the place where the central management
is carried on. 54
This at least makes clear that the seat"~ need not be at the place
where the central management (and therefore the true central
office) is located, 56 although it also indicates that there must "as
a rule" be at least an office at the place designated by the charter as
the seat. From Section 5 it seems possible to conclude that the Stock
Company Law of Germany in itself does not require that the true
central office or main establishment be located in Germany. 57
The company laws of the other four Member States do not define
seat as explicitly as Section 5 of the German Stock Company Law,
and, although each of the laws requires the designation and registration of a seat located within the country, none of them in itself
requires a domestic location for the true central office of a company
constituted pursuant to it.
The conflict rule which determines the law governing companies
in four of the Six does, however, impose such a requirement; according to this rule, the law governing the status of a company is the
law of the place where the true central office is located. If, for example, the Belgian subsidiary has its true central office in France,
its juridical personality will not be recognized by either country, if
it has not complied with the law (French) which each recognizes as
governing its status.
The Netherlands again provides the one clear exception, and the
rule in Germany is apparently not settled. The majority of the German authorities appear to favor the rule which looks to the location
of the true central office. 58 On the other hand, others maintain that
Germany determines the status of German companies which have
only a registered office in Germany in accordance with German law. 59
"""Ais der Sitz der Aktiengesellschaft ist in der Regel der Ort, wo die Gesellschaft
einen Betrieb hat, oder der Ort zu bestimmen, wo sich die Geschiiftsleitung befindet
oder die Verwaltung gefiihrt wird." (Translation by this author.)
56
"Seat" is here used as the neutral term to avoid use of "registered office" or "true
central office." The German equivalent of "seat" is Sitz, of registered office satzungmiissiger Sitz, and of true central office effektiver or tatsiichlicher Sitz.
'"'See generally BEITZKE, }URISTISCHE PERSONEN IM JNTERNAT!ONALEN PRIVATRECHT
UNO FREMDENRECHT 104 ff. (1938).
57
The German Limited Liability Company Law has no provision comparable to
Section 5.
58
See, e.g., Schilling, Note 47 of Allgemeine Ein/eitung in HACHENBURG, KOMMENTAR
ZUM GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE G.M.B.H. (1956) at 92.
59
Schmidt, Note 7 to Section 5, in GROSSKOMMENTAR, AKT!ENGESETZ (1957) at 40:
" .•• the Sitztheorie can be deemed correct, if it is satisfied by a nominal, statutory seat,
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A second question in determining whether a Common Market
"Delaware" is a possibility is, then, this: Does Article 58 directly
affect the conflict rules of the Six?
Article 58 requires only that companies qualifying under it shall
be treated as Community nationals for defined purposes. Nothing is
said in Article 58, or elsewhere in the right-of-establishment chapter, about the recognition of the juridical personality of companies.
On the other hand, it seems clear enough that Article 58 would be
partially meaningless if the Member States were not obligated to
recognize the juridical personality of the companies qualifying under it.60
If, however, Article 58 has created a rule which derogates from
conflict rules of some of the Six,61 another problem arises. So understood, Article 58 would seem to render meaningless the part of Article 220 of the Treaty which provides:
Member States shall, in so far as necessary, engage in
negotiations with each other with a view to ensuring for
the benefit of their nationals: . . . the mutual recognition of companies within the meaning of Article 58, second paragraph. . ..
No such negotiations would be necessary if Article 58 of itself requires recognition of the juridical personality of the companies
qualifying under it.
It follows that Article 58 probably should not be understood to
affect of itself the conflict rules of the Six which are not consonant
with it. On the other hand, Article 58 in tandem with Article 220
obligates the Member States to negotiate with each other to conform these rules with Article 58-in order to ensure, for example,
that the juridical personality of a company formed in Belgium, with
only a registered office there and with its true central office somewhere in the Community (in France, for example) will be recognized in the other five Member States. Moreover, these negotiations, if their timing is not to negate in part the force of Article 58,
must take account of the timing of directives to be issued and of the
that is a fictitious seat, and does not require .an 'effective domestic seat.' " (Translation
by this author.) See also BEITZKE, op. cit. supra note 56, at 104A.
00
Cf. Loussouarn, Droit International du Commerce, 1959 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU
DROIT COMMERCIAL (No. I, Jan.-Mar.) 246, at 251-52.
61
See Thibierge, Le Statut des Societes Etrangeres, in LE STATUT DE L':ihRANGER ET LE
MARCHE CoMMUN (57• Congres des Notaires de France, 1959) at 334ff.; and Loussouarn, op. cit. supra note 6o, at 25o-51.
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general program to be established by the Council for the removal of
restrictions on freedom of establishment (Article 54).
Timely ratification by the Six of the Hague Recognition Convention plus one additional agreement among the Six would meet
these obligations. Article I of the Convention provides that the
juridical personality acquired by a company by virtue of the law of
a signatory state where, inter alia, its registered office (siege statutaire) is located shall be recognized by the other signatory states
(subject to other conditions not here relevant). Article 2 provides,
however, that a signatory state may (pourra) refuse such recognition if the true central office (siege reel) is located within its territory (or that of another state) and if it (or the other state) "takes
the true central office into consideration."
Since the provisions of Article 2 are not compulsory, the Member
States could, after ratifying the Convention, agree among themselves that they would recognize the juridical personality of any
company constituted according to the laws of any of the others and
having its registered office there, provided it is deemed to be "established" in the Community within the meaning of Article 52. 62
This would be in keeping with the Convention and would fulfill the
obligations arising from Articles 58 and 220. At the same time it
would avoid the possibility that companies with no material connection with the Community could claim to be beneficiaries of the
right-of-establishment provisions of the Treaty.
Some commentators have denied, expressly or implicitly, that
recognition of the companies referred to in Article 58 depends on
negotiations pursuant to Article 220. 63 None of them has, however,
suggested a reason for the reference in Article 220 to negotiations
to ensure "the mutual recognition of companies within the meaning
of Article 58, second paragraph" if their view is adopted.
Regardless of the view that finally prevails, the result should
ultimately be that companies in the Six will enjoy more flexibility of
organization than has heretofore been possible. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that a "Delaware" of the Communityin the American sense-may develop. The idea that it is impermissible to form a company in one country to avoid more onerous laws
in another is too firmly embedded in the legal thought of the Six
to be discarded. 64 If, however, there are business reasons for form82
63

See text supra at notes 5 I and 52.
See, e.g., WoHLFARTH, DrE EWG at 190; Thibierge, op. cit. supra note 6r, at 333-

337·
"'See, e.g., Dolle, op. cit. supra note 48, at r88; and W<;~HLFARTH, DrE EWG at r88,
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ing a company under Belgian law, for example, although it is to
have its true central office in France, the Treaty should ultimately
make it possible to do so, despite conflict rules which have heretofore made such an organizational plan perilous.
These conclusions relating to Article 58 seem possible:
I) No company can be a beneficiary of the right-of-establishment
provisions if it has no substantial connection with a Community
country; "shell" subsidiaries of third-country companies will not be
deemed qualifying under Article 58, whatever the reason given for
this conclusion.
2) It will ultimately be possible to form a company in one of the
Six and locate only its registered office there, provided it is "established" in the Community and provided the avoidance of onerous
laws in another of the Six is not the sole reason for such an organizational plan.
3) Article 58 probably has no direct effect on the conflict rules of
the Six concerning the recognition of the juridical personality of
compames.
4) Articles 58 and 220 obligate the Member States to negotiate
with each other to ensure that the juridical personality of the companies qualifying under Article 58 will be recognized throughout
the Community. Moreover, the timing of these negotiations will be
imposed by the timing of the directives issued and the general program established by the Council pursuant to Article 54·
5) The Hague Recognition Convention, which three of the Six
have already signed, offers an ideal vehicle for the fulfillment of
these obligations.
2. EMPLOYMENT OF NON-NATIONALS

Freedom of establishment without discrimination based on nationality is to be achieved under the E.E.C. Treaty by, inter alia,
. . . applying the progressive abolition of restrictions on
freedom of establishment . . . in respect of the conditions governing the entry of personnel of the main establishment into the managerial or supervisory organs of
. . . agencies, branches and subsidiaries. . . . 65
There seems to be general agreement that this provision will require
the abolition of foreign merchants' identity cards in France as far
as Community nationals and companies are concerned. 66 The ques.. Art. 54(£).
66
Loussouarn, op. cit. supra note 6o, at 253; Chaine, ap. cit. supra note 18, at 237;
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tion, then, is what effect this result will have on the employment of
non-French personnel by a French branch of the Belgian subsidiary.
It will plainly mean, first of all, that employees of the French
branch can work in France without the foreign merchant's identity
card heretofore required, if they are Community (for example,
Belgian) nationals. What, however, of an American national who
has been employed in the Belgian subsidiary? Can he be appointed
manager of the French branch and act in this capacity without an
identity card? Although the answer to this question must await decision by the competent authorities, three factors suggest that it
will be an affirmative one.
One is the fact that Article 54 (f) speaks only of "personnel of
the main establishment"-there is no limitation in regard to nationality. More convincing, however, is the second factor. This is
the fact that, although the foreign nationality of the manager
(gcrant) of the branch of a foreign corporation is not irrelevant
(if he is French, he will not be required to obtain an identity card),
it is nonetheless the foreign status of the company at which these
regulations are directed (if the branch manager is French, the
identity card must still be obtained, but it is issued to the directors
of the foreign company rather than the branch manager) .67 Under
the right-of-establishment chapter of the Treaty, however, France
will be prevented from taking the foreign status of a Belgian company into account. Finally, it should be noted that "merchant"
( commert.;ant) is a legal term of art, and that a branch manager is
not, as that term is defined, in fact a "merchant." 67a
Article 48, paragraph 2 should also force elimination of the
labor permit (carte de travail) heretofore required of Community
nationals (in others of the Six as well as in France). Since, however,
the authorization to remain in France (carte de sejour) is a public
safety measure, the requirement of this authorization is probably
permitted by Article 56. 68

3·

OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY

Measures are to be taken under the Treaty " . . . enabling a
national of one Member State to acquire and exploit real property
Thibierge, op. cit. supra note 61, at 339· Rapport du Conseil Economique sur le Droit
d'Etablissement dans le Marchi Commun (Dec. 9, 1958) [Jan. 3, 1958] J.O. at 1009.
67
Thibierge, op. cit. supra note 61, at 291-92.
"'• See Chaine, op. cit. supra note 18, at 183.
68
Cf. Deletre, Le Statut Civil de l'Etranger en France, in LE STATUT DE L'ETRANGER
ET LE MARCHE CoMMUN, 74 at 154. But see, Savatier, Le Marchi Commun au regard
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situated in the territory of another Member State. . . . " 69 These
measures will not guarantee to Community nationals the right which
French nationals enjoy to renew commercial leases (propriete commerciale), but they will enjoy such a right by virtue of the general
definition of freedom of establishment contained in Article 52,
paragraph 2 (and of the relevant provisions of French law). 70
4·

ACCESS TO THE COURTS

Under Article 52, paragraph 2, one of the essential conditions
of freedom of establishment is plainly the right to judicial protection.71 Indeed, Article 52 will force France to exempt Community
nationals and companies qualifying under Article 58 from the requirement that foreign plaintiffs post bonds (donner caution) to
guarantee payment of costs and damages. 72 This requirement clearly
constitutes a discrimination based on nationality.
5·

VOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY

The right-of-establishment chapter says nothing about the right
of the owners of an enterprise to cease operations, sell its assets,
and leave the country with the proceeds, although this right has been
termed a necessary part of the freedom of establishment. 73 The
most important aspect of this problem is almost certainly the ability
to transfer assets. If the Belgian subsidiary liquidates its French
branch, for example, will it be able to transfer the resultant assets
fro~ France to Belgium? This depends on French exchange controls. As Mr. Jeantet has indicated, assets could be freely transferred to Belgium under present French exchange regulations. Two
questions therefore arise: ( 1) does the Treaty limit France's power
to institute new controls in regard to the other Member States; and
( 2) if France instituted new controls, could they, without violating
the Treaty, discriminate against companies like the Belgian subsidiary because control is in the hands of non-Community nationals
or companies?
du droit international prive, 48 REVUE CRITIQUE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 237,
at 24S (1959).
69
Art. 54 (e).
70
See text at note 26 supra.
71
See also Treaty, art. 220 (last clause) concerning the recognition of judicial and
arbitral awards.
72
See Deletre, op. cit. supra note 68, at ISS·
73
Zaneletti, Le Droit d'Etablissement des activith industrielles dans le cadre de Ia
Communaute Economique Europecnne, in [1959] Les Probleme~ de !'Europe 57·
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a. The Impact of the Treaty on Exchange Controls

Article 52 guarantees national treatment in regard to the freedom
of establishment "subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating
to capital." This reservation does not mean, however, that capital
movement restrictions may be used to circumvent the right-ofestablishment provisions. 74 Exchange controls may be continued or
instituted only for the purposes stated in the chapter relating to
capital. Moreover, the Community countries, pursuant to directives
of the Council, 75 will be obligated to eliminate exchange controls
"to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of the common
market." 76
These two rules regarding exchange controls mean that such controls may not be used to give competitive advantage, for example,
to French enterprises or, more relevantly here, to keep enterprises
in France which wish to leave. 77 The Common Market will only
function properly if laws and regulations are eliminated which
prevent choices based solely on the free play of economic forces,
and freedom of establishment will plainly be less meaningful if the
right to withdraw is artifically restricted.
But France is authorized to take measures if divergencies between her exchange regulations in regard to non-member countries
and those of other Member States prompt persons residing in a
Member State to use transfer facilities within the Community to
circumvent French controls. 78 Moreover, if France's capital market
experiences difficulties she may, on the Commission's authorization 79 or, in urgent cases, on her own initiative, 80 take protective
measures. 81
b. Discrimination Against Community Companies
Controlled from Abroad

If France should invoke either of these emergency provisions,
could she discriminate against companies like the Belgian subsidiary
•• See WoHLFARTH, Dl!! EWG, at 175.
75
Art. 69.
•• Art. 67(1).
77
See Everling, Einzelheiten der Regelung der selbstiindigen beruflichen Tiitigkeit
im Gemeinsamen Markt, 13 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 857 at 861 (1958).
78
Art. 70(2) .
.,. Art. 73 (2 ).
80
Ibid.
"'Measures taken on her own initiative will, however, be subject to modification or
elimination if the Commission so decides.
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because they are under the control of non-Community companies?
A prior question-and it probably moots the one stated-is this:
Would France so discriminate? Since exchange controls in France
are based on residence, such discrimination seems unlikely. Attempted discrimination would nowhere find justification in the
Treaty, in any case, since nothing in the two emergency provisions
described would authorize France to discriminate against the Belgian subsidiary in favor of other residents of Belgium.
c. Conclusion

The importance of these questions lies in the possibility that
France might attempt to re-institute more stringent exchange controls in regard to non-member countries than the Treaty permits
in regard to Member States. Should this happen, the Belgian subsidiary would be in the same position as other Belgian residents,
which is to say, it would be in a better position to withdraw assets
from France than would its American parent. But this does not
mean that the assets could in turn be transferred from the Belgian
subsidiary to the American parent, nor is it any indication that such
assets could ultimately be converted into dollars. In sum, the Belgian subsidiary might, by virtue of the Treaty, be able to obtain the
proceeds of the liquidation of its French branch and to use them
elsewhere in the Community in situations where it would be unable
to remit to United States stockholders.
The significance of Mr. Jeantet's conclusion-that exchange controls will become a Community, rather than a national, problemis evident.

6.

EXPROPRIATION

The Treaty makes no express mention of expropriation. Four
general provisions are relevant, however. Article 222 provides:
"This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the system existing in Member States in respect of property." This means that the Treaty in
no way affects the power of the Member States to expropriate private property for public use. 82 But Article 90 ( 1) subjects "public
enterprises and enterprises to which the Member States grant special or exclusive rights" to the rules of the Treaty. In particular it
subjects them to Article 7 (prohibiting discrimination based on nationality) and Articles 8 5-94 (the "antitrust" provisions of the
80

See Thiesing in

KoMMENTAR,

op. cit. supra note

so,

at 64.
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Treaty). 83 Moreover, Article 37 requires the Member States to
adjust progressively "any State monopolies of a commercial character in such a manner as will ensure the exclusion, at the date of the
expiry of the transitional period, of all discrimination between the
nationals of Member States in regard to conditions of supply or
marketing of goods." This suggests that, while the expropriating
power is unaffected, the ends to which nationalization, for example,
can be put have in fact been limited by the Treaty, since state
monopolies will not be able to pursue either protectionist or anticompetitive goals. 84 Finally, Article 52 requires that all Community nationals and companies who owned expropriated property be
compensated on the same terms that nationals of the expropriating
Member State 85 are compensated.
C. THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE AND THE E.E.C.
TREATY CoMPARED IN DETAIL
I.

THE COMPANIES PROTECTED

Both the Convention with France and the E.E.C. Treaty require
-expressly or in effect-that the law of the place of constitution
(and thus of the location of the registered office) should ultimately
be determinative of the nationality of companies. Both will require
recognition by a signatory of the juridical personality of companies
constituted under the laws of another signatory (and therefore having a registered office there), but the E.E.C. Treaty should be interpreted to add one condition: the company must also be "established" in the Community in keeping with Article 52.
This added condition is significant for it will represent a first shift
in the law of Community countries concerning companies from a
national to a regional perspective; the condition does not require
"establishment" in the country where the company is formed but
anywhere in the Community. This is to say that the Treaty has
taken a step-however limited-towards the recognition of a Community company. In this regard the contrast between the Convention with France and the E.E.C. Treaty is marked.
The criteria determining the companies protected by the E.E.C.
Treaty offer, then, a specific instance of the general basic difference
83

But see art. 90 (2).
Ibid. See WoHLFARTH, DIE EWG at 103.
'"If Article 52 is not applicable, then Article 7 will be and the same result should
follow.
84
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between the Treaty and the Convention with France. The perspective of the Convention is that of sovereign states which want
close economic ties with each other; that of the E.E.C. Treaty, one
of sovereign states which want ever closer economic ties with each
other and ultimately economic unification.
2. THE EMPLOYMENT OF NON-NATIONALS

The E.E.C. countries will ultimately be forced to eliminate, as
far as Community nationals and companies are concerned, requirements that foreign nationals and companies be authorized to do
business within their territories if no such authorization is required
of their own nationals and companies. After these requirements
have been eliminated, Community nationals will be able to work in
France without a foreign merchant's identity card in situations for
which it was heretofore required. Such freedom could extend even
to non-Community nationals employed by Community companies.
The Convention with France, on the other hand, does not absolve
an American national from obtaining such an identity card, although
it does afford protection against its arbitrary refusal.
3·

OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY

Both the Convention with France and the E.E.C. Treaty will
guarantee the right of nationals and companies of the, or of any,
other signa tory to own real property; and both will result, for example, in giving them a right in France to renew commercial leases
and, if this renewal right is denied, to demand eviction indemnification.
The two agreements differ in one respect in this area, however,
and this is again a specific instance of a general difference between
them. The E.E.C. Treaty creates a general right of establishment
of which the right to own property is, as Article 54 (3) (e) indicates, an element; the Convention creates no general right of establishment but provides for a number of specific rights of which the
right to own real property is one. Had no right to own real property been mentioned in the Convention, none would exist under it.
Had the Treaty made no specific mention of this right of ownership,
the general right of establishment could still be found to imply it.
This general difference between the two approaches is important
in determining the scope of each.
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4· ACCESS TO COURTS

Nationals and companies of the signatories have a right to sue
in the courts ofthe, or of any, other signatory under the Convention
with France and the E.E.C. Treaty, respectively. But the E.E.C.
Treaty goes further and will, for example, prevent France from
requiring Community nationals and companies to post bond to guarantee the payment of costs and damages in actions they initiate.

5·

VOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY

A comparison of the Convention with France and the E.E.C.
Treaty in this area is particularly speculative. Both will guarantee
certain rights in connection with the withdrawal by a company (of
one signatory nation) of its economic activity from the territory of
another, but the most significant question-whether the repatriation of assets to the country of origin can be prevented-will be
determined in both cases in accordance with as yet undefined criteria.
The Convention does, however, give some guarantee that earnings
may be repatriated, and both the Convention and the Treaty put
some limitation on the freedom of the signatory countries to institute new exchange controls preventing the repatriation of capital
assets.
The important difference between the two lies, however, again in
their differing basic aims. As economic integration, at which the
E.E.C. Treaty aims, proceeds, the feasibility of national exchange
controls, which would prevent repatriation from one Community
country to another, will diminish. A comparable result, where the
United States and France are concerned, will only be achieved
through agreements other than the Convention.

6.

EXPROPRIATION

Both the Convention and the Treaty guarantee national treatment by the signatories to nationals and companies of the, or of
any, other signatory in cases of expropriation. The Convention adds
additional requirements-compensation must be the equivalent of
the property taken, in effectively realizable form, granted without
needless delay, and every effort must be made to accord an opportunity to repatriate the proceeds. The Treaty, on the other hand,
specifies some of the conditions under which expropriated enterprises may be operated-and the limitations it imposes may reduce
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the possible desirability of expropriation from the point of view of
member governments.
I

IV. THE TREATIES OF COMMERCE AND THE
E.E.C. TREATY RELATED
Although the generally applicable criterion in the Italian, German, and Dutch F.C.N. Treaties and in the Convention with France
is national treatment, the most-favored-nation clause is also sometimes applicable. All four, for example, guarantee most-favorednation as well as national treatment in regard to exchange transfers, 86 and all, except the Convention with France, refer inter alia
to most-favored-nation treatment in connection with the organization and operation of companies. 87

A.

THE EFFECT OF MosT-FAvoRED-NATION CLAUSES

The most-favored-nation clauses raise numerous questions. For
example, will companies "residing" in the United States be able to
claim the same rights to repatriate assets from France which Community companies "residing" in Luxembourg will have by virtue of
the E.E.C. Treaty provisions concerning capital movements? Or,
for a second example, will a Delaware corporation be able to assert
a right to national treatment in bidding on construction contracts
of the German government because Luxembourg companies will
have such a right under the services provisions of the E.E.C.
Treaty? 88
Plainly these and similar questions must first be considered in the
light of the wording of all relevant provisions of the applicable
treaty of commerce. Paragraph 13 of the Protocol to the Convention with France, which permits differing treatment of different currencies, might resolve the example question concerning repatriation
of assets from France. And Article XVII, paragraph 2 of the German F.C.N. Treaty requiring "fair and equitable treatment as compared with that accorded to the . . . companies . . . of any third
country, with respect to . . . the awarding of . . . government
contracts . . . " presumably absolves Germany of a duty to accord
86
Italian F.C.N. Treaty, art. XVII, paras. 2, 3; German F.C.N. Treaty, art. XII,
para. I; Dutch F.C.N. Treaty, art. XII, para. I; Convention with France, art. X,
para. I.
87
Italian F.C.N. Treaty, art. III, para. 1; German F.C.N. Treaty, art. VII, para. 1;
Dutch F.C.N. Treaty, art. VII, para. 4·
•• Arts 59-66. St'e Part V of this chapter i11jra.
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Delaware companies most-favored-nation (as opposed to "fair and
equitable") treatment.
But the general question remains: Where the most-favorednation clause is applicable in a treaty of commerce between the
United States and a Common Market country, can an American
company, by virtue thereof, claim the same benefits which that country accords Community companies pursuant to the E. E. C. Treaty?
The answer is clear in the Netherlands-it cannot. Article XXII,
paragraph 3 of the Dutch F.C.N. Treaty provides:
The most-favored-nation treatment provisions of the present Treaty shall not apply to advantages accorded by
either Party . . . by virtue of a customs union . . . .
Moreover, an exchange of letters makes these additional provisions
part of the Treaty:
[The Netherlands J should continue to be able to
participate in European regional arrangements . . .
even though the Netherlands may thereunder be
obliged to grant some reciprocal advantages to other
participating countries which it is unable to grant to
non-participating countries; [and]
( 2) Either Party, notwithstanding . . . [the provision
concerning termination of this Treaty after 10 years
have passed], shall be entitled to suspend the operation of particular most-favored-nation provisions of
the Treaty to the extent deemed appropriate to the
situation . . . [if future contingencies arise]. 89
( 1)

The Italian F.C.N. Treaty, on the other hand, provides that the
most-favored-nation provisions shall not apply to "advantages accorded by virtue of a customs union of which either . . . Party
may . . . become a member." 90 A comparable provision in the
German Treaty is more explicit; it provides that most-favorednation treatment "in regard to customs duties and quotas on goods"
shall not apply to "advantages accorded by either party by virtue
of a customs union or free-trade area." 91
""l.r., future contingencies which Article XXII, paragraph 4 does not adequately
meet. Since the subject of the paragraph from which this second quotation is taken
is the reconciliation of the Treaty with then-existing European arrangements (that
is, in 1956), and since Article XXII, paragraph 4 refers only to the "treatment of
goods" and action required or specifically permitted under the G.A.T.T., there is a
question whether suspension of most-favored-nation provisions in connection with
"future contingencies" created by the E.E.C. Treaty would be warranted. In the light
of the letter as a whole, such a restrictive interpretation seems unlikely, however.
00
Art. XXIV, para. 3 (b) .
•, Art. XIV, para. 6.
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"Advantages accorded by virtue of a customs union"-whether
implicitly or explicitly-are restricted to questions of tariffs and
quotas. The effect of other most-favored-nation provisions of the
Italian and German treaties-read in conjunction with the E.E.C.
Treaty-remains, therefore, an open question. The authors of the
E.E.C. Treaty plainly had this problem in mind in drafting Article
234. Its third paragraph provides that in applying conventions between Member States and third countries the latter
shall take into account the fact that the advantages accorded [in the E.E.C. Treaty J by each of the Member
States are an integral part of the establishment of the
Community and are, because of this fact, inseparably
linked to the creation of common institutions, the attribution of powers to them and the granting of the same advantages by all other Member States.
Obviously the drafters intended by this provision to serve notice
that the Member States will not grant like advantages to third
countries unless the latter offer the same benefits and accept the
same burdens-unless, in short, the latter become members of the
Community. The justice of this position may be appealing, but it
involves in effect a unilateral interpretation by each Member State
of its agreements with third countries for which there is no warrant
in international law. 92
The position of the United States government in regard to its
treaties of commerce with Community countries may be foreshadowed by its response to the letter of the government of the Netherlands which became part of the Dutch F.C.N. Treaty. The answer
of the U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands read in part:
As your Excellencies are aware, the United States Government welcomes progress in the development of European cooperation and integration insofar as arrangements
for cooperation and integration contribute to a freer flow
of trade, a more efficient use of manpower and materials,
and greater unity. In this connection, it may be recalled
that the United States Government has given concrete support to such organizations as the European Coal and Steel
Community and concurred in the waiver relative thereto
granted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, bearing in mind the
.benefits expected to accrue from arrangements designed
to create a dynamic competitive common market within the
"'Piot, La clause
TIONAL I ( 1952 ).

de Ia nation Ia plus favorisie, 45
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Community and to insure sound economic relations between the Community and outside countries. The United
States Government is prepared to consider sympathetically in the same spirit other proposals which the Kingdom of the Netherlands might make.
An attempt to assert that the most-favored-nation status of American nationals or companies gives them the Community status created
by the E.E.C. Treaty seems, in any case, unlikely to succeed in any
Community country.

B.

CONCURRENT PROTECTION UNDER
DIFFERENT TREATIES

The Common Market subsidiary of an American parent may be
in a position to claim concurrent protection under more than one
treaty. If the Belgian subsidiary, for example, meets the standards
of Article 58, the right-of-establishment provisions of the E. E. C.
Treaty are applicable. In addition, it may be able to claim protection
under Belgium's bilateral treaties of commerce-for example, the
Franco-Belgian Convention of Establishment. 93 Finally, because the
Convention with France recognizes control of companies as decisive
for some purposes, the Convention may also apply.
To take only one example, assume that France expropriates property of the Belgian subsidiary's French branch. Under the E.E.C.
Treaty the Belgian subsidiary will be able to claim national treatment in regard to compensation; under the Franco-Belgian Convention of Establishment (Article 6), most-favored-nation treatment; and under the Convention with France also, apparently, the
rights it affords in case of expropriation. Paragraph 6 of the Convention's Protocol provides:
The provisions of Article IV, paragraph 3 providing for
the payment of compensation [in case of expropriation]
shall extend to interests held directly or indirectly by nationals and companies . . . [of the United States] in
property expropriated within the territories of . . .
[France]. (Emphasis added.)
V. DOING BUSINESS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY
UNDER THE E.E.C. TREATY
The significance of the E.E.C. Treaty to intra-Community operations of American corporate subsidiaries is obviously not limited
00

Of Oct. 6, 1927 [Nov. 5, 1927] J.O. See especially arts.

s, 6, and 7·
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to express protection of the right of establishment. At least three
other aspects of the Treaty are important, directly relevant, and
generally beyond the scope of other chapters of this book. The first
is the "services" provisions of the Treaty (Articles 59-66) ; the
second is the Treaty's provision for assimilation of the laws of the
Six; and the third is the pressure which the Treaty will create to
ameliorate investment conditions.

A.

THE "SERVICES" PROVISIONS

By virtue of Article 66 a company qualifying under Article 58
may also claim the protection of the "services" chapter of the
Treaty (Articles 59-66). The rights which will be created pursuant
to this chapter will complement those arising under the "right-ofestablishment" provisions of the Treaty. The difference between
the two lies in the situation of the persons, or what is more relevant to this discussion, the situation of the companies protected.
The "right-of-establishment" provisions envisage protection of
persons and companies of one Member State who desire to establish, or who have already established, in another Member State.
The "services" provisions look to protection of those of one Member State who wish to do business in another without establishing
there. An important segment of the rights of such a person or company are regulated by the Treaty provisions concerning tariffs,
quotas, and capital movements. These provisions, standing alone,
are clearly inadequate, however, to achieve the freedom of economic activity among Member States sought by the drafters of the
Treaty. The "services" provisions were therefore included to effect an ultimate elimination of those restrictions on economic activity in the Community not otherwise affected by the Treaty.
"Services" are, as a result of this "stop-gap" nature of the relevant provisions, negatively defined. Article 6o provides:
[W]ithin the meaning of the present Treaty services are
considered to be any performance normally performed for
remuneration to the extent that they are not regulated by
the provisions concerning free circulation of goods, of
capital and of persons. (This author's translation.)
This definition suggests that "services" as used in this chapter means
something broader than the term "services" as generally used in the
phrase "goods and services." The French, German, and Italian
equivalents of "performance" (if not the Dutch) suggest, in fact,
that "services" means "any performance pursuant to contract."
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The essential freedom to be created by the "services" provisions
is indicated by Article 59· That Article provides in pertinent part:
[R] estrictions on free performance of services within the
Community shall be progressively eliminated during the
transitional period in regard to nationals of Member
States established in a country of the Community other
than that of the recipient of the service. (This author's
translation.)
Although there is nothing in Article 59 to indicate as much, the majority opinion apparently is that the "services" provisions envisage
only national treatment. The Economic Council of France has, however, taken another view. In its report of January 3, 19 59, it stated:
[T]he restriction created by the second line of Article 52
as far as establishment is concerned, which reduced this
liberty to one of non-discrimination in regard to foreign
nationals of a Member State, does not exist in regard to
services. Moreover the drafters of the Treaty used the
term "Community" here and not the term "Member
States." The problem is, then, one of eliminating the obstacles to the free performance of services within the
territory of the Community. . . . 94
Despite the Report of the Economic Council of France it will be
assumed here that the majority view is correct.
The "services" chapter has three provisions which have no counterparts in the "right-of-establishment" chapter. The first of these,
Article 64, provides that Member States are prepared to go further than will be required by directives of the Council in freeing
services, if their general economic situations and those in the relevant economic sectors permit them to do so. Article 6 5 provides
that as long as restrictions on free performance of services are not
eliminated, each of the Member States will apply them without distinction based on nationality or residence 95 to all performers of
services as defined in Article 59, line I. And finally Article 6o provides:
Without prejudice to the provisions of the chapter concerning the right of establishment, the performer of serv"" Rapport du Conseil Economique du 9 dec. 1958, [Jan. 3, 1959] J.O. at 1003. (This
author's translation.)
""This provision could mean that France, for example, shall not now distinguish
between Frenchmen and Belgians in applying such restrictions. This would be its
meaning if the Economic Council has correctly interpreted the meaning of Article 59·
If the majority is correct about Article 59, Article 64 means only that France will not
discriminate between Belgians and Germans, for example, in applying such restrictions,
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ices may, in order to perform them, exercise on a temporary basis his activity in the country where the service is
supplied under the same conditions as those which that
country imposes on its own nationals. (This author's
translation.)
The greater liberality of the "services" chapter, as manifested
by these three provisions, is probably explained by the fact that the
significance of services in the Community-that is, services within
the meaning of the Treaty-is less than that of the economic activity of non-nationals established within each Community country. 96
More radical changes therefore seemed possible.
One example must serve to suggest the significance of the "services" chapter. Assume that an American corporation which specializes in the manufacture and construction of pre-fabricated housing
is 'contemplating the establishment of a Belgian subsidiary. Assume
further that an important element in this decision is its potential
ability to construct such housing for public housing projects. Assume, finally, that German laws, for example, which authorize public housing projects generally restrict bidding to German nationals
and companies. Should the American corporation assume that such
restrictive laws will, pursuant to the Treaty ultimately be eliminated?
The Member States have not been fully agreed that such laws
must be eliminated, but the Commission has assumed that they must
be. 97 And the Treaty supports the Commission's stand. The construction of housing, as an example, is clearly a service, and it is
obvious that the removal of other restrictions on the free performance of services would be meaningless to a company interested in
the construction of public housing if it were not free to bid on government contracts.

B.

AssiMILATION OF THE

LAws

OF THE

Six

Various provisions of the Treaty will expressly, or in effect, force
unification, harmonization, coordination, or approximation of laws
of the Six. The term "assimilation" will hereinafter be used to describe these measures in the aggregate, and it will be used in its
primary sense-that is, "to make similar."
96

See Ehring, op. cit. supra note

so,

at 164.

"'Cf. the discussion of the Commission's proposal pursuant to Art. 54 ( 1) in, Everling,

Forsc~lag der Kommission der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft zur Regelung
des· Nuderlassungsrechtes, 1960 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 570.
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I. THE ASSIMILATING EFFECT OF

ARTICLES

S8, 220, AND 221

Reference has already been made to one group of laws-those
concerning the recognition of companies-which will in effect be
assimilated pursuant to Articles 58 and 220. But Article 220 also
provides that the Member States shall negotiate to assure for their
nationals:
. . . the maintenance of juridical personality in case of
transfer of the central office (siege) from country to country and the possibility of merger of companies formed
under different national laws. . . . (Translation by this
author.)
Added to this is the provision of Article 22 I which guarantees (as
of January I, I96I) national treatment in respect of participation
in the capital of companies of other Member States (in the sense
of Article 58).
It is, perhaps, somewhat artificial to view these as provisions
directed at assimilation. Nonetheless, it is clear that their effect, at
least incidentally, will be to make the laws of the Six more similar
to one another, and it is helpful to view them in this light, as should
become clear.
2. PROVISIONS IN THE "RIGHT-OF-ESTABLISHMENT"
CHAPTER EXPRESSLY REQUIRING ASSIMILATION

Three provisions of the "right-of-establishment" chapter expressly require assimilation of the laws.

a. Article 56(2)
Under Article 56 ( 2) the Council is, prior to the end of the transitional period, to adopt directives in order to bring about coordination of:
legislative provisions and administrative rules and regulations which prescribe a special regime for aliens . . . for
reasons of public order, security and health. (This author's translation.)
Such directives are to be based on Commission proposals and
adopted, after consultation with the Assembly, by unanimous vote.
(Coordination of administrative rules and regulations are subject
to directives adopted by a qualified majority after the end of the
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second stage, however.) Assimilation in this area of law is of obvious importance; public order, security, and health offer ready
justification for the negation of virtually any Treaty provision or
administrative act of the institutions (for example, it may well be
argued that the requirement of a foreign merchant's identity card is
necessitated by public order and security) .98
b. Article 57(2)
Article 57 ( 2) requires coordination of legislative provisions and
administrative rules and regulations of the Member States concerning access to non-salaried activities and their exercise. A proposal of the Commission and consultation with the Assembly are
again necessary, and, with certain stated exceptions, the Council
is to adopt the required directives unanimously during the first stage
and by qualified majority thereafter.
c. Article 54(3) (g)

The provision for assimilation of most direct interest to companies, and the only one to be considered here in some detail, is
Article 54(3) (g). It requires the institutions to take action to bring
about coordination
to the extent . . . necessary and with a view to making
them equivalent, (of) the guarantees demanded in Member States from companies within the meaning of Article
58, second paragraph, for the purpose of protecting the
interests both of the members of such companies and of
third parties. . . . (This author's translation.)
This provision could have far-reaching consequences. A German
professor has even suggested that it may outlaw the provisions of
the projected reform of German stock company law. 99
This is an extreme view of the reach of Article 54(3) (g), but
the effects it may have are important enough to consider at least
some of them in detail. One way of doing this is to list the parties
affected by company laws and to ask which aspects of their relationships with each other are governed by rules designed to protect
members and third parties. The interested parties-if the discussion
is confined to stock companies-are the stockholders, the corporation, the directors and officers, creditors, other third parties, and
98
90

See Chaine, op. cit. supra note 18, at 195.
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the state. Obviously the rules governing corporation-stockholder
relations and corporation-creditor relations are of primary relevance. But what of the rules governing other relationships? For
example, the provisions in American corporation law permitting
derivative suits constitute a clear recognition that harm done by
directors of the corporation harms the stockholders. Thus, some
rules governing the company-director relationship may require coordination pursuant to Article 54 ( 3) (g) .
.
Or, for a more remote example, take the rules determining when
corporate existence begins. They most directly affect the companystate relationship, but it seems clear enough that they are also relevant in defining the protection of stockholders and creditors.
The limits of the area of company law which could be coordinated
pursuant to Article 54 (3) (g) can, then, be very broadly defined.
Within these limits, what-to ask a further question-are some of
the presently applicable rules of stock company law which should
be coordinated in the interest of Community stockholders and creditors? Two examples of differing rules in some of the six countries
which are relevant to the competing claims for protection of stockholders and creditors suggest the kind of answer which can be expected to this question. 100
I) Disregard of Corporate Entity. Some of the rules concerning
the conditions under which stockholders may be held liable for the
debts of the stock company differ in the Six. Specifically, these are
the situations in which the corporate entity may be disregardedthe veil "pierced."
Assume, for example, that an American corporation has acquired
So percent of the stock of a Dutch stock company, the remainder
of the shares being in the hands of the American corporation's
Dutch partners. Wishing to assign certain markets to the Dutch
company and aware of the problems which an agreement to share
markets may create under the U.S. antitrust laws if the Dutch company is permitted to hold itself out as a wholly independent entity,
the U.S. management adopts the following policy on advice of counsel: Some Western European markets will be left exclusively to the
Dutch affiliate (but no agreement to this effect will be adopted) ;
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TREATIES
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For discussions of the rules which require assimilation under Article 54(3) (g),
and under the Treaty generally see, Loussouarn, Le droit international du commerce
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the affiliate will, however, be treated wherever possible as if it were
simply the overseas division of the American corporation, ultimate
control being always in the hands of the U.S. company.
Key executives are thereafter transferred temporarily from the
United States to the Netherlands with a view to familiarizing Dutch
personnel with American mass market business methods; and personnel of the Dutch company pass freely back and forth between
the two ·companies for training purposes. Transactions are not always at arm's length; and, because of the pace general economic
growth within the Common Market, the business of the Dutch
company has developed more quickly than anticipated and this
unexpectedly rapid growth has given the Dutch affiliate an appearance of being under-capitalized.
Having first gotten substantial judgments against the Dutch affiliate which it cannot pay, creditors of the affiliate now attempt to
obtain payment from the American corporation in the Netherlands,
France, and Germany-in each of which the American corporation
has assets and in each of which one plaintiff is domiciled. In each
case the plaintiff-creditors argue that the Dutch corporate entity
should be ignored and the shareholders held liable.
In the Netherlands the U.S. stockholder would not, in all likelihood, be held liable. Disregard of juridical personality is apparently
extremely rare. 101 On the other hand, a French court could consider
the existence of the affiliate an "abuse of juridical personality" and
hold that in France the two companies should be considered as
one. 102 Finally, a German court might consider that the juridical
personality of the Dutch affiliate should be denied recognitionparticularly in view of its capitalization and the complete control
exercised by the American company-since
. . . the legal status of the juridical person cannot be
recognized to the extent that the uses to which it is put are
contrary to the purposes of the legal order .103
In sum, disregard of the corporate entity would be unlikely in the
Netherlands, probable in France, and possible in Germany.
Assuming that a German or French court might conclude that
the juridical personality of the Dutch affiliate should be disregarded
under the law of the forum, a conflict question arises. Under the
101
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general conflict rule of both Germany and France the law of the
Nether lands would determine whether a company with its central
office ( Sitz, siege) in the Netherlands should be viewed as a juridical entity. But application of this rule, like that of others, is subject to the proviso that its application must not violate the purpose
of a German law or French ordre public. 104 A German or French
court could, then, conclude that application of the usual rule in the
example case would be such a violation; a Belgian court in a like
case in fact did so. 105
If we assume a wholly-owned subsidiary of an American corporation, the problem is even more complex. There is no apparent objection, or penalty attached, to the ultimate concentration of all
shares in the hands, of one shareholder in the Netherlands or in
Germany. In France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, on the other hand,
ultimate single owne~ship of all the shares results in dissolution
of the company. Some-for example a Belgian commercial court 106
-have concluded that dissolution is automatic, and that liquidation is not, therefore, a prerequisite of the personal liability of a
sole stockholder. And "strawmen" will provide no insulation against
this liability in Belgium, for example. In Italy, single ownership of
all the shares will not dissolve the company, but the single shareholder is liable for the debts of the company contracted during the
period of single ownership should the company become insolvent. 107
2) Powers of the Heads of Companies to Bind Them. A second
example of rules of company law of the Six which should be coordinated in keeping with Article 54(3) (g) was suggested by a French
notary in a particularly able discussion of the status of foreign corporations in Common Market countries. 108 It concerns the power
of the heads of companies to bind the company.
In France there is, according to Mr. Thibierge, a difference between their powers to bind the stock company-the societe anonyme
-and those to bind the limited liability company-the societe
responsabilite limitee. Under French stock company laws their
powers are defined in the charter, or confirmed by subsequent action
or decision. Heads of the stock company obligate the company,

a

10
' See, e.g., Einfiihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch § 30: Die Anwendung
eines ausliindischen Gesetzes ist ausgeschlossen, wenn die Anwendung gegen die
guten Sitten oder gegen den Zweck eines deutschen Gesetzes verstossen wiirde.
'""Judgment of Jan. 5, 1911, Cour de Cassation, Pasicrisie II 68 (19II).
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Art. 2362, Coo. Crv.
108
Thibierge, op. cit. supra note 61 at 344 fl.
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therefore, only if they have express authority to do so, unless the
action taken concerns usual every-day company transactions which
it may be expected all company heads are authorized to carry out.
If real estate is to be sold, or money borrowed, however, company
heads have only the power expressly conferred on them, and third
parties fail to verify this power at their peril.
Under the French limited liability company act, on the other hand,
the heads of the company are granted powers by law which third
parties may rely on even if the charter limits them. Such limitations
will render the company heads liable to the stockholders if they are
transgressed, but that is their only potential effect. These legal
powers are, in short, granted as a matter of public policy.
The rules pertaining to limited liability companies in France were
borrowed from the German limited-liability-company law. Under
German law, however, the heads of German stock companies also
have powers which the law grants as a matter of public policy and
which are unalterable by charter.
In Italy company heads have all powers to obligate the company,
but limitations on their powers are binding on third parties if they
have been recorded in the public register of enterprises or if the
company can prove such third persons knew of the restrictions.
Finally, in Belgium the powers of the heads of the limited liability company as well as of those of stock companies can be restricted in the company charter to the detriment of third parties,
even parties who have no knowledge of the restrictions.

3·

ASSIMILATION UNDER THE TREATY SUMMARIZED

Three instances of assimilation in the Six have here been suggested. Their possible significance is worth consideration at this
point.
The three instances were-to re-order them: (I) assimilation of
laws to the principle of non-discrimination (Article 22 I, for example, which eliminates discrimination against the participation of
non-nationals in the capital of companies) ; ( 2) assimilation with
one another of the laws protecting stockholders and creditors (Article 54(3) (g); and (3) assimilation of the conflict rules determining the nationality of corporations (Articles 58 and 220).
The first of these may be most significant in eliminating legal
obstacles to Community-wide operations-present governmental
discrimination based on nationality will be removed and future discrimination is prohibited. The second may be most important in
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eliminating economic obstacles stemming from differences of the
laws: If creditors can be certain that their protection will be essentially the same regardless of the place of formation of a company
within the Community, Community-wide transactions will be facilitated. And if stockholders can be sure of like protection regardless
of the laws within the Community under which a company is formed,
they may be more willing to approve Community-wide ventures.
More important, companies may find it easier to raise capital on a
Community rather than country basis.
The third instance of assimilation discussed-that to be effected
by Articles 58 and 2 zo-may be most significant as first attack on
psychological obstacles to Community-wide company operation. Because Article 58 (read with Article 52) looks to location of any
two of the three elements (the registered office, the central management, and the central establishment) not in the country where the
company is formed but anywhere in the Community, it contains an
invitation to view the Six as a whole, to substitute a Community for
a natio~al perspective.
Such a shift in perspective, if it became general, would be important not only to the Community company which desires to operate on a Community-wide basis. The extent of legislative assimilation in the Six will be determined by the extent to which such a shift
occurs. Coordination of the laws is possible now, but the extent of
unification would seem to depend on the extent to which a Community consciousness replaces the present sense of allegiance solely to
the six nation-states.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TREATIES
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FURTHER PROPOSALS FOR ASSIMILATION

Three suggestions have already been publicly made which are
relevant to the Community-wide operation of companies, which
seem feasible, and which may be the next logical steps, departing
from Article 58, in the progression towards a Community viewpoint and unification.
The first of these suggested changes is the institution by treaty
of a Community companies register. 109 No Common Market company would be required to register but advantages of registration
would be substantial. For example, limitations of the powers of
company heads would be effective against third parties from the
date of their publication in the register-but only then. Moreover,
registration could be accompanied by the issuance of a European
109

/d. at 352.
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License of Establishment, which would result in simultaneous registration of the company in the commercial registers of each of the
Six.
The second suggested change-and this obviously goes considerably further in the direction of a unified Community company lawhas been to create a Common Market Securities Exchange CommissionY0 The argument is that some such central regulation of
the issuance of shares is necessary if investors are to be attracted in
any numbers to Community companies established in other countries. An intermediate step in this direction-a uniform prospectus
which could effect the listing of stock with all of the exchanges in
the Six-has also been discussed by the exchanges. 111
Professor Tunc, of the Faculty of Law of Paris, in an article
on the United States S.E.C. had already recommended in 1952
that French legislators might take inspiration from the various U.S.
federal laws controlling corporations and their issuance of shares. 112
Something comparable to the S.E.C. has also been urged in Holland, and in Belgium a Banking Commission already exists which
plays a role similar to that of the S.E.CY 3
The final suggestion has come-with only minor variationsfrom a number of sources-a secretary of state of the German
Ministry of Justice, 114 from the French notary 115 already quoted,
and from a Dutch professor. 116 It has also been the basis of an international congress convened by the Paris bar on June 16, q, 18,
1960. 117 The proposal is that a Common Market stock companies
law should be created which organizers could, but need not, choose.
Professor Sanders of Holland has suggested as a model the Canadian Dominion Companies Act. The purport of this analogy is
indicated by these sentences from Fraser's HANDBOOK ON CANADIAN COMPANY LAW:
I

Each province in Canada has a Companies Act of its own,
under which companies may be incorporated, and there is
also a Dominion Companies Act under which companies
""/d. at 354m See The Journal of Commerce, r :r (Aug. 2, 1960).
m Tunc, Le Controle federal des societes par actions aux Etats·Unis, 5 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DU DROIT COMMERCIAL 255, 509 (1952).
118
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114
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115
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110
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111
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may be formed with power to carry on business throughout the Dominion. (p. xix)
Dominion companies have a status and powers entitling
them to carry on business throughout Canada which no
provincial legislature is entitled to destroy. (p. 7)
Both Professor Sanders and Dr. Strauss of the German Ministry
of Justice point to the fact that European states have already created
by convention a number of international public companies. "Eurofima"-a company formed to finance the renewal of railroad equipment-is one. Moreover Articles 45 and following of the Euratom·
Treaty set a precedent in providing for Community Joint Enterprises to foster undertakings of outstanding importance to the development of atomic industry. Euratom Joint Enterprises will be
constituted by a decision of the Euratom Council.
To the proposals of Professor Sanders and Dr. Strauss, Notary
Thibierge adds the suggestion that a Community Arbitral Tribunal
be created. Parties to disputes concerning the treaty law creating
Common Market stock companies could refer to this tribunal by
agreement. Mr. Thibierge thereby emphasizes the fact-which the
Common Market Treaty recognizes in granting the Court of Justice sovereign jurisdiction in interpretation of the Treaty-that
common rules require uniform interpretation.
5.

CONCLUSIONS

The three instances of legislative assimilation discussed, when
completed by the three proposals alluded to, would form a program
of progressive assimilation of laws affecting companies.
Beginning with adherence to the principle of non-discrimination,
it adds coordination of the laws protecting shareholders and creditors. The perspective in both instances is the nation-state. Unification of the conflict rule determining company nationality-Articles
58 and 2 20-is strikingly different in viewpoint: the six countries
are seen as an entity.
The proposal to create a Common Market companies register
would entail a modest step toward unification involving the creation
of a minor supranational agency. The Common Market S.E.C.
proposal would, if realized, represent a far more significant piece
of international legislation and would create a major supranational
administrative agency. Finally, the proposal to create a Community
Stock Companies Law by treaty under which companies could, but
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need not, be formed would obviously be a highly significant step towards unification.
C. THE PRESSURE TO AMELIORATE
INVESTMENT CoNDITIONs

It is obviously difficult to isolate the causes for the efforts of the
Common Market countries, with the exception of Germany, to attract foreign investment. Some, if not all, would no doubt have been
made even if the Common Market had not come into existence.
But the creation of the Common Market has plainly increased
the interest of the foreign investor in the Six, and thereby the stakes
for which the individual countries are striving. The important point
is that such efforts are being made both by the individual countries
of the Six 118 and by non-member countries, notably Great Britain.
The importance of this fact lies in the pressure which it generates
to ameliorate investment conditions. The existence of this pressure
must be taken into account in assessing the effective significance of
the Treaty.
It has been suggested, for example, that restrictions on the right
of aliens to exercise non-wage-earning activities will not be eliminated but simply extended to apply to nationals as well. It is also
possible to assimilate laws and regulations by adopting the most
restrictive standards applied by any of the Six (for example, those
concerning access to non-wage-earning activities (Article 57 ( 2)).
The desire to attract foreign capital will be an important factor
countering the inevitable pressures to move in such directions, and
the Treaty will do much to increase it.
118
See Delvaux, Investissements ttrangers et Marche Commun, 1960 REVUE DU
MARCHE CoMMUN 183, 19o-92 (No. 25, May).
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The Protection of Competition
Stefan A. Riesenfeld
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I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE, BACKGROUND, AND

INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS FOR
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION IN
THE E.E.C. TREATY
A. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PERTINENT
ARTICLES
I. PLACE OF THE REGULATIONS WITHIN THE

TOTAL STRUCTURE OF THE TREATY

One of the most important and widely publicized aspects of the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community is its
protection of competition in the Common Market. Since the publication of the texts of the respective international agreements, 1 a
veritable flood of literature on that subject has emerged in the
Community countries as well as abroad, and a host of controversies
has arisen over the significance and import of the controlling
clauses. 2
The pertinent articles differ greatly in structure and are distributed and arranged over various portions of the Treaty, as a
*Dr. ]ur., Breslau, 1931; Dott. in Giur., Milan, 1934; LL.B., University of California, 1937; S.].D., Harvard, 1940. Professor of Law and Vice-Chairman, Institute
of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California. Special Consultant to the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices of the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations. Author of books on social legislation, international law, insurance Ia w, and other subjects and of numerous articles in the field
of commercial transactions and trade regulations in German and American legal
publications.
1
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is one of the group
of international agreements signed in Rome on March 25th, 1957. It is supplemented
by the Convention relating to certain Institutions common to the European Communities, of the same date, and a number of protocols.
2
See the bibliography in part IV, notes 580 and 634 infra.
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consequence of the fact that the play of the forces of competition
in the market may be channelized and affected by different modes
and measures of governmental action as well as by arrangements
and other practices of private enterprises. However, this dispersal
of the regulations and the multitude of interference types envisaged
must not becloud the essential unity of purpose and interconnection
of the various segments of the total scheme.
The E.E.C. Treaty is divided into six principal parts dealing,
consecutively, with the Principles (Articles 1-8), the Bases of the
Community (Articles 9-84), the Policy of the Community (Articles 8 s- I JO)' the Association of Countries and Territories Overseas (Articles 13 1-136), the Institutions of the Community (Articles I37-246), and, finally, General and Concluding Provisions
(Articles 210-248). Articles bearing on the protection of competition are found primarily in the First, Second, and Third parts
of the Treaty.
The most comprehensive and specific set of provisions on the
subject is placed in Part Three, Title I, Chapter I of the Treaty,
and bears the telling sub-heading "Rules of Competition." It deals
with restrictive practices by private or public enterprises (Articles
8 5-90), dumping (Article 9 I), and public subsidies (Article 9 2).
It must not be overlooked, however, that the provisions of this
chapter are supplemented by important articles in other parts or
chapters of the Treaty.
In the first place, Part One of the Treaty, which establishes the
governing principles of and for the Community, specifies, in Article
3, the principal activites of the Community for the accomplishment
of its task and lists, in a catalogue of eleven programmatic items,
the following two :
(f) The establishment of a system which safeguards the competition within the Common Market against adulterations; ..
(h) The harmonization of the provisions of national laws to the
extent required for an orderly functioning of the Common
Market. . . .
The particular position in the Treaty, as well as the broad
phraseology of this provision, makes it clear that one of the basic
objectives and tenets of the Common Market is the achievement
of a market order which is free from "falsifications" due to discriminatory or otherwise unduly restrictive practices whether imposed by governmental mandate or initiated by private action. 3
3

Moreover, it should be noted that the proscription of any discrimination on national
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Again, since Part Two regulating the Bases of the Community
focuses primarily on the structural pattern of the Common Market
as created by the gradual abolition of reciprocal territorial barriers
restricting the freedom of inter-market trade, employment or
mobility of workers, and movement of capital, only such interference with competition is dealt with in that connection as stems from
quantitative restrictions or government monopolies entailing discriminations on a territorial or local basis. The Treaty aims at the
ultimate elimination of all quantitative restrictions on imports and
exports impinging on inter-market trade; but Article 36 excepts
prohibitions against, and restrictions of, the importation, exportation, or transit of goods, justified by reasons of public morals, order, and safety, of the protection of the health and life of persons
and animals, of the preservation of plants, of the conservation of
natural treasures having an artistic, historical, or archeological
value, or of the protection of industrial or commercial property.
Nevertheless the Article specifies that such prohibitions and restrictions must "not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination
or a disguised restriction on the commerce among the Member
States."
Article 37, similarly, ordains a transformation of existing state
trade monopolies in such a fashion that at the end of the transitional period any discrimination among nationals of the Member
States is eliminated with respect to conditions governing supply to,
or procurement from, such monopolies. This provision is declared
to apply to all institutions by which a Member State exercises, in
law, or in fact, a direct or indirect control, direction, or discernible
influence over importation or exportation among Member States.
It also applies to monopolies conferred by a Member State upon
other legal entities.
2. THE RULES OF COMPETITION FOR ENTERPRISES
IN PARTICULAR

As has been stated before, the core of the Treaty provisions for
the protection of competition in the Common Market are congrounds is one of, the guiding principles of the E. E. C. by virtue of Article 7 of the
Treaty which provides:
Any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited within the
field of application of this Treaty, without prejudice to the special provisions
contained therein.
The Council, acting with qualified majority upon a proposal of the Commission and after consultation of the Assembly, may publish any regulation for
the purpose of prohibiting such discrimination.
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tained in Articles 8 5-90. While the last of these articles deals
primarily with public enterprises and enterprises which have been
accorded special or exclusive rights, the first five contain rules governing the market conduct of enterprises in general. Since the following discussions deal primarily with their significance and application, the full text of these Articles 4 is set out for the convenience of the reader :
ARTICLE

85

(I) Incompatible with the Common Market and prohibited are all agreements between enterprises, all decisions
of associations of enterprises and all concerted practices
which are apt to affect the commerce between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or adulteration of competition within the
Common Market, and especially those which consist in:(a) fixing directly or indirectly the purchase or sales
prices or other conditions of transacting business;
(b) limiting or controlling the production, distribution, technical development or investment;
(c) dividing the markets or sources of supply;
(d) applying unequal conditions for equivalent goods
or services vis-a-vis other contracting parties,
thereby inflicting upon them a competitive disadvantage;
(e) conditioning the conclusion of contracts upon the
acceptance by the other contracting parties of additional goods or services, which, neither by their
nature nor by commercial usage, have any connection with the object of these contracts.
( 2) The agreements or decisions prohibited according to
this article are void.
( 3) However, the provisions of paragraph (I) may be
declared inapplicable to:
any agreement or category of agreements between enterprises,
any decision or category of decisions of associations of
enterprises, and
any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contribute to the improvement of the production
or distribution of commodities or to the promotion of
• The wording of the translations is by the author. No satisfactory English translation is in print. The difficulties of an adequate rendition in English of the provisions
of the Treaty are formidably enhanced by the fact that there are substantial divergencies between the four controlling texts. See infra passim.
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technological or economic progress, while reserving an
appropriate share of the resulting profit to the consumers
and without:
(a) imposing on the enterprises involved any restrictions not indispensable for the attainment of these
objectives, or
(b) enabling such enterprises to eliminate competition
in respect of a substantial portion of the commodities involved.
ARTICLE 86
(I) Incompatible with the Common Market and prohibited is the abusive exploitation of a dominant position
in the Common Market or a substantial part thereof by
one or several enterprises to the extent that it is capable
of affecting the commerce between Member States.
These abusive practices may consist especially in:
(a) fixing directly or indirectly the purchase or sales
prices or other conditions of transacting business;
(b) limiting or controlling the production, distribution, technical development or investment;
(c) applying unequal conditions for equivalent goods
or services vis-a-vis other contracting parties,
thereby inflicting upon them a competitive disadvantage;
(d) conditioning the conclusion of contracts upon the
acceptance by the other contracting parties of additional goods or services which, neither by their
nature nor by commercial usage, have any connecnection with the object of these contracts.

87
(I) Within a period of three years from the entry into
force of this Treaty, the Council, by unanimous vote upon
a proposal by the Commission and after consultation of the
Assembly, shall issue all appropriate regulations or directives for the purpose of the application of the principles
laid down in Articles 8 5 and 86.
If such provisions have not been adopted within the
above-mentioned time limit, they shall be enacted by the
Council pursuant to a vote by a qualified majority upon a
proposal by the Commission and after consultation of the
Assembly.
( 2) The provisions specified in paragraph (I) have the
purpos_e, in particular, of:
(a) assuring the observance of the prohibitions set
forth in Articles 8 5 and 86 through the imposition
of punitive or coercive fines;
ARTICLE
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(b) determining the particulars governing the application of Article 8 5.• paragraph ( 3), having regard
for the need both of assuring an effective supervision and, at the same time, of simplifying administrative control to the greatest possible extent;
(c) specifying, if need be, the scope of application of
Articles 8 5 and 8 6 with respect to the different
sectors of the economy;
(d) defining the respective tasks of the Commission
and of the Court of Justice in the application of
the provisions envisaged in this paragraph;
(c) defining the relations between the provisions of
national law on the one hand and on the other
hand the provisions, contained in this Section or
issued pursuant to this Article.
88
llntil the entering into force of the provisions issued
in application of Article 87, the authorities of the Member States shall pass on the permissibility of agreements,
decisions and concerted actions as well as on the abusive
exploitation of a dominant position in the Common Market in conformity with the law of their own countries and
with the provisions of Articles 8 5, especially paragraph
(3), and 86.
ARTICLE

89
(I) Article 88 notwithstanding, the Commission, upon
assumption of its activities, shall watch over the observance of the principles laid down in Articles 8 5 and 86.
At the request of a Member State or ex officio, and in
cooperation with the proper authorities of the Member
State obliged to render official assistance, it shall investigate the cases in which contraventions of these principles
are suspected. If it finds that there has been a contravention, it shall propose appropriate means for its discontinuance.
( 2) If the contravention is not discontinued the Commission shall render a decision to the effect that there has
been such a contravention, furnishing reasons for its finding. It may publish the decision and authorize the Member
States to take the necessary remedial measures, specifying
the conditions and particulars thereof.
ARTICLE

ARTICLE 90

(I) The Member States shall not issue or retain in force
any measures which contravene this Treaty, and in par-
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ticular its Articles 7 and 8 5-94, with respect to public
enterprises to which they accord special or exclusive
rights.
( 2) Enterprises which are entrusted with the rendition
of services of general economic interest or which have the
character of a fiscal monopoly are subject to the provisions
of this Treaty, especially the rules governing competition,
to the extent that the application of these provisions does
not prevent, in law or in fact, the performance of the
special task imposed on them. The development of trade
must not be affected to a degree which is contrary to the
interest of the Community.
( 3) The Commission supervises the application of this
article and, if necessary, addresses the appropriate directives or decisions to the Member States.

B.

GENESIS OF THE RULES PROTECTING COMPETITION
AND THE PROBLEMS OF THEIR INTERPRETATION

When the governing texts 5 of the Treaty were published, it became evident to the students of the subject that the chapter on the
rules governing competition would create perplexing and far-reaching problems. The doubts and controversies prompted by the
phrasing and arrangement of the pertinent articles concerned not
only the exact types of restrictive practices falling within the purview of these regulations, but also their relation to the existing
laws governing the subject in the Member Countries and their
status prior to their implementation as envisaged by the Treaty.
The complexities of proper interpretation are greatly augmented
by the fact that the four governing versions of the text vary only
too often in significant nuances of style and vocabulary, with the
result that the proper construction cannot safely rely on the phrasing of a particular clause in only one language, and that any textual
interpretation must always take account of the composite meaning
conveyed by the four instruments.
Unfortunately, the task of interpretation finds precious little
guidance or assistance in the actual minutes or exposes of the draftsmen, inasmuch as they have not been put into print. To be sure,
some commentators have had access to the preparatory materials
for the purpose of publishing essential passages. 6 But not much
• According to Article 248 of the Treaty, the German, French, Italian, and Dutch
texts are each equally authentic and equally binding.
• Le Marche Commun et /'Euratom, 10 CHRONIQUE DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE 399
(Brussels 1957).
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can be gleaned therefrom; moreover, in the case of Articles 8 5-9 I,
the drafters consciously chose phraseology of a certain vagueness
in order to facilitate possible agreement. 7
Undoubtedly the richest source of interpretive clues among the
documents preceding the final formulation of the Treaty is the famous Spaak Committee Report 8 which constituted the tentative
blueprint for the Common Market. The idea of such an institution emerged in the wake of the wreck of the plans for a European
Defense Community and stemmed from the belief that the economic arena furnished better prospects for European integration
than the political sphere. The Council of Europe, the Common
Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, and the
governments of the Benelux countries supported efforts in that
direction as early as I 9 54, and the German government arrayed
itself with these forces by a memorandum of I955· As a result, the
Foreign Ministers of the E.C.S.C. countries, meeting in Messina
in I955, agreed upon the activation of such a plan and appointed
an intergovernmental committee under the chairmanship of Dr.
Spaak, then Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to work out a
suitable scheme for the creation of a common market. The labors
of the Committee resulted in a report which was published in April
I956 and accepted by the following conference of the Foreign
Ministers in Venice as the basis for the final negotiations of the
Treaty. 9
The Report, after commenting briefly on the advantages of a
European common market, stated at the outset that the creation of
such a market required a "converging action following three main
lines of approach," of which one consisted in the establishment of
"normal conditions of competition" through elimination of all protective barriers compartmentalizing the European economy and
another in the assurance of normal conditions of competition by
remedying the effects of state interventions and monopolistic situations.10
In elaborating on the second point, the Report emphasized that,
7
I d. at 482, referring to a document drafted by the secretariat of the Intergovernmental Conference.
8
Comite Intergouvernemental cree par Ia Conference de Messine, Rapport des Chefs
de Delegation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres [hereinafter cited as Spaak Report] (Brussels, April 21, 1956).
• See the official commentaries in Appendix (Anlage) C to Bundestagsdrucksache
3440, Deutscher Bundestag, z.Wahlperiode 1953, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 2. Wahlperiode 1953 (1957).
10
Spaak Report, supra note 8, at 1 s.
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in view of the custom of enterprises to form cartels with the ensuing monopolistic practices and possibilities of discrimination and
market division, it was necessary to impose rules of competition
upon the enterprises in order to prevent virtual dismemberment
of the market through discriminatory pricing, dumping, and market
divisions. In addition it was necessary to curtail all state intervention undertaken for the purpose of favoring national enterprises (and thus with "the purpose and effect of adulterating competition") rather than in the general interest and for the increase
of over-all production. Moreover, for the achievement of a truly
competitive market, it was also necessary to ascertain and, so far
as feasible, to correct the incidences which flowed for competition
from the disparity of state legislation in general.U
It followed that the control of the standards of competition
among enterprises, the curtailment or elimination of subsidies and
similar measures, and the provision of counter-measures against
distortions as well as possible harmonization of state legislation
were among the principal actions needed to establish a common
market and to make it function. 12
These rather general observations of the Spaak Report were,
later therein, followed by a more detailed outline of the rules of
competition in conjunction with an over-all study of "a policy for
the common market." 13
In turning first to the rules applicable to the enterprises, the Report focused on two main problems-that of discrimination and
that of monopoly. The authors of this section were fully aware of
the fact that these two problems were overlapping and that, in the
absence of public measures to that effect, discriminatory treatment
of consumers or suppliers is practicable chiefly if the enterprises
engaging in such conduct possess monopolistic powers by virtue of
size, specialization, or cartelization. An intervention in case of discrimination, therefore, was considered warranted and necessary
when a consumer is virtually compelled to submit to the terms
of his supplier, or vice-versa, and suffers a competitive disadvantage
from discriminatory treatment. In addition, it was urged that
monopolistic situations and practices needed curbing if they contravened the fundamental objectives of the common market, as is the
case in the event of a division of markets, restriction of produc11

I d. at 16 and 17.
,. I d. at 23.
13
I d. at 53·
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tion or technological progress, or capture or domination of the
market for a product by a single enterprise. It was recognized,
however, that purely local practices, which did not affect commerce
between the states, did not need to come within the purview of the
Treaty. A comparison of the form of the final Treaty, as outlined
before, with the Spaak Report demonstrates clearly that the latter
exerted a substantial influence on the former and, therefore, is a
valuable guide to its interpretation.
In addition to the Spaak Report, guides to a solution of problems of interpretation created by the Treaty may be found in the
documents and in the discussions which, though following the
formulation of its text, formed part of the ratification procedures
in the Community countries. Apart from the parliamentary debates
in the different countries, an official commentary, appended by the
German government to the text of the Treaty in the course of the
ratification procedures in the German parliament, deserves attention.14
In ascertaining the meaning and effect of the Treaty sight should
also not be lost of the fact that its provisions relating to restrictive
business practices were not the first venture into the field of international regulation of restrictive business practices and that previous efforts and experiences were undoubtedly in the mind of the
draftsmen. This applies with particular force to the analogous
provisions in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community/5 but may also be true with respect to the chapter on
restrictive business practices in the abortive Havana Charter for
the proposed International Trade Organisation. 16
Most of all, the views of the draftsmen must have been in" I Schriftenreihe zum Handbuch fiir Europaische Wirtschaft 223 (Der Gemeinsame
Markt) I957·
15
Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.), Articles
4, 65, and 66. On the influence of the provisions protecting competition in the E.C.S.C.
Treaty on the analogous provisions in the E.E.C. Treaty, see the observations to that effect in the general report by Dr. Heilwig in the Report of the Committee on Economic
Policy of the German Bundestag on the draft of the Law Against Restraints of Competition, Schriftlicher Bericht des Ausschusses fiir Wirtschaftspolitik (2I. Ausschuss)
iiber den Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, Deutscher Bundestag, z. Wahlperiode, zu Drucksache 3644, I at 9, IO ( I957).
16
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation, [I947-48] U.S. Dept.
of State, Commercial Policy Series nos. 113-I4; U.N. Doc. E/Conf. z/78 (I948). The
Havana Charter dealt in Chapter V with restrictive business practices. Article 46,
delineating the general policy towards restrictive business practices, was to apply
"whenever ..
2. {b) the practice is engaged in, or made effective, by one or more private or
public commercial enterprises or by any combination, agreement or
other arrangement between any such enterprises, and
(c) such commercial enterprises, individuaily or coiiectively, possess effec-
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fluenced by the development of legislation against anti-competitive
practices in the various Member Countries, especially Germany,
France, and the Netherlands. For that reason, as well as because
the regulations of the Treaty are superimposed upon the various
national measures of this type, individual national legislation will
be discussed prior to a detailed study of the scope and effect of
the pertinent articles in the Treaty.
II. THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION
UNDER THE NATIONAL LAWS OF
THE COMMUNITY MEMBERS

A.

GERMANY
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE LAW AGAINST
RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION OF

I957

a. The Period Prior to the Allied Occupation

(I) Developments before the passage of the Cartel
Ordinance of 1923. Germany evolved special legislation for the
protection of competition and the control of cartels and other
restrictive business practices only in the wake of World War I.
Prior to that time illegality, if any, of combinations in restraint of
trade or monopolistic practices had to be based on the general
principles of law, especially those deduced from the German Civil
CodeP
To be sure, prohibitions of certain injurious types of restrictive
trade practices go back to the early sixteenth century. But they
tive control of trade among a number of countries in one or more products"
and defined as ~uch practice the following:
"3· (a) fixing prices, terms or conditions to be observed in dealing with others
in the purchase, sale or lease of any product;
(b) excluding enterprises from, or allocating or dividing, any territorial
market or field of business activity, or allocating customers, or fixing
sales quotas or purchase quotas;
(c) discriminating against particular enterprises;
(d) limiting production or fixing production quotas;
(e) preventing by agreement the development or application of technology
or invention whether patented or unpatented;
(f) extending the use of rights under patents, trademarks or copyrights
granted by any Member to matters which, according to its laws and
regulations, are not within the scope of such grants, or to products or
conditions of production, use or sale which are likewise not the subjects of such grants."
17
For the pre-1923 status of German law concerning restrictive business practices
see: !SAY, DIE GESCHICHTE DER KARTELLGESETZGEllUNGEN (1955) j Kronstein & Leighton,
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remained sporadic and ineffective. 18 In the mining industry restrictive and monopolistic practices were actually authorized and
encouraged or even imposed by governmental action. 19 The liberalistic ideas and tendencies of the nineteenth century brought about
in Germany, as in other countries, the recognition of the two great,
though polar, principles of freedom of trade and freedom of
· contract. The former principle was proclaimed in Germany in a
basic code regulating the exercise of trades and professions, the
Gewerbeordnung of I 8 69. The rise in Germany of numerous cartel
agreements as an aftermath to the economic depression of I 873
brought the import of this legislation for the legality and enforceability of restrictive agreements into sharp focus. In two famous
decisions, rendered toward the end of the nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court of Germany held that the principle of freedom of
trade as laid down in the Gewerbeordnung did not bar the selfprotection of manufacturers and distributors against ruinous competition.20 It thus opened the gate for the celebrated differentiation
between "good" and "bad" cartels, holding agreements of the first
type to be valid and judicially enforceable. 21
World War I and the period of scarcity following it entailed a
brief period of economic regulation against excessive price increases
which was formally terminated in I926. 22 Moreover, the trends
toward the abolition of the old capitalistic market order and the
erection of a planned economy that accompanied the collapse of the
Imperial Regime produced publicly controlled compulsory cartel
organizations in the coal and potassium industries (I 9 I 9) ,23 and
subsequently a similar arrangement was introduced in the German
match manufacturing industries ( 1930) .24 Any general regulation
of the status of cartels, however, had to wait until four years after
the War.
( 2) From the Cartel Ordinance of 1923 to the Nazi
regime. In I 923 finally, the government, pressed by public opmCartel Control: A Record of Failure, 55 YALE L. J. 297, 302 ( 1946); Schwartz, Antitrust Legislation and Policy in Germany-A Comparative Study, 105 U. Pa. L. RF.V.
617, 625 ( 1957).
18
See Isay, op. cit. supra note 17, at 5 and 81.
19
Id. at 13, 15, and 83.
"'German Supreme Court, June 25, 1890, 28 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichtes in
Zivilsachen [hereinafter cited as RGZ] 238; German Supreme Court, Feb. 4, 1897,
38 RGZ, 155.
21
Cf. the comments by I say, op. cit. supra note 17, at 32; Kronstein & Leighton, supra
note 17, at 302; Schwartz, suPra note 17, at 626-3 x.
""!say, op. cit. supra note 17, at 37·
23
Id. at 34 and 35·
24
Id. at 36.
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ion, 25 enacted the famous Ordinance Against Abuse of Economic
Power, the so-called Cartel Ordinance, which remained the principal basis of German law on that subject until the advent of
Nazism. This measure refrained from an outright prohibition of
combinations in restraint of trade and provided merely for the
suppression of certain abusive practices and a limited governmental supervision. 26
The Ordinance applied, with one exception, only to cartels,
syndicates, and similar arrangements, defined (in Section r) as
"agreements and resolutions which establish obligations with
reference to the modes of production or marketing, the application
of conditions of doing business and the calculation or charging of
prices." Accordingly, it governed only horizontal arrangements
between independent enterprises, entered into for the purpose and
with the intent of influencing market conditions. 27 As a result
purely vertical price maintenance schemes, that is, price fixing
agreements between a single manufacturer, or wholesaler, and one
of his customers, or all of his customers separately, did not fall
under the sweep of the Ordinance. Price maintenance arrangements
enforced by cartels, however, were covered by the statutory provisions.28
The Ordinance required the agreements and resolutions governed
by it to be in writing and declared void any such agreements or resolutions which the parties thereto promised to observe by giving their
word of honor or making similar solemn assurances. It attempted to
forestall an excessive stranglehold of cartels on the market by four
types of legal devices specified primarily in Sections 4, 8, 9, and ro.
The first of the indicated Sections empowered the Minister of Economics to intervene for the protection of the national economy or
the public welfare and to:
I) institute proceedings for the complete or partial cancellation
of the cartel agreement in the newly created Cartel Court, or
2) subject it to an unconditional right of withdrawal by its members, or
3) establish censorship over all of its actions.
"'!d. at 40.
26
Leading German commentaries on the Ordinance of 1923, as amended, are
LEHNICH-FISCHER, DAS DEUTSCHE KARTELLGESETZ (1924); lSAY-TSCHIERSCHKY, KARTELLVERORDNUNG (1925); MULLENSIEFEN-DORINKEL, KARTELLRECHT (3rd ed. 1938). For
an English discussion of the pertinent provisions and their application, see Kronstein
& Leighton, supra note 17.
27
For a detailed discussion of the cartel concept as developed by the German Supreme Court: MtiLLENSIEFEN-DORINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at V, II.
28
See the references in MtiLLENSIEFEN-DiiRINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at V, 12.
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Section 8 gave each cartel member the right to withdraw from
the cartel whenever there was an important reason for such step.
Section 9 subjected cartel actions forfeiting deposits or imposing boycotts or similar. sanctions to a preliminary authorization
by the presiding judge of the Cartel Court, whose decision was
subject to review by the whole bench. 29 This tribunal also had
jurisdiction over contested withdrawals by cartel members pursuant to Section 8.
Finally, Section IO permitted the Cartel Court to authorize
aggrieved parties to rescind contracts with cartels, combines, or
trusts, where the conditions of doing business or the pricing practices were apt to threaten the national economy or the public welfare in exploitation of a dominant market position. Contracts concluded under identical conditions, after such determination by the
Cartel Court, were declared void ab initio.
Section 10 was thus the only provision in the Ordinance which
was applicable, not only to cartels in the technical sense, but also
to other organizations with a dominant market position, such as
trusts and combines. The Section, however, was of little practical
significance since in the case of cartels the right of intervention
under Section 4 was more comprehensive and more direct. An
amendment of 1933 further increased the advantage of a reliance
on Section 4 by eliminating the necessity of a proceeding in the
Cartel Court and authorizing the Minister of Economics to pronounce immediately the total or partial nullity of cartel agreements
or resolutions of the specified type. 30
The actual application of Sections 4, 8, and 9 produced difficult
questions of interpretation and economic policy and has evoked
retrospective censure by respected students of the field. 31
The most comprehensive and most perplexing of the provisions
mentioned was the requirement of administrative or quasi-judicial
authorization for boycotts and similar exclusionary measures, imposed by cartels for the enforcement of discipline against defecting members or for extension of the organization to outsiders. The
Cartel Court considered as measures needing prior approval all
29
Section 9, para. 4, authorized the Minister of Economics to confer jurisdiction over
the initial determination of the propriety of exclusionary measures of cartels operating
only in individual German states or parts thereof to local authorities instead of leaving
it with the presiding judge of the Cartel Court.
30
Law of July 15, 1933, [1933] Reichsgesetzblatt [hereinafter cited as RGBI.] 487.
See MtiLLENSIEFEN-DoRINKEL, op. cit. supra note z6, at VI, 13.
81
See especially Kronstein & Leighton, supra note 17; Schwartz, supra note 17, at
639/f.
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bars excluding an enterprise from customary business dealings. 32
Authorization was to be refused if the contemplated action entailed a threat to the national economy or the public welfare or
constituted an undue restriction of his freedom of action in the
economic field for the party involved. The Cartel Court deemed
such situation to be present if the boycott sought the expulsion of a
competitor from the market, but not, at least according to later
decisions, 33 if it merely aimed at pressure to make him join the
cartel. Unauthorized action by the cartel entitled the aggrieved
party to damages and injunctive relief in the ordinary courts of
justice. An amendment of 1932, however, predicated such remedy
upon prior declaration by the Cartel Court of a violation of Section 9. 34
The power of partial or total cancellation of cartel agreements
in the interest of the national economy or public welfare, entrusted
to the Minister of Economics by Section 4, permitted theoretically
an even more radical and flexible governmental intervention, both
before and after the abolition of judicial review in 1933. However,
it is doubtful whether any really effective use was ever made of
this possibility. 35 At any rate, the mere fact that an agreement was
annulled did not render it void or illegal with retrospective effect. 36
Beginning with 1930 the Cartel Ordinance was supplemented by
a series of enactments designed to implement the deflationistic
policies of the government by either facilitating or ordaining a
lowering of the price level. Accordingly, an emergency decree by
the President of the Republic in 1930 authorized the government
to invalidate price fixing agreements, whether in form of horizontal
arrangements or of vertical agreements between a manufacturer
or wholesaler and individual retailers, if they either constituted
an obstacle to economical production or distribution of goods and
services or entailed an unwarranted restriction on the freedom of
action in the market. 37 Pursuant to the powers under this decree,
the government invalidated agreements between a supplier and his
purchaser which obligated the latter to observe specified pricing
practices with respect to goods of another type or from another
32

MiiLLENSIEFEN-DORINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at VIII, 5·
ld. VIII, 6; Kronstein & Leighton, supra note 17, at 310.
Law of June 14, 1932, c. VI, art. x, [1932] RGBJ. 285, 289; MiiLLENSIEFENDoRINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at VIII, 31 and 35·
""Kronstein & Leighton, supra note 17, at 313.
36
MiiLLENSIEFEN-DORINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at VI, 8.
37
Emergency Decree of July 26, 1930, c.s §§ 1-5, [1930] RGBI. 3n, 328; See
MiiLLENSIEFEN-DoRINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, IV, 26.
32
34
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source or with respect to services rendered in connection with the
supplied goods. Price fixing arrangements relating merely to the
goods purchased thus remained unaffected and valid. 38
In I93 I the government ordered a lowering by 10% of all
prices set in vertical price fixing agreements pertaining to trademarkprotected goods. 39 A further lowering by 10% of prices set in all
price fixing agreements, whether of the horizontal or the vertical
type, was prescribed by a subsequent ordinance of the same year. 40
As a result German law of this period outlawed directly only
a very limited type of restrictive agreements, and, in general, pursued a case-by-case approach to abuse control. Invalidity or tortiousness of certain agreements, however, could be based, in especially
oppressive cases, upon the Statute Against Unfair Competition or
the general provisions relating to invalidity of legal transactions
(Section I 3 8) and anti-social infliction of injury (Section 8 26)
of the Civil CodeY
(3) Developments in the Third Reich. The radical
change in governmental philosophy and policy which occurred with
the advent to power of the Nazi leaders in I 933 left cartels undisturbed at first, but in the course of time transformed them into
instruments of the totalitarian regime and, finally, in I943 practically suppressed them. Little could be gained from tracing this
development in detail, but a few major stops on the road are worth
discussing.
A statute of I933, amending the Cartel Ordinance, abolished
the need of judicial proceedings for the total or partial invalidation
of cartel agreements by the Minister of Economics under Section
4 and extended the permissibility of boycotts and exclusionary
measures against enterprises managed by unreliable persons. 42 At
the same date a further statute was enacted which provided for
the compulsory cartelization of enterprises or the compulsory extension of cartels to outsiders if the Minister of Economics deemed
it to be in the interest of the enterprises concerned, the economy as
a whole, and the public welfareY In connection with such measures,
the Minister was also empowered to re-define the rights and duties
38

I d. XV, 12 and XV, 18.
For the text of the decree: id. IV, 29.
"" For the text: id. IV, 32·
"See in this connection Kronstein & Leighton, supra, note 17, at 325; Schwartz,
supra note 17, at 632.
"'See supra note 30 and MtkLENSIEFEN-OORINKEL, op. rit. supra note 26, at liT.
•• For the text: see MiiLLENSIEFEN-DORINKEr., op. cit. supra note 26, at IV, 1 r.
89
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of the cartel members. Moreover, the Minister was authorized _to
prohibit the establishment of new enterprises or the expansion of
existing facilities in a market if such action appeared to be necessary in view of the exigencies of this branch of the industry and
the national economy as a whole. This statute, which formed the
basis for approximately sixty actual governmental interventions
in the period between 1933 and 1938, 44 served as a model for
similar legislation in Belgium and the Netherlands. 45
In December 1934 the Government prohibited all increases of
prices controlled by private price-maintenance schemes, 46 and in
1936 the establishment of a general price-stop followedY In addition, the Commissioner for Prices issued an Ordinance Relating
to Price Maintenance Agreements or Recommendations for Goods
Sold Under Trademarks, of Oct. 27, 1937, which did empower
him to declare such agreements terminated and illegal.4 8 As a consequence cartels lost all functions in price policies and became more
and more semi-public instruments for market regulation. 49 In 1943
their total replacement by government agencies was completed. 50
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b. The Interlude of Allied Legislation
Following the surrender by Germany, Allied policy turned toward a de-concentration of the German industry and a suppression
of cartels. 51 The so-called Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945,
contained a paragraph which provided:
At the earliest practicable date, the German economy
shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the
present excessive concentrations of economic powers as
exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and
other monopolistic arrangements. 52
.. See the survey in MULLENSIEFEN-DiiRINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at XII, 47-54
and 59·
46
See part II, sections C and D of text infra.
46
See MULLENSIEFEN-DoRINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at IV, 53·
41
/d. IV, 66.
'"For details: id. IV, 74 and XV, 85. The Ordinance was superseded by another
ordinance relating to price-maintenance arrangements of November 23, 1940, [1940]
RGBI.l, 1573.
•• For details, see MULLENSIEFEN-DiiRINKEL, op. cit supra note 26, at XIV, Iff.
60
Cartel-Cleanup Decree (Kartellbereinigungserlass) of the German Minister of
Economics, May 20, 1943, issued pursuant to the authority contained in the MarketSupervision Ordinance of October 20, 1942, [1942] RGBI.I, 619.
51
For further references: lsAY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 63; Schwartz, supra note 17,
at 642.
""Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin (Aug. 2, 1945), Official Gazette
of the Control Council for Germany, Supp. No. I, at I 5 (April 30, I 946).
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Tgis agreement was implemented by separate enactments of the
Control Powers, in consequence of the impossibility of reaching
an understanding between the Soviet and the Western Powers.
In the three Western Zones the pertinent policies were carried
out by two types of action. On the one hand there were special
de-concentration proceedings against particular giant combines in
the coal and steel industry, the chemical industry, the motion picture industry, and in banking, initiated on the basis of individual
legislation. 53 These proceedings aimed at and, in part, accomplished
an at least temporary restructuring of the particular sectors of the
German economy. On the other hand, in each of the three Western
Zones the military occupation authorities, in I 94 7, also enacted
general legislation for the curtailment of restrictive business practices. The laws for the American and British Zones 54 were alike.
They were patterned after the antitrust legislation in the United
States, but were much more detailed and specific in their prohibitions and, in certain respects, went considerably beyond the thrust
of the American original. The French law was considerably less
detailed and somewhat more tolerant towards cartels. 55
The pertinent legislation was kept in force and in Allied hands
even after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in
I 949, by virtue of a specific reservation of such power in section
2b of the Occupation Statute of that year. 56 The termination of the
occupation regime in I 9 55, pursuant to the so-called Paris agreements, returned to Germany "the full authority of a sovereign
state over its internal and external affairs." 57 It was agreed between Germany and the three Allied Powers that until repeal or
amendment, in accordance with the German Basic Law, legislation
enacted by the Occupation Authorities should remain in force, 58
63
See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 646.
"'For the U.S. Zone and Bremen: Law No. 56, Military Government Gazette, Germany, United States Area of Control, issue C, at 2 (1947); for the British Zone:
Ordinance No. 78, 16 Military Government Gazette, Germany, British Zone of
Control 412 (1947). The catalogue of anticompetitive practices in art. V, Sec. 9(c) is
of particular interest as it served as a model for subsequent European legislation.
66
For the French Zone: Military Government Ordinance No. 96, June 9, 1947, 2
Journal Olliciel du Commandement en Chef Fran<;ais en Allemagne 784 ( 1947); see
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 643.
68
The reserved powers covered "Decartelisation, Deconcentration [and] Nondiscrimination in Trade Matters"; for a reprint of the text, see 43 AM. J. !NT'L. L. SUPP.
172 (1949)·
67
Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of
Germany, signed at Paris, October 23rd, 1954 and in force May sth, 1955, art. r, para.
z; see 49 AM. J. lNT'L. L. SUPP. 57 (1955).
58
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupa-
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and specific provisions were stipulated for the status of the coal
mining and iron and steel industries and for the completion of the
liquidation of the German Dye Trust. 59
The Allied legislation against the concentration of economic
power, accordingly, remained valid and applicable by German
authorities until the entry into force on January 1, 1958, of the new
Law Against Restraints of Competition, promulgated on July
27, 1957. As a result, the German Ministry of Economics, as
well as the German courts, were confronted with many difficult
questions of interpretation regarding the validity or legality of
cartels or other activities in restraint of trade, challenged under
Laws Nos. 56, 78, and 96. Generally speaking, the German authorities, in construing the applicable legislation, looked to American precedents and practices for guidance and thus had to familiarize themselves with non-indigenous notions and traditions. It was
therefore recognized by the interested and responsible quarters as
early as 1952 that there ought to be a prompt replacement of the
Allied enactments by a modern German law which, combining the
experiences both under the Cartel Ordinance of 1923 and under
the Allied Law Against Concentration of Economic Power, would
produce a social market-order suitable to the political and economic
climate in the young republic and in harmony with the basic tenets
of German judicial administration. 60
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tion, signed at Paris, Oct. 23, I954, in force May 5, I955, art. 2, para. I; see 49 AM. ].
1NT'L. L. SUPP. 69 jj. (I955).
59
/d. arts. 9 and II. A special chapter pertaining to decartelization and deconcentration, contained in the 1952 version of the Convention, was deleted in 1954; see 49
AM.]. INT'L. L. SuPP. 77, 78, (I955). But the German government committed itself,
by letter of October 23rd, I954 addressed to the High Commissioners, to guarantee the
maintenance of free competition in the future German Law. [I955] Bundesgesetzblatt
[hereinafter cited as BGBI.] II, 482.
60
The government bill which finally, and after considerable modification, became
law in 1957 was first introduced in the German Parliament in I952. Two prior government projects both drafted in I949 failed because the first of them proceeded too
much on a policy of state intervention, while the second one was inacceptable to the
Occupation Powers as leaving too much freedom to cartelization. For a history of these
drafts see the General Report by Dr. Hellwig in the Report on the Draft Law against
Restraints of Competition of the Committee for Economic Policy, Schriftlicher Bericht
des Ausschusses fiir Wirtschaftspolitik (21. Ausschuss) iiber den Entwurf eines Gesetzes
gegen W ettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, Deut3cher Bundestag, 2. Wahlperiode, zu Drucksache 3644, I et seq. (1957).
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2. THE ERA OF LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF
COMPETITION OF JULY

27, 1957

a. Character and Scope i11 General

(I) Background and basic structure of the Law. The
promulgation on July 27, 1957, of the new Law of Competition
marked the conclusion of a prolonged and bitter controversy between two opposing schools of thought. 61 One, advanced in particular by the German National Association of Manufacturers
( B.D.I.), harked back to the dogma of freedom of contract and
the traditional differentiation between good and bad cartels and
opposed any legislative intervention except for the purpose of
curbing abuses; 62 the other, represented by the German Minister of
Economics, proceeded on the teachings of the neo-liberalist doctrine and advocated a policy of prohibiting, at least in principle,
any restrictive arrangements, especially those of a horizontal type,
with provisions for dispensation in exceptional cases. Ultimately
the latter approach was adopted. However, by way of compromise,
concessions had to be made in form of a lengthy catalogue of
classes of enterprises exempted outright from the regulation of the
act and of a number of exceptions and possible dispensations from
the prohibition against restrictive arrangements if the same are
entered into for particular purposes or under special circumstances.
The new Law, 63 which aims at a comprehensive regulation of
the law relating to restrictive business practices, 64 is arranged in
61
The original governmental bill was transmitted to the German House of Representatives (Bundestag) on June 13th, 1952, and was transferred to its Committee on
Economic Policy, following a general debate on June 26th, 1952. Preoccupation with
other matters prevented the completion of the deliberations prior to the end of the
legislative period. Early in 1954 the German Government decided to re-introduce the
bill in the Second Parliament. The Senate (Bundesrat) voted in favor of a number of
modifications, and the bill, with the observations of the Government on the changes
proposed by the Senate, did not reach the House of Representatives until January
1955· It was finally passed by that body on July 3rd, 1957 and by the Senate, July 19th,
1957·
62
For details: Schwartz, Antitrust Legislation and Policy in Germany-A Comparative Study, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 617, 6:u (1957).
63
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen [hereinafter cited as Restraints of
Competition Law], [1957] BGBI. I, 1081. An English translation of the Law was
published by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, World Trade Information Service, pt. I,
No. 58-1 ( 1958). The new Law repealed all prior statutes and decrees on the subject. The decree of March 9, 1932 prohibiting bonuses to customers in form of free
merchandise or services and the Law of Nov. 25, 1933, regulating discounts remain in
force.
64
Commentaries on the new Law are KAUFMANN, RAUTMANN, STRICKRODT, U.A.,
FRANKFURTER KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN (1958);
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six main titles containing, consecutively, provisions for the substantive law of restraints of competition; sanctions; administrative
agencies charged with the application of the act; procedure; exempted categories of enterprises; and transitional and concluding
matters. The two titles laying down the operative rules and the exemptions therefrom obviously constitute the core of the new legislation. Title One, specifying the various restrictive practices envisaged by the Law, divides its subject in turn into six chapters,
dealing with: (I) cartels, ( 2) other restrictive agreements,
(3) enterprises with dominating market power, (4) additional
restrictive or discriminatory practices, ( 5) codes of competition,
and ( 6) formal requirements and civil sanctions.
As can be inferred from this list, the Law focuses on, and
differentiates among, four principal classes of restrictive practices
-restrictions in the form of arrangements or resolutions of the
horizontal type (cartels) ; restrictive agreements of vertical character; abusive exploitation of a monopoly or oligopoly; and, finally,
discriminatory and coercive practices not falling within the aforementioned three categories.
( 2) Cartel agreements and cartel resolutions
(a) Section I of the Law. Section I of the Law announces the basic policy toward cartels :
Agreements between enterprises or associations of enterprises, concluded for the accomplishment of a common
purpose, and resolutions of associations of enterprises are
invalid to the extent that they are apt to affect the production or the market conditions for the commerce in goods
or occupational services by means of restraints of competiti~m. This does not apply where this Law provides otherwise.
As indicated by the "does-not-apply" clause and as mentioned
before, the principle of invalidating cartel agreements and decisions is limited by far-reaching exceptions and provisions for
executive dispensations.
Generally speaking, in the cases of the statutory exceptions the
cartel agreements and resolutions falling within their scope are
either valid if properly filed with the Cartel Office 65 or become
LANGEN, KOMMENTAR ZUM KARTELLGESETZ (3d. ed. 1958); MULLER-GRIES, KOMMENTAR
ZUM GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN
(1958);
MULLER-HENNEBERG,
SCHWARTZ, GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, KOMMENTAR (1958); RASCH,
WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, KARTELL-UND MONOPOLRECHT (1957) •

.. Restraints of Competition Law§ 9 (2). In only one case-that of cartel agreements
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valid upon expiration of three months from such filing, unless the
office raises objections for specified reasons within such period. 66
The Cartel Office subsequently may declare them to be invalid if
such action is necessary to suppress abuses of market power gained
through the statutory privilege.67 Conversely, in the cases of permissive dispensation by the Executive, the cartel agreements and
resolutions subject thereto need prior authorization to be valid 68
and are rendered invalid by the expiration of the period of authorization without renewal or by revocation of the authorization
based on the grounds specified by the Law. 69
(b) Statutory exceptions. The statutory exceptions
encompass five categories of cartel agreements or resolutions which
are deemed to exert no, or only relatively minor, restraints on
competition in domestic markets. These five classes are agreements
and resolutions which
I) serve merely for the protection and promotion of exports
without regulation of competition in domestic markets (pure
export cartels) ; 70 or
2) provide for uniform methods of stating specifications for
goods and services or of itemizing prices (without price
fixing) in industries where prior inspection is not feasible
(quotation cartels) ; 71 or
3) provide for uniform application of the general terms of doing
business, delivery, or payment, including discounts ( conditions cartels) ; 72 or
4) regulate rebates which represent genuine compensation for
services rendered and do not entail discrimination between
different levels of distribution or between customers on the
same level who, in taking delivery, perform the same services
to their suppliers (rebate cartels) ; 73 or
or decisions regulating uniform methods of stating specifications for goods and services
or of itemizing prices without fixing prices or price components-does the Law refrain
from making filing a condition for their validity, although prompt filing is imposed as
duty upon the parties. I d. § 9 (2).
00
Restraints of Competition Law§§ 2(3), 3(3) and s(r), governing the validity of
conditions cartels, rebate cartels and rationalization cartels.
67
!d. §§ r2; see also § 3(4).
68
/d.§u(r).
69
!d. §II (5).
70
/d.§6(x).
71
/d. § 5 (4).
72
73

!d.§ 2(1).
/d.§ 3(1).
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5) regulate uniform application of standards or types (standardization cartels). 74
In the case of the rebate cartels, the Cartel Office may base its
initial objection on the ground that it is evident that the agreement
or resolution in question has harmful effects on the course of production or trade or on supplying consumers adequately or, in particular, that it renders the entry into a trade on a given level of
distribution more difficult. Moreover, initial objection or subsequent
intervention may be rested on the fact that market participants have
shown that they are subject to discrimination by reason of the agreement or resolution in question. 75
(c) Categories of cartel agreements and resolutions.
In addition, the Law enumerates six categories of cartel agreements
and resolutions, the validity of which depends on previous executive
authorization (authorization cartels). These dispensations are
provided for on the theory that the cartel agreements or decisions
of the particular type, though normally exerting undue restraint on
competition, may be desirable in view of special conditions or
emergencies in the particular industry or in the interest of the
national economy as a whole.
These cartel agreements and resolutions for which authorization may be obtained cover the cases in which the particular
action
I) is taken, in response to a decline in sales based on a permanent change in demand, by enterprises engaged in the production, manufacture, or processing of goods, provided that
the agreement or resolution is needed for an orderly adjustment of the productive capacity to market conditions and
that the regulation takes the national economy as a whole
and the general welfare into account (structural crises cartels) ; 76 or
2) constitutes regulation which serves to rationalize economic
processes and is apt substantially to enhance the productivity
or profitability of the enterprises involved in technological,
administrative, or organizational respects, and thus to improve their capacity to satisfy demand, provided that the
advantages of the rationalization are reasonably propor74 Jd. § 5 (I) •
75
Id. §§ 3 ( 3) and 3 ( 4).
76/d. §4.

220

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

tionate to the restraint of competition effected thereby
(simple rationalization cartels) ; 77 or
3) effectuates rationalization in conjunction with price fixing
or the establishment of common agencies for procurement
or marketing (syndicates), provided that the goal of rationalization cannot be achieved in any other way and that the
rationalization is desirable in the public interest ( rationalization cartels of higher order) ; 78 or
4) serves to protect and promote exports in cases in which
regulation affects commerce in goods and services in domestic markets, provided, and to the extent, that it is required to safeguard the intended regulation of competition
in foreign markets (export cartels affecting domestic commerce) ; 79 or
5) regulates solely imports into the area governed by the Law
and is confined to situations where the German consumers of
the imports are confronted with no or only insubstantial
competition (import cartels); 80 or
6) does not fall within the aforementioned categories, but
where a restraint of competition is necessary for exceptional
reasons of the paramount interest to the national economy
and the general welfare or where there is an immediate
danger threatening the survival of the major part of the
enterprises in a branch of industry, provided that there is
no, or no timely, possibility that other legislative or economic
measures can be taken and that the restraint of competition
is apt to avert the danger (emergency cartels) .81
In the first five of these classes, the Cartel Office is entrusted
with the grant or denial of applications for authorization. The
emergency powers which become operative in the sixth category,
however, are reserved to the Federal Minister of Economics. The
Law surrounds the exercise of the discretion of the Cartel Office
or the Minister of Economics, in the disposition of applications for
grants or renewals of authorizations, with a number of additional
special formal or substantive safeguards other than the conditions
77
!d. § 5 (2). Cartels providing for rationalization through specialization may
be autorized only if the specialization does not foreclose competition in the market.
78JJ. § 5·(,).
79JJ. §6(2).
""Jd. § 7·
"'!d.§§ 8(r) and 8(2).
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mentioned above. 82 A detailed discussion of them seems, however,
unnecessary.
Cartel agreements and resolutions which are valid either because they fall within one of the five statutory exceptions or because they belong to one of the six classes for which prior authorization by the Cartel Authority may be secured and they, in fact,
have been so authorized, are, nevertheless, subject to a right of
withdrawal for important cause by any of the participants. 83 The
Law specifies that an important cause is deemed to be present in
particular if the freedom of economic action of the person asserting
such right is either curtailed to an undue degree or impaired by
discriminatory unequal treatment in comparison with that of the
other participants. 84
(3) Vertical restricti•ve agreements. The second chapter
of Part I of the Restraints of Competition Law 85 deals with the
validity of restrictive agreements of the vertical type, such as contract provisions for resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, tieins, and the like. In appraising the scope of this regulation, one
must keep in mind at the outset that it is supplemented by a special
chapter dealing with restrictive practices by an enterprise or enterprises possessing dominant market power. 86
(a) Treatment of agreements imposing resale prices
or other contractual terms. The Law differentiates the treatment
of agreements imposing resale prices or other contractual terms
from that of other vertical restrictive stipulations. The basic rule
with respect to the former is contained in Section 15 which provides:
Agreements between enterprises with respect to goods or
occupational services which apply to domestic markets
are void to the extent that they restrict one of the parties
thereto in its freedom to determine prices or other terms
in the contracts which such party may conclude with third
parties in regard to the goods so supplied, other goods or
occupational services. 87
This general proscription of vertical price fixing is, however,
rendered inapplicable to the most common cases of resale price
82

Id. §§ 2(2), 3(2), 3(3)1-3, 5(3) last sentence, 6(2) last sentence, 7(2), 8(3),

12.
83

Jd.§13(1).

84

Ibid .
.. I d. §§
86

81

IS-21,

I d. §§ 22-24.

/d. § 15.

11,
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maintenance agreements covering trademarked or brand goods (as
defined by the Law) or products of publishing houses. 88 In defining
the exact scope of this exception with respect to trademarked or
brand goods the Law requires that they be subject to price competition by similar goods of other producers or dealers. Furthermore, the exception applies only to the goods or publications which
are supplied by the enterprise imposing resale price maintenance,
but it extends to arrangements with legal or economic force and
permits stipulations for the imposition of the same obligation upon
subsequent customers down to the resale to the ultimate consumer.
The concept of trademarked or brand goods is broadly defined and
includes all products which the enterprise imposing resale maintenance guarantees to supply in identical or improved quality and
which carry on their body, wrapping, or container a mark identifying their origin (whether consisting in a designation of the firm,
a word, or picture) .89
The resale price maintenance contracts for trademarked goods
are not valid unless filed with the Cartel Office accompanied by
complete information concerning all imposed resale prices or margins of profit. 90 The Cartel Office may institute proceedings to declare a price-fixing agreement inoperative, either with immediate effect or beginning at a specified future date, and to prohibit execution
of a new price-fixing stipulation of similar content, if: the conditions for its validity are not, or no longer, fulfilled; its enforcement
engenders abuse; or the price-fixing agreement by itself or in combination with other restraints of competition is apt to increase the
price for the protected goods, prevent a reduction in their price,
or curtail their production or distribution in a manner not justified
by general economic conditions. 91 As the wording of this provision
shows, the authority of the Cartel Office to invalidate price-fixing
agreements is neither exclusive of, nor coextensive with, the power
of ordinary courts of justice to hold agreements of that type void or
unenforceable in controversies between particular parties because
the conditions of their validity were not met at the time they were
concluded or subsequently ceased to be fullfilled. 92
58

/J. § 16(1), I and 2.

89

/d. § I6{z).
/J. § 16 (4).
91 Jd. § I7(I).
00

92

LANGEN, op. cit. supra note
ScHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 64,

64, § 17, II, 3; Schwartz in MuLLER·HENNEBERG,
§ 17, 20.
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(b) Exclusive dealing; tie-ins; use of resale restrictions. In addition, the Law specifies four other types of vertical
restrictive agreements which, while not proscribed or rendered
void on principle, may nevertheless call for an intervention by the
Cartel Office whenever they have certain specified undesirable effects.93 The four categories so envisaged are contracts between
enterprises with respect to goods or occupational services which
impose upon one of the parties thereto:
(r) restraints in the free use of the goods supplied,
other goods or professional services, or
(2) restraints in the procurement of other goods or
services from third parties or in the supply thereof
to third parties, or
restraints in the resale of the goods supplied to
third parties, or
obligations to receive goods or occupational servvices which are not connected therewith by nature
or commercial custom.
The Cartel Office may intervene in these types of agreements
and declare the stipulations of the indicated content to be inoperative, either with immediate effect or to begin at a specified future
date, to the extent that such restrictions limit unfairly the freedom
of economic action of a party to the contract or of a third enterprise
and that their scope impairs substantially the competition in the
market for these or other goods or occupational services.
(c) Restrictions attached to the transfer or licensing
of patents, other rights of industrial property or technological
know-how. The Law contains special regulations applicable to
restrictions placed on the assignee or licensee of patents, utility
models, or other rights of industrial property as well as to restrictions imposed in connection with the sale or lease of non-patented
inventions, manufacturing processes, blueprints, and similar technological know-how. 94
The basic rule is contained in Section 20 ( r) which provides:
Contracts respecting the acquisition or the use of patents,
utility models, or exclusive rights in brands are invalid to
the extent that they impose upon the assignee or licensee
any restrictions in his dealings which exceed the scope of
93 Restraints of Competition Law § x8 ( x) and (2) •
.. Id. §§ 20, 21.
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the statutory privilege; restrictions concerning the mode,
extent, quantity, territory or period of the exercise of the
privilege do not exceed the scope thereof.
But this principle is qualified by a catalogue of five types of restrictions which do not come within the purview of Section 20 (I),
if they do not exceed the duration of the statutory industrial property right which is the object of the assignment or license. 95 These
restrictions are :
( 1) limitations of the assignee or licensee, insofar and as
long as they are justified by an interest of the assignor or
licensor in a technically unobjectionable exploitation of
the object of the statutory privilege;
( 2) obligations of the assignee or licensee with respect
to the price charged for the protected article;
( 3) obligations of the assignee or licensee to exchange
experiences or to license improvement or new use patents,
provided that there are corresponding obligations of the
patentee or licensor;
( 4) obligations of the assignee or licensee not to contest
the validity of the statutory right involved;
( 5) obligations of the assignee or licensee to the extent
that they relate to the regulation of competition in nondomestic markets.
In addition, the Cartel Office may authorize the conclusion of
agreements, otherwise invalid under Section 20 (I), if neither the
freedom of economic action of the assignee or licensee or of other
enterprises is unfairly restricted nor the extent of the restrictions
substantially impairs competition. 96 Cases of this type are, for example, assignments or licenses of process patents coupled with the
obligation of the assignee or licensee to procure the necessary
materials from the assignor or licensor. 97
The statute provides expressly that the regulations regarding
cartels remain applicable, 98 evidently in order to provide for cases
where the restrictive agreements pertaining to patents and similar
rights possess cartel elements, that is, horizontal features.
The same rules apply with respect to agreements concerning the
""Id. §zo(z).
00
/d. §zo(g).
97
See the observations to that effect in Chapter III by Dr. Hoffman, in the Report of
the Committee on Economic Policy of the German Bundestag on the Draft Law against
Restraints of Competition, Schriftlicher Bericht des ilusschusses fiir Wirtschaftspolitik
(2I. flus schuss) iiber den Entwurf cines Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen,
Deutscher Bundestag, 2. Wahlperiode zu Drucksache 3644 (1957).
98
Restraints of Competition Law § 20(4).
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sale or lease of non-patented inventions, manufacturing processes,
blueprints and technological know-how. 99
(4) Abuse of dominant market power. The Law contains a special regulation concerning the situation where a single
enterprise or a group of enterprises enjoys a position of dominance
in the market. 100 In such a case the Cartel Office is given the power
to intervene in order to curb two types of anticompetitive practices if
they amount to an abuse of dominant market power.
The two types of practices which may, under proper regard for
all circumstances, be deemed to constitute an abuse of market dominance are:
1) the demand or offer of prices or the insistence on terms and
conditions in the conclusion of contracts for goods or service;
2) the condition in the conclusion of contracts for goods and
services that the other party take other goods and servtces
unrelated by nature or commercial custom. 101
The possible intervention by the Cartel Office in the case of
such abuse consists in a prohibition of the objectionable practices
and an invalidation of the respective contractual clauses. 102
The Law ascribes dominant market power to a single enterprise
insofar as it is subject to no, or no substantial, competition in regard to certain goods or services. Two, or several, enterprises are
deemed to dominate the market insofar as, for factual reasons,
there exists no substantial competition between them with respect to
a certain category of goods or occupational services or in particular
markets and insofar as they, cumulatively, are subject to no, or no
substantial, competition with respect to these items. 103 Where the
several enterprises form a combine, the Cartel Office may take action
against each individual constituent.
In addition/ 04 the statute imposes a duty to notify the Cartel
Office in cases of merger, acquisition of the assets or production
facilities of other enterprises, management contracts, or acquisition
of controlling stock in other enterprises if the resulting combination
or one of the participating enterprises prior to the combination is
in control of a share of the market in certain goods or services
totalling or exceeding 20% .
.. /d. § 21.
I d. § 22.
101 Id. § 22(3).
100

10"/d.
102
/d.

§22(4).

§§:a(t) and (2).
1
"'ld. § 23.
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If the Cartel Office, upon such notification, thinks that the combination results in, or increases, dominant market power, it may
initiate the necessary inquiries. 105 The original government draft
had subjected the combination of enterprises under particular conditions to a prior authorization by the Cartel Office. In the course
of the parliamentary proceedings this requirement was reduced to
a mere duty of notification.
( 5) Other restrictive or discriminatory practices. The
restrictive practices envisaged by the Law in Sections I-8 (cartel
agreements and resolutions) and in Sections I 5-2 I (vertical agreements) are of a direct and contractual or formal character. Since
objectionable restrictions of competition may also result from indirect and non-contractual or non-formalized action, whether concerted or individual, the statute supplements the aforementioned
provisions by a proscription of various additional restrictive practices not falling within the categories outlined so far, especially
with a view to shielding outsiders. Moreover since cartels and
enterprises with dominant or privileged status in the market are
in a particularly sensitive position, the Law subjects their business
transactions to special standards of fair and impartial dealing.
The final formulation of the Sections of this Chapter was the
product of considerable parliamentary change in the original
government bill, and thus the resulting organization of the material
into four categories of prohibitions appears somewhat haphazard. 106
I) Section 2 5 (I) prohibits resort to pressures or incentives for
the purpose of inducing evasions of the statutory limitations.
"Enterprises and association of enterprises, may neither
threaten or inflict damages nor promise or grant advantages to other enterprises for the purpose of inducing them
to a conduct which may not be the subject of a contractual
undertaking, either because of a statutory mandate or an
order issued pursuant to this Act."
2) Section 2 5 ( 2) proscribes coercion of outsiders which compels them to participate in permitted, though restrictive,
practices.
"Enterprises or associations of enterprises may not coerce
other enterprises to :
I. accede to a cartel agreement, trade association, or
cartel resolution within the meaning of §§ 2 to 8, 29
. . . of this Act;
""I d. § 24.
See the observations by
inch. 4·
106

LANGEN,

op. cit. supra note 64, in his prefatory comments
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form a combination within the meaning of this Act
with another enterprise;
3· pursue parallel conduct in the market for the purpose of restricting competition."
2.

Accordingly, while conscious parallelism as such is not within the
statutory bans, coercion thereto is taboo.
3) Section 26 ( 1) is directed against secondary boycotts, providing that
" . . . enterprises and association of enterprises may not,
in order to harm particular competitors, induce other enterprises or associations of enterprises to impose boycotts
with respect to supply or procurement."

4) Section 26 (2), finally, rounds out the list of "may-nots" by
a mandate to the effect that
" . . . enterprises with dominant market power, cartels
within the meaning of §§ I to 8, . . . [listing certain
special Sections of the Act] and enterprises which engage
in resale price maintenance within the meaning of § I 6
[and certain special Sections] may not unfairly hinder
other enterprises, whether directly or indirectly in their
business activities, usually open to similar enterprises, or
discriminate, whether directly or indirectly between similar enterprises without adequate objective reasons."
This catalogue of prohibitions is followed by a concluding Section 107 which empowers the Cartel Office to order the admission
of an enterprise into a trade association where the exclusion
amounts to an unfair discrimination entailing competition disadvantages.
( 6) Codes of fair competition. The Law authorizes
trade associations to establish codes of fair competition for the
purpose of combatting unfairness in the economic contest between
members of the same section of commerce or industry. 108 The Cartel Office keeps a separate register for such codes and exercises a
certain degree of supervision over the legality of the provisions of
the codes thus filed for registration. 109 Observance of such registered rules of competition may be the subject of stipulations
among the interested parties without running afoul of the general
invalidation of cartel agreements.U 0
Whether or not a prohibition against, or insistence upon, par"''Restraints of Competition Law § 27.
1
' " I d. §§ 28 ( r)
and ( 2).
"'"!d. §§ 28(3), and 31·
110 !d. §§ 29.
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ticular business practices amounts to a legitimate rule of fair competition may often depend upon a careful case-by-case determination.111
( 7) Exemptions and separate regulations for particular
industries. The Law contains exemptions of varying breadth as
well as separate regulations for particular trades and industries. 112
The sectors of the economy thus set apart cover transportation and
communications, 113 agriculture/ 14 central banking and industries
operated as public monopolies, m insurance, 116 and public utilities
in the field of energy and water supply. 117
The exemptions differ greatly as to their range. They may extend
to all provisions of the Law 118 or only to particular Sections thereof,
especially to Sections I and IS-I8, 119 to Sections I, IS, and r8/ 20
or solely Sections I and I 5. 121 The details are too complex to warrant discussion in this survey.
b. Administration; Sanctions and Liability for Infractions
(I) Scope and distribution of administrative responsibilities. As has been pointed out, the basic invalidations by the
Law of cartel agreements and of vertical agreements that restrict a recipient of goods or services in his freedom to contract in
regard thereto with third parties, are tempered by broad exceptions and possibilities of dispensation, coupled with a prohibition
against abuses. Similarly, enterprises with dominant market power
are subject to certain standards and control against abuses.
As a result the Law had to establish both an elaborate administrative machinery and a number of formal requirements (such
as reduction of agreements to writing, filing thereof with the Cartel
Authority, and, in appropriate cases, entry in a special register) for
the purpose of operating or facilitating the policing of the system.
Apart from the authorization of emergency cartels, which is reserved to the Federal Minister of Economics, 122 the administrative
111

LANGEN, op. cit. supra note 64, comments § 28, I,
Restraints of Competition Law pt. V,
!d. § 99·
1H Jd, § IOO.
115
Jd. § IOI.
110
I d. § 102.

2.

112

113

117
118

I d. § 103.

/d.§§ 99(1) and IOI.
/d. § 99(2) (high sea, coastal, and river navigation and port facilities).
=/d. §§ 100, 103 (agriculture and public utilities).
121
!d. § 102 (insurance and financing institutions).
122
See text to note 8 I supra.
119
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responsibilities for the proper application of the law are entrusted
to the "Cartel Authority." Because of the political structure of
the Federal Republic of Germany, the exercise of the powers and .
functions of the Cartel Authority are distributed among a new
federal administrative agency, the Federal Cartel Office, and the
top authorities for economic matters in the states constituting West
Germany.
The Federal Cartel Office has exclusive jurisdiction over crises
cartels, export and import cartels, resale price maintenance agreements, enterprises with dominant market power, mergers and
assimilated transactions, as well as matters involving the federal
railway and postal services. 123 The Federal Cartel Office likewise
has jurisdiction where the effects of the conduct influencing the market, of the restraints of competition or discriminations, or of the
rules of competition extend beyond the boundaries of an individual
state; otherwise the latter matters are left to the state authorities. 124
The Law gives the Cartel Authority broad investigatory
powers 125 and establishes elaborate procedural rules for administrative proceedings, 126 administrative rehearings 127 and judicial review of administrative decisions. 128
( 2) Penalties and tort liability for infractions. Since the
Restraints of Competition Law is essentially a regulatory and police
measure, it is obvious that its effectiveness depends upon the availability of appropriate forms of compulsion. Accordingly, the Law
provides for a system of fines to be imposed as penalty for the
intentional disregard of the invalidity of certain types of agreements or resolutions, as specified in the various statutory provisions,
or for the intentional violation of statutory prohibitions, as well
as for the intentional or negligent disregard of the invalidity of an
agreement or resolution flowing from an administrative declaration
to that effect, and for the intentional or negligent violation of administrative orders or requirements. 129 In addition, the Law penalizes intentional furnishing of false or incomplete information for
the purpose of obtaining an authorization or avoiding an objection,130 and intentional inflicting of injuries on others because they
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

"'"Restraints of Competition Law §§44(1), I.a), b), c) and e).

'""Jd. §44, (1), I.d) and 3·

125

Id.
Id.
= Id.
128 Id.
'""Id.
""'Id.
126

§§ 46 and 47·
§§51-58.
§§ 5<)-61.
§§ 62-75·
§38(1), 1, 8,
§38(1), 7·

2,

4, 5, and 6.
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have prompted orders by the Cartel Authority or exercised their
right of withdrawal from a cartel. 131
This catalogue of types of conduct penalized by fine is supplemented by a most important clause relating to the imposition of
fines as penalty for mere recommendations. Such sanction is incurred
in two cases. One is the intentional participation, by means of
recommendations, in the violations specified above; the other consists of recommendations which effectuate an evasion of statutory
prohibitions or orders of the Cartel Authority by means of parallel
conduct. 132 The Law, however, excepts recommendations of prices
or price calculations, made by associations of enterprises to their
members, if these recommendations have the purpose of creating
competitive conditions vis-a-vis big enterprises or big combines and
if such recommendations are expressly designated as non-binding
and are not enforced by social, economic, or other pressure. 133
Undoubtedly some of the most important, but also most perplexing, problems in the administration of the new law will relate
to the bearing of its provisions on the tort liability of enterprises
engaging in restrictive practices. 134 Generally speaking, this question will be governed by the interaction between the general principles of tort liability, established by the German Civil Code, and
the various provisions relating to the invalidity or proscription of
certain practices by the Restraints of Competition Law. The Law
contains only one specific Section in this connection, 135 which in part
duplicates and in part enlarges an analogous section of the Civil
Code.
The German Civil Code establishes three broad categories of
conduct which entail liability in tort:
I) intentional or negligent and illegal inflicting of injury to the
life, health, liberty, property or other absolute right of another; 136
131
132
183

Id. § 38(1), 9·
Id. § 38(2), first and second sentences.
Id. § 38(2), third sentence.

1
"' See in this connection especially: Gleiss & Kracht, Missbrauchsbestimmungen des
GWB als Schutzgesetz, 12 NEUE }URISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [hereinafter cited as
NJW] 971 (1959); Spengler, Zivilrechtliche Auswirkungen des Kartellgesetzes, 10

WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB (hereinafter cited as Wu\V] 410, at 417 (1960).
Schramm & Klaka, Das Deliktrecht im Gesetz gegen W ettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, 4
WETTBEWERB IN RECHT UND PRAXIS 75 ( 1958) j Benisch in MiiLLER-HENNEBERG,
SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 64, § 35(2)-(5).
135
Restraints of Competition Law § 35·
136
BiiRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 823, para. I.
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2) intentional or negligent violation of a statute, enacted for
the purpose of protecting another; 137
3) other intentional and unethical inflicting of injury on another.138
The Restraints of Competition Law duplicates and enlarges the
second of these categories by imposing tort liability upon any
contravention of any provision of the Law or of any order issued
by the Cartel Authority or a court of review pursuant to the Law,
insofar as such provision or order has the purpose of protecting
another, and by providing for the recovery of exemplary damages
in case of disobedience of a mandate ordering admission of the
plaintiff into a trade association. 139
The question as to which provisions of the Law or orders by the
Cartel Office or a court of review will be deemed to have the purpose of protecting another in the position of the plaintiff is liable
to involve difficult policy considerations and cannot be answered
with certainty at this stage. At any rate, the possibility of liability
under the other two broad tort categories specified in the Code must
be kept in mind, especially in view of the fact that an established
and operating enterprise is recognized as a basis for an absolute
right within the meaning of the Civil Code, Section 823 I, which
is protected against intentional or negligent illegal invasion. However, the problem as to which restrictive practices may be deemed
to be "illegal" and not merely "invalid" conceivably will have to
be answered by applying the same tests that determine the protective purpose of the statutory provision or order invalidating
them. A conclusive answer must likewise await further decisional
clarification. Finally, it must be noted that the Law Against Unfair Competition of June 9, 1909, may furnish additional grounds
for tort liability.
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c. Initial Judicial and Administrative Experience
(I) Categories of administrative operations. It goes
without saying that an act as broad and complex as the new Restraints of Competition Law is bound to produce countless practical
uncertainties and controversies 140 and that its actual scope and
=Id. § 823, para. 2.
188
ld. § 826.
139
Restraints of Competition Law § 35·
140
A complete bibliography of the ceaseless flood of articles and comments published
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significance will depend on gradual administrative, judicial, and
doctrinal classification.
A great deal about the initial experiences with the new Law can
be gleaned from the first two annual reports of the Federal Cartel
Office which were published in 1959 and 196oY 1 As could be expected, the principal activities of the Federal Cartel Office, as well as
of the state cartel authorities, consisted in the processing and, where
appropriate, scrutiny of the vast number of notifications and registration statements submitted pursuant to the various mandates of
the Law, in the examination of applications for authorization, as
required for various categories of cartels or patent licenses containing restrictive clauses and assimilated stipulations, and in the
investigation of the notifications relative to mergers and assimilated
forms of economic concentration. Thus the Federal Cartel Office,
during the first two years of its activities, received 144- notifications,
or applications for authorization, of cartel agreements permitted by
the Law under the conditions specified in Sections 2-7/ 42 and registration statements of 203,109 vertical price-fixing stipulations communicated by 1,056 firms. 143 Ten additional notifications, or applications for authorization, of cartel agreements were submitted to
state authorities, 144 and the Federal Minister of Economics received
three petitions for authorization under the general interest clauses
of Section 8. 145
Of course, a substantial portion of the work load of the cartel
in the various learned or trade journals is practically impossible and hardly of interest
to the non-German reader.
141
Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes iiber seine Tiitigkeit im Jahre 1958 sowie iiber
die Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet, Deutscher Bundestag, 3· Wahlperiode, Drucksache 1000. (15 April 1959); Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes iiber seine
Tiitigkeit im Jahre 1959 sowie iiber Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet,
Deutscher Bundestag, 3. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 1795 (13 April 1960).
142
Report for 1959, supra note 141, at 96. The breakdown shows that 36 of these
144 notifications or applications were petitions for authorization of rationalization
cartels with price agreements or common sales or purchase agencies under § 5 ( 3),
while another 48 were filings of export cartels without regulation of competition
within Germany pursuant to § 6(1). The remaining 70 items involved all of the
other seven allowed categories of cartels.
3
"
/d. at 114. In addition, the Federal Cartel Office received 94 applications for
authorization of patent and trade secret licenses containing restrictive stipulations,
while 158 further licenses or assimilated agreements were submitted to it for examination. !d. at 43 and u8.
1
" !d. at 97·
140
Report for 1958, supra note 141, at 2. One of these petitions involved the shortlived Coal-Fuel Oil Cartel which, inter alia, aimed at a restriction of the competition
between oil and coal as industrial fuel, in order to protect the German coal industry
against further increase of its existing dangerous overproduction. The petition was
granted on February 17, 1959·
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authorities consisted also in proceedings for the suppression of suspected violations of the statutory prohibitions or of suspected
abuses. During the first two years the Law was in effect the Federal
Cartel Office initiated 8 59 investigations of suspected violations,
while state authorities instituted 824 such proceedings.14 6 In each
instance by far the greatest number of cases concerned violations
of the general ban against horizontal agreements in restraint of
trade. 147 In addition the Federal Cartel Office commenced 323 investigations of suspected abuses, primarily of vertical resale price
maintenance agreements. 148
( 2) Particular judicial or administrative decisions. In the
course of the first two and one-half years of operation of the Law a
number of important issues have come before the courts 148a and administrative agencies. The High Court of Germany rendered its
first leading opinion clarifying various basic aspects of the new
Law in October I958 in a suit between the two well-known rival
manufacturers of eau de cologne, 47I I and Johann Maria Farina. 149
The former distributed its products under a genuine system of retail price maintenance agreements, while the latter did not operate
under such an arrangement but published retail prices for its
products on its price lists, bills of sale, brand labels, and advertisements. 4 7 I I considered this practice of its competitor as a violation of the Restraints of Competition Law and the Law Against
Unfair Competition and brought an action for a permanent injunction. The Court held that plaintiff was entitled to the relief
prayed for. In reaching this result the Court considered the interrelation of Sections I5, I6(I), I6(4), and 38 of the Law and
came to the conclusion that the invalidity laid down by Section I 5
in general terms for vertical restrictive agreements extended to
resale price maintenance agreements for articles sold under trademarks or manufacturers' brands, and that the exception provided
for in Section I 6 (I) applied only to agreements properly registered
with the Federal Cartel Office in accordance with Section I 6 ( 4) .
It held further that "invalidity" implied at the same time a "prohibition." Consequently, Section 38 ( 2), prohibiting recommendations
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Report for 1959, at 125, 126.
"'Ibid. The Federal Cartel Office started 424, and the state authorities 546, proceedings against purported § I violations.
""I d. at 122. Abuse proceedings under § 17 totaled 189.
148
" For a good survey see Klaue, Zwei Jahre Rechtsprechung zum Gesetz gegen
W ettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, 6 WuW 319 ( 1960).
149
Eau de cologne, 4711 v. Johann Maria Farina, 28 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [hereinafter cited as BGHZ] 222, II NJW 1868 ( 1958).
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which effectuate evasions of statutory prohibitions through uniform
conduct, covered recommendations of retail prices, if they were
publicized in such a way as to be generally observed by the merchants, as was found by the court below to be the case in the controversy before it. Having arrived at the determination that retail
price recommendations of the type in question were illegal, the
Court addressed itself to the further question of whether violations
of the statutory mandate entitled a private party and, in particular,
a competitor to relief. It held that the prohibitions of Sections 15,
16, and 38 (2) amounted to a law aiming at the protection of others
within the meaning of Restraints of Competition Law, Section 35 150
and that therefore an intentional or negligent contravention constituted a private tort for which a competitor or other injured
party could seek redress by way of damages or injunction. 151
Another important decision by the High Court involving the
Restraints of Competition Law likewise dwelt on the private law
ramifications of the Law. 152 It arose out of a discriminatory refusal
to an enterprise of membership in a trade association. Such action
constitutes an abuse against which the Cartel Authority may proceed upon petition of the aggrieved party by virtue of a special
provision in the Law to that effect. 153 The Court held that the
Law, by providing an administrative remedy in the public interest,
did not mean to deprive the aggrieved party of redress in the
ordinary courts. It held further that the regulation of Section 27
amounted to a law aiming at the protection of the excluded enterprise, thus entitling the latter to mandatory relief in cases of intentional or negligent contravention, pursuant to Section 35 of the
Restraints of Competition Law, and not merely in cases of intentional and unethical action, pursuant to Section 826 of the German
Civil Code.
A series of pioneering judicial decisions settled basic procedural
matters, such as the jurisdiction over, and the proper procedure in,
private controversies involving application and interpretation of
150

See text to notes 135 and 139 supra.
The court held further that retail price recommendations relating to merchandise
sold under trade marks or brands are entitled to registration with the Federal Cartel
Office if they are "factually" binding and that, upon such notification, the practice becomes permissible. The court also ruled, upon a cross-complaint for declaratory judgment by defendant, that the mere designation of the specified retail prices as "nonobligatory standard prices" does not remove the ban of the law.
:u;• Judgment of BGH of Feb. 25, 1959, 29 BGHZ 344, u NJW 88o (1959); 9
WuW 566 (1959).
53
'
Restraints of Competition Law § 27.
:L5l
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the new Law. Others dealt with important questions of substantive law, particularly with difficult aspects of resale price maintenance. Thus the Court of Appeals of Frankfurt rendered a
lengthy opinion laying down the various conditions which must be
met by a manufacturer's retail price maintenance scheme in order
to be enforceable against a price-cutting non-signer/ 55 while the
Court of Appeals of Munich decided whether a publisher who had
established a resale price maintenance system was entitled to discontinue delivery to one of his dealers without running afoul of
the statutory prohibition against discrimination by enterprises with
dominant market power. 156
The Federal Cartel Office likewise passed on many fundamental
questions, for example, on the authorizability of certain cartel
types 157 and the invalidation of exclusive-dealing agreements. 158
Of course, the comprehensiveness and novelty of the Law will
call for a great deal of judicial or administrative clarification for
a long time to come. 159 Some of the decisions mentioned here will
be discussed further in connection with the problem of the private
law consequences under national legislation of violations of the
articles in the E.E.C. Treaty proscribing specified anticompetitive
practices by private enterprise.
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' Judgment of BGH of July 9, I958, I I NJW I395 ( I958) ; Judgment of BGH of
Dec. I9, 1958, u NJW 575 (I959); Judgment of BGH of June IS, 1959, 30 BGHZ
I86, 12 NJW 143 (I959); Judgment of BGH of July Io, 1959, 10 WuW 36I (1960).
Judgment of BGH of November 11, 1959, 3I BGHZ 162; Judgment of Oberlandesgericht [hereinafter cited as OLG] Frankfurt of July 17, 1958, I I NJW 1637 (1958).
155
Judgment of OLG Frankfurt of July I7, 1958, 9 WuW 361 (1959); I I NJW 1637
(I958); criticized by Von Gamm, Die Durchsetzung der Preisbindung im Ferletzungsprozess, 12 NJW 964 (1959). For a recent BGH decision'involving the conditions
for the enforcement of resale price maintenance systems against signers, see Judgment
of BGH of Jan. zo, 1959, 9 WuW 733 (I959).
""'Judgment of OLG Miinchen of Jan. 26, 1959, 12 NJW 943 (I959). For another
interesting case involving liability of enterprises possessing dominant market power
for discriminatory refusal to deal, see Judgment of OLG Celie of Sept. I, I958, 9 WuW
455 (1959)157 See the decision of the appeals division authorizing the aggregate-volume rebatecartel of the wallpaper industry, 9 WuW 455 (I959). For a discussion of current
problems in the administration of the Law, see Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes iiber
seine Tiitigkeit im Jahre I959, Deutscher Bundestag, 3· \Vahlperiode, Drucksache
1795 (1960).
158
See the Melitta case, 9 WuW 756 (I959). The two annual reports of the Federal
Cartel Office, supra note 141, contain detailed discussions of the many problems of
interpretation that the Office had to face in the administration of the Law.
159
For a recent important decision by the German Supreme Court involving the
concept of a cartel agreement within the meaning of the Restraints of Competition
Law § 1 see Judgment of BGH of Oct. 26, 1959, 3I BGHZ 105; for a most important
decision clarifying when mere recommendations constitute prohibited circumventions
of the Law see Judgment of BGH of Jan. I4, 1960, 13 NJW 723 (1960); 10 WuW
347 (1960).
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FRANCE
I. DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH LAW RELATIVE

TO RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PRIOR TO
THE LEGISLATION OF

I 9 53

a. Period Prior to 1945: The Regime
of Article 419 of the Penal Code

(I) Development until World War II. French law
governing restrictive business practices is the product of rather late
growth. 160 During the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth
century there existed only limited concern about the curbing of such
activities and, at some periods between the two world wars, concentration and cartellization were even fostered officially, especially
by administrative action. As a result, the French approach to the
protection of competition, whether viewed from a factual or legal
aspect, is quite complex and rather difficult to describe. For reasons
which will become apparent, the evolution of French law can be
divided into three major periods.
The traditional liberalistic tendencies of French decisional law
and legal doctrine until comparatively recently made the courts
quite hesitant to interfere with business practices. A statute of
March 2- I7, I 79 I, had liquidated the medieval restrictions on the
access to professional and commercial life and proclaimed freedom
of trade. 161 The Code Napoleon a little later elevated freedom of
160
French literature ·on the Ia w governing cartels and other restrictive business
practices has become rather voluminous. Of the copious publications of comparatively
recent vintage we mention Reuter, A propos des ententes industrielles et commerciales,
15 DROIT SociAL 442, 508 (1952); 1953 ibid. 1; Mazard, Prix imposes et prix d'entente,
16 DROIT SOCIAL 129 ( 1953); Souleau, La reg/ementation des ententes professionne/les
dans le decrrt-loi du 9 aout 1953 16 DROIT SociAL 577 (1953); Moreau et Merigot,
Les ententes professionnelles devant Ia loi, in LA DocuMENTATION FRAN<;:AISE, ENTENTES
ET MoNOPOLES DANS LE MoNDE, France No. 1736, May 5, 1953 (1953); Barbry and
Plaisant, Libre concurrence et ententes industrielles, [1954] Dalloz [hereinafter cited
as D.] I, 67; Souleau, Prix, in ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, Repertoire de Droit Criminel
675 ( 1954); Soule au, Speculation Illicite, in ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, Repertoire de Droit
Criminel 865 (1954); Plaisant and Lassier, Les Ententes 1ndustrielles sous forme de
Societes ou d'Associations, JURIS-CLASSEUR DES SOCIETES 178 (1955); Lassier, La regie-

mentation de Ia concurrence et des ententes economiques en France: Bilan des trois
premieres annees d'app/ication, LIGUE INTERNATIONALE CONTRE LA CONCURRENCE
DELOYALE, Communication No. 43, 14 (1957); Lassier, Monopoles et Pratiques Commerciales Restrictives, International Bar Association Conference, Seventh Conference
Report, 278, 1958; Castel, France, in FRIEDMANN, ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A COMPARATIVE
SYMPOSIUM 91 ( 1956) ; Castel, Recent trends in compulsory licensing in case of non-use
of patents: A comparative analysis, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 330 No. 5 (1954).
161
For the text see f178CJ-183o] Sirey, Lois Ann. 92.
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contract to a cardinal principle of the French legal system. 162 Where
these two liberties clashed, the courts were perplexed and floundering.
The chief statutory basis for resolving the dilemma was to be
found in Article 4 I 9 of the Penal Code of I 8 10, creating the crime
commonly designated as distortion of the price level (alteration
des prix). Otherwise some isolated provisions and general principles developed by the courts had to serve the purpose.
Until its revision in I926, Article 419 of the Penal Code proscribed and penalized "the raising or depressing of the price level
for victuals, merchandise or public securities above or below that
which would have flown from natural and untrammeled competition" through two major types of conduct: either (a) "intentional
dissemination in the public of false or calumnious facts, the making
of offers topping the price asked for by the sellers themselves, or
any sort of fraudulent ways or means," or (b) "by combination
or coalition among the principal holders of the same type of merchandise or victual, aiming at not selling it or not selling it except
at a specified price." In applying this section, especially in respect
to combinations, the courts vacillated from period to period, reflecting the changing moods of the times. 163 At first the courts favored a broad construction. Thus the statutory terms "victuals"
and "merchandise" were held to include transportation/ 54 and the
actual raising or lowering of the price level was not considered
critical if the purpose of the combination was the attainment of
such results. 165 The passage of the law of 1884, establishing full
freedom of association/ 66 was deemed to be a legislative recogniTHE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

102

CODE CIVIL art. II34·
For a detailed analysis see Moreau in Moreau et Merigot, op. cit. supra note t6o,
at 38.
164
The two leading cases in that respect involved a combination of two stagecoach
companies which attempted to undersell their competitors, Messageries Royales et
Generales c. Guerin, Cass. Crim. Div. 1836, [1836] Sirey, Jur. 882; Messageries
Fran~aises c. Messageries Royales et Generales, Cass. Crim. Div. 1839, [1839] Sirey,
Jur. 722.
166
As early as 1850 the Supreme Court of France declared in a case involving an
agreement between local merchants and ship captains stipulating for discriminatory
freight charges against outsiders "that in a commercial matter it is not necessary that
the decision which finds the perpetration of a coalition declare expressly that the result of the combination was a raising or lowering of the price level of goods so long
as the whole of the decision is to that effect." Gombaud c. Petit, [185o]. D. I, 212.
166
[1884] D. IV, 129. Arts. 2 & 3 thereof provided: "The trade unions or associations,
even of more than twenty persons exercising the same profession, similar trades or
connected professions concurring in the manufacture of specified products, may be
established freely without governmental authorization." "The trade unions have as
their exclusive object the study and the protection of economic, industrial, commercial
and agricultural interests."
163
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tion of the principle that trade associations and combinations for
economic purposes were not illegal per se and resulted in, or at
least strengthened, a doctrinal and decisional trend of differentiating between "good" and "bad" cartels. 167 Combinations of manufacturers were found not to be illicit even where they engaged in pricefixing, division of markets, or restriction of production, 168 and the
French Supreme Court went along in sanctioning such holdings. 169
As a consequence the provisions of Article 419 of the Penal Code
appeared more and more an anachronism, and a revision of the law
relative to status of combinations was felt to be in order. In 1926
an amendment became reality/ 70 and the pertinent section was
overhauled. In its new and current form, Article 419 penalized
the effectuation of, or the attempt to effectuate, an artificial rise or
fall of the price level for victuals, merchandise, or public or private
securities (a) by specified or other fraudulent maneuvers or (b)
by individual or concerted action on the market with the purpose
of obtaining a profit which would not result from the natural play
of demand and supply. 171 Actually, the new law, apart from closing
certain gaps relative to attempts and individual action, engendered
little change. Combinations were held illegal only in infrequent and
comparatively minor cases of local character which, as Professor
Reuter has so aptly put it, smacked of a setting borrowed from a
Balzac novel. 172
161
Illustrative of and analyzing this trend are especially the long annotation by
Professor Percerou to a decision of May 3, 1911 by the French Supreme Court in Gaillard et autres c. La Renaissance, [1912) D. I, 33, 39, and the opinion by Justice MicheiJaffard in the same case, id. at 40. This case involved a combination of plate glass
cutters and polishers providing for cooperation in production and standardization of
pricing practices.
168
See, for instance, the decision of the Appellate Court of Nancy of 1902 in the
matter of the Comptoir Metallurgique de Longwy, involving a combination of the
principal foundries in Lorraine providing for common purchases, production quotas,
fixed sales prices, etc., discussed by Moreau in Moreau et M'erigot, op. cit. supra note
160, at 41, and by Plaisant and Lassier, op. cit. supra note 160, at 9 and 13.
169
E.g., in the case of Gaillard et autres c. La Renaissance, supra note 167.
17
°For the legislative history see Moreau in Moreau et Merigot, op. cit. suPra note
160, at 42.
171
"Anyone ( 1) who by means of false or calumnious facts disseminated intentionally
in the public, or by offers thrown on the market with the purpose of disturbing the
quotations, or by offers topping the prices demanded by the sellers themselves or by
whatever other fraudulent ways and means; or (2) who by perpetrating or attempting
to perpetrate an action on the market, whether individually or in concert or coalition
and with the purpose of securing a profit not resulting from the natural play of supply
and demand, directly or through a middleman effectuates, or attempts to effectuate,
an artificial rise or fall of the price for victuals, wares, or public or private securities,
shall be punished with imprisonment . . . or a fine . . . ."
172
Reuter, II propos des ententes industrielles et commercialrs, 16 DROIT SociAL 1 at
4 (1953).
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Where a combination is illicit because it aims at, or results in,
excessive profits or the elimination of competitors, the participants
are not only subject to criminal prosecution but may be held liable
for damages by the injured competitor. 173 Moreover, dissatisfied
parties may have the agreement annulled by civil action 174 or assert
its invalidity as a defense if the other members of the combination
attempt to collect stipulated damages for breach thereof. 175
The economic crisis of the thirties and the impact of World War
II resulted in a further strengthening of the status and role of the
cartels.
In France, as in most other countries, there was a widespread belief that the great depression was caused by over-production and
consequent disorganization of the market and that the cure was to
be found in a strict self-regulation by the various branches of industry and commerce. As a result, the government between 1935 and
193 8 proceeded to foster or even require cartellization in a number of industries and trades and obtained power to do so in a
number of other instances. 176 The sugar industry/77 shoe manufacturing, 178 high sea fisheries/ 79 the potassium industry / 80 and the export trade 181 are perhaps the most important instances of such action.
( 2) World War II. World War II brought a complete
transition to a controlled economy in the form of the authoritarian
corporative state 182 which lasted until the establishment of the
Fourth Republic and was formally terminated by a statute of
173
See, e.g., Messageries Royales et Generales c. Guerin, suPra note 164, holding that
art. 419 permits the institution of a prosecution by the injured competitor coupled with
the recovery of damages.
174
See, e.g., Gombaud c. Petit, supra note 165.
175
See, e.g., Gaillard et autres c. La Renaissance, supra note 167.
17
°For a detailed discussion of this phase of French legislation see Moreau in Moreau
et Merigot, op. cit. supra note 16o, at 63-75.
171
Decrees of Aug. 8, 1935 and Oct. 30, 1935, [1935] D. IV, 252, 533·
178
Law of Mar. 22, 1936, implemented by regulation of Mar. 26, 1936, [1936] D. IV,
155, 160 and Law of Apr. 7, 1936, [1936] D. IV, r6o.
179
Decree and regulation of Jan. 14, 1936, discussed by Moreau in Moreau et
Merigot, op. cit. supra note 16o, at 67.
180
Law of Jan. 23, 1937, [1938] D. IV, 156.
181
Decree of May 24, 1938, [1938] D. IV, 259, discussed by Teitgen, in Note, 1 DROIT
SoCIAL 237 (1938).
, .. The two main legislative enactments establishing the framework for this action
were the Law of July II, 1938 regarding the organization of the nation in time of war
[1939] D. IV, 209 (especially arts. 46 and 49), and the Law of Aug. 16, 1940, regard~
ing the provisional organization of industrial production, [1940] D. IV, 253; see Noyelle,
L'economie dirigee selon la loi du I6 aout 1940, 7 CoLLECTION DROIT SociAL 4 (1941);
Teitgen, L'organisation provisoire de la production industrielle et les principes du
droit public fran,ais, 9 CoLLECTION DROIT SOCIAL 2 ( 1941) ; Personnaz, Les Groupements d'importation et de repartition, 18 COLLECTION DROIT SoCIAL 23 (1943).
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1946. 183 Yet, there still survived numerous semi-official trade associations which had been formed during the crises and wartimes
and which appeared to be ripe for liquidation. This was accomplished by a decree of 1949 and a regulation of 1950 implementing it. 184 However, this action failed to make a clean sweep. The
government retained certain compulsory combinations and subcombinations with official functions, especially in the steel industry
and the coal import trade, and, as a consequence, found itself involved eventually in a protracted controversy with the High
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. 185
183
Law No. 46-827 of Apr. 26, 1946, effectuating dissolution of the professional
organisms, [1946] D. IV, 195.
, .. Decree No. 49--1236, modifying the conditions of liquidation of certain organisms
of the para-administrative sector, JoURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;AISE
[hereinafter cited as J.O.] Sept. 12, 1949, 9278 (1949); regulation of Jan. II, 1950 of
the Minister for Finances and Economic Affairs, specifying the organisms affected by
the decree 49-1236, J.O. Jan. II, 1950, 395 (1950).
"'"For details see European Coal and Steel Community, High Authority, FouRTH
GENERAL REPORT, 147 (1956); FIFTH GENERAL REPORT, 130, 157 (1957); SIXTH GENERAL
REPORT II, 93 ( 1958). The facts, as gathered from these reports and inquiries by the
author, are as follows: In November 1944 the shortage of both coal and foreign currency prompted the organization of a private non-profit corporation, styled A.T.I.C.
(Association technique de )'importation charbonniere), which included as members
the major importer-consumers and representatives of the professionally recognized importer-distributors, the latter being organized in two trade associations called, respectively, G.P.I.R. ( Groupement professionnel des importeurs revendeurs) and
G.P.I.R.T. ( Groupement professionnel des importeurs revendeurs par voie terrestre).
Subsequently, in 1944 and early in 1945, the Ministry of Industrial Production charged
A.T.I.C. with certain public functions. Its activities were placed under the supervision
of a government commissioner and the State was entitled to nominate the president of
the corporation. The nationalization of the French coal mines by the Law of May 17,
1946 ([1946] D. IV, 230) entailed a further strengthening of the prerogatives and
functions of A.T.I.C. Meanwhile the government also had undertaken a re-definition
of the functions of the various cartel-agencies of the steel industry by regulation of
June 28, 1947 (J.O. 6234). A corporation called C.P.S. (Comptoir fran~;ais des produits
siderurgiques) was recognized as the joint sales agency of the steel industry, in charge
of the allocation of orders, as well as the delivery terms. Another corporation called
O.R.C.I.S. (Office de reparation des combustibles pour l'industrie siderurgique) was
placed in charge of the coal industry's procurement, having a monopoly with respect
to all plants using at least 100 tons per month. A.T.I.C. henceforth was composed of
the two importer-distributor organizations mentioned above, and a few of the largest
consumers, such as O.R.C.I.S., the Electricite de France and the Societe Nationale des
Chemins de Fer. By Decree No. 57-46 of January 24, 1948 (J.O. 791) it was established
that both the purchase and transport, until delivery to its destination, of foreign coal
could not be effectuated except through an association of importers, the reciprocal obligation to be regulated by agreement between the government and the association;
and in consequence of this provision A.T.I.C. on April 7, 1948 was placed in charge
of these functions. In 1952 in order to conform with the French law of 1952 regarding
price-fixing and in anticipation of the impending establishment of the European common market for steel, the steel industry changed the status of the C.P.S. into a trade
association, with mainly statistical functions. The structure and functions of A.T.I.C.
and its components, however, remained unchanged. As a result the High Authority
felt that this setup in the French coal industry was inconsistent with the Treaty and
entered into protracted negotiations with the French government. The French govern-
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b. The Period from 1945-1952: The Advent
of "Acts Assimilated to Illegal Pricing"
The recoil from the system of the corporative state launched by
the Vichy government brought a return to the free market economy.
Nevertheless, this change-over was slow, beset with difficulties,
and by no means complete. Certain sectors of the French economy,
especially in the fields of banking, insurance, production and distribution of electricity and gas, and coal mining were withdrawn
partially or totally from private enterprise by means of the famous
nationalization decrees of I 94 5 and I 946. 186 In the remaining areas
retention of price control remained unavoidable at first. The war,
of course, had necessitated in France, as elsewhere, the introduction of rationing and price controls. The latter was accomplished
by a series of price freezing decrees which culminated in the codification of October 2 I, I 940. 187 The restoration of the Free French
government was followed in 1945 by the enactment of a new comprehensive price control ordinance 188 which reproduced a great portion of the provisions of the prior legislation.
The Ordinance of June I945, which since its passage has been
the object of a steady stream of amendments, defines and penalizes,
in Article 36, a lengthy array of types of action labeled as "illicit
pricing practices." This catalogue is followed, in the subsequent
article, by the enumeration of additional categories of prohibited
conduct, lumped together under the common designation of "offenses assimilated to illicit pricing practices." The latter list inment was willing to, and did, deprive O.R.C.I.S. of its legal coal purchase monopoly
for the steel industry and opened membership in G.T.I.R. and G.P.I.R.T. to all
authorized importers. Moreover, by Decree No. 57-46 of January 14, 1957 (Dall. Bull.
Leg. 72) it changed the position of A.T.I.C. with respect to coal purchases in the countries belonging to the European Coal and Steel Community to that of a broker or agent,
free from administrative veto or instruction. As this action still required French buyers
to procure non-French Community coal through the state-controlled cartel agency and
to purchase from non-French dealers in the Community through the medium of authorized French dealers, the High Authority, on December 18, 1957, issued a decision
finding that such regulation was incompatible with the duties under the Treaty. The
French Government asked for review and annulment of this decision by complaint
filed on February 26, 1958 (7 Journ. Off. de Ia Communaute Europeenne du Charbon
et de I'Acier 151 (1958) ).
186
See I HAMEL AND LAGARDE, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 37, 887 ( 1954) and the
Laws of Dec. 2, 1945 (banking), April 25, 1946 (insurance), April 8, 1946 (gas and
electricity) and May 17, 1946 (coal mining).
187
Law for the modification, completion and consolidation of price legislation, (1940]
Sirey, Lois, Decrets etc. 1654.
188
Ordinance No. 45-1483 of June 30, 1945, (1945] Sirey, Lois Ann. 1898.
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eludes
a variety of restrictive or discriminatory business practices. In the course of time it has been considerably expanded and
has come to constitute the actual core of French legislation safeguarding economic competition. 190
Article 3 7 of the Ordinance of June I 94 5, as originally enacted,
proscribed three categories of restrictive business practices, committable by dealers, manufacturers, or artisans: 191 (a) the refusal
to sell disposable stock-in-trade or to render feasible services; 192
(b) arbitrary discrimination in the hours for the sale of different
kinds of merchandise or for the rendition of different types of services; 193 and (c) tie-in clauses or quantity restrictions. 194 In addition, the ordinance specified a general crime of speculative hoarding, committable either by persons other than merchants, artisans,
or growers with respect to any kind of commodity, or by mer189
Some of the infractions classified as "offenses assimilated to illicit pricing practices" cannot be considered as restrictive or discriminatory business practices, but
merely as actions apt or calculated to thwart the maintenance and enforcement of
price controls. Thus art. 37 (I) (d) prohibits the failure to produce certain business
records promptly upon request by the authorities. Conversely, some of the actions,
proscribed under the rubric of illicit pricing practices may perhaps under certain circumstances assume a restrictive flavor, particularly the offense specified in art. 36 (8)
and styled as intervention of a new (i.e., noncustomary) middleman. For a discussion
of the elements of this type of infraction see Souleau, Prix, ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ,
Repertoire de Droit Criminel 675 at 68o ( I954).
190
As Professor Reuter has pointed out and illustrated so lucidly, th~ French price
control system originally was conceived as an autonomous arrangement designed to
determine ceiling prices. Yet quickly and to a steadily increasing extent it had to concern itself with the mechanics of the competitive process and to combat and proscribe
certain restrictive practices while, on the other hand, its administration on occasion
necessitated resort to "dirigistic" and concentrative techniques, 16 DROIT SociAL I, IO
(I953)·
191
Actually the three categories specified were incorporated from a prior decree of
January 30, I940, [1940] Sirey, Lois Ann. I39+
192
Art. 37(I) (a): "To withhold products destined for sale by refusing to fill orders
of purchasers within the limits of disposability or to refuse the filling of orders for
the rendition of services within the limits of available means, so long as such orders
do not possess an abnormal character and the sale of these products or the rendition of
these services are not prohibited by special regulation or subject to conditions which
are not met."
193
Art. 37 ( 1) (b) : "Absent the applicability of any special regulation, to restrict the
sale of certain products or the rendition of certain services to certain hours of the day,
although the establishments or shops involved remain open for the sale of other products or the rendition of other services."
1
" Art. 37(1) (c): "Absent the applicability of any special regulation, to condition the
sale of any product or the rendition of any service upon either the simultaneous purchase of other products or the purchase of a required quantity or the rendition of
another service." It may be mentioned in this connection that exclusive dealing contracts (as distinguished from tying clauses) were restricted in duration to a period of
ten years by a statute of October 14, 1943, [1943] Sirey, Lois Ann. 1378, cf. Hemard,
Les Contrats commerciaux in ESCARRA ET RAULT, TRA!TE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
DROIT CoMMERCIAL 66 (1953).
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chants, artisans, or growers with respect to commodities or goods
foreign to their authorized trade or occupation. 195
In I 946 196 this list of offenses assimilated to illicit pricing practices was lengthened by inclusion of a prohibition against individual
as well as concerted or collective action aiming at the thwarting
of price control through threats or effectuation of withdrawal
from activity as a dealer, manufacturer, or artisan. In I947 further additions to and modifications of illicit pricing practices and
offenses assimilated thereto were made. Thus, tying of an exchange
of goods or services, outside of personal or family needs, to the
sale of products, the rendition of services, or the offer of such sale
or rendition was declared to be a further illicit pricing practice. 197
Moreover, the definition of the offense of speculative hoarding of
inventory as committable by growers, manufacturers, or merchants
were identified and expanded and the catalogue of Article 37 was
lengthened to conform to that change.
In I952, at a time when the enactment of general cartel legislation
was a much debated issue, the government decided to propose immediate and separate measures against concerted price-fixing. The
result was the passage of Law No. 52-835 of July I 8, I952, which
added to the catalogue of offenses assimilated to illicit pricing
practices in Article 3 7 of the Ordinance of I 94 5 a new clause to
that effect. It prohibited the imposition and maintenance of minimum prices by means of organized or collective action, except with
respect to articles protected by a trademark or within the limits
of governmental dispensation. The Law provided specifically that
it should cease to be operative upon the enactment of a general
law on the subject of business combinations. 198
In addition, the return of a relative abundance of goods necessitated the outlawing of a business practice which was deemed to
permit large scale suppliers an undue advantage over their small
competitors: the sale with gratuities. A statute of March 20, 1951,
prohibited and penalized sales coupled with the distribution of
gratuities of all sorts such as other merchandise, coupons, etc.m
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION
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0rdin. of June go, 1945, arts. g7(2) and 45 in conjunction with arts. 41-44.
Law No. 46-1024 of May 14, 1946, [1946] D. IV, 22411" Law No. 47-587 of April 4, 1947, art. I, [1947] D. IV, 148 amending art. g6 of
the Ordinance No. 45-148g of June go, 1945·
198
Law No. 52-8g5 of July 18, 1952 [1952] D. IV, 259· For a detailed discussion of its
history and significance see Mazard, Prix imposes et prix d'entente, 16 DROIT SociAL
129 (195g).
199
Cf. Hemard, Les ventes avec primes, u REVUE TRIM, DE DROIT CoMMERCIAL 47g
100
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2. THE PERIOD SINCE

1953:

CARTEL LEGISLATION OF

1953

AND ITS SEQUELS

The year 1953 brought a special and more general regulation of
the activities of combinations of enterprises. It constituted the
climax of and, in a real sense, the anticlimax to, the long series of
attempts during the preceding thirty years to obtain comprehensive
parliamentary action determining the legal status of cartels and
similar combinations. 200 The sharp conflict between the two chambers about the scope and content of such legislation early in 1953
prompted the Laniel government to forego reliance on parliamentary action and to resolve the impasse by using the emergency
powers in the economic field conferred upon the government by
Law No. 53-611 of July II, 1953, for economic and financial rehabilitation.201 The result of this decision was the passage of
Decree No. 53-704 of August 9, 1953, relative to the maintenance
or re-establishment of free competition in industry and commerce. 202
Formally this Decree added a new section entitled "Maintenance
of free competition" to the Price Control Ordinance of 194 5
(composed of Articles 59 bis, ter, and quater) and amended Article
37 thereof which (as discussed above) defines and punishes offenses
assimilated to illegal pricing practices.
The new Article 59 bis prohibits, with qualifications subsequently
specified, "all concerted actions, agreements, express or implied understandings, or combinations under whatever form or for whatever
reasons, that have as objective or may have as result the restraint
of the full exercise of competition by hindering the lowering of
costs or sales prices or by facilitating an artificial rise of the prices."
Article 59 ter, however, exempts two categories of cases from
this prohibition: (a) those in which the otherwise prohibited action was taken in compliance with a statute or regulation, and (b)
( 1958); Hemard, Les contrats commerciaux in EscARRA ET RAULT, TRAITE THEORIQUE
ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 63 ( 1953 ).
200
For a detailed discussion of the various French projects for a legislative determination of the status of monopolies and combinations of enterprises, see Moreau in
Moreau et Merigot, Les ententes professionnelles devant la loi, 93, 151 (LA DocuMENTATION FRAN~AISE, RECUEILS ET MONOGRAPHIES, No. 21, 1953).
201
See Souleau, La reglementation des ententes professionnelles dans le decret-loi du
9 a out I95J, 16 DROIT SociAL 577 ( 1953) ; Poinso-Chapuis, Le controle des ententes
professionnelles et le probleme de la liberte des ententes, 16 DROIT SociAL 576 ( 1953) ;
Barbry and Plaisant, Libre concurrence et ententes industrielles, [1954] D. I, 67;
Delpech, Ententes Professionnelles, in I Dalloz, Repertoire de Droit Commercial et des
Societes 783, 792 (1956). For the Law of July n, 1953 see [1953] Dall. Bull. Leg. su.
202
[1953] Dall. Bull. Leg. 587.
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those in which the actions could be justified as resulting in an improvement or extension of the markets for the production or as
assuring the development of the economic process through rationalization and specialization.
Agreements and undertakings thus proscribed are declared void
as a matter of private law, but the participants are barred from
invoking the nullity against third parties. 203 In addition, engaging,
or inducing to engage, in prohibited combinations was specifically
included in the catalogue of offenses assimilated to illicit pricing
practices. 204
In order to assure the proper application and enforcement of the
new regime, the Decree established a special administrative agency
entitled Commission Technique des Ententes and composed of I 2
members, of whom six were to be chosen from high-ranking judicial
or administrative officers, four from business organizations, and
two from the National Committee for Productivity. 205 This body
is given investigatory powers and charged with the responsibility
of ascertaining whether or not violations of the terms of the ordinance have occurred and to initiate prosecution in case of such
finding. Further implementation regarding the proceedings of and
before the Commission was left to an administrative regulation
which was issued on January 2 7, I 9 54. 206 Moreover, by Circular
of March 3 r, 1954,207 the Ministry of Economic Affairs issued a
detailed commentary explaining and construing the cartel provisions of the Decree of I953· This Circular, though not possessing
the force of law, has had decisive effect on the subsequent practice.
In addition to the new discipline of cartel activities the Decree
of 1953 amended some of the existing prohibitions of restrictive
practices. Thus, the offense constituted by a refusal to deal was
slightly re-phrased and enlarged by a new interdiction of habitual
discriminatory price increases not justified by cost differentials.208 Similarly, the scope of the prohibition against the mainTHE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

"'"Art. 59 bis. paras. 2 and 3·
,.,. Art. 37(3), as revised.
205
Art. 59 quater.
206
Decree No. 54-97 of Jan. 27, 1954, [1954] D. IV, 86. For a discussion of the
procedure of the commission see Durand, La commission technique des ententes, 23 DROIT
SociAL 65 ( 1960).
207
Secretariat d'Etat aux Affaires Economiques, Direction Generale des Prix et des
Enquetes Economiques, Circulaire No. 6 5, entitled Instruction portant commentaire des
dispositions du decret no. 53-704 du 9 aout 1953 relatives aux ententes professionnelles.
20' The new definition of the offense (art. 37 (I) (a) ) reads as follows: "To refuse
the filling of orders by purchasers of products or for the rendition of services within
the limits of feasibility, so long as these orders do not present an abnormal character,

246

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

tenance of minimum prices was expanded in several respects and
the exceptions clarified. 209 It should be noted, in particular, that
now all vertical fixing of minimum prices, whether by an individual
manufacturer employing the proscribed methods or by collective
action, are condemned by the law. These two categories of infractions and their various elements formed the content of an elaborate
administrative commentary, published by Circular of February 15,
1954·210
In 1 9 55, apart from a further addition (concerning formalities
to be observed in sales on credit and installment sales) to the
catalogue of offenses assimilated to illicit pricing practices, 211 the
government issued an important decree which again fostered and
strengthened cartelization. 212 By tne terms of this enactment, government authorization could be obtained for the formation of
enterprise combinations, with national or regional scope, for the
purpose of plant rationalization or conversion. In addition, such
combinations were enabled to obtain direct subsidies of various
types, and contributions to them by the member enterprises were
declared to be tax deductible.
In 195 8 the Council of State held that the Laniel government
had lacked the powers for the imposition of penal sanctions for
engaging in restrictive combinations. 213 As a result, the provisiOns
of the Decree of 1953 had to be re-enacted. This step was taken
emanate from good faith offerers and the sale of the products or the rendition of services are not prohibited by law or administrative regulation, as well as to engage
habitually in discriminatory price increases which are not justified by cost differentials." For a detailed comparison between the new and the old elements of the
offense, see Barbry and Plaisant, Libre concurrence et ententes industrielles, [1954] D.
I, 67, 70.
""'The new definition of the offense (art. 37(4)) has the following form: "[It is
unlawful] for any person to confer, maintain or impose a minimum character upon
the price of products and rendition of services or upon the commercial mark-ups, either
by means of tariffs or price lists or by virtue of combinations, whatever may be their
nature or form.
"This subsection does not apply in cases where the products or services are the
object of a dispensation granted by joint order of the Minister for Economic Affairs,
the Minister of Commerce and the Minister having a particular interest in the matter.
This dispensation, which in any event must be of limited duration, may be granted
particularly in view of the novelty of the product or service; of the exclusiveness derived from a patent, a license of exploitation or the deposit of a utility model; of the
need for a booklet of charges signifying warranty of quality and specification of condition; or of an advertising campaign for the purpose of launching."
21
°For the complete text see [1954] D. IV, 96.
ru Decree No. 55-585 of May 20, 1955, [1955] Dall. Bull. Leg. 559·
=Decree No. 55-877 of June 30, 1955, [1955] Dall. Bull. Leg. 740, implemented by
Decree No. 55-1369, of October 18, 1955 [1955] Dall. Bull. Leg. 1012.
""'Syndicat des grossistes en m~thial electrique de Ia region de Provence et autres,
Conseil d'Etat June 18, 1958, [1958] Rec. Cons. d'Etat, 358 (1958), Juris-Classeur
Periodique [hereinafter cited as Juris-Class. Per.) No. 10727. As a result, convictions
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by Decree No. 58-545 of June 24, 1958. While in most respects
it was merely a textual reproduction of the prior decree, it made
some minor changes in the composition and procedure of the Commission Technique des Ententes and inserted some additions in the
definitions of the offenses constituted by a "refusal to deal" or by
discriminatory price increases. The former crime is now committed
only by a failure to fill normal and bona fide orders within the limits
of feasibility and under conditions conforming with commercial
usages. The latter infraction now consists in the habitual resort to
discriminatory sales terms or price increases not justified by corresponding augmentations in the costs of procurement or service. 215
A decree of August 17, 1959, 216 introduced some further modifications in the size and composition of the Commission Technique
des Ententes, 217 eliminated some unnecessary formalities in the procedure and, above all, provided for the publication of annual reports
including the decisions of the Minister and the opinions of the Commtsswn.
3·

THE RESULTING CURRENT PICTURE

a. General Summary

From the foregoing discussion of the legislative developments
in France, it can be concluded that at least one line of her economic
and juristic policies has taken the course of protecting workable
and working competition against restraints and impairments flowing from an untrammeled adherence to the principle of freedom
of contract. Legislative enactments and decisional developments
have combined in the suppression of certain agreements, whether
of the horizontal or the vertical type, as restrictive, discriminatory,
or abusive. On the other hand, it cannot be said that there exists a
uniform and clear-cut policy against combinations in restraint of
under the pertinent sections of the decree of 1953 had to be set aside, Lissac c. Daire,
Cour d'Appel de Paris, (9• ch. corr.) Oct. 29, 1958, [1958] Juris-Class. Per. No. 10864;
De Lassus de Saint Genies, Trib. corr. Seine, (12e ch.) Oct. 28, 1958, [1958] JurisClass. Per. No. 1088o.
2
" Decree No. 58-545, [1958] Dall. Bull. Leg. 447· Its legality is discussed by Auby,
Limitations apportees a l'ixercice, par le Gouvernement, de pouvoirs spiciaux: Apropos
de Ia legalite du dicret du 24- juin 1958 modi/iant certaines dispositions de /'ordonnance
no. 4-5-1483 du ]O juin 194-5, [1960] D. I, 46.
215
The italicized words are the amendments.
216
Decree No. 59-1004, [1959] D. IV, 574217 The commission is now composed of fourteen members. Its president is a Councillor of State, a justice of the Court of Cassation, or a senior judge of the Court of
Accounts; five members are selected from the members of the Council of State or
the judiciary; six members are chosen by reason of their professional competency; and
two members are elected because of their economic expertise.
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trade or monopolization. To be sure, cartels and similar combinations have been subjected to an ever-increasing control and curbing
of manifest abuses. But they still enjoy a wide area of toleration
and legitimate action and, above that, there are many conditions
or sectors of the economy in which the government considers combinations and their discipline as salutary and in the public interest
with the attendant grant of privileges and subsidies.218 As a result,
the situation is not free from paradoxes and dilemmas.
As a matter of positive law, the main statutory sources for the
suppression of restrictive, discriminatory, or abusive business practices are to be found in Article 4 I 9 of the Penal Code and Articles
37 and 59 bis, ter and quater of the Price Control Ordinance of
1945, as amended. Conversely, legislative bases for the fostering
or aiding of combinations are widely dispersed and quite obscure.
b. Currently Existing Prohibitions and Their Interrelation
( 1) Article 419 of the Penal Code and the general principles of law. Article 419 of the Penal Code and the general principles of law based upon it, as well as upon the proclamation of
the freedom of trade, still serve as the ultimate palliatives against
unabashed and abusive restraints of competition and are invoked
by the courts, with increased liberality, to vindicate the interests of
consumers or obstinate competitors or to relieve unwilling participants.
Thus, the Court of Cassation not long ago upheld a judgment by
the Court of Appeals of Paris which condemned the blacklisting of a
perfume store owner by the trade association of perfume manufacturers on account of violations of his resale price maintenance obligations and awarded damages to the boycotted plaintiff. 219 Likewise, the courts have held invalid and unenforceable agreements
by bakeries prohibiting supplying of grocery stores and other retailers 220 or home delivery services.221
218
For a recent forceful advocacy of the necessity and advantages of cartels in manufacture or export trade by a government official charged with economic administration
see Teissedre, Les groupements d'exportateurs: Effort d'adaptation au Marche Commun, 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 404 (No. 8); for a more resigned appraisal
see Merigot, Les donnees economiques du Probleme de la legislation des ententes en
France, in Moreau et Merigot, Les entmtes professionnelles de'Vant la loi, op. cit. supra
note 160, at 7·
219
Groupement des parfumeurs de marques n\glementees c. Berthier, Cour de Cassation, (ch. civ.) May 9, 1957, [1957] D. II, 665, with note by Esmein, upholding
Cour d'Appel de Paris, June 23, 1953, [1954] D. II, 366, with note by Leaute.
"""Boulangers d'Aix-les-Bains c. Mallen et Guichet, Cour d'Appel de Chambery,
May z6, 1953, [1954] D. II, 365.
221 Vattement c. Arnette, Cour d' Appel de Rouen, (2" ch.) Nov. 14, 1957, [1958] D.
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However, the main sources of judicial or administrative action
are now the detailed provisions codified in the Price Control Ordinance of I 94 5, as amended, especially in Articles 3 7 ( I)- ( 5) and
59 bis and ter.
( 2) Particular restrictive practices prohibited by Ordinance No. 45-1483. As has been discussed in the previous section
in connection with the development of French law relative to the
protection of competition, Ordinance No. 45-I483, as currently
applicable, contains in Article 37 a catalogue of specifically proscribed restrictive practices. 222 This list has been lengthened and
modified in details by a series of enactments passed since the original enactment in I 94 5, especially by Decree No. 53-70 5 for the
preservation or re-establishment of free commercial and industrial
competition and Decree No. 58-545, re-enacting it with slight
modifications. The most important of these prohibitions are those
against (a) discriminatory refusal to deal (Article 3 7 (I) {a) first
branch) ; 223 (b) habitual discriminatory price increase (Article
37(I)(a) second branch); 224 (c) discriminatory restriction of
store hours with respect to particular commodities or services
(Article 37(I){b)); 225 {d) tie-ins {Article 37 {I){c); 226 and
{e) fixing of minimum resale prices (Article 3 7 ( 4) ) .227
The list shows that French law contains no special provision
against exclusive dealing (requirement) contracts as such, apart
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

III, 138; Andouin et autres c. Fortin, Cour d'Appel de Poitiers, July z, 1954 [1954] D.
II, 771.
"""As mentioned before, the decree penalizes also other pricing practices which,
without being restrictive, are deemed to be in violation of the public price controls.
Thus, art. 36 ( 9) penalizes sales or offers of sales at conditions constituting disguised
additions to the quoted price, construed in Min. Public c. G., Trib. corr. Ales, Oct. z6,
1956 [1956] Juris-Class. Per. No. 9593; art. 36 (13), mentioned supra in the text at
note 197, penalizes the coupling of sales and service contracts with the trading of
other goods or services except for the satisfaction of personal or family needs. The
latter interdiction supplements the general prohibition of tie-ins, made by art. 37
(1) (c), supra note 193.
223
See supra note zo8 .
... See supra note zo8.
=See supra note 193.
"""See supra note 194. In addition to the proscription of express tying contracts,
French law specifically prohibits and penalizes hidden tie-ins by means of stamps for
or outright gifts of "free" merchandise to purchasers. A statute to the effect was passed
in 1951, Law. No. 51-356 of March zo, 1951, [1951] D. IV, 89, and supplemented by
the Interpretative Governmental Decree No. 51-u78 of Sept. 19, 1951, [1951] D. IV,
366. The latter was invalidated in part by the Council of State in 1956, Societe Approvisionnement Livraison, Vente et Publicite, C. E. June 1, 1956, Rec. Cons. d'Etat
216 ( 1956) [1957] Juris-Class. Per. No. 9749, with note by Hemard. For a recent
Court of Cassation decision applying the statute see Borocco et autres, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.) Nov. rz, 1957, [1958] D. II, Z71, with note by Hemard.
ll!¥1 See supra note zo9.
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from the above-mentioned statute of I943, 228 which restricts their
duration to ten years. Accordingly, it has been held that an agreement whereby a retailer has obligated himself vis-a-vis a manufacturer to procure all his requirements of a particular class of merchandise from the latter is unaffected by the Decree of I 9 53 and
enforceable. 229 Conversely, the courts likewise have held that grants
of exclusive territorial franchises for the sale of particular products,
stipulated between a manufacturer and certain dealers, do not constitute an undue discriminatory refusal to sell within the meaning
of the Decree of I 9 53 and that they are enforceable, by quasidelictual action, even against third parties disregarding such arrangement.230 Where, however, the producer or wholesaler has not
established a system of exclusive distributorships, his failure to
supply customers without legitimate cause falls within the notion
of a discriminatory refusal to sell, proscribed by the Decree of
I958. 231 The interpretative Circular of February I 5, I954, mentioned above, is in accord with these results. 232
The aforementioned prohibition against the fixing of minimum
resale prices or minimum mark-ups is very broad in its scope. It
clearly applies to all types of vertical arrangements, whether by
means of formal or informal, express or tacit, understandings or
by means of price lists of schedules and regardless of whether they
emanate from a single person or combination. 233 The notion of
minimum prices and mark-ups includes the cases where no variations are permitted. 234 Exemptions may be granted by orders of the
appropriate Ministers. The decree lists as proper instances de"""See supra note 194Epoux Ruer c. Soc. des Grandes Brasseries de Charmes, Cour d'Appel de Colmar
of Nov. 5, 1958, [1959] D. II, 183 .
... Soc. Guerlain c. Morand, Cour d'Appel d'Aix (2" ch.), Oct. 14, 1958, [1959] JurisClass. Per. No. 10924; Editions G. P. c. Brunei "Le Crayon d'Or," Cour d'Appel de
Bordeaux (2" ch.), Dec. m, 1958, [1958] Juris-Class. Per. No. 10933; Soc. Guerlain c.
Dame Vandanjou, Trib. Comm. Nantes, April 23, 1956, [1956] Juris-Class. Per. No.
9640; Soc. Guerlain c. Soc. Marie Antoinette, Trib. Comm. Nice, April 29, 1955, id.
with note by Plaisant and Lassier.
231
Min. Pub. c. Bugnon, Trib. Corr. de Lyon, Oct. 3, 1956 No. 9790 [1957] Juris-Class.
Per. with note by Plaisant and Lassier; Daire c. Lissac et Ste. Industrielle de Lunetterie,
Trib. Corr. de Ia Seine (12" ch.), Dec. 23, 1957, [1958] Juris-Class. Per. No. 10+27,
reversed because of invalidity of decree of 1953, Cour d'Appel de Paris (9" ch. corr.),
Oct. 29, 1958, [1958] Juris-Class. Per. No. 10864.
233
Circular of February 15, 1954, Section I, A., [1954] D. IV, 96, at 97 ( 1954).
233
Circular of February 15, 1954, Section II, A. Plaisant and Lassier, Les ententes
industrielles sous forme de socitftes ou d'associations, JURIS-CLASSEUR DES SociETES, 178
at 9 (1955) suggest that art. 37(4) does not apply to resale price maintenance pursuant
to a horizontal agreement. Even if this were correct, such agreements still would be
prohibited by articles 59 bis and 37(3) •
... See the statements to that effect in section liB of the Circular.
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mands by producers of patented articles or products meeting special
standards as to quality or dimensions.
( 3) The general prohibition against concerted restraints
of trade. It goes without saying that the most important portion
of the French law for the protection of competition consists in the
generalized prohibition of concerted practices in restraint of trade
and the establishment of a special administrative machinery for
the investigation of possible violations. 23 "
Article 59 his of Decree No. 45-1483, as inserted by the Decree
of 1953, proscribes in general terms "all concerted actions, agreements, express or tacit understandings, or coalitions, in whatever
form and for whatever reason, which have as their object or may
have as their effect a restraint of the free exercise of competition,
by hindering the lowering of the costs or prices or by favoring an
artificial rise of the prices." While the scope of this prohibition is
very broad, nevertheless it must not be overlooked that, as Circular
No. 65 of March 31, 1954/36 emphasizes, its terms outlaw concerted restraints of the full exercise of competition only if they
are susceptible of a deleterious effect on the price level. Actions of
this type are, in particular, voluntary limitation of production or
sales, sanctions against exceeding sales quotas fixed in advance,
division of primary materials or orders among the cartel members,
and division of customers according to geographical criteria. 237
Moreover, the law provides for exemptions. The latter are based
either on special legal authorizations or upon the ground that the
measures in question have the effect of improving and extending
the outlets for the production or of assuring the development of
economic progress through rationalization and specialization. 238
In order to facilitate the ascertainment and proper appraisal of
the rather complex economic factors which determine the applicability of the law, a special advisory administrative tribunal, called
Commission Technique des Ententes, is established. It is in charge of
the formal investigations which are initiated either upon the request
of the Minister of Economic Affairs or upon the Commission's own
motion. 239 It holds hearings which, however, are not open to the pub235

Decree No. 53-704 of August 9, 1953, art. 1.
Supra note 207.
No. 65, at p. 10.
238
Decree No. 45-1483, art. 59 ter. as inserted by Decree No. 53-704.
230
Decree No. 54-97 of January 27, 1954, regulating the administration of the application of Decree No. 53-704, [1954] D. IV, 86, as amended by Decree No. 59-1004
of Aug. 17, 1959, [1959] D. IV 574; see supra notes zo6, 216, 217, and Durand, op. cit.
supra note zo6.
230

7
"'' Circular
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lic. 240 Its opinions which are advisory in nature must be based on
stated findings and may contain recommendations concerning the
practices under examination.241 Originally the opinions of the Commission and the decisions of the Minister were considered confidential and not published. Decree No. 59- I 004 of August I7,
1959/42 however, provided for the publication of comprehensive
annual reports by the Commission, including, by way of appendix,
the individual ministerial decisions and the opinions of the Commission. The Decree specjfied that this mandate included the period
of operation prior to its enactment. Accordingly, the Commission
has now published three reports covering the period of the years
1954-1957· 243 In addition, the Minister of Economic Affairs gave
a detailed summary of the experience during the first three years
in reply to a parliamentary inquiry addressed to him in January
1957·244
According to the information imparted by these sources, the
Commission, during the period from April 9, 1954 to January 31,
1958, made a final disposition in fourteen cases referred to it, of
which thirteen terminated in formal opinions. 245 In a number of
these proceedings the Minister of Economic Affairs, acting upon
the advice of the Commission, proposed to the parties the measures
deemed necessary to re-establish a sufficient degree of competition.
So far as it can be deduced from the reports, in every instance where
apposite, his suggestions were accepted and carried out. As a result, all proceedings reported for the indicated period had terminated amicably. 246
In the course of these thirteen interventions, the Commission and
the Minister had the opportunity to crystallize the principles guiding the application of the law, that is principles for the determination of whether a concerted action of the defined "anticompetitive"
""'Decree No. 54-97 of Jan. 27, I954, art. I2, [1954], D. IV, 86.
241
I d. art. I 5.
... Supra note 2I6.
243
J.O., Documents Administratifs, Nos. I, 2, and I I (I96o). The first two reports
are discussed by Plaisant and Lassier, Les trois premieres annees d'une politique drs
ententes, [1960] D. I, 6I.
,.. Assemblee Nationale, I957. No. 4987, J.O., Oct. I9 1 I957, at 4569.
""'Rapport de Ia Commission Technique des Ententes pour les annees I954 et I956,
J.O., Documents Administratifs No. I ( I96o); Rapport de Ia Commission Technique
des Ententes pour l'annee I956. J.O. Documents Administratifs No.2 (I96o). Rapport
de Ia Commission Technique des Ententes pour l'annee I957, J. 0. Documents Administratifs No. I I (I96o) .
... See Section III in the reply of the Minister of Economics to the parliamentary
inquiry of I957, supra note 244, and the two reports of the Commission, supra note 245·
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character has been engaged in, and whether such conduct is exempt
from the prohibition in view of the over-all beneficial effects. 247 In
developing the criteria for the solution of the latter issue the
Commission developed the approach of preparing "a veritable
economic balance sheet." 248 Practices without ultimate advantages
for the national economy and the consumers are condemned, 249
while restrictive practices which, under existing conditions, tend to
result in improvement of the market structure or technological
progress are condoned, at least for the near future.
As the Minister and the Commission in its annual reports underscored, the criteria established by the Commission are essentially
constructive. The Commission has endeavored not to tend toward a
systematic suppression of cartels, but to obtain the approbation of
the interested parties for its formulae of technical progress and
general interest. For that reason it has favored agreements for concentration and specialization, at least as long as no danger of
monopoly results.
Under the provisions of the Decree No. 45-1483, as amended,
the courts possess jurisdiction to pass on the validity or invalidity
of restrictive arrangements independent of the Commission and
the courts are under no duty to refer such questions to the administrative tribunal. Nevertheless the courts may seek or take cognizance of the opinion of Commission, without, however, being bound
by its conclusions. 249 a
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7
"' See the comments to that effect in the reply of the Minister of Economic Affairs
to the parliamentary inquiry of 1957, supra note 244, and the discussion by the Commission in the three reports supra note 245. See also the discussion of this new body
of decisional law by Durand, op. cit. supra note 206, and Plaisant and Lassier, op. cit.
supra note 243·
8
"' See Sec. V, B in the reply of the Minister, supra note 244·
249
The response lists four types of effects which have led to the condemnation of the re'pective restrictive practices: (a) alignment of a common sales price on the basis of the
highest costs in the branch; (b) crystallization of industrial or commercial positions
which hamper the chances of the best placed enterprises for further advance, (c) creation of a factual monopoly for the benefit of a single distributor which renders the
customers closely dependent upon a single merchant and does not permit them to discuss usefully either the price or the quality of service, (d) establishment of lists of
minimum prices or discriminatory pricing practices.
"""'See the discussion to that effect in Rapport de Ia Commission Technique des
Ententes pour l'annee 1957, J.O. Documents Administratifs No. n, at 212 (1960).
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THE NETHERLANDS
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE ECONOMIC
COMPETITION ACT OF

1956-1958

a. The Period Before and During the
German Occupation

(1) The Entrepreneurs' Agreements Act of I935· The
Netherlands entered the era of special legislation with respect to
cartels only as a result of, and in defense against, the demoralization of the markets produced by the great depression of the
thirties. 250 Up to that time few domestic cartels were operative in
the Netherlands and their activities were not thought to call for
legislative intervention. However, the cut-throat competition in
the fight for survival during the depression changed the picture
and was thought to create a legitimate need for market organization by means of cartels and, in appropriate cases, their compulsory extension to outsiders.
The first measure of this kind was the Entrepreneurs' Agreements Act, passed in 1935. Influenced by the then contemporary
German legislation, which on the one hand provided for the curbing of cartel abuses but on the other hand authorized compulsory
extension of cartels to outsiders by administrative order, 251 the
Dutch law took a twofold approach.
Article 2 empowered the Minister of Economic Affairs, upon
application by the industry, to render entrepreneurs' agreements,
as defined by the Act, 252 binding on outsiders whenever, in his judgment, such agreements were, or might be, of predominant significance to the economic conditions in that particular branch of the
economy, and if the public interest required such extension. Conversely, Article 6 enabled the Minister to invalidate entrepreneurs'
agreements, as defined by the Act, if such action was required in
the public interest.
During the period of the applicability of the Act, between 1935
260

For discussions of the development and status of Dutch Cartel Legislation:
Op INTERNATlONALE KARTELS 97jf. ( I957); Verloren van Themaat,
Het Kartelbeleid Sinds de Bevrijding, I SociAAL-EcoNOMISCHE WETGEVING I29 (I952);
Verloren van Themaat, Het Kartelbeleid in de Eerste !lmbtsperiode Van Minister
Zijlstra, 5 SoCIAAL-ECONOM!SCHE WETGEVING I ( I957).
251
See note 43 supra.
259
Entrepreneurs' Agreements were cartel agreements and resolutions of enterprises
engaged in the field of commerce and manufacture, excluding agriculture and fisheries,
concerning business dealings.
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and I94I there were 38 applications for compulsory extension,
eight of which were granted, fifteen rejected, and those remaining
discontinued. There was no case of invalidation under this Act. 253
( 2) The Cartel Ordinance of 1941, as amended in 1943·
The Act of I 93 5 was superseded by the Cartel Ordinance of November 5, I 94 I, enacted under the aegis of the German Occupation Authorities. 254 This Ordinance extended the regulation and
supervision of cartels and assigned vast powers in that respect to
the Secretary General in the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and
Navigation.
The pivotal concept of the ordinance was that of "trade regulations," defined, after an amendment in I94J, 255 as "provisions for
the regulation of competition between persons who conduct an
enterprise in any branch of commerce or trade and of whom at
least one is domiciled in the Nether lands; such provisions for the
regulation of competition including also provsions for the regulation of financial obligations connected with a regulation of competition applicable to the participants." 256
The Ordinance required reduction to writing of all regulation
of trade, as thus defined, if arrived at after its entry into force, as
well as communication of all existing or subsequently established
trade regulations to the Secretary GeneraJ.257 Moreover it subjected their establishment, ambit of bindingness, validity, content,
and execution to vast substantive powers lodged in the Secretary
General. On the one hand, he was given authority either to render
existing trade regulations obligatory on outsiders, whether with
or without attachment of conditions, 258 or to issue trade regulations
de novo with obligatory force for all members of a trade or industry.259 On the other hand, he was empowered to:

I) supplement, alter or invalidate, in whole or in part,
trade regulations;
253
See Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, Wet Economische Mededinging 9
(I958).
254
Verordnung der Generalsekretare in den Ministerien fiir Handel, Gewerbe und
Schiffahrt und fiir Landwirtschaft und Fischerei iiber das Kartellwesen, [I94I] Verordnungsblatt fiir die besetzten Niederlandischen Gebiete 88I.
255
ld. as amended by Verordnung der Generalsekretare in den Ministerien fiir
Landwirtschaft und Fischerei und fiir Handel, Gewerbe und Schiffahrt, wodurch
die Kartellverordnung abgeandert und erganzt wird [hereinafter cited as Cartel Ordinance], [I943] Verordnungsblatt fiir die besetzten Niederlandischen Gebiete III.
256 I d. §I (3).
257 Cartel Ordinance § 2 (I) and ( 3)
... I d. § 3·
259
ld. §4-
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2) supplement, alter, or invalidate, in whole or in part,
resolutions for the execution of trade regulations;
3) take measures for the execution of trade regulations;
4) take measures for the administration of organisations
or institutions entrusted with tasks connected with
the execution of trade regulations. 260
The Ordinance provided expressly that no one was permitted
to use legal or economic means for the purpose of restricting others
in their freedom of action relative to matters envisaged by the invalidated trade regulation or resolution for its execution and entitled anyone with a legitimate interest in the maintenance of such
freedom of action to the recovery of actual or exemplary damages. 261
Moreover an amendment of 1943 262 entrusted the Secretary
General with special powers over persons or enterprises which, by
reason of factual elements or their legal status, exert a substantial
influence upon market conditions. The Secretary General was
authorized to give directions to such persons or enterprises relative
to the conduct to be pursued by them with respect to market conditions, if, in his opinion, they exercised their influence to the injury
of the general welfare, the interests of the economy as a whole, a
branch of industry, or another person or enterprise.
The Secretary General was given broad investigatory powers
for the execution of his functions. 263
The administration of this law during the German occupation
is of little interest for present purposes, as the whole economy was
placed upon a totalitarian basis, and there was little room for
cartel practices as such. Nevertheless the provisions of the Cartel
Ordinance are of significance because they remained the basis for
the status of cartels after the liberation and after the end of the
economy of scarcity which required extensive controls, especially
in the area of pricing. 264
b. From the Liberation to the Enactment of the
Act of 1956-1958
T award the end of 1 948 the Dutch economy returned to normalcy
and cartel policy again became an issue of importance. Although
a draft of a new Law on Economic Competition was prepared by
260

ld.§6(z).
Id. § 7(3) and (4).
"""Id. § 7a.
263
!d. § 8.
... Cf. Verloren van Thernaat, H et Kartelbeleid Sinds de Bevrijding,
2fll

EcoNOMISCHE WETGEVING 129 (1952).
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265

the Dutch Government as early as 1950, the course of parliamentary action on the substantive aspects of the law was not completed
until June 28, 1956,266 and the passage of final statute providing
for procedural implementation and putting the act into actual
operation had to wait until July 16, 1958.267
Meanwhile the Cartel Ordinance of 1941-1943 remained the
basis for governmental intervention against restrictive practices
by cartels and enterprises with dominant market power. But
whereas at the time of its enactment the main thrust of this
Ordinance stemmed from its provisions for compulsory cartelization and the executive assurance of market regulations, its center
of gravity now shifted to the sections aiming at the protection of
the market from undue interference.
The Dutch Government resorted to this ordinance as early as
1946 when it rendered three decisions for the invalidation of
clauses in cartel agreements which restricted the resale trade in
automobile tires to garages, to the exclusion of other retailers. 268
The next intervention of this type occurred in 1948 when the government invalidated a clause in the cartel agreement for the illumination and electro-technical industry, requiring wholesalers to order
products from Dutch manufacturers exclusively through the medium
of agents. 269 It was, however, only from the beginning of 1950 that
the government had to, and did, intensify its intervention for the
supervision of and curbing of abuses by cartels. 270
There had been a tremendous increase in the number of cartels,
registered under Section 2 ( 3) of the Cartel Ordinance in the
period between 1950 and 1956.271 In 1950 the number of cartels
006
For a discussion of the 1950 draft: Verloren van Themaat, Enkele Juridische
Aspecten van de Evolutie der Kartelpolitiek, 14 EcoNOMIE 203 (1950); Ameringen &
Bra hers, J7 oorontwerp Economische M ededinging, 195 I N aamloze Vennootschap 187;

Advies van de Sociaal-Economische Raad betreffende het Voorontwerp wet Economische Mededinging, Tweede Kamer (2. Chamber), Document No. 3295, No.4, Session
1953/54; Verloren van Themaat, Netherlands, in FRIEDMANN, ANTITRUST LAWS, A
COMPARATIVE SYMPOSIUM 258 at 265 (1956).
266
[1956] Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [hereinafter cited as
Stb.] 1061.
""' [1958] Stb. 825.
")8 [19-J-6] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 2 and No. 39·
••• [I9.J.6] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 222.
"'"For references: WEEBERS, op. cit. supra note 250 at 100; Verloren van Themaat,
Het Kartelbeleid Sinds de Bevrijding, I SOCIAAL·ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 129 (1952);
Verloren van Themaat, Netherlands, in FRIEDMANN, ANTITRUST LAWS, A COMPARATIVE
SYMPOSIUM; Verloren van Themaat, Het Kartelbeleid in de Eerste Ambtsperiode van
Minister Zijlstra, 5 SoCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING I ( 1957); Verloren van Themaat,
Cartel Policy in the Netherlands, in UNiv. OF CHICAGO GRADUATE ScHOOL oF BusiNEss,
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 18 (1960).
271
For details: Verloren van Themaat, Het Kartelbeleid in de Eerste Ambtsperiode
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with national scope in the Netherlands amounted to 455; in I956
it reached a total of 8 50. 272 In addition in I 9 56 there existed I ,ooo
registered cartels with regional or local character. As a result of
the active government policy no substantial growth in the spread of
cartels was observable after I956.
In order to cope with the increasingly burdensome task and to
place the necessary intervention on a more democratic basis, the
Cartel Ordinance was implemented and supplemented by other
acts and regulations, and, in addition, informal procedures adapted
to particular purposes were worked out. Thus the Royal Decree of
July I6, I949, 273 established a permanent Commission of the
Economic Council to perform advisory functions in administering
the Cartel Ordinance. It was replaced with a Commission for Trade
Regulations, established by a decree of the Minister of Economic
Affairs of May 25, I950, 274 with the task of rendering advice in
the invalidation or compulsory extension of trade regulations. In
May 1951 the duties of communicating trade regulations to the
proper public officials were made the subject of a detailed administrative order, 275 and a new statute of the same year authorized
the Minister to suspend provisions in trade regulations until the
completion of the final determination. 276 Finally, investigation and
prosecution of infractions against the Cartel Ordinance became
more active as a result of measures taken in I 9
and I 9 51.277
On the basis thus provided, the Minister for Economic Affairs,
between the beginning of I950 and November I956, conducted
and completed 4I formal proceedings for the purpose of determining whether "there existed an occasion for invoking the powers
granted in the Cartel Ordinance," especially those given by Section
6 (partial or total invalidation of cartel agreements), Section 3
(extension of cartels to outsiders), or Section 7a (orders regulating the conduct of enterprises with dominant market power) .278

so

van Minister Zijlstra, 5 SoCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING, I. (1957); Verloren van
Themaat, Cartel Policy in theN etherlands, op. cit. supra note 270.
m About so regulated production, 180 contained market quota arrangements, more
than soo included price-agreements, about 250 fixed other contract terms, more than
100 incorporated exclusive dealing arrangements and 90 established central buying or
selling agencies. Verloren van Them a at, Cartel Policy in the Netherlands, op. cit.
supra note 270.
273
[1949] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 172.
274
[1950] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. ror.
275
[1951] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 89.
276
!d. No. 107.
277
See Verloren van Themaat, supra note 264, at 133.
278
The decisions initiating and terminating such proceedings are published in
Nederlandse Staatscourant,
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In the majority of the cases involving the invalidation of provisions
in cartel agreements, the parties voluntarily amended the questioned
provisions and thereby obviated a need for actual intervention. 278a In
a substantial number of proceedings, however, all or some of the
regulations investigated were actually declared to be enforceable,
while a few investigations were closed because it became evident
that there was no cause for action or because the agreements in
question were terminated. 279 At least once the Minister for Economic Affairs has used his power under Section 7a; he ordered the
Milk Homogenization Enterprises of Amsterdam, Utrecht, and
surroundings, to supply lawfully established grocers in these cities
with packaged milk products for resale. 280 On the other hand, the
Minister so far has never used his power to extend cartels to outsiders, and he has rejected an application to that effect. 281
In assessing the scope and effectiveness of the Dutch policy
against abuses by cartels, the appraisal must not be based only
on the results of these half a hundred formal proceedings. They
produced a body of decisional law on the basis of which the Minister
for Economic Affairs was able to deal with similar abuses by other
cartels on a more informal basis without request for advice from
the Commission for Trade Regulations. In fact the number of
these informal settlements is many times that of the formal proceedings.282 As a result the latter type of investigation is resorted
to only in cases ( 1) which present new questions of principle,
( 2) which involve cartels of a complicated character where it
appears desirable to offer the interested parties the opportunity
of clarifying by means of hearings the concrete consequences, and
(3) where no agreement with the cartel in question can be reached
or where the cartel as well as the Minister for various reasons
prefer a formal procedure. 283
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r.sa For a recent example, see the elimination of four types of restrictive practices
agreed upon by the cartel of the construction industry, after they were found objectionable in an investigation, Decision of March 2, 1960, [1960] Nederlandse Staatscourant
No. 45, at 7·
27
° Cf. the survey (status of 1956} by WIJSEN, DEVELOPMENTS IN CARTEL LEGISLATION
AND CARTEL PoLICY IN THE NETHERLANDS 5 (Mimeo. 1957).
280
Decision of Oct. 2, 1957, [1957] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 192.
281
Application of Association of Brakefluid Manufacturers for extension of their
cartel to outsiders; rejected by Decision of March 20, 1957, [1957] Nederlandse
Staatscourant No. 57·
1182
See the statements to that effect in the discussion of the actual practice under the
Cartel Ordinance by the Ministers concerned in the "Memorandum of Reply" of April
13, 1955, Second House, Doc. No. 3295 No. 7, Session 1954-1955, at 2 (1955), and
the summary by Verloren van Themaat, Het Kartelbeleid in de Eerste ilmbtsprriode
van Minister Zij[stra, 5 SOCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING I (1957].
""' Verloren van Themaat, supra note 282.
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Formal proceedings are often broad in scope, and the decisions
terminating them are detailed and carefully reasoned. In summarizing the substantive principles which can be deduced from the
case law thus developed, the ministers concerned with the administration of the Cartel Ordinance have isolated the following eight
categories of cartel practices which have called for official intervention in the public interest: 284
1) The unconditional exclusion of enterprises or groups of
enterprises from the supplying or procuring of goods or
services, whereby such enterprises (for example, co-operatives
or department stores) are seriously hampered in exercising
a particular commercial function in the same manner as
other enterprises (complete boycott of particular enterprises
or particular types of enterprises) ;
2) The conditioning of the admission of enterprises to the
supplying or procuring of goods or services upon the consent of a cartel agency, without providing that the determination of whether or not the consent should be given should be
made pursuant to rules of admission that are acceptable from
the viewpoint of general economic policy and susceptible of
being tested objectively (arbitrary action with respect to the
access to a market);
3) The coercion of enterprises or groups of enterprises, either
by actual exclusion or threats of exclusion from the supplying or procuring of goods or services, for the purpose of gaining compliance with stipulations in trade regulations, where
such coercion does not possess utility which-from a community point of view-balances the harm flowing from the
compulsion for the person subjected thereto (coercive compliance) ;
4) The requirement that supply be obtained through specified
channels of distribution whereby an efficient and adequate
provisioning of the trade or the general public may be
hampered (rigidifying methods of distribution) ;
_5) The restriction of the extent of production to a quantity
smaller than the demand which reasonably can be expected
(limitations on production);
6) The regulation of production in such measure that individual producers are deprived of their chance of increasing
""'Memorandum of Reply, April 13, 1955, Second House, Document No. 3295, No. 7,
Session 1954-1955, at 1.
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their share in the total production (freezing of individual
positions) ;
7) The fixing of uniform minimum prices:
when there was no reason to assume that a mm1mum pnce
regulation was necessary in the particular area; or
at a level or by a method of calculation amounting to an
obstacle to economically warranted competition (pricefreezing);
8) The making of regulations of various kinds with respect to
public bids where the same are an obstacle to economically
warranted competition or effectuate price increases.
While this catalogue was meant to be neither complete nor
inexorable (as the Ministers were careful to point out) ,285 it serves
as a valuable guide to the principal practices deemed to constitute
abuses.
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2. THE ECONOMIC COMPETITION ACT OF

1956-1958
a. General Characteristics and Scope

Basically the new Economic Competition Act of 1956-1958 286
continues the pattern of the Cartel Ordinance of 1941 and utilizes
the practical experience gained under the previous cartel legislation. Again the Act can be classified as so-called "abuse legislation," 287 and, like its predecessor, it provides for three large cat=Id. at 2.
[1956] Stb. No. 401; [1958] Stb. No. 412 and No. 413. The first draft of the
legislation, prepared late in 1950, was submitted to the Social-Economic Council in
1951 and formed the subject of a detailed criticism by that body (published in 1953,
2d House, Doc. No. 3295-4, Sess. 1953-1954). A new draft was perfected and submitted
to the Second House of the Dutch Parliament in 1953, 2d House Doc. No. 3295-2, Sess.
1953-1954. It was accompanied by an "Explanatory Memorandum" of the Ministers
concerned, discussing in detail the reasons for the new legislation and the policies
governing it as well as furnishing comments on the various measures envisaged,
2d House, Doc. No. 3295-3, Sess. 1953-1954. In consequence of certain objections
raised by the House the Ministers concerned with the cartel policy subsequently submitted another lengthy statement on the existing practice and the principal features of
the draft, Memorandum of Reply, 2d House, Doc. No. 3295-7, Sess. 1954-1955. In 1956
the substantive provisions were enacted as law, but its entry into force postponed until
further implementation relating to judicial review. [1956] Stb. No. 401. In 1958 the
"Law Providing for Appeal from Determinations under the Economic Competition Act"
was passed, amending the Act of 1956 accordingly. [1958] Stb. No. 412. The entry
into force of the Act as revised and republished ([1958] Stb. No. 413) was left to
further determination. The Law was put into force by ordinance of Nov. 11, 1958,
[1958] Stb. No. 491. (The Act of 1956 as amended in 1958 will hereinafter be called
Economic Competition Act.}
287
See the statement to that effect, op. cit. supra note 284, at 3·
286
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egories of measures: (a) the compulsory extension of cartels to
outsiders, 288 (b) the invalidation, in whole or in part, of cartel
agreements deemed to be in conflict with the general welfare, 289
and (c) the regulation of the conduct of enterprises with dominant
market power. 290 Despite the continuance of the established approach, however, the new Act provides for some new methods of
control and incorporates a vast number of changes in detail and
technical modifications.
Most of all, the new legislation aims at the replacement of the
broad and untrammeled powers of the government under the Cartel
Ordinance of 1941-1943 by a regulation more consonant with the
standards required by the rule of law. 291 Accordingly, the new
Act circumscribes carefully the forms of, and grounds for, public
intervention and possible exemptions and dispensations and subjects the administrative determination to judicial review by the
Tribunal of Appeal in Industrial Matters, created in 1954. 292 In
addition, it redefines its scope of applicability by replacing the
former central term of "trade regulation" with a newly created
concept, designated as "competition regulation," which in some
respects is broader in scope as it covers all sectors of economic
activity and not only trade and industry in the narrow sense. Conversely, in other respects it is narrower as it is restricted to legally
enforceable agreements and resolutions for the regulation of competition.293 The statute provides, however, that its applicability
may be extended, by general executive order, either in toto to
designated agreements or resolutions which merely affect competition 294 or, as far as apposite, to designated written arrangements
regulating or affecting competition which are not legally binding
in character.295 Furthermore, publicity is introduced as a new type
of sanction, both against competition arrangements deemed to be,
or to be applied, in conflict with the public interest and against
uses of economic power deemed to be in conflict with the public
interest.296 Last, although not least, the new Act introduces, for
288

Economic Competition Act arts. 6-9.
I d. art. 1o-15, 19-23.
200
I d. arts. 24-27.
m See the comments to that effect in the Explanatory Memorandum of 1953 hy the
responsible Ministers of State, 2d House, Doc. No. 3295-2, at 7 ( 1953-54).
292
Economic Competition Act art. 33·
293
I d. art I (x), defining competition regulation as "agreement or resolution, pursuant
to private law, which constitutes a regulation of competition among owners of enterprises."
""'/d. art. I( 3 ).
"""!d. art. 1 (4).
200
Jd. arts. 19(1) (a) and 24(1) (a).
289
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the first time, the possibility of invalidating competition agreements
of specified types of character by means of generic regulation,
though not without allowance of dispensations. 297
As under the regime of the former Cartel Ordinance, as modified
in I950, the Minister of Economic Affairs is assisted in the administration of the Act by a special advisory board, now styled the
Economic Competition Commission. 298 It consists of a minimum
of twelve regular members who may be supplemented, if deemed
necessary, by a number of extraordinary members. Consultation
of the Commission is compulsory in formal proceedings for the
issuance of generic or specific orders for the supervision or suppression of restrictive practices as authorized by the Act, 299 as well
as for the grant of dispensation from generic prohibitions. 300
b. Particular Regulations of the New Act

(I) Duty of registration and reduction to writing. Like
the prior law the new Act requires communication to the Minister
of Economic Affairs of all competition regulations within the meaning of Article I (I) as well as of such agreements, resolutions, and
understandings to which the application of the Act has been extended, either in toto or as far as apposite, by administrative
regulation pursuant to Article I (3) and I (4). 301 The contents
of the notification are determined by administrative regulation.
The duty of communication is imposed upon (a) the owners of
enterprises which are subject to the regulation and have their seat
in the Netherlands, (b) those persons who in addition to the
owners are parties to the agreement or have participated in the
resolution based on private law, (c) those who have obligated
themselves in writing to execute the regulation or to perform the
duty of communication. 302 Upon request by the Minister, which
may be made at any time, such persons must also submit information as to which enterprises are then subject to a specified regulation.303
Because of the broad scope of the definition of competitive
regulation, the Act authorizes the Minister of Economic Affairs,
where appropriate, in conjunction with another Minister interested
2
'" I d.
••• /d.
9
"" Jd.
"""Jd.
301
/d.

302
303

arts. Io-15.
art. 28.
arts. 5(2), 7(1), 20(1), 25(1), 23(3), 27(3).
art. 13 ( 1 ).
art. 2(1).

Ibid.
ld. art. 3·

264

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

in the matter, to establish general exemptions or, upon application,
to grant individual dispensation from the duty of communication. 304
Such exemption must be established for competition regulations
which do not apply to competition in the Netherlands. 305
Non-observance of the provisions for communication is a misdemeanor.306 In addition, the Act authorizes the government to
enact general executive decrees which deprive designated competition regulations of their enforceability if they are not reduced to
writing and communicated in accordance with Article 2 within one
month from the time they have come into existence. 307 The reason
for this provision is the opinion of its draftsmen that penal sanctions may not suffice to guarantee the proper and timely communication of the more important competition regulations. 308 A similar
rule existed under the Cartel Ordinance of 1941-1943.309
( 2) Extension to outsiders. Like its two predecessors,
the new Act provides for the compulsory extension of existing competition regulations, in whole or in part, to outsiders. 310 In contrast to the Cartel Ordinance of 1941-1943, however, such exten... I d. art. 4·
005
ld. art. 4(1), last sentence. Exercising the powers granted by, and executing the
mandates of, art. 4, the appropriate Ministers of State issued an order on June 3, 1960,
providing for dispensation from the duties under art. 2, para. I, for the following five
classes of competition regulations:
(a) those that are not in force for more than one month except where there is a
•tipulation for express or implied prolongation;
(b) those concluded by a supplier and a customer whereby the prices are fixed at
which the customer may resell the goods obtained from the supplier;
(c) those among retailers in milk, milk products, and special milk products, as
defined in art. 2, para. r, of the Order establishing the Trade Organization of the
Retail Trade in Milk and Milk and Dairy Products, aiming at the rationalization
of the local supply of these goods;
(d) those which do regulate no other matters concerning economic competition
except: (I) the joint purchase of goods; (2) the obligation of a supplier to supply
specified goods, whether within a designated territory or not, exclusively to one customer; (3) the obligation of a customer to procure specified goods, whether within a
designated territory or not, exclusively from one supplier; (4) the obligation of an
agent for certain goods or services to represent exclusively one principal, whether
within a designated territory or not; (5) the obligation not to exercise a specified
trade or business, whether within a designated territory or not, provided that these
stipulations are part of an agreement of employment or for the transfer of an enterprise which includes such trade or business; ( 6) the production, distribution, or procurement of goods abroad as well as the rendition or utilization of services abroad;
( 7) international transportation, so far as such regulation of competition covers one
or more natural or juristic persons domiciled abroad;
(e) those which do not regulate economic competition within the Netherlands.
[rg6o] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 107, at 9·
306
Id. art. 41(3).
7
"' I d. art. 5·
"''Memorandum of Explanation, 2d Chamber, Document No. 3295-2, at IS ( 1953-54).
809
Cartel Ordinance art. 2 (4).
310
Economic Competition Act arts. 6-9.
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sion is no longer authorized unless one or more of the enterprises
affected thereby make an application to this end. 311 It requires, in
addition, (a) that in a particular branch of the economy the number
or the aggregate market share of the enterprises which are subject to the regulation sought to be extended, according to the
judgment of the Minister of Economics, exceed substantially the
number or the aggregate market share of the other enterprises and
(b) that the interest of that branch of the economy, consistent with
the general welfare, demands such action. 312 The period of the
compulsory extension is limited to a maximum of three years. 313 The
law authorizes the Ministers to provide for general exemptions or,
upon application, to grant individual dispensations from the regulations thus extended to outsiders. 314 Such exemptions or dispensations
may be subject to limitations or conditions. 315 The dispensations may
be modified or revoked, subject, however, to judicial review. 316
In consequence of such compulsory extension of a competition
regulation to outsiders, the latter are bound by its terms and stipulations, such judicially enforceable obligation existing vis-a-vis any
party having a legitimate interest in its performance. 317
Under the conditions as developed in recent years, the government saw no reason to resort to the use of similar powers under
the previous law and rejected applications from the industry requesting it to do so. 318 Nevertheless, attempts to obtain compulsory
extension of cartels to outsiders are being made even now, 319 and,
at any rate, the provisions in the new Act constitute an important
reserve power.
(3) Invalidation of restrictive agreements and resolutions. Like the prior law, the new Act makes provision for governmental action terminating or suspending, in whole or in part, the
enforceability of restrictive agreements or resolutions deemed to
311

I d.
/d.
313
Id.
314 I d.
316
Id.
316 I d.

art. 7·
art. 6{1).
art. 6(2).
art. 8 (I).
art. 8(2).
arts. 8 ( 3) and 33 (I) a.
317
I d. art. 9·
318
See, e.g., the rejection by the Minister of Economic Affairs in March, 1957 of the
application by the Association of Brakefluid Manufacturers, Veremfa, for the compulsory extension of their "brakefluid convention" to outsiders, [1957] Nederlandse
Staatscourant No. 57, at 5·
319
See, e.g., the notifications regarding the pending application by two trade associations of opticians for the compulsory extension of a resolution by their principal officers
limiting the permissibility of discounts, [1959] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 64, at
13; No. 109, at 3·
312
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be in conflict with the public interest. While, however, the former
two Cartel Ordinances authorized such decrees only in individual
proceedings, the new statute, following a suggestion of the Social
Economic Council made in 195 I, authorizes the issuance of general
executive orders for the generic invalidation of certain classes and
types of restrictive clauses in agreements and resolutions, 320 in
addition to individual intervention with respect to particular agreements or resolutions. 321
Generic invalidation of stipulations, in competition regulations,
of a specified nature or effect may be ordered when such measure
appears to be necessary in the public interest. The invalidation
lapses after five years, unless revoked prior to the expiration of
such period. 322 The issuance or revocation of an order containing
a generic invalidation requires previous consultation of the Economic Competition Commission. 323 Though, generally speaking,
such generic invalidation applies to all clauses in conventions and
resolutions falling within its scope, whether then in existence or
thereafter agreed upon, the Act envisages the grant of exemptions.
Accordingly, such general order may contain an authorization,
pursuant to which the Minister, upon application, may render the
same inapplicable to a competition regulation subsequently agreed
upon which has been submitted in draft form in conjunction with
such request; 324 and in case of such authorization the Minister may
grant an exemption also with respect to an existing competition
regulation, provided that an application to that effect was submitted before the generic invalidation went into force. 325 Such
exemptions may be coupled with restrictions and conditions and are
subject to modification or revocation. 326 When an application for
an exemption from a generic invalidation has been rejected or such
""'Economic Competition Act arts. 1o-1s.
321
I d. arts. 19-23.
"""Id. art. 10( r) and (4).
323
Id. art. u{r). The request for advice must be published in the Nederlandse
Staatscourant, Economic Competition Act art. II (z). For the first example see [1959]
Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 52, containing notice to the effect that the Minister for
Economic Affairs, in conjunction with the Minister of Justice, has consulted the Commission on the question of whether a generic invalidation should be decreed of clauses
in competition regulations which govern the imposition of sanctions for the infraction
of a regulation without providing for a number of specified guaranties as to the
impartiality of the disciplinary tribunal and the fairness of the proceedings.
Another request for advice relating to a generic invalidation of vertical resale price
maintenance agreement was made on March 3, 1960, and published March 8, 1960,
[r96o] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 47, at 7·
... Economic Competition Act art. 12 ( r ).
925
Id. art. r2 (z ).
326
Id. art. r2 (3) and (4).
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exemption has been modified or revoked, the Minister may suspend
the enforceability of the clauses involved until final determination
of the question whenever in his judgment there exists an important
ground for such action. 327
In case a generic invalidation of certain specified provisions in
competition regulations has been decreed in accordance with the
Act, any conduct tending to ignore or circumvent such measure is
prohibited and made punishable. 328 Where the generic invalidation
results only in partial invalidity of an agreement, the parties thereto
may withdraw from the remaining portion within a month from
the time that the order in question has become applicable to such
agreement. 329
In providing for individual invalidation, in whole or in part, of
particular competition regulations by special proceedings, 330 the
new Act retains substantially the pattern developed under the
previous law. Thus the Minister may take such action only after an
advisory opinion by the Economic Competition Commission has
been rendered upon hearing the affected and other interested
parties. 331 In case of urgency the Minister may suspend the regulation in question until a final determination on the invalidation has
been reached. 332 The invalidation may be conditional. 333 Ignoring
or circumventing such invalidation or suspension is prohibited and
punishable. 334 Partial invalidation entitles the parties to timely
withdrawal from the whole. 335
Invalidation of an individual competition regulation is authorized
by the Act if, and to the extent that, such regulation or its application, in the judgment of the Minister of Economic Affairs and
other appropriate Ministers, conflicts with the public interest. 336
The Act refrains from prescribing any more precise or detailed
standards for the intervention by the authorities and, in particular,
avoids any catalogue of proscribed categories or types of competition regulation. Rather the matter is left purposely to the develop= Id. art. IZ{6).
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828
Id. arts. 15(1) and 41(1). Similar rules apply with respect to conduct tending to
ignore or circumvent suspension orders issued in conjunction with the denial, modification or revocation of an exemption from a generic invalidation. Economic Competition
Act arts. 12(8) and 41 (1).
323
I d. art. 14.
380
I d. arts. 19-23.
'"'1 I d. art. 20.
..- Id. art. 23 (r).
333
Ibid.
834
Id. arts. 22, 23(5), 41(1).
835
I d. art. 21.
386
I d. art. 19.
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ment of decisional law through a case-by-case approach. 337 As a
result, the administrative policies developed and articulated under
the regime of the Cartel Ordinance will remain controlling, at
least for the near future. 338
( 4) Suppression of abuses of economic power. Since
invalidation, whether generic or individual, is an appropriate
remedy only in the case of binding arrangements, the Act provides
for additional forms of governmental intervention against certain
uses of "positions of economic power" not resting on binding agreements or resolutions where such uses are deemed to be in conflict
with the public interest. 339 Accordingly, "position of economic
power" is defined broadly as "factual or legal relationship in the
economy which results in a dominant influence of one or several
owners of enterprises upon a market for goods or services in the
Netherlands." 340
In contrast to American law or the Coal-Steel Community Treaty,
the Dutch Act neither prevents nor controls excessive concentrations of economic power as such nor authorizes steps for their
dissipation. 341 It merely provides for measures to curtail abuses, by
empowering the authorities to impose certain duties or rules of
conduct upon the persons deemed to possess such power. The Act
authorizes four types of orders which may be issued in such cases, 342
those which
(a) require abstention from activities tending, by legal
or factual means, to induce designated owners of
enterprises to pursue specified conduct in the market
concerned;
(b) require the supply of specified goods or the rendition
837
See the comments to that effect in the Memorandum of Reply of 1955, 2d House,
Doc. No. 3295-7, at 4 (1955).
383
A survey of the guiding principles was recently released, in mimeographed form,
by the Dutch authorities. A German translation thereof is printed in 6 WuW 428
(1959). For an instance of a recent invalidation, based on Economic Competition Act,
art. 19, of an agreement among the store owners in a shopping center whereby they
obligated themselves for a period of so years neither to conduct nor to permit the conduct of competing businesses in such stores, see [1959] Nederlandse Staatscourant No.
65, at 5 and 6. The Minister deemed such exclusive arrangements to be in conflict with
the public interest for the reason that its duration was excessive and, in view of the
lack of other stores in the vicinity, apt to hamper a sound development of the distribution pattern needed by the neighborhood.
389
Economic Competition Act arts. 24-27. For the necessity and functions of this
type of intervention, consult especially Memorandum of Explanation of 1953, 2d House,
Doc. No. 3295, at 9 ( 1959).
340
Economic Competition Act art. r ( x).
341
See the comments to that effect in the Memorandum of Reply, 2d House, Doc. No.
3295-7, at 7 (1955) .
... Economic Competition Act :~rt. 24(r).b(x")-(4").
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of specified services to designated persons against
cash and, in the absence of other mandates to that
effect, at the cash price and the terms for delivery of
goods or rendition of services that are usual in the
market involved;
(c) contain rules concerning the price for specified goods
or services;
(d) contain rules concerning the terms for the delivery
of specified goods or the rendering of certain services and the payment therefor, including rules which
prohibit the limiting of buyers in their right to dispose of the goods purchased, or the conditioning of
the delivery of specified goods or the rendering of
specified services upon the purchase or sale of other
goods or the acceptance or rendering of other services or the performance of certain activities.
The maximum period during which such orders may remain in
force is five years. 343 Their issuance requires prior consultation of
the Economic Competition Commission. 344 Compliance can be enforced by any person who has a legitimate interest in their observance.345 In cases of urgency the Minister of Economics may
issue temporary orders of that kind while hearings before the
Commission are in progress. 346
Intervention of this type has been resorted to on various occasions
in the past, and there is good reason to believe that the pertinent
articles of the Act will be frequently resorted to. 347

D.

BELGIUM
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE LAW AGAINST
ABUSE OF ECONOMIC POWER OF MAY

27,

I960

a. Statutory Development and Trends of the Case
Law Apart from the Cartel Decree of 1935

(I) Statutory development. Belgian law relating to restrictive business practices prior to I 93 5 followed a course of development which was, at first, identical with and, subsequently, at
343

Id. art. 24(2).
I d. art. 25.
845
I d. art. 26.
"'"Id. art. 27.
347
See, for instance, the recent investigation concerning resort to the powers under
art. 24 for the purpose of suppressing the boycott of a wholesale grocery store by cigar
manufacturers, initiated at the instigation of competing wholesale dealers of tobacco
products, [1959] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 91, at 4·
344
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least parallel to that occurring in France. Thus, as a result of the
annexation and incorporation of Belgium by the French in I 7 9 5, 349
the celebrated Decree of March 2-17, I79 I, establishing freedom
of trade was rendered (and still is) 350 applicable in that country;
Article 4 I 9 of the French Penal Code of I 8 I o, defining the crime
of the "distortion of the price level," discussed before, likewise
extended to the Belgian provinces and remained in force even after
their separation from France in I 8 I 5 and their independence from
the Netherlands in I 83 r.
The enactment of the Penal Code of I 8 67 did not engender any
substantial change in the situation. Article 3 I I of that Code subjected to punishment "persons who by fraudulent means of any
kind have maneuvered the rise or fall of the price for victuals,
goods or notes and securities." That prohibition was supplemented,
if not in fact superseded, by an Act of July I8, I924, "for the
suppression of illicit speculation in victuals and goods or notes and
securities" that expanded the ambit of unlawful manipulations of
the market and differentiated two distinct classes of proscribed
conduct, only one being fraudulent. The new Act penalized those
348
For discussions of Belgium law relative to restrictive practices in general, or
certain phases thereof, see especially: Del Marmo), Le traitement juridique des contraintes economiques, 71 JoURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 453 ( 1956); De'J Marmo), Le boycottage commercial en droit prive, ANN ALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT DE LIEGE ( 1956) ;
Del Marmo), La Iiberti du commerce en droit beige, 68 JouRNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 65
( 1953) ; Del Marmol, La reglementation juridique des ententes industrielles en
Belgique, 10 ANNALES DE DROIT ET DE SCIENCES PoLITIQUES 3 (No. 39, 1950); Del
Marmo), Les ententes industrielles en droit compare, in CoLLECTION D'ETUDES DE LA
REVUE DE LA BANQUE, at 93 (1950); Del Marmo), La reglementation juriJique des
ententes industrielles, REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARE, No.
special 125 ( 1950); Del Marmo), Protection contre les a bus de Ia puissance iconomique,
13 REVUE DE LA BANQUE 65 (1949); Del Marmo), Rapport sur le boycottage commercial
en droit prive beige, 10 TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOCIATION H. CAPITANT 101 (1959); Haesaert,
Prix imposes, in 1932 PANDECTES PERIODIQUES 566; LIMPENS, PRIJSHANDHAVING BUITEN
CONTRACT BIJ VERKOOP VAN MERKARTIKELEN (1943); Limpens and Van Ryn, La responsabi/ite du tiers complice de la violation d'un contrat, 5 REVUE CRITIQUE DE }URISPRUDENCE BELGE 85 (1951); Machiels, Des conventions de monopole, 70 }OURNAL DES
TRIBUNAUX [hereinafter cited as }OURN. DES TRIB.] 40 (1955); Van Bunnen, Eflets
l'egard des tiers de quelques conventions conclues par autrui, 71 JoURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 245 (1956); Van Heeke, De bescherming tegen misbruiken 'Van de economische
macht, 1948 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 625. For discussion by non-Belgian authors see
Ententes et Monopoles dans le Monde, Benelux II, Belgique et Luxembourg, in LA
DocUMENTATION FRAN<;;AISE, NOTES ET ETUDES DOCUMENTAIRES, Nos. 1777, 1778 ( 1953) ;
Benz, Kartellentwicklung und Kartellpolitik in Belgien, in }AHN AND }UNCKERSTORFF,
lNTERNATIONALES HANDBUCH DER KARTELLPOLITIK (1958); Strauss and Wolff, Kartel/recht, in 4 SCHLEGELBERGER, RECHTSVERGL. HANDWORTERBUCH, 614 at 642 ( 1933),
WEEBERS, CONTROLE OP lNTERNATIONALE KARTELS 52 (1957).
349
Decree of Oct. 1, 1795, [1789-1830] Sirey, Lois Ann. 353·
350
See Del Marmo), La Iiberti du commerce en droit beige, 68 JouRN. DES TRIB. 65

a

(1953)·
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who by fraudulent means of any kind have maneuvered
or attempted to maneuver, or maintained or attempted to
maintain, the high or low level of prices for victuals or
goods or notes and securities; or who, even without fraudulent means, have voluntarily maneuvered, maintained or
attempted to maintain, in the national market, an abnormally high level of prices for victuals or goods or notes
and securities, whether by prohibitions or agreements aiming at the fixing of minimum or maximum sales prices or
by restrictions on the production or free circulation of
products. 351
Owing to the limitations in scope of the second clause (which
is confined to activities aiming at abnormally high or low price
levels) and of the need for complex economic tests implicit in
such restriction, this statutory regulation has remained without
great practical significance. 352
Further important legislation in the field of restrictive practices
was enacted in 1934 when Royal Decree No. 55 of December 1934
(for the protection of producers, merchants, and consumers against
certain activities tending to adulterate the normal conditions of
competition) sweepingly provided for cease and desist orders
against
acts contrary to honest usages in matters of commerce
and industry, whereby a merchant, manufacturer or artisan . . . generally impairs or attempts to impair the
ability to compete of his competitors or any of
them . . . .353
This provision actually is one of the chief statutory bases of
judicial intervention against restrictive practices. However, the
courts have granted relief thereunder only sparingly and in especially strong cases.
Finally in 1946 the Price Control Decree of May 14 of that
year expressly prohibited tying agreements entered into or demanded "under abusive exploitation of a situation of scarcity or
need." 354 Again the courts have taken a narrow view of the
851
2 SERVAIS AND MECHELYNCK, LES CODES EN VIGUEUR EN BELGIQUE 678 (29th ed.
1957).
852
Cf. Del Marmo!, op. cit. supra note 350, text at n. 22. Similarly, a legislative decree
of 1945 "for the suppression of infractions against the regulations for the supply of
the country" proscribes "pricing practices in excess of the normal prices" with respect
to products, materials, victuals, goods, or animals and vests the courts with full powers
to determine the abnormal character of the challenged prices •
... 2 SERVAIS AND MECHELYNCK, op. cit. supra note 351, at 673.
"""Id. at 686. In ·addition Belgium, like other European countries, has special legisla-
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statutory qualification and have held that in the absence of such
exceptional conditions, tying clauses are unobjectionable. 355
( 2) The trend of the case law. Generally speaking, the
Belgian courts like (or perhaps even more than) their French
counterparts have been reluctant, if not loath, to invoke either the
general principles of civil law or the statutory provisions listed
in order to interfere with restrictive agreements, whether of the
horizontal or vertical type, and have shown increasing willingness
to lend their arm for the enforcement of restrictive vertical agreements even against their disregard by third parties with knowledge
thereof. Thus in the case of resale price maintenance agreements
it has come to be the recognized principle that a manufacturer who
sells his products with the stipulation that his customers must resell
the same either at a fixed retail price or by requiring further resale
price agreements, and who diligently watches over the observance
of this arrangement, may recover damages on quasi-delictual
grounds from a third party who markets the products at a lesser
amount with knowledge of the manufacturer's price system. 356 The
manufacturer is entitled to keep the distributors in line by circulars
and other means of publicity. 357 But the courts have considered it
to be an unfair trade practice subject to be enjoined where competing retailers collectively tried to coerce a manufacturer to exclude a price-cutting retailer from his dealership although the resale price maintenance scheme theretofore had not been consistently
enforced. 358 In the cases of exclusive dealing arrangements, especially regional sole distributor franchises, similar trends are discernible, and courts have protected the dealer against injury retion prohibiting the coupling of the promise of a gratuity with a contract of sale or for
the rendition of services, Decree No. 61 of Jan. 13, 1935, 2 SERVAIS AND MECHELYNCK,
op. cit. supra note 351, at 708.
856
See e.g., M.P.c.B. (Ct. of App. Bruxelles, 1956), 71 JoURN. DES TRIB. 718.
866
For an important recent case discussing the bases and scope of this doctrine see
Office Beige des Ventes c. S. A. Philips (Ct. of App. Bruxelles, May 13, 1958), 74
JoURN. DES TRIB. III (1959), with note by Van Bunnen, but cf. Willems c. S.A. Ets.
Jacques Neefs et a/. (Ct. of App. Bruxelles, June 8, 1955), 71 JouRN. DES TRIB. 253
(1956), with note by Van Bunnen; for surveys of the doctrinal and decisional developments see especially LIMPENS, PRIJSHANDHAVING BUITEN CONTRAT BIJ VERKOOP VAN
MERKARTIKELEN ( 1943) ; Del Marmo!, La liberte du commerce en droit belge, 68
JoURN. DES TRIB. 65, at 69 (1953); Van Bunnen, Effets a l'egard des tiers de quelques
conventions conclues par autrui, 71 JoURN. DES TRIB. 245, at 248 (1956); Del Marmo!,
Rapport sur le boycottage commercial en droit prive beige, ro TRAVAUX DE L'AssocrATION H. CAPITA NT IOI, at 142 ( 1959).
061
Union Spepha c. S. A. Pharmacies X. et al. (Ct. of App. Bruxelles, 1957), 73
JoURN. DES TRIB. 290 (1958).
"""Anciens Laminoirs a Plomb c. Van Marcke et al. (Com. Trib. Ghent 1953), 68
JouRN. DES TRIB. 551 ( 1953).
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suiting from invasions of his territory by others with knowledge
of his exclusive rights. 359 However, the courts have been hesitant
about giving the same protection against a competitor to a manufacturer who required his customers to obtain from him all their
needed supply of a certain commodity. 360
Similar willingness has been shown by the Belgian courts to
condone, and give judicial remedies to, cartels and similar horizontal agreements whether for the fixing of prices, the division
of markets, or the regulation of production, provided that such
concerted action falls short of the conduct proscribed by the penal
statutes mentioned before. 361 Even group boycotts are held to be
unobjectionable, at least as long as they are the sanction for pricecutting or other violations of proper market behavior. 362
b. The Cartel Decree of 1935
In the throes of the great depression of the mid-thirties, Belgium,
like her neighbor the Netherlands, followed the example of Germany and enacted legislation for the compulsory extension of
cartels and similar trade associations to outsiders. Royal Decree
No. 62 of January 13, 1935, "authorizing the establishment of
economic regulation of production and distribution" specified the
conditions under which, and set up the procedures by which, "any
professional association of manufacturers or distributors vested
with legal personality may seek the extension of obligations, volun359

S.a.r.l. Ets. H. Horn c. Staelens-Vervaet (Ct. of App. Ghent, 1955), 71 }OURN.
DES TRIB. 252 (1956); Otten c. S. A. Gelec (Ct. of App. Ghent, 1958), 73 }OURN. DES
TRIB. 404 (1958); Dick c. Holvoed (Ct. of App. Ghent, 1959) 23 Rechtskundig Weekblad 636 (1959); but contra S. A. Technique et Commerciale "Jobo" c. S. A. Les Arts
Menagers (Comm. Trib. Liege, 1954), 70 JouRN. DES TRIB. 39 (1955), noted by
Machiels ibid.; Ets. Reno c. S. A. Van Adelsberg & De Vries (Comm. Trib. Bruxelles,
1958), 74 JouRN. DES TRIB. 81 (1959); De Greef c. Anysz (Comm. Trib. Bruxelles,
1958), 74 }OURN. DES TRIB. 82 (1959). See the discussion by Van Bunnen, Effets a
l'egard des tiers de quelques conventions conclues par autrui, 71 JoURN. DES TRIB. 245,
249 (1958).
300
S. A. Coca-Cola Export Corp. c. S. A. Grandes Brasseries Ultra (Ct. of App. Ghent,
1950), 5 REV. CRIT. DE }URISPR. BELGE 81, criticized by Limpens and Van Ryn, La
responsabilite du tiers complice de Ia violation d'un contra!, ibid. at 85, Del Marmo!,
La liberte du commerce en droit beige, 68 }OURN. DES TRIB. 65, at 66 (1953).
361
See the discussion by Del Marmo!, La liberte du commerce en droit beige, 68
}OURN. DES TRIB. 65, at 67 ( 1953) ; Del Marmo!, La reglementation juridique des
ententes industrie/les en Belgique, 10 ANNALES DE DROIT ET DE SciENCES POLITIQUES 3
(1950).
362
See Del Marmo!, La liberte du commerce en droit beige, 68 JouRN. DES TRIB. 65, at
67 ( 1953); Del Marmo!, Le Traitement juridique des contraintes economiques, 71
}oURN. DES TRIB. 453 (1956); Del Marmo!, Le boycottage commercial en droit prive,
ANNALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT DE LIEGE (1956); Del Marmo), Rapport sur /e boycottage commercia/ en droit prive beige, 10 TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOCIATION H. CAPITANT 101 1
at II3 (1959).
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tarily assumed by it, concerning production, distribution, sale, export or import to all other manufacturers or distributors belonging to the same branch of industry or commerce." 363
In order to accomplish such purpose, the association must address
a request to that effect to the Minister for Economic Affairs. 364
The request must be accompanied, inter alia, by evidence showing
that the obligation sought to be extended was assumed voluntarily
by manufacturers or distributors representing the indisputable majority of interest in that branch of industry and commerce and that
the extension is in the general interest. 365 The request, if deemed
proper, is thereupon published in the M oniteur Belge with the
announcement that adverse interests should register their opposition.366 If there is such opposition, the parties are invited to submit
their controversy to a single arbitrator or to a board of arbitrators.367 If arbitration fails to materialize, the controversy is
brought before the Council for Economic Disputes, 368 an administrative tribunal especially created for such purpose by the Decree
of 1935- 369 If there is no valid opposition, or if the arbitrator or
arbitrators or the Council for Economic Disputes render a favorable opinion, the King may grant or reject the request; 370 if the
arbitrator or arbitrators or the Council are adverse to the request,
the King must reject it. 371 The obligations thus extended to outsiders also bind new manufacturers and distributors. 372 If such
obligations limit production, importation, or exportation, no new
manufacturer may enter the market without special royal authorization upon advice by the Council for Economic Disputes, specifying,
if apposite, the amount of products or materials which the applicant may manufacture, import, or export. 373
This Decree which seems to be still in force despite the new legis363
Decree No. 62, I935, art. I, par. I. 2 SERVAIS AND MECHELYNCK, op. cit. supra note 351,
at 692. For an excellent discussion of the provisions of, and the practice under, this
decree see Moreau, Ententes et Monopoles dans le Monde, Benelux, II Belgique et
Luxembourg, Deuxieme Partie, 20 If. (DocuMENTATION FRAN<;AISE, NoTES ET ETUDES,
No. I778) (I953)·
364
Decree No. 62, I935, art. I, para. 2.
366
Decree No. 62, I935, art. I, para. 3{c).
866
Decree No. 62, I935, art. 2.
367
Decree No. 62, I935, art. 4·
368
Decree No. 62, I935, art. 5·
360
Decree No. 62, I935, art. 6 fl. Cf. Verhaegen, Considerations sur le Conseil du
Contentieux economique, 62 }OURN. DES TRIB. 533 (I947).
370
Decree No. 62, I935, art. I9, para. I.
371
Decree No. 62, I935, art. I9·, para. 3·
872
Decree No. 62, I935, art. 20, para. I.
873
Decree No. 62, I935, art. 20, para. 2-4.
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lation against abuse of economic power of 1960 has apparently been
applied cautiously and judiciously. 374 According to statistics published
by the Office of the Council for Economic Disputes in I 9 52, 375 the
total number of applications filed with the Council in the period
from 1935 to the beginning of 1952 amounted to 95· Sixty-two
came from associations of manufacturers, while the remaining
thirty-three stemmed from associations of distributors. 376 The
majority of them were either rejected or withdrawn, 377 but a substantial number of applications by manufacturers' groups were
successful and entailed the compulsory extension of the obligations
assumed by them to outsiders in a variety of industries. 378 While
most of these regulations have expired and have not been renewed,
there may still be a few industries subject to regulation under this
Decree. 379
2. THE LAW OF MAY

27, 1960,

FOR PROTECTION

AGAINST THE ABUSE OF ECONOMIC POWER

a. Evolution of Legislative Proposals to Curb
Monopolistic Power

As early as 1937 the Belgian Government was concerned over
abuses of monopolistic power and the lack of adequate legal bases
for proceeding against the abuses. A tentative draft-bill was perfected and, in 1938, submitted to the Permanent Legislative Committee; but the political events culminating in the outbreak of
World War II prevented further progress. 380
8
" See the conclusions to that effect by Moreau, op. cit. supra note 363 at 25, and the
comments by Verhaegen, op. cit. supra note 369, at 535·
375
Reproduced in Moreau, Ententes et Monopoles dans le Monde, Benelux, II Belgique
et Luxembourg, Deuxieme Partie, 20 at 26 (DocUMENTATION FRAN<;AISE, NOTES ET
ETUDES, No. 1778) (1953).
876
Between 1935 and 1941 the ratio of applications by distributors' associations and
those by manufacturers' associations was 27 to 38; between 1941 and 1952 it decreased
to a ratio of 6 to 24. One of the main reasons for this apparent disparity has been seen
in the fact that the possible closure of the market against newcomers under art. 20
applied only to manufacturers.
371
So far no application by associations of distributors for extensions to outsiders has
ever met with success.
378
A report submitted in 1952 by the staff of the Council for Economic Disputes to
the Central Economic Council listed 15 manufacturing industries which had been subject to economic regulation under the Decree of 1935, viz. carbonic acid, bolts, bottles,
wire and nails, rubber, glass panes, steel bars, special glasses, water meters, cups, copper sulphate, rolling mill rolls, compressible tubing, road equipment, pressed cork.
879
For a survey of the status in 1954, see I BAUDHUIN, CODE ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIER
1587 (1954).
380
For a discussion of the various Belgian drafts of legislation for the protection
against abuses of economic power see Moreau, Ententes et Monopoles dans le Monde;
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After the liberation, in January 1947, Representative Duvieusart
and some of his colleagues introduced a bill for the protection
against abuses of economic power, which aimed at a broad and
comprehensive regulation of that subject. 381 The proposed legislation was divided into two chapters, of which the first dealt with the
protection of private interests, while the second was devoted to the
supervision of economic power and the protection of the public
interest against abuses. In the protection of private interests the
proposal differentiated in turn between that accorded to cartel
members against excessive or unwarranted disciplinary measures
imposed by the organization and that made available to outsiders
or other third parties with respect to unduly restrictive practices.
In the part providing for official intervention in the public interest
the proposed legislation established procedures for ascertaining
whether certain organizations had acquired dominant market power.
In case of affirmative findings the public authorities were authorized to control further economic concentration in the hands of the
enterprises so designated and to suppress their restrictive practices
deemed to be injurious to the public interest, if necessary by dissolution. The bill provoked violent attacks from the spokesmen
for industry and was subjected to extensive criticism in professional
journals. 382 As a result, no further parliamentary action followed.
M. Duvieusart, having become Minister for Economic Affairs in
1947, proceeded to the preparation of a government bill with the
same objectives, but taking account of some of the objections
leveled against his former proposal. A draft of the proposed legislation was completed in 195 I and transmitted for advice to the
Central Council for the Economy. 383 The latter approved the bill
in 1952 making, however, significant suggestions for amendments. 384
The government draft as submitted resembled the original Duvieusart bill of I 94 7 in differentiating between abuses by cartels visa-vis third parties and practices contrary to the public interest. But
Benelux, II Belgique et Luxembourg, Deuxieme Partie, 38-56 (in DocUMENTATION FRAN«;:AISE, NOTES ET ETUDES, No. 1778, 1953); Gunther, Belgische Kartellpolitik, 5 WuW
242 (1955), Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 21 (1957-1958); Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 216
( 1958-1959 ).
081
For the text of the bill see Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Doc. No. 123
( 1946/r947) ·
382
See especially Del Marmo!, Protection contre les abus de Ia puissance economique,
x949 REVUE DE LA BANQUE 65.
388
The text of the draft is reproduced by Moreau, op. cit. supra note 380, at 65 .
... The text of the opinion of the Central Council for Economy is reproduced by
Moreau, op. cit. supra note 380, at 49·
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it differed, on the one hand, by the restriction of government investigations to cases where serious indications of abuses exist as
well as the omission of restrictions on mergers and other forms
of concentration, and, on the other hand, by inclusion of provisions
for abuses of preponderant economic power by public entities and
against implementation of the then proposed International Trade
Organization. The Central Council for the Economy, in recommending modifications, suggested, in particular, the elimination of
the section dealing with abuses vis-a-vis cartel members and of the
chapter on Belgian cooperation in the international repression of
restrictive business practices. Following this advice the government
in 1 9 53 perfected a new text of the proposed legislation and submitted it to the Council of State. The latter raised several questions and objections, especially because of the violation of the
principle of the separation of powers.
As a result, the government proceeded to a further revision of
the proposed legislation and submitted it again, on June 26, 1956,
to the Council of State. 385 The draft as transmitted was based
squarely upon a policy which does not deem combinations or concentrations of economic power to be evils in themselves but calls
for public intervention only in cases of abuses. Accordingly, it refrained from declaring cartel agreements to be invalid or illegal
and rejected the introduction of a cartel register. 386
The first part of the proposed legislation contained definitions
of the two pivotal concepts of the contemplated regulation: "economic power" and "abuse." The former was defined as "power
possessed by a natural or juristic person, acting individually, or by
a group of such persons, acting in concert, to exert, within the territory of the Kingdom by means of industrial, commercial, agricultural or financial activities, a preponderant influence upon the supply
of the market with goods or capital or upon the price or quality
of particular goods and services." 387 "Abuse" was declared to be
committed, "whenever one or more private persons possessing
such economic power inflict harm upon the public interest by means
of practices which adulterate or restrict the normal play of competition or which hamper either the economic freedom of producers,
distributors or consumers or the development of production or
trade." 388 The general definition of abuse was followed, by way
385

For this phase of the development see Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 21 (1957-1958).
Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 21, at 5-7.
88T Draft-Bill art. r.
888
Draft-Bill art. 2, para. 1,

880
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of example, by an enumeration of twelve types of practices especially apt to have the proscribed effect. 389
The two definitions were followed by a series of provisions regulating the procedures for the ascertainment and suppression of
abuses of economic power within the meaning of the law. The
proposed legislation envisaged and differentiated two types of
proceedings. 390 One, aiming at the ultimate suppression of uncovered abuses, was to be of a formal nature, conducted with
full investigatory powers by the officials in charge thereof and
culminating in a veritable hearing before an administrative tribunal.
The other was designed to be more of preliminary and informal
character, conducted without broad investigatory powers of the
officials in charge thereof and terminating in a report of the findings without a special hearing stage. The administrative tribunal
intervening in the hearing stage was to be the Council for Economic
Disputes, created by the Cartel Decree of 1935, while the actual
investigation was to be entrusted to a newly established official at
the Council for Economic Disputes, the Commissioner in charge
of investigations of abuse of economic power. The formal procedures were to be initiated upon complaint by persons claiming to
be injured by practices constituting abuse of economic power, upon
request of the Minister for Economic Affairs, or upon the Commissioner's own motion. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the Council for Economic Disputes was to render a reasoned advisory
opinion as to whether an abuse was established and to propose
appropriate remedies. If the Minister accepted the finding of an
abuse, two courses of action were to be open to him. 391 Either he
might proceed in an amicable fashion and communicate recommendations for the termination of the practices in question or he
might procure a royal decree determining the existence of an abuse
and imposing upon the perpetrators the measures required for
eliminating the abuse. Disobedience was to entail penal sanctions.
889 Draft-Bill art. 2, para. 2. The twelve categories of presumptively abusive practices were: (1) practices tending to raise, maintain, or lower price levels; (2) unwarranted discrimination between purchasers; ( 3) coercion of third persons not to sell
to or buy from certain other persons; (4) selling below cost; (5) hampering improvement or operation of technical processes or inventions; (6) quantitative limitation
or qualitative alteration of the production; ( 7) resale price maintenance; (8) division
of customers; ( 9) stipulation of exclusive dealing or loyalty clauses; ( 10) tied sales;
(II) restrictions of the volume of sales or purchases for economic purposes; ( 12) restrictive, discriminatory, or coercive measures tending to distort the distribution of
primary materials, manufactured article, or credit.
800
See Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 21, at 43 (1957-1958).
391
Government Draft arts. 7 and 9·
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The Council of State, in passing on the draft, suggested a number of substantive changes and a rearrangement of the articles
mainly for purposes of clarification. 392 Perhaps the most significant
modifications suggested were the elimination of the enumeration
of the twelve categories of practices constituting presumptively
an abuse of economic power and the insertion of special provisions
for the exemption of the State, its territorial subdivisions, the
public entities, and other agencies of public interest subject to the
authority or control of one of the Ministers of State.
The government accepted these recommendations and deposited
a revised draft, following the Council of State proposal, with the
Senate in November 1957.393 The bill lapsed, however, as a result
of the end of the parliamentary session.
b. Genesis and Structure of the Law of

May 27, 1960
On June 9, 1959, the government deposited a new bill with the
Senate and, after it was passed by that body, introduced it in the
same form in the Chamber of Representatives on December 16,
1959. 394 The Chamber of Representatives likewise adopted the
government bill under rejection of several amendments proposed
by members of the House on May 18 and 19, and the bill became
law on May 27, 1960. 395 The new statute incorporates the substance
and structure of the government bill of 1957, but it is changed in
some respects for the purpose of greater efficiency and streamlining,
and the former absolute exemption with respect to public or quasipublic entities has been replaced by a more qualified rule. In deriving
the ultimate form of the proposal the government had before it,
and to a large extent followed, the views of the Central Council for
the Economy and of the Council of State. 396
The new legislation repeats the definitions of economic power and
abuse contained in the 1957 draft. Thus, the actual law, like the
final form of the 1 9 57 proposal, defines abuse by means of a general
formula and omits any enumeration of specific practices. Likewise,
as before, provision is made for two types of initial proceedings
to be conducted by or under the supervision of a newly appointed
"""Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 21, at 37 If. ( 1957-1958).
/d. at 28 If,
393

"""Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 216 ( 1958-1959) ; Belgian Chamber of Representatives,
Doc. Nos. 383-1 and 383-2 (1959-1960).
395
Belgian Chambre des Representants, Annales parlementaires, Nos. 85-87 ( 19591960); 130 MONITEUR B:tGE 4674 (Jur.e 22, 1960'.
396
Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 216, at 5 (1958-1959).
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Commissioner for investigations of abuses of economic power at
the Council for Economic Disputes. These proceedings are either
informal inquiries for the purpose of determining whether or not a
formal prosecution shall be instituted 397 or formal investigations. 39s
Again, the latter are to be initiated either upon complaint by injured
parties or upon request of the Minister of Economics, but the Commissioner is now given the power of refusing to proceed upon complaint by private parties if he deems it to be inadmissible or unfounded. If, as a result of the preliminary investigation, the Commissioner or the Minister for Economic affairs concludes that the
proceedings shall be pursued further, the case is transferred to the
Council for Economic Disputes for hearing before one of its special
trial divisions. As proposed before, the opinion of that tribunal is
advisory only. If the Minister for Economic Affairs accepts its findings of an abuse of economic power, he must, under the new law,
proceed in an amicable fashion and make such recommendations as
he deems appropriate for discontinuance of the objectionable practices.399 If the parties accept the recommendations, the matter is
settled by an agreement. If the parties fail to follow the recommendations, even after a more formal reiteration, or if they neglect
to perform the agreement, the Minister may obtain a formal royal
decree issuing a cease and desist order. If the abuse is committed
by a juristic person which has been proceeded against previously,
the royal decree may, in addition to the measures required to
terminate the new abuse, add some special sanctions designed to
curb existing or the acquisition of further economic power. 400
Perhaps the two most important new provisions of the act are
inserted for the purpose of harmonizing the Belgian law with the
mandates and the policy of the European Economic Community
Treaty. Thus, a new Article 28 prescribes: "Whenever the Belgian
authorities have to decide, by virtue of Article 88 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, ratified by the
Law of December 2, 1957, upon the permissibility of cartels and
upon the abusive exploitation of a dominant position in the Common Market, such determination must be made by the authorities
defined in the present law: ( 1) either in conformity with Articles
391
Art. s. Inquiries of this type are initiated by the Commissioner either when there
are serious indications of an abuse of economic power in a particular market or upon
request by the Minister.
398
Art. 4399 Art. 14.
•oo Art. rs.
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8 5 (I) and 86 of the Treaty and following, the procedure prescribed by the present act; ( 2) or in conformity with Article 8 5 ( 3)
of the Treaty and following the procedure provided for in Article
14, paragraph 8 et seq. with the exception of the three years' limitation." Furthermore, because of the fact that the European Economic Community Treaty contains, in Article 90, special rules with
respect to public and quasi-public entities, the exemption contained
in the former bill is changed so as to empower the King to regulate
the scope and mode of the applicability of the new statute to such
entities by royal decree. 401

E.

ITALY
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN LAW

RELATIVE TO ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

a. Developments Prior to the Fascist Cartel
Legislation of 1923-1936 and the Enactment
of the Civil Code of 1942

Italian law, in its current state, contains no comprehensive special
legislation for the control or suppression of anticompetitive practices that is actually enforceable. Rather the chief statutory bases
for legal action in this field consist of the articles contained in
Book V, Title X of the Civil Code of 1942, entitled "Of the
Regulation of Competition and Consortia," as supplemented by
applicable articles pertaining to the law of contracts and torts and
the Penal Code. 402 This condition results from, and is explainable
Art. 27.
For recent general works dealing with the legal protection of competition in Italy,
see especially ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEI BENI IMMATERIAL! (2d ed.
1957); Ghiron, La concorrenza e i consorzi (in VASSALLI et a/., TRATTATO DI DIRITTO
CIVILE ITALIANO, Vol. 10) (reprinted 1954); Tonni and Ferrara, Die Konsortien im
ita/ienischen Recht in }AHN-}UNCKERSTORFF, INTERNATIONALES HANDBUCH DER KARTELLPOLITIK, 285 (1958); for older books or articles treating the subject see AscARELLI,
CONSORZI VOLONTARI TRA IMPRENDITORI (2d ed, 1937); Ascarelli, Le Unioni di imprese,
33 Rrv. DEL DIR. COMM. 152 (1935); 8ALANDRA, IL DIRITTO DELLE UNION! DI IMPRESE
(1934); Ascarelli, Note preliminari .wile intese industriali, 1933 RIVISTA ITALIANA PER
LE SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 90; De Sanctis, Das Recht der Kartelle und anderen Unternehmenszusammenfassungen in Jta/ien (KARTELI. UND KONZERNRECHT DES AUSLANDES,
Eo. R. !SAY, issue 4) (1928); Strauss-Wolff, Kartellrecht: Italien in 4 RECHTSVEROLEICHENDES HANDWORTERBUCH FUR DAS ZIVIL-UND HANDELSRECHT (ed. Schlegelberger)
650 ( 1932) ; Ricca-Barberis, I sindacati industriali e Ia giurisprudenza, r Rrv. DEL
DIR. CoMM. 458 ( 1903). For the treatment of particular aspects, see especially Santini,
La vendita a prezzo imposto, 6 Rrv. TRIM. DI DrR. E PROC. CIVILE 1042 (1952); Franceschelli, Importazioni libere in zona di esclusiva e concorrenza sleale, 3 RIV. DI DIR. IND.,
I, 97 (1954); La Lumia, Ancora su importazioni libere 4 Rrv. DI DIR. IND., I, 5 (1955).
401
402

282

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

by, the difficulties of adapting the Italian legal system and economic
structure to the sharp change in political philosophy attending the
abolition of the Fascist corporative state.
Prior to the advent of Fascism, the Italian legislator had felt
little need for special interference with cartels and other restrictive arrangements, apart from the general limitations on freedom of contract contained in the Civil Code of 186 5 403 and certain
sections of the Penal Code of 1888. The latter penalized interference with freedom of trade through violence or threats 404 and
the production of a rise or fall of the prices in public markets or
exchanges through the spreading of false news or use of other
fraudulent means. 405 Conspiracy by five or more persons to commit
such offenses was likewise punishable. 406
As a result of the absence of specific norms governing the legality of cartels or other restrictive combinations and because of the
unwillingness of the Italian courts to deduce rules for the protection of competition against private restraints from the legislation
establishing freedom of trade, 407 it became recognized that cartels
and similar arrangements are legal and enforceable as long as they
do not engage in practices proscribed by the Penal Code or have
particularly aggravated effects. The leading precedent which established the course which was followed subsequently by the courts
was the decision of the Court of Cassation of Naples of May
26, 1903, in the case of Algranati ed altri c. Ferro, Cobianchi ed
altri. 408 In that controversy some members of a cartel had brought
a damage action against other members because of alleged violation of certain obligations mutually assumed by them. The de... CIVIL ConE {1865), art. 1119: "An obligation . . . resting on an illicit cause cannot
have any effect"; art. 1122: "The cause is illicit, whenever it is in contravention to
the law, good custom or public order."
""PENAL CODE {1888), art. 165: "Anybody, who by means of violence or threats,
restrains or hampers, in any way whatsoever, the freedom of work or trade shall be
punished . . . ." For a detailed exposition of the background and scope of this provision see particularly 4 MANZINI, TRATTATO DI DIRITIO PENALE ITALIANO 715 ff. (2d
ed. 1921).
400
I d. art. 293: "Anybody, who through the spreading of false news or other
fraudulent means, produces in the public markets or commercial exchanges a rise or
fall of the prices for wages, victuals, wares, or instruments which are negotiable in
the public market or admitted in the lists of stock exchanges shall be punished . . . ."
This article was supplemented by the special provision of art. 326 which imposed increased punishment on "anyone who, by means of false news or other fraudulent means,
produces a scarcity of, or increase in price for, food stuffs . . . ." See 6 MANZINI, TRATTATO D1 DIRITI'O PENALE ITALIANO 265 (2d ed. 1922).
406
PENAL CODE (1888), art. 248.
4fY1 Italian legislation establishing the freedom of trade cumulated in the Act No.
1797 of May 29, 1864, 9 Leggi e Decreti 626 ( 1864).
""'Court of Cassation of Naples, May 26, 1903, [1903] Giurisprudenza Italiana
[hereinafter cited as Giur. Ita!.] I, x, 845.
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fendants claimed that agreements such as the one in question were
invalid under Italian law and that therefore they were not responsible for any breach of contract. The Court of Cassation, affirming to that extent the detailed decision of the court below, 409
held to the contrary. The high tribunal rested its result on the
ground that, apart from the narrow and inapplicable sections of the
Penal Code, Italian law contained no positive prohibition against
concerted action by producers or distributors and that it was not
for the judiciary to arrogate to itself the essentially legislative
function of regulating the new phenomenon of joint economic action. Moreover, the Court felt that "in the case of honest cartels,
the gains and savings achieved by them" might enure to the benefit
not only of the members, but also of the employees and, in the
long run, the consumers.
In consequence of this determination, which was much discussed
in contemporary legal periodicals, 410 courts and textwriters accepted
the position that cartels and similar anticompetitive arrangements
were not prohibited in principle and that judicial intervention was
apposite only in case of outright infractions of the Penal Code or
other special circumstances. 411 As a result, courts and doctrinal efforts occupied themselves primarily not with the permissibility of
cartels and similar combinations, but rather with their exact juristic
nature and the reciprocal rights, obligations, and remedies of their
members as well as of third parties engaging in business transactions with them. 412
The Italian government likewise not only condoned such restrictive combinations by failing to take legislative action for the control or suppression of their activities, but actually fostered their
existence by creating a few compulsory cartels in certain industries
by special legislation. 413
••• Court of Appeals of Naples, July 2, I900, [I900] Giur. Ital. I, 2, 703.
See the detailed survey by Ricca-Barberis, I sindacati industriali e Ia giurisprudenza, I RIVISTA DI D!R. COMM. 458 (I903).
411
For details see De Sanctis, op. cit. supra note 402, 42; Ascarelli, Note preliminari
sulle intese indu.rtriali, 1913 RIV. I TAL. PERLE ScrENZE GruRIDICHE, at 103, 169; Ascarelli,
Le unioni di imprese, 33 Rrv. DI DIR. CoMM. 152, at 155 (1935).
412
These problems have been the subject of an overwhelming mass of technical controversies among Italian legal writers. For discussions under the aegis of the old
civil code, see especially SALANDRA, IL DIRITTO DELLE UNION! DI IMPRESE ( CONSORZI E
GRUPP!) (1934); ASCARELLI, CONSORZI YOLONTARI TRA IMPRENDITORI (2d ed. 1937);
Carnelutti, Natura giuridica dei consorzi industriali, 37 Rrv. Dl DrR. CoMM. I, I ( 1939) ;
FRANCESCHELLI, I CoNSORZI INDUSTRIAL! ( 1939) ; Betti, Societa commercia/e costituita
Per finalita di consorzio, 39 Rrv. m DrR. CoMM. II, 335 (1941).
413
For the early growth of Italian cartels, see Pitigliani, The Development of Italian
Cartt'l.r Under Fascism, 48 JoURN. PoL. EcoN. 375 at 377 (1940).
410
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b. The Fascist Cartel Legislation and the Regulation
of the New Civil Code of 1942
(1) Compulsory cartels: the Act of 1932. The Fascist
tenets of the "corporative state" and a totalitarian economy
prompted an even increased predilection for cartels, coupled with
an effort of converting them, to a varying extent, into instruments
of the state and of governmental policy. This manifested itself in
further creations of compulsory cartels 414 and, in 1932, in the passage of a statute "concerning the establishment and the operations
of consortia among enterprises engaged in the same branch of economic activity." 415
The new Act provided for the formation, by royal decree, of
compulsory cartels among enterprises, belonging to the same branch
of the economy, for the purpose of regulating production and competition and for the coordination of compulsory cartels servicing
interconnected branches of the economy. 416 Government action of
this type was predicated upon a request to that effect either by 70
percent of all the enterprises in a particular industry controlling 70
percent of the aggregate output or, in the absence of the requisite
number, by firms controlling together 8 5 percent of the total output. In the case of agriculture the requirements were somewhat
less stringent. 417 In addition, the government had to find that granting such request was in the interest of the national economy and
tended to achieve a more rational technological or economic organization of the production. 418 The Act provided in detail for
close supervision of the cartel activities by the government as well
as by the corporative body representing the particular sector of the
economy. 419 It regulated, in addition, various aspects of the internal
organization and legal status of such compulsory cartels. 420 Actually, the law was never applied, as a decree envisaged by it for
its implementation 421 was never enacted. Rather the government
414
For a survey of the status of compulsory cartels in Italy and the governmental
attitude toward their establishment, see the exposition by Mussolini of the bill of 1932
regulating the formation and organization of compulsory cartels, reprinted in [1932]
Le Leggi 753·
416
Law No. 834 (1932), [1932] Le Leggi 753·
.,. Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. r.
417
Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. 2 (a) •
.,. Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. 2 (b) .
.,. Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, arts. 6 and 7·
420
Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. 5·
421
Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. 12.
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proceeded, as before, with the establishment of compulsory cartels
by individuallegislation. 422
Formation of compulsory organizations (consortia) by special
statute or decree occurred not only in industry and commerce but
also in the agricultural sector of the economy, there, however,
more frequently on a local basis. 423 Subsequent legislation in 1938,424
1939, 425 and 1942, 426 however, profoundly changed the status and
structure of the agricultural consortia, whether voluntary or compulsory, by supplementing them with, and incorporating them into,
a completely totalitarian organization of Italian agriculture. 427
(2) Voluntary cartels: legislation of 1936-I937· Voluntary cartels, likewise, became of increased governmental interest
under the sweep of Fascist legislation. Already the Compulsory
Cartelization Act of 1932 had required voluntary cartels regulating the economic activities of their members to transmit their
charters and by-laws to the authorities and, in addition, had authorized a considerably further-reaching supervision for voluntary
cartels representing seventy-five or more per cent of the national
production. 428 A decree of 1936,429 converted into statute law in
1937, 430 extended the imposed publicity and provided for communication to the secretariat of the appropriate corporations of
annual balance sheets and detailed reports. Whenever the dis"" See ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEI BEN! IMMATERIAL! 126 (2d ed.
1957) ; Pitigliani, op. cit. supra note 413, at 385.
423
See Pitigliani, op. cit. supra note 413 at 396. For instance, a statute of July 18,
1930, [1932] Le Leggi 66o, established a compulsory consortium of the grape growers
on the island of Pantelleria, the "Consorzio viti vinicolo de Pantelleria." The subsequent insolvency of this consortium created difficult problems regarding its amenability to the bankruptcy act, Tribunale di Trapani, 1954, [1954] Foro Italiano [hereinafter cited as Foro It.] I, 1493.
,.. Law of June 16, 1938, No. 1008 for the unification of the provincial economic
entities in the field of agriculture, [1938] Le Leggi 819.
425
Law of Feb. 2, 1939, No. 159, converting into statute the Decree of Sept. 5, 1938,
No. 1593 concerning the reform of the nature and organization of the Agrarian Consortia, [1939] Le Leggi 247, [1938] Le Leggi 1300.
420
Law of May 18, No. 566, reorganization of the economic entities for agriculture
and the Agrarian Consortia, [1942] Le Leggi 530.
421
The final organization as completed by the law of 1942 consisted of diverse National Entities designed to act as an auxiliary arm of the Ministry of Agriculture and
of the Provincial Agrarian Consortia charged both with regulatory and commercial
functions. The latter were re-transformed into regular agricultural cooperatives by
the Legislative Decree of May 7, 1948, No. 1235, concerning the organization of the
agrarian consortia and the Italian federation of agrarian consortia, Gazzetta Ufficiale,
Oct. 16, 1948, No. 242 (supp.)
423
Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. 10.
429
Royal Decree of April x6, 1936, No. 1296, [1936] Le Leggi 684.
480
Law of April 22, 1937, No. 961, [1937] Le Leggi 582. The exposition of the bill
given by the Minister of Corporations contained a list of the 91 cartels operating during the end of 1936.
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closures indicated the appositeness of such action, the Minister for
Corporations was empowered to issue directives for modification
of the cartel activities. Moreover, the public authorities could
delegate appropriate functions to the cartels. The law, however,
applied only to cartels of national importance.
(3) The regulation of the new Civil Code of 1942.
The Civil Code of 1942 attempts to subject the whole field of
lawful competition and the limitation thereof by private transactions to a comprehensive, though fairly broad, regulation. 431 It provides in general that agreements which restrict competition must
be susceptible of written proof, must be limited to a defined area
or activity, and must not exceed a period of five years. 432 It supplements this general rule with more detailed provisions governing cartels with a common organization for the coordination of
production and trade (consortia) 433 differentiating, in turn, between such consortia without and with external activities. 434 The
Code lists a number of conditions as to form and content which
must be complied with by the contracts establishing such consortia 435 and contains a number of other articles concerning legal
status and internal functioning of the cartels. 436 In contrast to ordinary agreements in restraint of trade, whether vertical or horizontal, which are limited to a maximum period of five years, organized cartels may be established for a period not exceeding ten
years.437
The Code also includes provisions dealing with the establishment of compulsory cartels 438 and with the necessity for government authorization and supervision. 439 However, these sections are
currently not applicable as their entry into force was postponed 440
1
"' CIVIL CoDE 1942, Bk. V, Title X, arts. 2595-2620.
••• CIVIL CoDE 1942, art. 2596.
""'For a discussion of the distinction between simple cartels (falling under the rule
of art. 2596) and "cartels, between several entrepreneurs exercising identical or connected economic activities, having as their object the regulation of these activities by
means of a common organization" (falling under the rules of art. 26oz If.), see
ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA CoNCORRENZA E DEI BEN! IMMATERIAL! 72, 86, 89, 91 (2d ed.
1957).
""CIVIL CoDE 1942, arts. 2606-2611, 2612-2615 •
... CIVIL CoDE 1942, art. 2603.
""'CIVIL CODE 1942, arts. 2605-2611.
437
CIVIL CODE 1942, art. 2604, cf. Ascarelli, op. cit. supra note 433, at 89, who deems
the differentiation unjustified so far as it discriminates between simple and organized
cartels.
438
CIVIL CoDE 1942, arts. 2616, 2617.
439
CIVIL CODE 1942, art. 2618.
440
Decree, March 30, 1942, No. 318, for the application and implementation of the
Civil Code, art. rn, [1942] Le Leggi 380.
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until the issuance of a special decree to that effect which has not
been enacted as yet. As no operative prior regulation existed on
the subject, Italy at present lacks any special machinery for the
control of anticompetitive practices apart from the ordinary courts
of justice. 441
Italian law likewise made no provision to curb economic concentration by horizontal or vertical integration. In fact, the trend
toward a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure in all of Italy's
basic industries was greatly accentuated by the operations of the
lstituto per la Ricostruzione lndustriale which, since its creation
in 1933,442 has achieved financial control of the state over a substantial portion of the industry of the country. 443 In the case of
enterprises endowed with a legal monopoly the Code imposes a
duty to contract with any potential customer and without discrimination; 444 but this rule does not cover factual monopolists. 445
2. THE PRESENT STATE OF ITALIAN LAW GOVERNING

ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND PROPOSALS
FOR REFORM

a. Current State of Italian Law Governing
Anticompetitive Practices

The collapse of the Fascist regime and the formal suppression
of the agencies of the corporative state 446 did not result in an immediate drastic change of the law with respect to illegality or supervision of anticompetitive practices.
To be sure, the new Constitution of 1947, in Article 41, has elevated freedom of private economic initiative to an Italian civil
right. 447 But the actual scope of this liberty, vis-a-vis legislative action, as well as its immediate impact on the administraton of justice
in private controversies involving the legality or validity of anti"' Cf. Ascarelli, op. cit. supra note 433, at 127.
442
Legislative Decree No.5 (1933), converted into a statute by Law No. 512 (1933),
[1933] Le Leggi 49, 560.
443
See Bernini, International Cartels and National Legislation: Some Comparative
Observations, 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIAL£, I, 39, 76 ( 1955).
444
CIVIL CoDE 1942, art. 2597·
445
Ascarelli, op. cit. supra note 433, at 43 ff.
446
Legislative Decrees of August 9, 1943, No. 721, [1943] Le Leggi 473, and of
Nov. 23, 1944, No. 362.
447
Italian Constitution art. 41: "Private economic initiative is free. It cannot be employed so as to be incompatible with social utility or in a way that inflicts injury to
human safety, freedom or dignity. The law determines the appropriate programs and
controls to the end that public and private economic activity may be directed and
coordinated toward social goals."
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competitive arrangements, is controversial 448 and needs clarification by decisional practice. 449 Apparently this Article does not prevent the establishment of compulsory cartels where such action is
deemed to be in the public interest. 450 At any rate, generally speaking, the permissibility or enforceability of restrictive practices,
whether concerted or not, still depends primarily on the provisions
of the Penal Code of I 930 and of the Civil Code of I 942, particularly its sections governing contracts, torts, and unfair competition.
The present Penal Code of I 930, like its predecessor, contains
only fairly narrow prohibitions, such as the imposition of penalties
on the dissemination of false news or the employment of other
stratagems for the purpose of affecting the market price of goods
or securities 451 and on the direct interference with the freedom of
industry and commerce by way of violence practiced on objects or
by fraudulent means. 452 Nevertheless, it has been concluded that
concerted boycotts, though short of a violation of the Penal Code,
may constitute a tort. 453
In general, however, Italian law condones restrictive agreements,
whether of the horizontal or vertical type, and enforces them, at
least inter partes. Thus, stipulations for resale price maintenance
and the grant of exclusive territorial distributorships have been
held legitimate and enforceable between the parties. 454 The Italian
... See the controversy between Santini, La vendita a prezzo imposto, 6 R1v. TRIM. DI
DIR. E PRoc. CIV. 1042, 1050 note r8 (1952) and Ascarelli, Sui progetto di Iegge "antitrust," 4 RIV. TRIM. DI DIR. E PROC. CIV. 742, 749 ( 1950). But see also the recent exposition by the latter author on the orientation and significance of art. 41 in TEORIA
DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEI BEN! INDUSTRIAL!, II-r6 (2d ed. 1957).
""The new Italian Constitutional Court has considered the limits which legislative
action may place on the liberty guaranteed by art. 41 and vice versa in several cases;
see decision no. 29 of Jan. 26, 1957, [1957] Giur. It. I, 432 (upholding the constitutionality of public health legislation); decision no. 50 of Apr. 13, 1957, [1957] Giur. It.
I, 642 (upholding the constitutionality of export or import restrictions) ; decision no.
103 of July 8, 1957, [1957] Foro It. I, 1139 (upholding the constitutionality of price
control legislation).
450
Recent cases which have questioned the constitutionality of legislation imposing
contributions to the compulsory National Cellulose and Paper Cartel on the members
of the industry and, accordingly, brought that issue before the Constitutional Court,
have done so only because of the retroactive character of those measures; see Corte
di Cassazione, order no. 69 of Jan. 28, 1957, [1957] Le Leggi 927; order no. 70 of Jan.
28, 1957, [1957] Le Leggi 919, [1958] Giur. It. I, r, 635; order no. 351 of June 25, 1957,
[1957] Foro It. I, 1728; Tribunale di Bergamo, order of Jan. 8, 1958, [1958] Le Leggi
479, [1958] Foro It. I, 998, [1958] Giur It. I, 2, 427.
461
PENAL CODE 1930, art. 501.
452
PENAL CoDE 1930, art. 513 .
... Ascarelli, op. cit. supra note 32, at 78, 201; Grisoli, Le boycottage en droit italien,
IO TRAY. DE L'Assoc. H. CAPITANT 171 (1956).
464
With respect to the validity of vertical price fixing agreements, see Dominici c.
S.p.az. Palmolive, Cass., no. 3503, Oct. 26, 1955, [1956] Giur. It. I, r, 216. The legality
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courts, however, have been reluctant to provide remedies against
third parties acting in disregard of such arrangements. 455 Some recent authors have questioned this attitude and argued in favor of
outsider liability. 456
b. Proposals for Further Antirestrictive Practices
Legislation
Italy, like other countries, has witnessed, in recent years, several proposals for more extensive legislation for the suppression
and control of anticompetitive practices. Thus, in I950 the Italian
Government submitted to Parliament the draft of an "Act Containing Provisions for the Supervision of Cartel Agreements." 457
The proposal was never debated and lapsed as a result of the dissolution of Parliament in I953· In March I955 two members of
Parliament, the Hon. Malagodi and Bozzi, introduced a new bill
containing "Norms for the Protection of the Freedom of Competition and Trade." 458 It was much more ambitious in scope and
provided not only for the filing of restrictive agreements with a
newly established administrative board, but prohibited outright
restrictive practices for the purpose of achieving unjustified price
increases to the injury of consumers. Again the end of the parliamentary session entailed the lapse of this bill. On March I 2, I 9 59,
Representatives Malagodi, Bozzi, Cortese, and Alpino introduced
a revised bill containing "Norms for the protection of the freedom
of competition and trade," which considerably enlarged the scope
of exclusive dealership arrangements is settled by decisions too numerous to cite and
is implied by the cases cited infra, note 455·
455
Recent decisions by the Corte di Cassazione have reaffirmed its traditional position that disregard by a merchant of an exclusive dealership granted to a competitor
does not entail liability for the latter, whether in tort or on the basis of unfair competition; De Marchi c. Sentieri, Cass. Oct. 22, I956, [I957J Foro It. I, 588; Cianci c.
De Marchi, Cass. Mar. I4, I957, [I957J Foro It. I, 356; Salengo c. lvaldi, Cass. July
3I, I957, [I958] Giur. It. I, I, 692; Strano c. De Marchi, Cass. Jan. 2I, I958, [I958]
Foro It. I, I88. In the last case cited, however, the Court has qualified these general
principles and held that liability for unfair competition is incurred if the outsider
procures the merchandise by illicit means. On principle the same rules should govern
the liability for price-cutting by outsiders, although there are no recent holdings by the
Court of Cassation on that issue .
... See in particular Santini, La vendita a prezzo imposto, 6 RIV. TRIM. DI DIR. E PRoc.
CIV. I042, I063 ff. ( 1952) ; Ligi, La disciplina della concorrenza e il contralto di agenzia
con esclusiva in una interessante fattispecie, 3 Rrv. DI DrR. CIVILE Io6 ( I957), and
Ligi, Note, [I957] Foro It. I, 588, all with copious references.
457
The text of the bill is reproduced in 4 Riv. TRIM. DI DIR. E PRoc. Crv. 752 (I950),
preceded by a critical discussion by Professor Ascarelli, Sui progetto di Iegge "antitrust," id. at 742.
""'The text of the bill is reproduced in I RIV. DI DrR. Civ. 369 ( I955), preceded by a
critical discussion by Professor Visentini, Un progetto di Iegge antitrust, id. at 358.
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of the prohibitions and regulations of the previous proposal. 459
Later in 1959 the Government itself prepared a Draft Bill for
the protection of the freedom of competition 460 which is reputed
to have good prospects of being adopted in the near future. It contains comprehensive prohibitions against restrictive understandings
among entrepreneurs and abuse of dominant market power, requires communication of cartel agreements to the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and establishes a special administrative and
judicial machinery for its enforcement.
The principal prohibition of the bill extends to all "understandings among entrepreneurs which, by means of contracts, accords or
concerted practices, or by means of clauses in charters, general or
regulatory provisions, or resolutions of consortia or associations
of enterprises, are capable of hampering, falsifying or limiting in
any way the competition in the domestic market." Following the
example of the E.E.C. Treaty the bill specifies that the prohibition
applies in particular to "understandings that
I) fix, directly or indirectly, purchase or sales prices or other
contractual terms;
2) limit or control production, outlets, technical development,
or investments;
3) divide markets or sources of supply;
4) apply, in commercial dealings, unequal conditions to similar
or equivalent goods or services;
5) condition the conclusion of contracts upon the acceptance of
supplementary goods or services which neither by their nature nor by commercial usage are connected with the contracts themselves." 461
This broad interdiction of collective restraints is followed by a
prohibition against abuse of dominant market power, circumscribed
as "manipulating, in the market for particular goods or services,
the price, the conditions of delivery, or the flow of supply in such
fashion as to subject the consumers or particular categories of enterprises to unjustified burdens or restrictions." Dominant market
power is deemed to exist when the respective enterprises, either by
themselves or as a result of combinations, understandings, or accords, are not subject to efficient competition in the internal mar""'The bill is reprinted in [1959] Foro It. IV, 154, preceded by comments of Ligi,
and in 8 Rrv. nr DrR. IND., I, 193 (1959), preceded by comments signed G. G., id. at 189.
460
For the text of the draft bill see Testo definitivo del disegno di Iegge per Ia
tutela della liberta di concorrenza, [1960] Foro It. IV, 30.
1
. . I d., art. I.
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ket.
The bill specifies that certain transactions as such are not
considered to be understandings within the meaning of the law. It
includes in that list "mergers of associations, concentration of shares,
management and agency contracts even though they provide for
exclusive dealing, assignments or licenses of patents, except, in the
case of licenses, agreements that provide for reciprocal exclusive
licensing or contain additional clauses which by themselves perform
anticompetitive functions." 463 The bill requires communication to
the Minister of Industry and Commerce of all understandings,
whether formalized or oral, that regulate the production or the
commerce of the parties thereto. 464
For the proper enforcement of the law a new administrative body,
called Commission for the Protection of Competition, is established.
It is composed of eighteen members, chosen from specified government departments and persons with the requisite economic or legal
expertise. Upon request by the Minister of Industry and Commerce, it conducts investigations for the purpose of ascertaining
whether there are (communicated or non-communicated) illegal
understandings in operation or whether abuses of dominant market power are being committed. It advises the Minister of its findings and suggests measures which should be adopted. 465
If the Commission finds that there is an illegal understanding or
abuse of dominant market power, the Minister may issue a warning
to the parties involved and demand cessation of such conduct. If
the parties comply, no further governmental action will be taken
and they will not be subject to the penalties imposed by the law
upon participation in prohibited understandings or abuse of dominant market power. If the parties fail to comply, the Minister may
institute proceedings for declaratory judgment in a newly established special division of the District Court of Rome for the purpose of establishing the illegality of the understanding or the abuse
of dominant market power. In case the special division makes
a finding to that effect, proceedings for penalties will be instituted.
Actions for declaratory judgment of the type described are also
made available to all other interested parties provided their intention of initiating such proceedings was duly communicated to the
Minister at least three months prior thereto. Compliance by the
••• I d.,
468
I d.,
... I d.,
•o.• I d.,

art. 2.
art. 3·
art. 4·
arts. 5 and 6.
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enterprises with a warning by the Minister is no bar to the latter
proceedings.
Determination of the illegality of an understanding or of the
abuse of dominant market power by the special division of the
District Court of Rome is also required whenever such issue arises
in civil, criminal or administrative proceedings. If necessary, such
other proceedings must be discontinued until such determination.
It is res judicata vis-a-vis all interested parties. 466

F.

LuxEMBOURG

As might be expected in view of the relative size and industrial
structure of the country, as well as its close economic and legal
ties with Belgium, Luxembourg has not enacted any special legislation with respect to restrictive business practices. 467 In fact, as the
home of one of the largest steel producers in the world, the wellknown ARB ED ( Acieries Reunies de Burbach-Eich-Du Delange),
Luxembourg was also the seat of the powerful continental European Steel Cartel, the Entente Internationale de L'Acier, which
in turn was the pivot of the notorious International Steel Cartei.4 68
Luxemburgian law, as a result of the political history of the
Duchy, still stems to a large extent from the French legislation between 179 I (proclamation of freedom of trade) and I 8 I 5 469 and
belongs to the French family of legal systems. Many of Luxembourg's more recent statutes and decrees, however, are copies or
adaptations of Belgian acts. Thus the Penal Code of the Duchy
was borrowed from its western neighbor in I 879 470 and, accordingly, contains, in Article 3 I I, an identical prohibition against
fraudulent production of price rises and falls as governs in Belgium.471 Similarly, a Grand Ducal Decree of January 22, I936, 472
466

/d., arts. 11-16.
About the Luxemburgian law relating to restrictive business practices, see especially METZLER, MELANGES DE DROIT LUXEMBOURGEOIS, 58 If., 260 If. (1949); Ententes
et Monopoles dans le Monde: Benelux II, Belgique et Luxembourg (DocUMENTATION
FRANc;'AISE, NoTES ET ETUDES DocuMENTAIREs, No. 1778) 69 If. (1953).
468
About the E.I.A. and the International Steel Cartel, see HEXNER, THE INTER·
NATIONAL STEEL CARTEL ( 1943) ; METZLER, op. cit. supra note 467 at 59; LISTER, EUROPE'S
CoAL AND STEEL CoMMUNITY 181 (1960).
469
Accordingly the French Civil Code of 1804 as well as the Commercial Code of
1807 are both in force in Luxembourg.
470
HAMMES, CoDE DE LA LEGISLATION PEN ALE EN VIGUEUR DANS LE GRAND-DUCHE DE
LUXEMBOURG, Vol. I (1953).
471
Similarly, a Grand Ducal Decree of May 31, 1938, against illegal speculation in
victuals, goods, and securities, repeated the somewhat broader formula of the Belgian
law of July 18, 1924 on the same subject discussed supra part II, sec. D. See Huss, Le
boycottage en droit luxembourgeois, 10 TRAV. DE Assoc. H. CAPITANT 176 (1956).
""Grand Ducal Decree of January 15, 1936, as amended by Grand Ducal Decree of
467
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enacted for the purpose of "protecting producers, merchants and
consumers against certain activities tending to falsify the normal
conditions of competition," replaced the major part of a prior law
against unfair competition, the new provisions being modeled after
the Belgian Ordinance on that subject of 1934.473
While the decree against unfair competition, following the
Belgian model, contains a broad and general prohibition against
the infliction of harm, or the attempt to inflict harm, to the competitive capacity of a competitor, Luxemburgian courts, like their
Belgian counterparts, seem to have used this provision only haltingly for the curbing of anticompetitive practices and have condoned cartels and similar restrictive arrangements. 474 Resale price
maintenance agreements are held to be valid and enforceable not
only inter partes, but also, on the theory of quasi-tort or unfair
competition, against price-cutting outsiders. 475 The validity of exclusive dealership arrangements likewise seems to be beyond question.476
In the field of concentrations it is worth noting that Luxembourg, in 1929, enacted particular legislation aiming at the encouragement of the formation of holding companies, that is, corporations created for the purpose of acquiring and exploiting financial
participation in other enterprises, by according them exemption
from corporate income taxes and other fiscal advantages. 477 Moreover, an enabling act of 1937 authorized the issuance of special
government regulations for the purpose of modifying the general
corporation and holding companies law, so far as applicable to
holding companies acquiring or having acquired stock in foreign
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

July 16, 1938, in HAMMES, CODE DE LA LEGISLATION PENALE EN VIGUEUR DANS LE GRANDDUCHE DE LuxEMBOURG, Vol. II, sub voce, Concurrence DcHoyale.
473
See the discussion of the Belgian ordinance, supra sec. D. In contrast to the Belgian ordinance, the Luxemburgian decree contains, in the list of particularized offenses, a special prohibition against sales accompanied by free gifts or trading stamps,
first outlawed by Grand Ducal Decree of May 9, 1934 [1934] Pas. Lux. 343•
m See METZLER, op. cit. supra note 467, at 58. It has been suggested, however, that
the Grand Ducal Decree of 1936 against unfair competition, as well as the law of May
II, 1936 guaranteeing the freedom of association, provides sufficient sanctions against
boycotts, especially those having the purpose of coercing outsiders to adhere to a cartel,
Huss, op. cit. supra note 471 at 178.
5
"
See METZLER, op. cit. supra note 467, at 6o.
476
Thus, ARBED has granted exclusive global distributorship for its products to the
Comptoir Metallurgique Luxembourgeois [COLUMET A].
477
Law of July 31, 1929, [1929-1932] Pas. Lux. 145. Compare de Sola Caiiizares,
Les societh financieres en droit compare, 7 REV. INT. DE DR. CoMP. 6oo, 6o3, 604 (1955).
According to Maul, La limitation de Ia responsabilite dans les entreprises commerciales,
Rapport sur le droit luxembourgeois, 9 TRAY. DE L'Assoc. H. CAPITANT 124, at 127, on
Jan. I, 1955 there existed 1165 Luxemburgian holding companies incorporated as
business corporations ( ~ocietes anonymes or societes a responsabilite limitee).
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corporations having a value of at least one billion Luxemburgian
francs, and of providing for a special tax status for such companies.478
In order to comply with the mandates of the E.E.C. Treaty, the
Luxemburgian government contemplates the introduction of legislation necessary for the implementation of its provisions.
III. THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION IN THE
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY
A. FuNDAMENTAL AsPECTs OF THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF THE EuROPEAN CoMMON MARKET
FOR COAL AND STEEL
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND

STEEL COMMUNITY

a. Historical Background

Without going into the complex political and economic reasons
which prompted the establishment of the European Coal and Steel
Community by the six nations participating therein, 479 suffice it to
say that it was conceived as the first great step toward economic
integration of continental Western Europe, taking the form of a
common market in a basic sector of the economy, i.e., the coal and
steel industries. The initial public impetus came from a declaration
of the French Government on May 9, 1950, which proposed "to
place the combined coal and steel production of France and Germany under a common High Authority in an organization open to
other European Countries." 480 The governments of the Federal
Republic of Germany (with the approval of the Allied High Commission), of Italy, and of the Benelux countries accepted these
478
Act of Dec. 27, I937, art. I ( 7), [1937] Pas. Lux. 224. In exercise of the power so
delegated the government, on Dec. I7, I938, issued two decrees, one of which governed
the corporate actions necessary for the acquisition by a holding company of the stock of
a foreign corporation valued at a billion francs or more, while the other regulated the
tax status of holding companies of that size, [I938] Pas. Lux. 505 and 5II.
479
For a discussion of the varied causes and the background of the creation of the
E.C.S.C., see in particular RIEBEN, DES ENTENTES DE MAITRES DE FoRGES AU PLAN
SCHUMAN 3I4 (I954); HAUSSMANN, DER SCHUMAN-PLAN IM EUROPAISCHEN ZWIEL!CHT
7 (I952); REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 23 (I953);
RACINE, VERS UNE EUROPE NoUVELLE PARLE PLAN SCHUMAN 25 (1954); DIEBOLD, THE
ScHUMAN PLAN 8 ( I959) ; LISTER, op. cit. supra note 468, at 3 ( I96o).
""The text of the whole declaration is reproduced in Rapport de Ia Delegation
Frano;;aise sur le Traite et Ia Convention Signes a Paris le IS Avril I95I (published
by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs) at 9 (1951).
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principles, and beginning with June 20, 1950, a conference of delegates under the chairmanship of Mr. Monnet worked out the details of the Treaty. 481 The draft was completed in March 1951
and the Treaty was signed on April 18, 1951. 482 Upon ratification
by the member states it went into force on July 23, 1952. 483
b. Structure and Organs of the European Coal
and Steel Community
The "basis" of the European Coal and Steel Community is a
"common market for coal and steel" 484 which is subject to comprehensive and, with qualifications, exclusive economic powers
vested in four Community organs, in accordance with the detailed
and complex provisions of the Treaty. The exact juridical qualification of the Community and Community organs has evoked a
voluminous, but largely semantic, debate, prompted in part by the
fact that the Treaty itself, in one place, uses the phrase "supranational." 485
The four Community organs, under whose aegis the life of the
market is placed, were originally named the High Authority, the
Common Assembly, the Special Council of Ministers, and the Court
of Justice. 486 Upon establishment of the E.E.C. and Euratom in
1957, the Common Assembly was replaced by a single assembly
for the three communities, styling itself the European Parlia81

For an account of the progress of the work of the conference which stretched over
a period of nine months see RACINE, op. cit. supra note 479 at 76-96; cf. also Schuman,
Origines et Elaboration du Plan "Schuman," 3 CAHIERS DE BRUGES 266 (1953).
482
The treaty was drafted in French and, accordingly, has only one authoritative
text. The original and a German translation are published in [1952] BGBI. II, 447·
An English translation was published by the High Authority. Art. 56 of the Treaty
was modified in 1960 by the procedure applicable to so-called "little amendments"
which is established by art. 95, para. 3, of the Treaty. The text of the new art. 56 is'
published in [1960] Journal Officiel des Communautes Europeennes [hereinafter cited
as }'L OFF.] 781.
483
[1952] BGBI. II, 978. For a brief survey of the parliamentary debates preceding
the individual ratifications, see RACINE, op. cit. supra note 479 at 102-n6; MASON, THE
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, EXPERIMENT IN SUPRANATIONALISM 1o-33
( 1955); DIEBOLD, op. cit. supra note 479, at 78-n2.
, .. E. C. S.C. Treaty arts. 1, 2 and 4·
'""See the discussion, with survey of the copious literature, by MATHIJSBN, LE DROIT
llE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 144-156 (1958); note, in
addition, De Visscher, La Communaute Europeene du Charbon et de l'Acier et /es
Etats Membres, 2 ACTES 0FFICIELS DU CONGRES INTERNATIONAL D'ETUDES SUR LA C.E.C.A.
[hereinafter cited as AcrEs 0FFICIELS] 7, at 31 (1957); Catalano, Le fonti normati'lle
della Communita Europea del Carbone e dell'Acciaio, 2 id. n7, at 12o; Delvaux, La
notion de supranationalite dans le traite du r8 A'VTil I95I, creant Ia C.E.C.A., 2 id. 225;
Miinch, Delimitation du domaine du droit des communautes supranationales par rapPort. au droit etatique interne, 2 id. 271, at 274.
... E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 7·
'
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mentary Assembly, and the Court of Justice was transformed into
a common Community organ. 487
Without going into the details of the respective attributes and
jurisdictions of the four organs, it may be indicated, in a general
way, that the High Authority is envisaged as the principal executive and regulatory agency of the European Coal and Steel Community; conversely, the Parliamentary Assembly exercises general
supervisory and extremely limited embryonic legislative powers,
while the Special Council of Ministers, in its role as a Community
institution, apart from separate responsibilities for certain organizational and budgetary matters, is established mainly as a body
charged with the clearance of actions by the High Authority involving major policy determinations and with the maintenance of
harmony between national and Community policies. 488 The Court,
of course, is the chief instrument for preserving the legality, under
the Treaty, of the conduct of the Community organs, the member
states, and the enterprises subject to the Community law. 489
2. CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE DISCIPLINE
OF THE COMMON MARKET FOR COAL AND STEEL

a. Basic Orientation of the Market
The E.C.S.C. Treaty, in Articles 2-5, spells out the fundamental
law of the Community by fixing its objectives and tasks, as well as
designating the basic rules for the creation, administration, and
orientation of the Common Market. 490 While the ultimate goals
m Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, of March 25, 1957 [1957] BGBI. II, 1156 .
... About the institutional aspects of the E.C.S.C. see, in particular, REUTER, LA CoMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER (1953); Mattern, Rechtsgrund/agen
und Praxis der Montanversammlung, 7 NJW 218 (1954); MASON, op. cit. supra note
483 at 34-52; De Visscher, op. cit. supra note 485 at 20. In actual practice the Council
of Ministers has tended to function more as a representation of the divergent national
interests than as a Community apparatus, and more as a policy-making agency than
as a brake on the High Authority; see the comments by Reuter, Les interventions de
Ia Haute Autorite, 5 ACTES 0FFICIELS 7, 69.
489
See especially VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JusTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND
STEEL COMMUNITY ( 1954). The new rules of procedure are published [1959] J'!. OFF.
349, [1960] J'L OFF. 13.
490
See the repeated statements to that effect by the Court of Justice for the E. C. S.C.,
in Groupement des Hauts Fourneaux et Acieries Belges c. Haute Autorite de Ia
C.E.C.A., 4 REc. DE LA JuRISPRUDENCE DE LA CouR [hereinafter cited as Rec.] 223, at
242-244 (1958); Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen und Stahl Industrie et al. c. Haute
Auto rite, Id. 261, at 288, 289 ( 1958) ; Chambre Syndicale de Ia Siderurgie Fran~;aise c.
Haute Autorite, Id. 363, at 382, 383 ( 1958); Societe des Anciens Etablissements Aubert
et Duval c. Haute Autorite, Id. 399, at 417, 418 (1958); Societe d'electro-chimie,
d'electro-metallurgie et des acieries electriques d'Ugine c. Haute Autorite, Id. 435, at
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and aspirations of the Community may be of a social and political
character, its route is determined on the basis of a predominantly
economic conception: that of a coherent and non-compartmentalized, under normal conditions spontaneously functioning, effectively
competitive market. 491 Accordingly, Article 4 enumerates four categories of actions by member states that are recognized as incompatible with a common market for coal and steel and therefore
abolished and prohibited within the Community, in the manner
specified by the provisions of the Treaty, viz.:
(a) import and export duties, or extractions with an
equivalent effect, and quantitative restrictions on the
movement of coal and steel;
(b) measures or practices discriminating among producers, among buyers or among consumers, especially
with reference to prices, delivery terms and transportation rates, as well as measures or practices which
hamper the buyer in the free choice of his supplier;
(c) state subsidies or aids, or special charges imposed
by the state, in any form whatsoever;
(d) restrictive practices tending towards the division or
the exploitation of the markets.

These provisions designed to blueprint the proper market mechanism are surrounded by definitions of the Community goals (Article 3) and mandates for Community action (Article 5) which, inter
alia, direct the Community institutions to "assure to all consumers
in comparable positions within the common market equal access to
the sources of production," 492 and to "assure the establishment,
the maintenance and the observance of normal conditions of competition and not to interfere directly with the production and the
operation of the market except when the circumstances require
action." 493
These precepts, including the fundamental prohibitions enshrined
in Article 4, are not mere programs, but directly controlling rules
454, 455 ( 1958); Syndicat de Ia Siderurgie du Centre-Midi c. Haute Autorite, Id. 471,
at 491, 492, 493 (1958).
·
491
About the economic conceptions and policies enshrined in the treaty see Rapport
de Ia Delegation Fran~aise, supra note 480 at 71, 91; KRAWIELICKI, DAs MoNOPOLVERBOT
IM ScHUMAN PLAN (1952); HAUSSMANN, op. cit. supra note 479 especially 10 and 52;
Reuter, Les interventions de la Haute Autorite, 5 AcTEs 0FFICIELS 7; comments by
Dupriez, id. at 223; Demaria, Le systeme des prix et Ia concurrence dans le marche
commun, 6 AcTES 0FFICIELS 7, at 32; Allais, Le systeme des prix et la concurrence dans
le marchC commun de Ia C.E.C.A., 6 id. 143, at 153.
492
E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 3(b).
••• E. C. S.C. Treaty art. 5, para. 2, cl:' 3·
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of conduct 494 that became operative immediately upon the initiation
of the respective common markets for each of the three categories
of products : (a) coal, iron ore, and scrap, 495 (b) steel, 496 and (c)
special steels. 497 Consequently they must be constantly taken into
consideration in the application of the other provisions of the
Treaty. 498

b. Built-In "Dirigistic" Safety Valves
Although the basic orientation of the market discipline is that
of a "tempered liberalism," 499 the framers of the Treaty realized
full well, in the light of past experiences, that the scope and structure of the market for coal and steel, as well as its susceptibility
to technological or cyclical changes, rendered it unrealistic to rely
on an unshackled spontaneous market mechanism as' the exclusive
device for the achievement of the Community aims. They felt a
need for empowering the Community institutions to resort, on a
supranational level, to public interventions of varying character
and severity. 500 Accordingly, they inserted in the Treaty a "hierarchy" of allowable "dirigistic" measures, either for the purpose
of promoting the maintenance, improvement, and expansion of the
means of production or for the purpose of controlling the production or consumption in periods of oversupply or shortages, 501 subject always to the aggregate of basic limitations deriving from
Articles 2-5. 502
c. Treaty Provisions Implementing the Basic Orientation

As the normal basis of the European Coal and Steel Community
is a coherent competitive market, freed from compartmentalization
... Groupement des Industries Siderurgiques Luxembourgeoises c. Haute Autorite, 2
Rec. 53, at 9I (I956); and authorities cited note 490 supra .
... The common market for coal, iron ore, and scrap was initiated on Feb. Io, I953,
but the free movement of scrap was postponed until March 15, 1953, Letters of the
High Authority to the Member States of Feb. IO, I953 and Decision 2-53, [I953]
}'L OFF. 5, 6.
•""The common market for steel was initiated on May I, I953, [I953] J'L OFF. 112.
m The common market for special steels was initiated on August I, 1954, [I954]
J'L OFF. 478.
498
See the authorities cited supra notes 490 and 494·
499
Ophiils, Das Wirtschaftsrecht des Schuman plans, 4 NJW 381 ( I95I).
600
See the analysis in Rapport de Ia Delegation Fram;aise, supra note 479, at ISII66; Reuter, Les Interventions de la Haute Auto rite, 5 ACTES OFFICIELS 7 ( 1957).
1!01 Measures of the latter type are price controls or, if not sufficient, rationing or
restrictions on production, see E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 5, 57, 58, 6I.
"""The details are worked out gradually by the various decisions of the Court on that
subject.
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or other protectionistic interferences by the national governments,
as well as from restrictive or discriminatory practices by its enterprises themselves, the Treaty has not been content with the broad
formulae laid down in Articles 2-5, but has implemented them with
more specific regulations relating to pricing practices, 503 to cartels
and concentrations, 504 and to interferences by the member states
with the competitive process, 505 which will be discussed in greater
detail below. 506
The intellectual origin of the provisions against restrictive practices and concentrations has been the subject of conflicting theses
and conjectures. It is not clear whether regulations of that type
were envisaged in the working papers distributed by the French
delegation to the other conferees at the beginning of negotiations
or whether they were inserted into the draft only at a later stage. 507
To be sure, a well-informed French author has spoken of an "anticartel conception" as the basis of the Schuman plan; 508 but other
sources have asserted that the provisions in question were due to
the German influence, either upon the insistence of the Occupation Authorities, who wished to anchor the effects of their decartelization and deconcentration policies vis-a-vis the German coal and
steel combines into the framework of the Treaty, or because of the
economic philosophy of the Adenauer government. 509 At any rate,
the other powers agreed on the need for such stipulations, though
in advance of their own national legislation, in order to safeguard
the competitive mechanism of the market. 510 In fact, the structure
and phraseology of Article 6 5 show more the imprint of contemporary Belgian and French legislative techniques than the
paternity of German draftsmanship. 511
008
E. C. S.C. Treaty art. 6o.
'""E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 65, 66.
'"'"E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 67 .
..,. As the E.C.S.C. Court of Justice has frequently emphasized, the implementing
provisions must not be construed as if standing by themselves, but must be interpreted
and applied together with the norms of arts. 2-5 as a whole, if need be under reconciliation of the somewhat divergent objectives specified in art. 3· See the authorities cited
supra notes 490 and 494·
607
See RACINE, op. cit. supra note 479, at 83, 93·
"""See RACINE, op. cit. supra note 479, at 94·
..,. See the discussion by Haussmann, op. cit. supra note 479, at ro, 150. Actually, it
appears that only art. 66 and its formulation (concentrations) was the source of special
concern to the Occupation Authorities and the subject of special difficulties and negotiations. See Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbs-Beschrankungen, Deutscher
Bundestag, Ist Elective Period, Doc. No. 3462, Annex 1, at 18 ( 1952).
610
Rapport de Ia Delegation Franc;aise supra note 480, at 91, 92 ( 1952).
611
See infra part A, sec. 2,
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d. Coverage of the Market Discipline
Since the European Coal and Steel Community, in its very nature,
aims at only a partial or, more exactly, segmental economic integration, the extent of the coverage of the market discipline raises
important issues. (I) The types of products to which the market
extends are defined in three special Annexes to the Treaty, and
include iron and manganese ore, scrap, pig iron and steel ingots,
semi-finished products, and finished iron or steel products, such as
rails, beams, wire rods, and sheets. ( 2) Enterprises subject to, and
entitled to the Court's protection by reason of, the market discipline are the coal and steel producers within the European territories of the member states and also, but only with reference to
the provisions regulating restrictive practices and concentrations,
enterprises and organizations engaging in commercial distribution
excepting sales to domestic consumers or artisans. 512 ( 3) The market discipline is not restricted to private enterprises but binds nationalized enterprises, such as the French coal mining industry,
as well. The Treaty does not affect the power of the member states
to regulate enterprise ownership according to their own standards.513
e

B.

PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AGAINST COLLECTIVE
RESTRAINTS OR ADULTERATIONS BY ENTERPRISES
I. NATURE AND EXTENT OF PROTECTION

a. Sources and Types of Anticompetitive Actions and
Practices in General
(I) Sources of proscribed actions and practices. Since
a spontaneously functioning competitive market is deemed to be,
ender normal conditions, the best means for achieving the Community objectives, the Treaty endeavors to shield the competitive
process against various kinds of deleterious impairment. Such interference may either stem from outside sources, i.e., "measures" by
the member states or the Community organs, or come from within,
""' E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 79, 8o. For details see especially Grassetti, Rob lot, Daig,
Lagrange, van Heeke and Weber, La Communaute et les enterprises, 4 ACTES OFFICIELS
7 If. Associations of Community enterprises, as specified in arts. 78, 8o, may be forl'!led
and are subjected to certain rights and duties by virtue of art. 48. They may resbrt to
the Court of the European Communities for judicial relief within the limits available
to individual enterprises, E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 33, para. 2.
618
E.C,S.C, Treaty art. 83.
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i.e., "practices" by the market enterprises themselves. The Treaty
contains more or less detailed provisions directed against various
impairments from both classes of sources, 514 but this section deals
only with anticompetitive practices by enterprises in the market.
( 2) Types of anticompetitive practices of enterprises
envisaged by the Treaty. The Treaty classifies anticompetitive
conduct of enterprises under four main headings: (a) collective
restraints or adulterations of competition, 515 (b) concentrations or
abuses of monopolistic power, 516 (c) discriminations, 517 and (d)
pricing practices, dictated by monopolistic aspirations or unfair for
other considerations. 518 The legal sanctions against, and the powers
of the Community organs with respect to, practices falling within
one of these classes may vary substantially, according to what
particular category is involved.
Unfortunately, however, it is easier to state the difference in
labels than to indicate the exact content of each of these categories
which have fluid boundaries and may overlap in numerous circumstances. As a result, the interrelation between the various parts of
the Treaty relating to anticompetitive practices by enterprises has
been the subject of much uncertainty and discussion. 519 There is
no escape from the conclusion that the Treaty has not followed
sharply defined and consistent criteria of classification, but has approached the protection of competition in a pragmatic and rather
unsystematic way, 520 leaving it to practice and theory to weld the
dispersed provisions into a coherent and workable scheme. This
applies with particular force to the differentiation between the
""Impairment may also result from practices by enterprises not subject to the market
discipline. In such case the Treaty by its very nature is confined to indirect and limited
counter-measures, e.g., as specified in art. 63.
515
E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 4(d), 65.
516
E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 66(I-6) and (7).
517
E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 4(b), 6o(I) (2).
518
E. C. S.C. Treaty art. 6o( I) (I).
519
See KRAWIELICKI, DAS MONOPOLVERBOT IM SCHUMAN PLAN (I952); REUTER, LA
COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 202/f. (I953); KERN, DAS RECHT
DER UNTERNEHMENSZUSAMMENSCHLUSSE IN DER MONTANUNION (I955); WEEBERS, CONTROLE OP INTERNATIONALE KARTELS I35 (I957); Bayer, Das Privatrecht der Montanunion, I7 ZEITSCHR. F. AUSL. & INTERN AT. PRIVATRECHT 325 ( I952); Roblot, Les rela-

tions privies des entreprises assujetties a Ia Communaute Europienne du Charbon et
de I' A cier, I7 DROIT SociAL 561 ( I954) ; Abraham, Les entreprises com me sujets de
droit dans Ia Communa~te Charbon-Acier, 4 CAHIERS DE BRUGES 255 (I954); Prieur,
La notion de concentratzon d'entreprises au sens de /'art. 66 du Traite instituant Ia
C.E.C.A., 82 }oURN. DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 8o6 (I955); Di Cagno, La discip/ina delle
intese e delle concentrazioni nel trattato istitutivo della C.E.C.A., 3 Riv. DI DIR. CIV.
759 (1957); Roblot, Droits et devoirs des entreprises de Ia Communaute-Sanctions, 4
ACTES 0FFICIELS 19.
520
To the same effect REUTER, op. cit. supra note 5I9, at 202.
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formation of cartels (Article 6 5) and concentrations (Article
66), 521 and the delimitation between prohibited pricing practices
(Article 6o) and concerted restraints (Article 6 5) .522

b. Treaty Provisions dgainst Restraints and
Adulterations by Enterprises
(I) Text of the pertinent Treaty provisions

(a) Article 4 (d) :
The following are recognized to be incompatible with the
common market for coal and steel, and are, therefore,
abolished and prohibited within the Community under the
conditions specified in this Treaty:
'
(d) restrictive practices tending towards the division or
the exploitation of the markets.
(b) Article 65(1)-(3):
r. All agreements among enterprises, all decisions of associations of enterprises, and all concerted practices,
tending, directly or indirectly, to hinder, restrict or
adulterate 523 the normal operation of competition
within the common market are prohibited, and in particular those tending:
(a) to fix or determine prices;
(b) to restrict or control production, technical development or investments;
(c) to divide markets, products, customers or sources
of supply.
521
Most authors seem to agree in the conclusion that the criterion which differentiates
an accord creating a cartel within the meaning of art. 65 from an agreement constituting a concentration within the meaning of art. 66 lies in the retention of independent power over the management of their affairs by the principal parties to the
transaction, see KRAWIELICKI, op. cit. supra note 519, at 55; Bayer, op. cit. supra note
519, at 372; REUTER, op. cit. supra note 519, at 216, 217; Rob lot, Les relations privies
des entreprises assujetties a Ia C.E.C.A., 17 DROIT SOCIAL 561, at 571, 575; Prieur,
. op. cit. supra note 519, at 809; but contra Demaria, Le systeme des prix et Ia concurrence dans le marc he commun, 6 AcrEs 0FFICIELS 7, at 103, n. 24 ( 19<;7): "What
seems to distinguish essentially the concentration from the cartel is the policy pursued
and not the property arrangement or the mode of the accord." Professor Reuter defines
concentration as "an operation which places two or more enterprises under a common
control over the entirety of their affairs."
522
About the overlap between the prohibitions of art. 6o and art. 65 see REUTER,
op. cit. supra note 519, at 218. Another question, much discussed in the early stages of
the common market, concerned the problems as to how far the High Authority may
establish price controls to counteract the effect of existing cartels in the coal and steel
market. See the references in MASON, THE EUROPEAN CoAL AND STEEL CoMMUNITY 85,
n. 33 (1955).
523
The French text is "fausser," which may be rendered in English as "fal~ify" or
"adulterate." Some translations have employed the expression "distort." In this discussion "adulterate" is used as the nearest English equivalent.
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However, the High Authority shall authorize agreements to specialize in, or to engage in joint buying or
selling of, specified products, if the High Authority
finds:
(a) that such specialization or such joint buying or
selling will contribute to a substantial improvement in the production or distribution of the
products in question;
(b) that the agreement involved is essential to achieve
these results, without being more restrictive in
character than is necessary for that purpose; and
(c) that it is not capable of giving the interested enterprises the power to determine prices, or to control or limit the production or marketing of a
substantial part of the products in question within
the common market, or -of withdrawing them
from effective competition by other enterprises
within the common market.
If the High Authority should find that certain
agreements are strictly analogous in their nature and
effects to the above-mentioned agreements, taking into
account in particular the application of this section to
distributing enterprises, it shall likewise authorize such
agreements, provided that it finds that they satisfy the
same conditions.
Authorizations may be granted subject to specified
conditions and for a limited period. In that case the
High Authority shall renew authorizations once or
several times if it finds that at the time of renewal the
conditions stated in paragraph (a) to (c) above are
still satisfied.
The High Authority shall revoke or modify an authorization if it finds that as a result of a change in
circumstances the agreement no longer satisfies the conditions specified above or that the actual consequences
of the agreement or its application are contrary to the
conditions required for its approval.
Decisions granting, renewing, modifying, denying
or revoking an authorization shall be published together with the reasons therefor; the restrictions
specified in the second paragraph of Article 47 shall
not apply in such cases.
3· The High Authority may obtain, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 47, any information necessary for the application of this article, either by a
special request addressed to the interested parties or
by a general regulation defining the nature of the
agreements, decisions or practices which must be communicated to the High Authority.
2.
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( 2) Scope and interpretation. In analyzing the significance and scope of the controlling text it might be worth noting
at the outset that its general scope, apart from reflecting clearly
the influence of the Havana Charter, resembles most the contemporary French statutory provisions and drafts. The Commissariat
au Plan, which played such an important part in the preparation
of the plan subsequently announced so dramatically by Mr. Robert
Schuman, was at the same period engaged in the drafting of domestic legislation for the suppression of anticompetitive practices.524 That work culminated in the government bill for the control of cartels, no. 9·9 5 I, which was introduced in Parliament
three days after the publication of the Schuman proposal. 525 Other
legislative proposals of similar character were introduced at the
same time by representative Henri Teitgen, who later assumed
an active role in the Common Assembly, 526 and by the members of
the socialist party. 527 In comparing the tenor and phraseology of
these drafts with the formulation of Article 6 5 the great similarity
between them becomes strikingly discernible. Especially the notion
of protecting competition against adulteration (fausser), which is
employed in the E.C.S.C. Treaty, can be found not only in the
Belgian and Luxemburgian legislative language, as noted before, 528
but occurs likewise in the French discussions of that period. 529
In analyzing the range of the prohibition it is worth noting that
it consists (a) of a general clause which proscribes all agreements,
decisions, and other concerted practices which "tend," directly or
indirectly, to hinder, restrict, or adulterate the normal operation of
competition in the common market, and (b) of a catalogue of
three special categories of practices, that is, price-fixing, restriction or control of production, technological development, or investment, and division of markets, products, customers, or supplies.
The exact elements of the practices proscribed by the general
clause and the significance of the addition of the catalogue of
specifically named practices have been the subject of numerous
""'See Moreau, Les ententes professionnelles devant Ia loi, at n8 in DocUMENTATION
FRAN<;'AISE, ENTENTES ET MoNOPOLES DANS LE MONDE (I 9 53}.
"""Reprinted in Moreau, op. cit. supra .note 524, at 121 .
... France, Assemblee Nationale, Doc. Pari., Annexe No. 8.967, Sess. Jan. 13, 1950;
discussed by Moreau, op. cit. supra note 524, at n5.
6!11 France, Assemblt\e Nationale, Doc. Pari., Annexe No. 10.223, Sess. June 8, 1950;
discussed by Moreau, op. cit. suPra note 524, at 122.
"""See supra Part II, sections D and E .
... See especially the counter-project of the Commission of Economic Affairs of the
National Assembly, reprinted in Moreau, op. cit. supra note 524, at 124.
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doubts and controversies. 530 Thus the meaning of the phrase "tend
to" has been much debated, and in particular there seems to be a
question of whether the specific practices listed are meant to be
per se violations for which anticompetitive tendency needs no further proof. At any rate, there seems to be agreement that the
practices enumerated are proscribed only if they relate to and
affect the common market. Price-fixing of pure export cartels is not
prohibited. 531 Another important controversy pertains to the applicability of Article 6 5 to vertical agreements. While Professor
Reuter has advanced the thesis that Article 6 5 covers only horizontal agreements, Dr. Krawielicki, Professor Roblot, and Dr.
Daig have argued for its application to vertical agreements. 532 The
High Authority seems to tend toward the latter view. In response
to an inquiry by a member of the Common Assembly relative to
the grant by the collieries of France and the Saar of an exclusive
sales franchise to a Belgian coal distributor, it declared that such
agreements might fall under the prohibitions of Article 6 5. 533
It is, however, most important to note that the prohibitions of
Article 6 5 ( I ) are not all absolute in character. Article 6 5 ( 2)
empowers the High Authority to authorize specialization agreements with respect to specified products and arrangements establishing joint purchase or sales agencies and analogous agreements provided that such arrangements have particular beneficial
effects and do not result in excessive control over the market.
Cartels or other restrictive agreements which have been entered
into after the initiation date of the common market for the particular type of product 534 (new cartels) are not effective until authorization has been obtained. Whether such authorization has retro530

See especially KRAWIELICKI, DAS MONOPOLVERBOT IM SCHUMAN PLAN, 12 (1952);
REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER, 209 (1953); Roblot,

Les relations privies des entreprises assujetties a Ia Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, 17 DROIT SoCIAL, 561, at 570; Roblot, Droits et Devoirs des Entreprises, in 4 AcrEs OFFICIELS 28 (1958); Daig, Discussion, id. 332, at 334531 KRAWIELICKI, op. cit. supra note 530, at 22; REUTER, op. cit. supra note 530,
at 211, 237; Rob lot, Les relations privies etc., op. cit. supra note 530, at 572. Accordingly, the High Authority refused to interfere with the so-called Bruxelles Entente,
the export cartel of West European steel producers, see Rosen, The Brussels Entente:
Export Combination in the World Steel Market, ro6 U.PA.L.REv. 1079 (1958); Di
Cagno, La disciplina delle intese e delle concentrazioni nel trattato istitutivo della
C.E.C.A., 3 Rrv. or DrR. Crv. 758, at 764 n. 34 (1957).
'"'"KRAWIELICKI, op. cit. supra note 530, at 12; REUTER, op. cit. supra note 530, at 21o;
Roblot, Les relations privies etc., op. cit. supra note 530, at 571; Roblot, Droits et
devoirs etc., op. cit. supra note 530, at 28; Daig, op. cit. supra note 530, at 335·
633
Response of March 13, 1954, [1954] ]'L OFF. 301,
534
See supra notes 495-497.
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active effect is controversial. 535 Cartels and other restrictive agreements which existed at the date of the initiation of the common
market for the particular product remained unaffected by the
prohibition of Article 65(1) until August JI, I95J,"~'; and even
after that time and until the actual rejection of an application
for approval, if such application was filed prior to the date indicated.537 The High Authority has used this power of authorization, as well as that of a modification thereof, in a substantial number of cases both in the coal and the steel sector.r.as
(3) Discrimination as anticompetitive practice. Of particular complexity and importance is the question as to the circumstances under which discriminatory actions by enterprises are
deemed to be anticompetitive practices and therefore prohibited.
At the outset it must be recalled that Article 6 5 constitutes only a
segment of the intricate and balanced market discipline of the
Treaty and that it must· be read in context with the broad prohibitions of Article 4 (b) and (c) ,539 as well as with the special regulation of pricing in Article 6o 540 and the provision against the abuse
of a dominant position in the market in Article 66 ( 7). Accordingly, prohibited discriminatory practices may consist not only in
the imposition of unequal terms on purchasers in comparable positions (as under the American Robinson-Patman Act), but also in
the unwarranted refusal to deal with particular parties, especially
535
See Roblot, Les relations Privees etc., op. cit. supra note 530, at 573, n. 69 (with
references).
536
Date fixed by the High Authority's decision No. 37-53, [1953] ]'L OFF. 152.
537
Decision of the European Court of Justice 1-58, 10 WuW 70 ( 1960).
538
For details see E. C. S.C., High Authority, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT 146 ( 1959) ;
EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT 185, 202 (1960). For important recent decisions see decision
No. 14-60 of June 2, 1960, rejecting the application for authorization of the Dutch
Scrap Dealers' Cartel, [1960] }'L OFF. 869, and the decision No. r6-6o of June 22, 1960,
rejecting the application for consolidation of the three Ruhr Coal Sales Cartels, [1960]
}'L OFF. 1014.
539
Reprinted p. 297 supra.
540
Art. 6o ( r) provides:
"Pricing practices contrary to the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 4 are prohibited, and
in particular:
-unfair competitive practices, in particular purely temporary or purely
local price reductions which tend toward the acquisition of a position of
monopoly within the common market;
-discriminatory practices involving within the common market the application by a seller of unequal conditions to comparable transactions, especially according to the nationality of the buyer.
'
After consulting the Consultative Committee and the Council, the High
Authority may define the practices covered by this prohibition."
Pursuant to the power given to it by paragraph 2 of this section the High Authority,
in 1953 and 1954, issued regulations defining certain "differentiations" in sales terrils
as discriminatory, Decision No. 30-53 modified by Decision No. r-54, [1953] }'L OFF.
109, [1954] }'L OFF. 77·
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where such action rests on criteria or motives which aim at, or result in, effects inconsistent with the spirit and objectives of the
common market.
An illustrative example of a suppression of the latter type of discrimination occurred in I956 in connection with the authorization
of three sales cartels for corresponding groups of coal-mining corporations in the Ruhr district. 541 The applicants had stipulated that
the cartel would supply only such wholesale distributors whointer alia- (a) had sold at least 40,000 tons of solid fuel in their
territory during the preceding year, (b) had procured at least
I 2,500 tons of the solid fuel sold from the cartel, and (c) had
procured at least 25,000 tons of the solid fuel sold from the Ruhr
coal mines. The High Authority, however, while approving the
other conditions, 542 refused to authorize the third of these requirements for the reason that it would entail a discrimination both
between the wholesale distributors and against the coal producers
outside the Ruhr district. The Court of Justice sustained this decision. 543 It held specifically that discriminatory practices within
the meaning of Article 4 of the Treaty may at the same time constitute anticompetitive practices within the meaning of Article
6 5 (I) of the Treaty and that therefore stipulations of such character were not capable of being authorized under Article 6 5 ( 2).
2. SANCTIONS AGAINST AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
TREATY PROHIBITIONS

a. Enforcement by Community Agencies

(I) Text of governing provisions. The Treaty itself, as
well as the Convention on Transitional Provisions, includes various
541
High Authority decisions Nos. s-s6, 6-s6, 7-s6, [1956] j'L OFF. 29, 43, s6. These
three separate sales cartels (named GEITLING, PRii.SIDENT and MAUSEGATT) were established as successors to a comprehensive cartel of the whole Ruhr coal mining industry
known as GEORG, which was dissolved in 1956. An attempt to reestablish an analogous
carte!Aailed because of the opposition of the High Authority, see supra note 538. An
appeal against the decision is pending, [1960] ]'L OFF. 1181.
..,. For later modifications and extensions of the status of the Ruhr coal sales cartels
see High Authority decisions Nos. 10-57, 11-57 and 12-57, 6 [1957] ]'L OFF. 159, 160,
161; High Authority decisions Nos. 16-57, 17-57, 18-57, [1957] ]'L OFF. 319, 330, 341;
High Authority decisions Nos. 24-57, 25-57, 26-57, [1957] ]'L OFF. 629, 631, 633; High
Authority decision No. 17-59, [1959] }'L OFF. 279; High Authority decision No. 36-59,
[1959] ]'L OFF. 736; High Authority decision No. 48-59, [1960] ]'L OFF. 57; High Authority decision No. s-6o, [1960] ]'L OFF. 153; High Authority decision No. 7-6o, [1960]
]'L OFF. s86; High Authority decision No. 9-6o, [1960] J'L OFF. 601; High Authority decision No. 10-60, [1960] ]'L OFF. 618; High Authority decision No. 11-6o, [1960] ]'L
OFF. 751; High Authority decision No. 17-60 [1960] ]'L OFF. 1028 .
... Geitling et a!. v. High Authority, Docket No. 2-56, 3 Rec. 9 ( 1957) ; but cf. Nold ,.,
High Authority, Docket No. 18-57, [1959] }'L OFF. 421 (1959); 10 WuW 75 (1960),
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sections regulating the sanctions against violations and the enforcement of the prohibitions against anticompetitive practices by
enterprises. The most important ones are Article 64 ( 4) and ( 5)
of the Coal-Steel Treaty and Section I 2, paragraphs I-3 of the
Transitional Convention.
Article 65 ( 4) provides :
Agreements or decisions prohibited by virtue of Section I of the present article shall be null and void and may
not be invoked before any tribunal of the member states.
The High Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction,
subject to review by the Court, to pass on the conformity
of such agreements or decisions with the provisions of this
article.
Article 6 5 ( 5) adds :
The High Authority may impose upon enterprises:
which have concluded a void agreement;
which have applied or attempted to apply, by way of
arbitration, forfeiture, boycott or any other means, a
void agreement or decision or an agreement for which
approval has been refused or revoked;
which have obtained an authorization by means of information known to be false or misleading; or
which engage in practices contrary to the provisions
of Section I,
fines and daily penalties not to exceed twice the proceeds
from the actual turnover of the products which were
the subject of the agreement, decision or practice contrary to the provisions of this article; however, if the
purpose of the agreement is to restrict production, technical development or investments, this maximum may be
raised to IO percent of the annual turnover of the enterprises in question, in the case of fines, and 20 percent of
the daily turnover in the case of daily penalties.
Section

I2

of the Transitional Convention specifies further:

Any information about the understandings or organizations referred to in Article 6 5 shall be communicated
to the High Authority under the terms of Section 3 of the
said article.
In those cases where the High Authority does not
grant the authorization provided for in Section 2 of Article 6 5, it shall fix reasonable time limits at the expiration
of which the prohibitions provided for in Article 6 5 shall
come into effect.
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In order to facilitate the liquidation of the organizations prohibited under Article 65, the High Authority
may name receivers who shall be responsible to it and
shall act under its instructions.

( 2) Intervention by Community agencies. As the quoted
text of the Treaty and the Convention on Transitional Provisions
indicates, the High Authority has the exclusive responsibility for
the direct enforcement of the prohibitions of Article 65. It possesses
extensive investigatory powers and may impose fines and daily penalties, as well as compel the dissolution of prohibited organizations by
the appointment of receivers. The decisions of the High Authority
are directly enforceable in the member states, in accordance with
the procedure governing the execution of local instruments. 544 Its
decisions are subject to review by the Community Court of Justice.545 Cases have come before the High Authority either following an application or on its own initiative. 546 In a number of cases
where authorization has been sought, it was granted only after
lengthy negotiations involving substantial revision of the original
agreement. In some instances authorization of particular provisions has been denied. 547
b. Sanctions by Virtue of the Legal Systems of the
Member States

( 1) Controlling Treaty provtstons. One of the most
difficult problems in the application of the provisions against anticompetitive practices by enterprises subject to the discipline of the
Coal-Steel Community Treaty is the question as to the possible
legal consequences of violations according to the individual legal
systems of member states. 548 Article 6 5 itself contains only two
5
" E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 44 and 92. See the comments by Spaak, Problems of Competition and Restrictive Trade Practices in the European Coal and Steel Community,
FEDERAL BAR Ass'N INSTITUTE ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 118,
at 129 (1960) .
.., Depending upon the measures taken by the High Authority review will be available either in proceedings for annulment, under art. 33 para. 2 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty,
or in proceedings for full review, under art. 36 of the Treaty. In proceedings of the
latter type which are available against monetary sanctions and penalties the Court
may not only reverse their imposition but also reduce their amount, cf. Acciaierie
Laminatoi Magliano Alpi v. High Authority, Docket No. 8-56, 3 Rec. 179 (1957). In
cases of a failure to intervene, injured third parties might proceed against the High
Authority in a damage action based on administrative tort under E.C.S.C. Treaty
art. 40.
546
See the table in E.C.S.C. High Authority, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT 202 (1960).
547
See the action by the High Authority vis-a-vis the three Ruhr coal sales cartels,
discussed supra.
548
For European discussions of this question see especially Bayer, Das Privatrecht
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mandates in that respect. On the one hand, it ordains that agreements and decisions violative of Article 6 5 ( r) are absolutely void
and incapable of being invoked in any tribunal of the member
states. On the other hand, it provides that the High Authority
and, on review, the Court of Justice have the sole jurisdiction over
determinations of the conformity of agreements and decisions with
the rules of Article 6 5. 549
Accordingly, it is clear that national tribunals may not lend their
arm to the enforcement of anticompetitive agreements and decisions
by parties thereto and must refer the matter to the High Authority
if in such controversy the enforceability is contested. More difficult,
however, is the question of whether and in what way national courts
may grant affirmative relief to third parties claiming to be aggrieved
by anticompetitive practices by others. Since Article 6 5 reserves the
determination of the illegal character of challenged agreements,
decisions, or concerted practices 550 to specified Community agencies,
it has been held that national courts are barred from issuing temporary injunctions. 551 The issue arose in consequence of a resolution
of the Coal Distribution Cartel for the Upper Rhine Region,
adopted in 1953, according to which coal consumers of annual
amounts of 30,000 tons and more were to procure their supply
directly from the cartel instead of buying from wholesale distributors. The new arrangement caused disadvantages not only for the
excluded wholesale dealers, but also for the consumers as it deprived the latter of certain quantity discounts. Therefore eight
large consumers and four wholesalers of coal brought suit for a
temporary injunction on the ground that the execution of the cartel
resolution violated Article 6 5 of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty.
The court ruled that the complaint was subject to dismissal for the
der Montanunion, 17 ZEITSCHR. F. AUSL. & INTERN. PRIVATRECHT, 325 at 359 (1952);
KRAWIELICKI, DAS MONOPOLVERBOT IM ScHUMANPLAN, 44 (1952); Matthies, Das
Recht der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft fiir Kokle und Stahl und die nationalen
Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten, 9 ]URISTENZEITUNG 305 (1959); BALLERSTEDT, fiBERNATION ALE UNO NATIONALE MARKTORDNUNG (1955); Steindorff, Der Begri/f der
Preisdiskriminierung im Recht der EGKS, 21 ZEITSCHR. F. AUSL. & INTERN. PRIVATRECHT,
270 at 317 (1956); Mylord, Zur Frage des Rechtsschutzes "Driller" im Rechtssystem
der EGKS, 7 WuW 483, at 485 (1957) •
... Art. 65 (4) para. 2. In addition art. 41 provides that only the Court of Justice
may decide on the validity of actions of the High Authority, if such validity is
challenged in a litigation pending before a national tribunal.
..., Art. 65 (4) para. 2 does not mention concerted practices in ad,llition to agreements and decisions, but this omission apparently is only an oversight of the draftsmen.
661
City of Stuttgart et al. v. Oberrheinische Kohlenunion, judgment of Landgericht
Stuttgart, Aug. 10, 1953, reprinted in 4 WuW 140 ( 1954) ; Sirey, Jur. Part IV, I
(1954), with note by Philonenko;

THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

3I I

reason that Article 6 5 required a decision by the High Authority on
the merits and that prior to such determination a national court
could not grant temporary relief. 552

( 2) Implementation and supplementation by national
laws. The rule that deprives a national tribunal of jurisdiction for
determining whether or not an enterprise has engaged in anticompetitive practice does not, of itself, bar such a court from imposing
civil liability on any enterprise either after the High Authority has
found the same to be in violation of the prohibitions of Article 6 5
or if such violation is not contested. The Treaty is silent as to the
possible tort liability for contraventions against Article 65. Thus
the questions arise as to whether the national legal systems may
attach and actually have attached civil liability to the perpetration of
the anticompetitive practices as defined and prohibited by the
Treaty.
There is nothing in the general policy of the Treaty which would
support a conclusion to the effect that a member state is forbidden
to declare a violation of the prohibitions of Article 6 5 to be a tort
rendering the perpetrator liable in damages, so long as the imposition of such liability is not discriminatory. 553 The problem therefore
reduces itself to the question whether the national legal systems
actually should be interpreted that way. The answer, of course, may
vary according to which one of the six national legal systems is involved.
In German law, for instance, liability in damages of a violator of
the mandates of Article 65 ( 1) conceivably could be based on one of
four broad and overlapping categories of torts:
r) intentional or negligent invasion of the absolute right of a
person to his established and conducted enterprise (Civil
Code, Section 823 I); 554
502
Actually the court requested a determination by the High Authority, but the latter
replied that its investigation was still in process. The High Authority, in fact, did not
approve the cartel until 1957, and then only after drastic structural changes, Decision
No. 19-57, July 26, 1957, [1957] ]'L OFF. 352. For the subsequent history of the status
of this purchase cartel see E.C.S.C. High Authority, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT 192
(1960).
668
Accord REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 214
(1953); Matthies, Das Recht dur Europiiischen Gemeinscha/t fiir Kohle und Stahl
und die nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten, 9 }URISTENZEITUNG 305, at 307
(1954); Steindorff, Der Begriff der Preisdiskriminierung im Rechte der EGKS, 21
ZEITSCHR. F. AUSL. & INT. PRIVATRECHT 270, at 317 (1956); Roblot, Les relations
privees des enterprises assujetties la C.E.C.A., 17 DROIT SociAL 561, at 567 and 574
(1954) .
... About this tort under German law see 2 RGR Kommentar zum BGB § 823 Anm.
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2) intentional or negligent violation of a law enacted for the
protection of others (Civil Code, Section 823 II);
3) intentional and unethical infliction of damages (Civil Code,
Section 826) ;
4) unethical business conduct for purposes of competition (Law
against Unfair Competition, 1909, Section I).
Similarly, in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg such liability
would result if engaging in anticompetitive practices contrary to the
Treaty were deemed to fall within the sweeping contours of tortious
conduct marked by the French Civil Code, Articles 1382 and
I 3 83.555
There is some judicial authority supporting such results. In Germany the District Court of Stuttgart, in the aforementioned decision of 1953, 556 stated, by way of dictum, that a cartel action,
taken in violation of Coal-Steel Community Treaty Article 65, entitles injured parties to damages under Sections 823 I and 823 II
of the German Civil Code. A similar conclusion was reached by the
District Court of Essen in an order of November 4, 1953. 557 That
case arose as a consequence of a resolution of the then-existing six
sales agencies for Ruhr coal which decided to discontinue the direct
supplying of wholesale coal dealers having an annual sales volume
of less than 48,ooo tons. An aggrieved dealer brought suit for declaratory judgment to the effect that the challenged action entitled
him to damages. The Court conceded that damages could be demanded if the action in question violated the prohibitions of Article
6 5 and continued the proceedings 558 until a determination of this
question by the High Authority. 559
However, more recent and authoritative judicial authority has
shown reluctance to consider every prohibition of the Treaty to be
a law for the protection of others within the meaning of Section
8 23 II of the German Civil Code. In a far-reaching decision of April
9 (10th ed. 1953). For recent decisions by the German Supreme Court see 12 NJW
479 (1959); 12 NJW 934 (1959).
6155
This conclusion is adopted as correct by Roblot, op. cit. supra note 553, at 574,
text at n. 75; see in general Roubier, Theorie genera/e de I' action en concurrence
diloyale, 1 REV. TRIM. DE DR. CoMM. 541 (1948).
566
Supra note 551.
557
8 BETRIEBS-BERATER 991 (1953).
558
The decision is criticized on that score by Spengler, A bgrenzungsfrag(/n aus der
Obergangszone zwischen Kartell- und Montanunions-Recht, 4 WuW 753, at 768 (1954).
559
The High Authority declared the prohibitions to be inapplicable and its determination was sustained by the Court of Justice, see supra note 537·
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560

14, 1959,
the German Supreme Court held that the prohibitions against price discriminations, contained in Articles 4 (b) and
6o ( 1) of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, do not constitute laws
for the protection of the injured customers or competitors within
the meaning of Section 823 II of the German Civil Code. A similar
question confronted the Court of Appeals of Celle 561 in a suit instituted by a wholesale dealer in lignite against the sales subsidiary
of a lignite producer as a result of the latter's determination to
discontinue a direct supply of the plaintiff and to accord exclusive
sales franchises to other dealers. The Court left open the question
of whether the plaintiff was entitled to relief in a national tribunal
as a result of a violation of Coal-Steel Community Treaty Article
4b and determined the litigation on the basis of the provisions of
the German Law against Restraint of Trade, in particular those governing enterprises with dominant market position.
The latter Court thus proceeded on the theory that the national
laws against anticompetitive practices remain applicable to the enterprises subject to the discipline of the Coal-Steel Community
Treaty so long as there is no conflict between the two sets of rules.
Absence of tort liability under national law for violations of the
prohibitions of Article 6 5 accordingly would not mean freedom
from any liability, if, and to the extent that, such conduct is also in
contravention of national legislation.
C. PROTECTION AGAINST ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND
MisUsE OF DoMINANT MARKET PowER
I. CONTROL OF NEW CONCENTRATIONS

a. Genesis and Purpose of Article 66

As has been mentioned before, the Treaty includes not only prohibitions against cartelization and concerted practices (Article 6 5)
but, in addition, contains provisions designed ·(a) to curb new concentration of economic power through total or partial integration
of enterprises (Article 66(1-6) ), and (b) to suppress misuses of
dominant market power by enterprises which have or acquire such
position (Article 66 ( 7)).
560
30 BGHZ 74 ( 1959). The decision is criticized by Janssen van Raay, Een beslissing
van het Bundesgerichts-hof over E.G.K.S.-recht, [1960] NEDERLANDS }URISTENBLAD 437•
561
Court of Appeals of Celie, Sept. 1, 1958, 9 WuW 290 (1959).
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Provisions for administrative control of misuses of dominant
market power, such as are contained in the last section of Article 66,
were traditional with some of the European antitrust legislation
and could be found in the German Cartel Ordinance of 1923 and
the Dutch Cartel Ordinance of I 941, as amended in I 942. 562 Their
inclusion in the market discipline of the Treaty, therefore, was not
novel.
Limitations on economic concentration by integration, however,
were unknown to European cartel legislation and were inserted
in the framework of the Treaty, at least in a large measure, it
seems, upon the insistence of the Allied Occupation Authorities
in Germany who desired a legal palliative against future untrammeled reconcentration in the German coal and steel industry, which
had been subjected to drastic deconcentration just at the time of
the negotiations of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty. 563
The Treaty did not aim at a re-structuring of the common market
as it existed at the time the Treaty became operative, but it subjects
any new concentration of enterprises to the control of the Community agencies, thus forestalling the formation of giants with market
power deemed to be excessive.

b. Method and Scope of Control
( 1) Form of control in general. Article 66 ( 1) of the
Treaty requires prior approval by the High Authority for every
transaction which, directly or indirectly, effectuates within the common market a concentration, as understood by the Treaty, involving at least one enterprise that is engaged in coal or steel production
or in distribution except retail trade. Article 66 ( 2) makes it mandatory for the High Authority to grant such approval, unless the ensuing concentration gives the enterprises involved excessive power
over the market according to a set of criteria specified by the Treaty.
The High Authority is empowered by Article 66 (I) to determine, by
way of regulation, the factors which constitute control for the purposes of a concentration within the meaning of that Article. Moreover, the High Authority, by way of regulation, may also exempt
662
See supra part II, sections A and C.
"""See supra text at note 509. For a discussion of the deconcentration of the West
German coal and steel industry under Allied High Commission Law No. 27 of
May 16, 1950 (AHC Off. Gaz. No. 20, 299) and the interrelation between this
program and the negotiation and ratification of the E.C.S.C. Treaty see Office of
the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany [FINAL] REPORT ON GERMANY, 1949-1952,
at 108-113 (1952); Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 6TH QuARTERLY REPORT, 83 (1951); 7TH QUARTERLY REPORT, 15, 52, 109 (1951).
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certain types of transactions resulting in concentration from the requirement of prior approval if their effects are certain not to be
harmful to competition (Article 66 (3)). The High Authority has
issued regulations both as envisaged by Article 66 ( 1) 564 and Article 66 (3) .565
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(2) Concept of concentration within the meaning of
Article 66; scope of applicability. Unfortunately Article 66 does
not contain a direct definition of the concept of concentration. However, it is possible to glean its criteria from various elements of that
complex provision. Accordingly, a concentration within the meaning of the Treaty (a) occurs ((between enterprises," one of which
must be a producer of or wholesale dealer in coal and steel products,
(b) is the direct or indirect effect, within the common market territory, of an operation consisting in the act of a person or enterprise,
or a group of persons or enterprises, (c) is accomplished by merger,
acquisition of stock or assets, loan, contract, or other means of control. The essence of concentration, then, is the establishment of a
common control over the equipment or management of an enterprise
subject to the general discipline of the Treaty and that of another
enterprise operating in the common market. 566 The concept includes
cases of both horizontal and vertical arrangements.
The High Authority, with the advice of the Council of Ministers,
has issued a detailed regulation specifying the proprietary or contractual arrangements which, under appropriate factual conditions,
may confer power to control production, pricing investments, procurement, sales, or distribution of profits and thus constitute elements of control as envisaged in the definition of concentration. 567
The acquisition of stock by banks in connection with the formation
of corporations or the issuance of new stock for purposes of resale
does not constitute control as long as the right to vote such shares
remains unexercised. 568
... Decision No. 24-54, May 6, 1954, [1954] }'L OFF. 345·
565
Decision No. 25-54, May 6, 1954, and No. 28-54, May 26, 1954, [1954] }'L OFF.

346, 381.
566
For a discussion of the concept of concentration see also KRAWIELICKI, DAS
MONOPOLVERBOT IM SCHUMAN-PLAN, 55 (1952); REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE
DU CHARBON ET DE L'AciER, 215 ( 1953); Roblot, Les relations privees des entreprises
assujetties a la C.E.C.A., 17 DROIT SociAL, 561 at 575 ( 1954) ; Prieur, The Concept of

the Concentration of Enterprises within the Meaning of art. 66 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty,
82 ]OURN. DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 807 (1955); KERN, DAS RECHT DER UNTERNEHMENSZUSAMMENSCHLUSSE IN DER MONTANUNION 37 ( 1955), review thereof by J erusaJem, 8 NJW 1430 (1955).
507
Decision 24-54, [1954] ]'L OFF. 345 and comments thereon, Prieur, op. cit. supra
note 566, at 817 ( 1955); Kern, op. cit. supra note 566, at 52.
""'Decision 24-54, art. 2, [1954] ]'L OFF. 345·
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Article 66 (I) requires previous approval for "operations" effecting concentration. The question has been posed whether concentrations resulting from an operation of law, such as intestate succession, are included within this term or whether it is equivalent
with, and limited to, the concept of transaction. Authors who have
taken the former view have pointed out that in any case the acceptance of the inheritance may be subject to prior approval. 569 The
controversy obviously will require final resolution by the Court.
Apart from exceptions no longer material, the regime of the
Treaty applies only to new concentrations, i.e., operations taking
effect after the date at which the Treaty went into force. The requirement of prior approval, moreover, affects only transactions
subsequent to the promulgation of the pertinent regulation. 570
(3) Conditions for refusal of approval. The grant of
the approval is mandatory unless the High Authority finds that the
contemplated concentration affords the participants excessive market power with respect to products subject to its jurisdiction. That
condition is deemed to exist if the parties are capable either (a) of
determining the price, of controlling or restricting the production or
distribution, or hindering the maintenance of an effective competition, in a significant part of the market for such products, or (b) of
escaping the Treaty rules governing competition, especially through
the establishment of an artificial position of privilege which affords a
substantial advantage in the access to sources of supply or outlets. 571
The Treaty provides expressly that the High Authority, in making the requisite determination, is bound to observe the basic principle of non-discrimination and therefore to take account of the size of
other enterprises of the same type operating in the Community, to
the extent that it considers justified in order to avoid or correct
disadvantages which flow from a disparity in competitive position. 572
In practice the High Authority has exercised its powers over concentrations with extreme caution and in a restrained case-by-case
approach. Up to the present it has seen no occasion for refusing any
of the applications processed so far. 573 As a result the Common As56" REUTER, op. cit. supra note 566, at 216; Rob lot, op. cit. supra note 566, at 575· Contra
KRAWIELICKI, op. cit. supra note 566, at 57· That author, however, concedes that a
concentration by operation of law may be subject to the High Authority's power, of
deconcentration under art. 66 ( 5) ( 2).
67
° Convention on Transitional Provisions sec. 13, paras. I & 2.
671
Art. 66 ( 2) para. I.
672
Art. 66 ( 2) para. 2.
673
See the survey in the High Authority, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE CoMMUNITY, 203 (196o). For an expose of the criteria applied by the High
Authority in the disposition of applications for authorization of concentrations see its
reply to the written interpellation No. 2r-6o [r96o] ]'L OFF. 1078.
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sembly has pressed for the development of a more articulate and
energetic policy in that field. 574 The pending application for authorization of a concentration reuniting August Thyssen Hiitte AG
and Phoenix-Rheinrohr AG (the two most important enterprises
carved from the former Thyssen combine), however, has met with
considerable opposition from the High Authority.
c. Enforcement and Sanctions
Article 66 accords the High Authority broad powers of investigation 575 and of enforcing the observance of the discipline of the
Treaty with respect to concentrations. 576 Article 66 ( 5) differentiates between two categories of concentrations accomplished in contravention to the provisions of the Treaty: (a) those which are
irregular because they lack the requisite prior authorization but for
which such authorization would have been mandatory; (b) those
which are illegal because they result in excessive market power as
defined by Article 66 ( 2) .
In the first alternative the primary sanctions consist of fines imposed upon the persons responsible for the operation. The maximum amounts of these fines are fixed by Article 66 ( 6). Only if
the fines remain unpaid, may the High Authority proceed to deconcentration of the enterprises involved in the irregular concentration.
In the second alternative the High Authority must first make a
finding as to the excessive market power resulting from the concentration. After a hearing which permits the interested parties to
present their arguments the High Authority may order the steps
appropriate for severing the concentration and restoring the normal conditions of competition, such as divorcement, dissolution,
and divestiture. In case of non-compliance with its mandates the
High Authority itself may proceed to the execution of the measures
specified, by making the appropriate orders or requesting the appointment of a receiver.
The determinations of the High Authority are subject to the usual
review by the Community Court, with the qualification, however,
that there is an appraisal de novo on the issue of excessiveness of
the resulting market power. 577
57
• The policy of the High Authority has been reviewed in two successive reports
on the concentration of enterprises in the Community by members of the Common
Assembly for the later's Commission: viz. by Mr. Henry Fayat, Common Assembly,
Doc. No. z6 (1956-1957) and by Mr. Lapie, Common Assembly, Doc. No. 16 (19571958).
676
Art. 66(4).
676
Art. 66(5).
677
Art. 66(5) para. 2,
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In the case of unauthorized concentrations the Treaty refrains
from ordaining nullity ab initio, as it does in the case of cartels and
other restrictive agreements.
2. CONTROL 0¥ THE CONDUCT OF ENTERPRISES WITH
DOMINANT MARKET POWER

Since Article 6 5 applies only to collective practices and since Article 66 ( 1-6) concerns only new concentrations, the framers of the
Treaty felt that additional safeguards for the competitive mechanism of the market were necessary with respect to anticompetitive
practices by single enterprises with dominant market power which
had attained this status either by unassailable pre-Treaty concentration or had acquired or were going to acquire it in a manner other
than by concentration. As has been mentioned-before, such approach
corresponds to significant precedents in European cartel legislation.
Accordingly, Article 66 ( 7) grants the High Authority additional
powers over enterprises in the coal and steel industry, whether public or private, which by reason of legal or factual circumstances
possess a dominant position with respect to their products in a significant part of the common market. If such enterprises engage in
practices which are inconsistent with the basic policies of the CoalSteel Community Treaty, such as the principle against non-discrimination, the High Authority may address appropriate recommendations for remedying the situation to the enterprise in question. 578
If the latter persists in its conduct, the High Authority may impose
upon it specific rules for doing business.

D.

PROTECTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE

As has been pointed out above in Section B, I a (I), the Treaty
not only protects the common market against anticompetitive practices by enterprises but also liberates and shields it from governmental measures that interfere with the forces of competition. One
of the bases of action by Community organs in such cases, though
somewhat perplexing in scope and modest in thrust, is Article 67.
578
A famous instance of a recommendation under art. 66(7) was that of July u,
1953, [1953] ]'L OFF. 154, directed to the Oberrheinische Kohlenunion, the exclusive
distributor for South and Southwest Germany of coal produced in the Ruhr, Saar,
Lorraine and Aix-la-Chapelle districts. It recommended to take all measures proper
to prevent practices contrary to art. 4· The addressee was a cartel which possessed
a dominant position in the market, but held a lease on life until the termination of
proceedings under art. 65 by virtue of sec. 12 of the Convention on Transitional
Provisions, see supra text at note 537· See also notes 551 and 557·
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This article concerns itself with "measures of member states that
are capable of exerting substantial influence upon the competitive
conditions in the coal industry." The Treaty differentiates between
two great classes of such measures:
(a) those which are capable of producing severe economic imbalance by significantly augmenting the differences in production
costs in a manner other than by increasing productivity;
(b) those which decrease the differences in production costs by
according special advantages to or imposing special burdens
upon domestic coal and steel enterprises as compared with
other domestic industries.
In cases of interferences of the latter type the High Authority is
authorized, after having consulted with the Council and the Consultative Committee, to address the appropriate recommendations
to the respective state. 578a
Another and seemingly much more comprehensive and effective
source of power for the Community organs is Article 88 of the
Treaty. It authorizes the High Authority to initiate certain proceedings and take certain measures whenever it finds that a member
state has failed to live up to its treaty obligations and, in particular,
to observe the sweepmg mandates of Articles 2-4. The High Authority has resorted to the procedure under Article 88 in two cases
involving official, or officially sanctioned, organisms possessing a
monopoly over coal imports, the Office Comm~rcial du Ravitaillement in Luxembourg and A.T.I.C. in France. )'he former controversy became moot when the Luxemburgian government rescinded
the provisions governing the importation of solid fuels. 578 b The
A.T.I.C. dispute is still in the stage of negotiations between France
and the High Authority 578c and has involved the latter in a damage
suit brought by a Belgian dealer on the ground that the High Authority has failed to perform an official duty.'578d
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For a more detailed discussion of the purpose and scope of Article 67, see Reuter,

op. cit. supra note 566, 196.
578

See E.C.S.C., High Authority, SIXTH GENERAL REPORT 92 ( 1958).
See supra note 185 and E.C.S.C., High Authority, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT 195
(1960).
678
d Societe Commerciale A. Vloeberghs S.A. c. Haute Autorite, [1960] }'L OFF. 8o8.
•

678
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IV. THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION IN THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

A.

THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION WITHIN THE
GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMUNITY
STRUCTURE
I.

FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE GENERAL
EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

a. From the European Coal and Steel Community
to the European Economic Community

(I) Functional and institutional changes in Community
organization. When the governments of the six nations forming the
European Coal and Steel Community decided 579 to take the long
step from a partial economic integration, restricted to the coal and
steel industry, to a general economic integration encompassing the
whole field of production and distribution, by the establishment of
a new European Economic Community, it became clear that the pattern of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty would have to be significantly modified, both as to functional and institutional aspects.
While a detailed comparison of the legal framework of the two
communities would go far beyond the scope of this discussion, 580
it is necessary to underscore a few basic likenesses and differences.
There is no question that the architects of the new European
Economic Community relied heavily on the experience and structure
of the European Coal and Steel Community as the starting point
for their blueprint. As Professor Reuter has put it so adroitly: "In
579

For the background of this decision, see supra Introduction.
For a general discussion of the politico-economic and legal structure of E.E.C.
(with or without comparison with E.C.S.C. and Euratom), see Carstens, Die Errich580

tung des gemeinsamen Marktn in der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Atomgemeinschaft und Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl, I8 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 459 ( I958) ; Catalano, LA COMMUNITA EcoNOMICA EUROPEA E L'EURATOM (I957); Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communaute Economique
Europeenne, I958 REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN, 6 (No. I), x6I (No.3), 310 (No. 6);
Soule, Comparaison entre les dispositions institutionnelles du Traite CECA et du Trait/
GEE, 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN, 95 (No. 2), 208 (No. 4); Le Marchi Commun
et ses problemes, I958 REVUE n'EcoNoMIE PoLITI QUE, Numero Special; Les Aspects Juridiques du Marche Commun, 8 COLL. SCIENT!FIQUE DE LA FACULTE DE-DROIT DE L'UNIV. DE
LIEGE (I958); Aspects du Marchi Commun, 3 BIBLIOTHEQUE DE LA SOCIETE RoYALE
D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DE BELGE (I958). For an article-by-article explanation of the
Treaty see von der Groeben and von Boeckh, KoMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, (2 vols.
1958, 1960); WOHLFAHRT, EVERLING, GLAESNER, SPRUNG, DIE EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEME!NSCHAFT, KoMM!lNTAR ZUM VERTRAG ( I960).
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a large measure E.E.C. is an extrapolation of the European Coal
and Steel Community." 581 Both organizations are fashioned as
Communities of the member nations; 582 both Communities depend
upon the institution of a common market, i.e., a market freed from
all national barriers, at least against a free circulation of goods 583
as a principal means for the attainment of the community goals.
However, while the common market is the "basis" and sole
mechanism of the Coal-Steel Community, 584 the E.E.C. Treaty adds
the gradual approximation of the economic policies of the member
states as an additional instrument of E.E.C. 585 Moreover, the common market of E.E.C. is surrounded by a uniform customs wall 586
and developed by a common commercial policy vis-a-vis other nations,587 while the Coal-Steel Community does not provide for such
an arrangement. 588 Conversely, only the Coal-Steel Community
Treaty accords the Community agencies extensive "dirigistic" or
regulatory powers over the market in circumstances where economic
developments render a reliance on its auto-mechanism unfeasible.589
The E.E.C. Treaty does not duplicate this scheme and entrusts the
Community, acting through the Council of Ministers, only with few
and narrowly circumscribed direct powers of economic controJ.5 90
Needless to say, these changes in function were caused not only by
the differences in economic structure and magnitude of the two markets, but also, and perhaps primarily, by the realistic respect of the
drafters for national sensitivities, the resurgence of economic liberalism, and certain other developments in the general political
climate. 591 The same considerations produced corresponding 1Jlodifications in the institutional framework. The framers of the new
Treaty avoided provocative terms such as "supranational" or "High
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Reuter, op. cit. supra note 580, at 8.
582 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. I; E. E. C. Treaty art. I; cf. Carstens, op. cit. supra note
58o, at 46o.
1588
About the relativity of the notion of a common market, see also Carstens, op. cit.
supra note 580, at 460.
... E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. I and 2 para. I,
""'E.E.C. Treaty art. 2. While, accordingly, the economic policies of the states are
to be "harmonized," but, generally speaking, remain within the province of the
individual states, a more extensive integration is adopted with respect to foreign
commerce. It is to become a matter of Community policy at the end of the transitional
period, E.E.C. Treaty, art. Ill. See Carstens, op. cit. supra note s8o, at 495, 497, and
507, but contrast the skeptical comments by Reuter, op. cit. supra note 580, at 9.
""'E.E.C. Treaty arts. 18-29.
587
E.E.C. Treaty arts. no, n6.
1588
E. C. S.C. Treaty art. 72.
589
E.g. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 59·
6110
E.g. E.E.C. Treaty art. 103.
""'See the discussion by Reuter, op. cit. supra note 580, at 9 and II.
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Authority" and strengthened the participation of both the Council
of Ministers and the Assembly, transforming at the same time the
role of the Commission. 592
( 2) Changes in the normative technique of the respective
treaties. The difference in scale of the two markets and the impossibility of foreseeing and providing with precision all economic measures that might become necessary in the larger setting, no less than
the exigencies of political realities, resulted also in a significant
change in the normative technique employed by the framers of the
E.E.C. Treaty from that utilized by the draftsmen of the older instrument. The E.E.C. Treaty, much more than the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, is merely a "framework treaty." 593 In many of its
portions it is confined to a stipulation of programs and principles,
leaving the implementation to further normative procedures by the
Community agencies, in particular by the Council of Ministers. In
other words, the E.E.C. Treaty is of much lesser normative "density" than its counterpart of more ancient vintage. Accordingly,
the E.E.C. Treaty relies to a much greater extent than the CoalSteel Community Treaty on legislative or, at least, quasi-legislative
action by the Council 594 which, as the case may require, is either
directly applicable to individuals or requires further concretization
by legislation on the part of the Member States. 595 Corresponding
to this change in normative technique is a significant modification in
terminology evident from a comparison between Coal-Steel Community Treaty, Article 14, and E.E.C. Treaty, Article 189. The
latter expressly adds the further categories of "regulations" and
"directives" to the categories of decisions, recommendations, and
opinions defined by the former.
b. Legal Characteristics of the Common Market
(I) Unification without uniformization. The legal nature of the Common Market depends in the first place and most of
502
See Soule, op. cit. supra note sSo, at 98 (comparison of the respective functions
of the Councils of Ministers, of the High Authority, and of the Commission), 100
(comparison of the roles of the Assembly) ; Reuter, op. cit. suPra note 580, at 310;
Catalano, op. cit. supra note s8o, at 19-32. For the position of the Court of Justice,
see Daig, Die Gerichtsbarkeit in der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der

Europiiischen Atomgemeinschaft mit vergleichenden Hinweisen auf die Europiiische
Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl, 83 ARCH. OFF. R. 132 (1958).
"""Reuter, op. cit. supra note 580, at 161.
594
See Reuter, op. cit. supra note s8o, at 161; Meibom, Die Rechtsetzung durch die
Organe der Europiiischen Gemeinschaften, 14 BETRIEBS-BERATER, 127 ( 1959) ; Everling,
Die ersten Rechtsetzungsakte der Organe der Europiiischen Gemeinschaften, 14
52 ( 1959).
""" E.E.C. Treaty art. 189, paras. 2 and 3·

BETRIEBS-BERATER,
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all on the character and degree of integration of the Community
which it serves. As has been stated before, the objective of the
Treaty of Rome is the achievement of European integration on a
predominantly economic rather than on a primarily political level.
Thus, the European Economic Community "is founded upon a customs union," 596 entailing a fusion of the markets included therein,
but without exhausting itself solely in that feature. Rather the Common Market, as instituted, is to evolve under the aegis of a common
and unified commercial policy 597 and of harmonized policies of the
Member States covering other economic matters. 598 In other words,
in the latter respects the individual Member States retain their separate though greatly tempered jurisdictions. 599 Accordingly, the Common Market is conceived as a unified but, speaking legally, not uniform market.
The fusion of the markets is to be achieved by a successive removal of all internal barriers against (a) the free exchange of
goods, 600 (b) the mobility of the labor force, 601 (c) the exercise of
a trade by citizens of the other Member States, 602 (d) the right to
work of non-resident citizens of the other Member States, 603 and
(e) the transfer of capital from one Member State to another. 604
The Common Market includes agriculture, but the Treaty establishes a separate discipline for that sector. 605 The coherence of the
Common Market is safeguarded by provisions for a common transportation policy. 606 However, the Treaty has not unified the currency of the Member States.

( 2) Reliance on the auto-mechanism of the market. The
discipline of the Common Market, especially after the expiration
of the transitional period, is inspired by a liberalistic approach. 607
The market is to be shaped by its own auto-mechanism as governed
by the forces of normal competition. Therefore, the framers of the
Treaty concentrated primarily on the removal of obstacles to, and
506

E. E. C. Treaty art. 9·
E.E.C. Treaty art. IIO, para. 2, art. III (r); see Carstens, op. cit. supra note 580,
at 495-500.
698
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 2, 104, 145; see also art. 103 (policies regarding cyclical
fluctuations) and art. 105 (policies regarding currency questions).
599
See Carstens, op. cit. suPra note 580, at 497, 498.
000
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 12-17, 3o-37.
001
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 48-51.
002
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 52-58.
603
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 59-66.
""'E.E.C. Treaty arts. 67-73.
606
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 38-47.
006
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 74-84.
007
See Reuter, op. cit. supra note 580, at II.
697
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the protection of, sound competition. Only a few cautious provisions
permit direct Community intervention in the processes of the market. The establishment of the European Investment Bank, formed
by the Member States, 608 and the creation of the European Social
Fund 609 may be cited as mild forms of "dirigistic" tendencies.
Powers to take more drastic measures are conferred only with vague
contours in the matrix of the provisions for the development of
concordant policy by the individual states with respect to cyclical
fluctuations. 610
2. PATTERN OF THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION IN
THE E.E.C. TREATY

a. Structure and Interrelation of the Treaty
Provisions in General
Since the European Economic Community relies so preponderantly on the competitive auto-mechanism of the Common Market
for its progress and the achievement of its aims, the framers of the
Treaty took particular pains in providing for appropriate conditions
and safeguards needed to assure a proper functioning of the competitive process.
Not only does Article 3 (f) specify that one of the principal activities of the Community consists in "the establishment of a regime
which assures that competition in the Common Market is not adulterated," but this program is implemented by a series of detailed
provisions to that effect. It may even be, as Professor Reuter
claims, 611 that the drafters have belabored this subject too much and
that their afterthoughts have resulted in defective formulations.
Theory and arrangement of the Treaty proceed on the basis that
such deleterious restraints or adulterations of competition may result either (a) from anticompetitive practices engaged in by private
or public enterprises operating in the market, or (b) from direct
and open restrictions or discriminatory burdens imposed, or competitive advantages granted, by the Member States, or (c) repercussions on the market structure of existing or contemplated differences and inequalities in the general legal systems of the Member
States. Accordingly, the Treaty contains not only regulations per006

E.E.C. Treaty arts. 129, 130.
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 123-128.
E.E.C. Treaty art. 103.
ll1l See Reuter, op. cit. supra note sSo, at 8.

609
610
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tammg to anticompetitive practices by enterprises, 612 but, in addition, an array of provisions dealing with anticompetitive measures
by the Member States relating to public enterprises or enterprises
with special franchises, 613 dumping, 614 state subsidies, 615 discriminatory exactions, 616 and harmonizations of the legal systems. 617
This list shows in stark relief that the anticompetitive practices
by enterprises are only one facet of the total legal framework designed to assure a common market with a truly competitive mechanism and that the major preoccupations of the framers of the
Treaty focused on the distortions of the competitive process resulting from specific measures of the Member States or from the
repercussions of the divergencies in the different national legal systems. Needless to say, the comprehensive scope of the provisions
and, at the same time, delicate task of protecting competition in the
Common Market is reflected in the activities and attitudes of the
Community agencies. 618

b. Protection of Competition and Protection
Against Discrimination
Protection of competition and protection against economic discrimination are twin policies, although, on occasion, they may come
into perplexing conflict, as any person familiar with American antitrust law will confirm. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Treaty
intertwines the two principles. However, it does not lay down a
broad proscription of all discriminations of an economic nature. On
the one hand, it elevates the prohibition against discrimination on
grounds of nationality to one of the cardinal principles of the Community 619 and reiterates it specifically with respect to state measures
relative to (a) the supply of consumers by commercial state monopolies 620 and (b) activities of public enterprises and enterprises with
612

E.E.C. Treaty arts. 85-89.
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 90 and 37·
E.E.C. Treaty art. 91.
615
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 92-94616 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 95-99.
617
E.E.C. Treaty arts. roo-ro2.
618
See especially von der Groeben, Probtemes de la politique europeenne de concurrence, [1960] BULLETIN DE LA CEE No. 3, at 5· Verloren van Themaat, Fiinf Grundsiitze
der europiiischen Wirtschaftspolitik, 2 EuROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 535 (1959); Verloren
van Themaat, Competition and Restrictive Business Practices in the European Economic Community, FEDERAL BAR Ass'N. INSTITUTE ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 99 (1960).
619
E.E.C. Treaty art. 7, para. 1.
020
E.E.C. Treaty art. 37(1).
612

614
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special franchises. 621 On the other hand, the Treaty contains only
a few cautious prohibitions against other discriminatory practices
of economic import, that is, prohibitions against the imposition of
discriminatory business terms on sellers or buyers either by enterprises acting in concert 622 or by enterprises with dominant positions
in the market. 623
c. Comparison of the Protection of Competition in

the E.E.C. and Coal-Steel Community
In comparing the structure and form of the protection of competition in the E.E.C. Treaty with that of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, a few basic points become evident. On the one hand,
the pattern and formulation of a number of the respective provisions in the two Treaties have many common traits and, accordingly, present analogous problems of interpretation and application. On the other hand, there are marked fundamental differences.
The E.E.C. Treaty, because of the comprehensive scope of the
market and the abstention from vesting vast overriding powers
over the market in the Community organs, focuses much more than
the Coal-Steel Community Treaty on all facets of a balanced basis
for competition. Conversely, the E.E.C. Treaty attributes a somewhat more modest range to the principle of non-discrimination ~
and deletes all barriers against economic concentrations, confining
itself merely to the control of abuses of monopoly power.
6 4

B.

THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AGAINST
CoLLECTIVE ANTICOMPETITIVE CoNDUCT oF
ENTERPRISES
I. STRUCTURE, APPLICABILITY, AND SCOPE OF THE

PROHIBITION AGAINST COLLECTIVE
ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

a. Structure of the E.E.C. Treaty, Article 8 5
The E.E.C. Treaty, Article 85, 625 following the example of the
Coal-Steel Community Treaty, Article 65, 626 contains a specific pro621

E.E.C. Treaty art. 90(1).
E.E.C. Treaty art. 85(1) (d).
623
E.E.C. Treaty art. 86(c) .
... See Reuter op. cit. supra note s&o, at 12.
25
" For the text, see supra part I, Sec. A, I.
""'For the text, see supra part III, Sec B, a (I).
622
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hibition against collective anticompetitive conduct by enterprises.
A comparison between the two Articles shows unmistakably that
the former is an extrapolation of the latter. Both Articles proscribe
collective anticompetitive action in the nature of "agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises and concerted practices"; both Articles designate the anticompetitive character of the prohibited conduct with the terms "hinder, restrain or
adulterate . . . competition"; both Articles are couched in the
form of a general clause followed by a list of specific categories of
anticompetitive practices; both Articles, finally, envisage exemptions from the prohibition. But there are numerous significant differences in the two provisions relating to (I) the formulation of
the general clause, ( 2) the classes of anticompetitive practices specifically enumerated, and ( 3) exemptions.

(I) Formulation of the general clause of the prohibition.
While the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, Article 6 5 (I), encompasses all enterprise actions of the specified collective nature which
"tend," directly or indirectly, to be anticompetitive within the Common Market, the general clause of E.E.C. Treaty, Article 8 5 (I),
applies to the defined collective enterprise actions only if they (a)
are capable of affecting [adversely J 627 the commerce among the
Member States and (b) have the designated anticompetitive character within the Common Market "as their object or effect." In
other words, the prohibition of Article 8 5 (I) covers only such collective conduct of anticompetitive purpose or effect which is not
purely intra-national but adversely affects commerce between Member States within the Common Market. 628 It is perhaps worth noting in passing that the E.E.C. Treaty does not refer to "normal
competition" as its predecessor does but merely to "competition"
pure and simple.
( 2) Specified categories of anticompetitive conduct. The
E.E.C. Treaty, as compared with the Coal-Steel Community Treaty,
expands the number and, in part, the scope of the categories of anti627 The addition of the adverb "adversely" is based on the German, Italian and
Dutch version of the controlling texts. It is not required by the French version. How·
ever, the Commission's Directorate General for Competition and the government ex·
perts on restrictive practices seem to endorse the reading given in the text. Whether a
given practice is capable of affecting commerce among the Member States must be
determined on the basis of the indications available at the time that decision is made,
E.E.C. Commission, THIRD GENERAL REPORT No. 140 (1960) .
... According to the Commission and the government experts, the term "common
market" refers to it as a geographical unit, 1959 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY, 38 (No.2, May 1959) i E.E.C. Commission THIRD GENERAL REPORT No. 140
(1960).
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competitive practices specifically listed following the general prohibitory clause. The Coal-Steel Community Treaty lists only three
special classes of such practices, price-fixing, limitations of production, technological development, or investments, and division of
markets or sources of supply. The E.E.C. Treaty adds two further
categories: (a) discriminations against customers in comparable
positions, with resulting competitive disadvantages for them, and
(b) the insistence on tying clauses not warranted by the nature of
the tied-in matter or commercial custom, apparently following the
example of the analogous provisions of a French ordinance. 629
Under the E.E.C. Treaty, as under the Coal-Steel Community
Treaty, there exists the problem as to the correct relationship between the elements of the general prohibitory clause and the definitions of specified anticompetitive practices in the catalogue following it. It seems to be beyond question that the enumerated practices
are proscribed only if they are capable of affecting adversely the commerce between Member States.629a It is, however, an open question
whether, in addition, it must be shown that they have an anticompetitive character as their object or effect, or whether such nature is
conclusively presumed for the classes singled out by the Treaty. The
answer must await further clarification in practice. 629b
( 3) Possibility of exemptions from the prohibition. Following the example of Coal-Steel Community Treaty, Article
65(2), and of the French cartel decrees of 1953-1958, the E.E.C.
Treaty provides for exemptions from the sweeping prohibition of
Article 8 5 ( r) .630 These exceptions cover those agreements between
enterprises, decisions of associations of enterprises, and concerted
practices of enterprises, which the framers of the Treaty deemed
to be capable of an over-all salutary effect. Accordingly, authorization of an exemption is predicated on the fulfillment of four cumulative conditions, namely, that the agreements, decisions or practices
in question
(a) contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of products, or to the promotion of technical or economic
progress;
629
Ordinance No. 45-1483, art. 37(a) and (c) as amended. See supra note 188 and
text at that note; cf. also Fabre, Les Pratiques commerciales restrictives et le Traite
de Marchi Commun, 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN, 260 (No. 5).
629
• Accord, E.E.C. Commission, THIRD GENERAL REPORT No. 140 ( 1960).
629
• See infra, text at note 654.
636
E.E.C. Treaty art. 8 5 ( 3) •
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(b) leave an equitable share of the resulting gain to the consumers;
(c) refrain from subjecting the enterprises involved to restraints
which are not indispensable for the attainment of those goals;
(d) do not give those enterprises the power of eliminating competition for a substantial portion of the products in question.
It would seem, therefore, that the E.E.C. Treaty employs greater
latitude in the matter of exemptions from the prohibition against
collective anticompetitive practices than the Coal-Steel Community
Treaty which accords such privilege only to a few designated categories of cartel agreements.
Moreover, the former Treaty permits greater flexibility in the
administration of the exemptions than the latter, which requires the
High Authority to grant approval to cartel agreements whenever
the delineated standards are met and confines the High Authority
to a case-by-case procedure. According to E.E.C. Treaty, Articles
85(3) and 87(2) (b), the dispensation seems to be discretionary,
and its availability may be determined in detail by general regulations, including regulations which accord blanket exemption in advance to specified categories of restrictive agreements or practices
deemed to meet the requisite standards.
Until the issuance of these general regulations, the appropriate
authorities of the Member States are empowered to decide on the
applicability of the exemptions, 631 apparently by following a caseby-case approach. 632 Finally, it should be noted that the prohibitions
of Article 8 5 ( 1) apply to agricultural products only to the extent
that will be determined by the Council. 633
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

b. The Problem of Immediate Applicability

E.E.C. Treaty, Article 87, requires the Council to issue regulations for the purpose of implementing the prohibitions and dispensations provided for in Article 8 5. In particular such regulations
should pertain to :
631

E.E.C. Treaty art. 88.
The German Cartel Office has employed the power flowing from art. 88 in
connection with art. 85 ( 3) and has granted a temporary dispensation for restrictive
patent licensing agreements. Bundeskartellamt, Bericht iiber seine Tiitigkeit in Jahre
1959, Deutscher Bundestag, 3· Wahlperiode, Drucksache 1795, 55 (1960). For one
of these decisions see Federal Cartel Office, Adjudication Division, Order of Feb. 19,
1959 (thread-cutting machinery), 9 WuW 259-305 (1959).
633
E.E.C. Treaty art. 42.
682
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I) measures of constraint appropriate to assure the observance
of the prohibitions;
2) the details governing the application of the provision for possible exemption;
3) the scope of applicability of Article 8 5 with respect to particular branches of the economy;
4) the delineation of the relative functions of the Court and the
Commission in the application of these regulations;
5) the determination of the relation between the national legal
systems and the rules governing competition contained m
either the Treaty or the implementing regulations.
In view of the importance and the scope of the regulations so
envisaged a veritable literary battle has been fought as to whether
or not the prohibitions and possible dispensations provided in Article 85 constitute directly and immediately applicable rules of law,
even prior to the issuance of the regulation under Article 87. 634
63
' Of the copious literature, mention may be made of the following: Brijnen &
Wertheimer, De Interpretatie van de Kartelbepalingen in het EWG-Frrdrag (with
postscript by Verloren van Themaat), 5 SOCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 253 (I957);
Coing-Kronstein-Schlochauer, Das F erhaltnis des deutschen Kartellrechts zu den
kartel/rechtlichen Forschriften des EWG Fertrags, 7 SCHRIFTEN DES INST. F. AUSL. &
INTERN. WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (I958); Dei Marmo!, Marchi commun et ententes internationales, [I957] FABRIMETAL 492; PLAISANT AND LASSIER, ENTENTES ET MARCHE
COMMUN (Comite d'Action et d'Expansion Economique, 1960); Deringer, Zwei Jahre
europiiische Kartel/politik, 3 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 43-47, 66-68 (I96o); Fabre,
Les Pratiques Gommerciales Restrictives et le Traite de Marche Gommun, I REVUE
DU MARCHE CoMMUN 260 (I958); van Geldern, Le prob/Cme de l'applicabilite directe
des regles de concurrence dans la GEE, 5 NED. T!JDSCHR. VOOR INTERNATIONAAL R.
366 (I958); Giinther, Die Regelung des Wettbewerbs im Fertrag zur Griindung der
Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 7 WuW 275 ( I957); Koch, Das F erlzaltnis der

Kartellvorschriften des EWG Fertrages zum Ges. geg. Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen,
I4 BETRIEBS-BERATER 24I ( I959) ; Obernolte, Die Wettbewerbsbedingungen im
Gemeinsamen Markt, 3 EuROP.iiiSCHE WIRTSCHAFT 93-95, I62-164, 183-184 ( 1960) ; Peters, Die W ettbewerbsbestimmungen fur den Gemeinsamen M arkt, I EUROPXISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 126, I46 ( I958) ; Reuter, Ententes et cartels (Apropos de /'application des art. 85 et suiv.), I959 REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 46 (No. 10); Schumacher,
La Politique de la GEE en matiere d'ententes, I959 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 207
(No. I4); Schumacher, Enthalten die Artt. 85 und 86 des EWG Fertrages bereits in
den Mitgliedstaaten geltende Rechtsnormen? 8 WuW 779 (I958); Spengler, Die
F ertragsbestimmungen iiber die Wettbewerbsregeln im Gemeinsamen Markt, 2I DER
BETRIEB 75 (I959); Spengler, Abgrenzung zwischen GWG und EWG-Fertrag, in
Miiller-Henneberg & Schwartz, GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, Anh. zu
§ IOI, No. 3 (I958) and in 8 WuW 73, 461 (1958); SPENGLER, DIE WETTBEWERBSREGELN DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT, BUNDESVERBAND DER DEUTSCHEN
INDUSTRIE, (Drucks. No. 46) ( I957) ; Steindorff, Das F erbot von Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen in der Anfangszeit der EWG, I3 BETRIEBS-BERATER 89 (I958);
Strickrodt, Geltungskraft und Geltungsumfang der W ettbewerbsregeln im F ertrag
iiber den Gemeinsamen Markt, DER BETRIEB, 3 (Beilage Nr. 9l57); Snetens, De

mededingingsregeling voor ondernemingen in het F erdrag der Europese Ekonomische
Gemeenschap, 23 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 954 (I960); Verloren van Themaat, De
Kartelpolitiek in der Europese Economische Gemeenschap, 5 SocrAAL-EcoN. WETGEVING
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There is little point in reviewing the arguments pro and con or in
discussing the many nuances of the divergent views advanced, but
a brief survey of the practical developments and of the present
status of the issue should be useful.
The controversy over the legal status of the rules governing cornpetition of enterprises in Article 8 5 and the following articles precipitated lengthy debates in the Dutch Parliament on the occasion
of the ratification of the E.E.C. Treaty. 635 The government took
the position that the interrelation of the various provisions in these
articles warranted the conclusion that the rule of Article 8 5 ( 2),
which declared agreements or decisions prohibited by that article to
be null and void, did not become operative until the enactment of the
regulations envisaged by Article 87. This position was enshrined in
a bill purporting to execute Article 8 8 of the Treaty. The bill was
enacted into law on December 5, 1957. 636 It provides that arrangements regulating competition, as mentioned in E.E.C. Treaty, Article 8 8, shall be unexceptionable and no misuse of a dominant position in the Common Market, as mentioned in said Article, shall be
deemed to be made so long as, and to the extent that, the appropriate Dutch authorities have not interceded by virtue of the Cartel
Ordinance of 1941 or the Economic Competition Act of 1956. The
applicability of the Act was limited to a period beginning with the
entry into force of the E.E.C. Treaty and ending with the issuance
of the regulations under Article 87.
The constitutionality of this legislation was drawn into issue in
I 9 58 in a much-noted litigation pending in the District Court of
Zutphen. 637 Plaintiff and defendant had entered into an agreement
dividing between them the Belgian and Dutch markets for a particular product. Upon the entry into force of the E.E.C. Treaty, the
defendant, a Dutch corporation, claimed that the agreement had become null and void and refused further compliance. Plaintiff sued
for specific performance. The Court granted the relief prayed for.
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

224 ( 1957) ; Verloren van Them a at, Fiinf Grundsiitze der europiiischen W ettbewerbspolitik, 2 EUROPAISCHE \VIRTSCHAFT 335 (1960); Weebers, Kartelcontrole op de Europese Gemeenschap/ijke Markt, 35 DE NAAMLOOZE VENNOOTSCHAP 86 (1957); Thiesing
in I GROEBEN-BOECKH, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, comments to art. 85 (1958);
WoHLFAHRT-EVERLING-GLAESNER-SPRUNG, KoMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG comments
to art. 85 (1960).
686
Proceedings of the Second Chamber, Oct. 1-4, 1957; Proceedings of the First
Chamber, Dec. 3 and 4, 1957.
636
Staatsbl. (No. 528, 1957).
637
S.A. Tuberies Louis Julien w. N.V. Van Katwijk's Papier en carton verw. Ind.,
1958 NED. JURISPR. 984, noted by Schumacher, 8 WuW 779 (1958), Steindorff, 13
8ETRIEilS-BERATER 931 (1958).
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It held that the act of December 5, I957, supported the complaint
and that the act was not invalid because of inconsistency with
the Treaty since Article 85 ( 2) could not be considered to be directly
applicable prior to the issuance of the regulations under Article
87.638

In Germany the problem of the immediate and direct applicability
of Article 8 5 (I) and ( 2) was raised in two suits to enjoin violations
of retail price maintenance systems brought by manufacturers
against retailers. 639 In both cases, however, the courts saw no necessity for passing on the issue since they found that the price-fixing
schemes in question did not adversely affect commerce between the
Member States. The German Cartel Office, however, has held that
Article 8 5 (I) and ( 3) is immediately applicable and must be considered in applications to the Cartel Office for approval of patent
licenses with restrictive clauses, submitted under Section 20 ( 3) of
the German Restraints of Competition Act. 640
The position of the German Cartel Office was endorsed by the
government experts on cartels (who studied the principal problems
arising from Articles 8 5-90 in a series of conferences convened by
the staff of the Commission), as well as by the latter body itself and
by the Parliamentary Assembly. 641 According to the conclusions
688
The judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeal at Arnhem, 6 NED. TIJDSCHR.
V. INTERN. RECHT 408.
639
Court of Appeals of Dusseldorf, Order of Oct. 21, 1958, 2 W 47/58, 4 WETTBEWERB
IN RECHT UND PRAXIS 382 (1958); 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1110 (1958); District Court of
Frankfurt, Order of Feb. 13, 1959, 14 BETRIEBS-BERATER 210 at 213 ( 1959).
040
Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes iiber seine Tiitigkeit im Jahre 1959, Deutscher
Bundestag, 3· Wahlperiode, Drucksache 1795, at 55 ( 1960). See Thread-cutting machinery case, Cartel Office, Adjudication Division, Order of Feb. 19, 1959, 9 WuW
305 ( 1959). In that and the other cases dispensation was granted under E.E.C. Treaty
85 ( 3) in conjunction with art. 88.
641
As of May r, 1960 seven conferences of the national cartel experts had been held.
The first of them met on Nov. 18-19, 1958 and was followed by others taking place
on Jan. 15-16, 1959; April 14-15, 1959; June 29-30, 1959; October 8-9, 1959; December 15-16, 1959; March 16-17, 1960. These conferences have deliberated consecutively:
upon the effect of articles 85 and 86; the functions of the national authorities and
the Commission under articles 88 and 89 in the present enforcement of the rules on
competition; the cases falling within the categories specifically listed in art. 85 ( 1);
the characteristics of a dominant position; the impact of existing or proposed national
procedures on the procedures to be followed on the Community level; the effect of
art. 90 on the position of public enterprises and enterprises operating under a public
franchise; the procurement of requisite data. For the conclusions reached see Communaute Economique Europeenne, Commission, PREMIER RAPPORT GENERAL, III, 59 ff.
(1958); DEUXIEME RAPPORT GENERAL, 85 (1959); THIRD GENERAL REPORT, III, 32-38
(1960); BULLETIN OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Engl. ed. 26 (No. 1-58),
37 (No. 2-59), 47 (No. 3-59); French ed. 24 (No. 1-59), 40 (No. 1-6o), 38 (No. 3-6o),
39 (No. 4-6o); Germ. ed. 45 (No. 4-59), 49 (No. 5-59). For resumes of the conclusions of the first three conferences of the national experts see 9 WuW 445 ( 1959) ;
for information on the succeeding four conferences see EuROfE, EuRATOM & MARCRE
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reached by these authorities the wording and the interrelation of
the various pertinent articles have the result that
1) the prohibitions of Article 85 ( 1) and the provision for dispensations of Article 85 (3) are immediately and directly operative legal rules;
2) the national authorities, under Article 88, 642 and the Commission, under Article 89, 643 are jointly charged with their
current application, the principal responsibility for this task
resting with the national authorities;
3) the Member States are obligated to designate the proper
agencies for, and to regulate the applicable procedure in, the
performance of the functions entrusted to the national authorities by Article 88.
As Italy/44 Belgium, until May 27, 1960, and Luxembourg had
no legislation sufficient to constitute a compliance with their duty
in that respect, the Commission addressed a letter to these three
governments inviting them to take the necessary steps.645
The Commission has taken great pains to point out that its position has no necessary bearing on, and leaves still unsolved, the
question of whether the illegality and invalidity of the prohibited
practices, as established by Article 85 ( 2), can be invoked prior to
COMMUN, DAILY BULLETIN No. 446 (June 27, 1959) j No. 528 (Oct. 16, 1959); No.
577 (Dec. 14, 1959); No. 624 (Mar. 15, 1960).
642
Art. 88 provides: "Until the time when the regulations issued under Article 87
go into effect, the authorities of the Member States pass on the permissibility of
collective practices and on the misuse of a dominant position in the Common Market
in conformity with the law of their countries and the provisions of Article 85, in
particular paragraph 3, and of Article 86."
643 Art. 89 provides: "(1) Without prejudice to Article 88, the Commission, from
the assumption of its functions, shall watch over the execution of the principles laid
down in Articles 85 and 86. Either upon request by a Member State or upon its own
initiative, and in conjunction with the appropriate authorities of the Member States
which are bound to render official assistance, it shall investigate the cases in which
infractions of these principles are suspected. If an infraction be found it proposes the
measures appropriate to terminate the same. (2) If the infraction does not cease
the Commission shall find the existence of such infraction in a reasoned opinion. It
may publish that decision and authorize the Member States to take the measures
necessary for remedying the situation, specifying their terms and details."
"''The Italian legislature, when authorizing ratification of the E.E.C. Treaty, empowered the government to issue the decrees "necessary ••. to effectuate the measures
provided by article ••• 89 ••• , [and] to accord, consistent with the combined
content of articles 85 and 88 of the E.E.C. Treaty, the dispensations envisaged by
art. 85 (3) of said Treaty." Law No. 1203 of Oct. 14, 1957, Gazzetta Ufficiale No. 317
of Dec. 23, 1957 (supp. ord. 2) •
... BULLETIN DE LA COMMUNAU:TE EcoNOMIQUE EUROPEENNE 27 (No. 1-58). In the
interest of uniformity the Commission has expressed preference for the designation of
administrative agencies as appropriate authorities for the per:f'~rmance of the functions
under art. 88. C.E.E., Commission, DEUXIllME RAPPORT GENERAL 88 (1959).
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an intervention by the appropriate authorities under Articles 8 8 and
89. 646 In other words, the issue which was actually before the District Court in Zutphen is still unresolved and requires ultimate clarification by the Court of Justice. 647
c. Scope of the Prohibitions

As might be expected, the broad formulae of the prohibitions of
Article 8 5 (I) have shown, and are bound to show in the future, a
marked proclivity to spawn delicate problems of interpretation respecting their scope. The Council sensibly has hesitated to issue the
supplementary regulations envisaged by Article 87. As far as the
broader contours are concerned, however, a prevailing trend of
opinion is in the state of crystallization with a reasonable prospect
of governing the practice.
Generally speaking, the conduct of enterprises in order to fall under the proscription of Article 85 (I) must possess three characteristics. It must:
I) be capable of adversely affecting the commerce between member states;
2) be of collective nature;
3) possess anticompetitive characteristics within the meaning of
the governing provisions.

(I) Capability of adversely affecting the commerce between Member States. It has been observed before that only conduct
which is capable of adversely affecting the commerce between Member States falls under the prohibition of the Treaty. Practices which
remain wholly intra-national in their effect remain outside the regulation of Article 8 5. 648 Conversely, restrictive agreements which cover
only the foreign commerce of a Member State without producing
anticompetitive repercussions in the domestic market, and which for
that reason may be permissible under national cartel laws, are nevertheless prohibited by the Treaty if they are capable of affecting the
... C.E.E., Commission, DEUXIEME RAPPORT GENERAL 89 ( 1959) .
... E.E.C. Treaty art. 177 requires that issues pertaining to the interpretation of the
Treaty that are necessary for a decision by a national court of last resort must be
certified for determination to the European Court of Justice .
... Thus the recent short-lived German Coal and Fuel Oil cartel, formed in order to relieve the technological depression of the coal industry, 'was approved by the German
Minister of Economic Affairs on Feb. 17, 1959, by virtue of his emergency powers
under the German Restraints of Competition Act, only after an express finding,
pursuant to E.E.C. Treaty art. 88, to the effect that the cartel did not adversely
affect the commerce between Member States, i.e., did not have anticompetitive effects
outside Germany. (See the text of the decree, 9 WuW 385.) Cf. also similar findings
by the Dusseldorf Court of Appeal and the Frankfurt District Court in the two
opinions, supra note 63 9·
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commerce of other nations. Export cartels, consequently, are no
longer immune unless the effect of their operations does not spill
over into the area of the Common Market. 649
( 2) Types of collective action reached by the prohibitions. Although the wording of the prohibitions of Article 8 5 (I) is
not entirely free from ambiguity, there seems to be a widespread
acceptance, both in doctrine 650 and in practice, 651 of the interpretation which does not restrict their application to horizontal arrangements but includes those of a purely vertical character. As has
been pointed out before, a similar construction prevails for the
analogous provision of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty. 652 An
opposite conclusion would outlaw vertical restrictive agreements
only if they are concluded by an enterprise possessing dominant market power.
As a result of the prevalent view, price maintenance schemes, tying agreements, exclusive dealing and requirement contracts, etc.,
may fall under the sweep of Article 8 5 (I). The prohibition applies,
however, only if such agreements are of an anticompetitive character within the meaning of Article 8 5 and if they are capable of
adversely affecting the commerce between Member States. The latter element usually will be absent if such agreements, as frequently
is the case, are confined to the national market. 653

(3) Anticompetitive character within the meaning of
Article 8 5 (I). Finally, collective practices are prohibited only if
they have anticompetitive character as defined in Article 8 5 (I). The
general clause considers practices as anticompetitive if they have
"the object or effect of hindering, restraining or adulterating competition" within the Common Market. Ordinarily, therefore, a finding of the presence or absence of this element will depend on an eco... C.E.E., Commission, PREMIER RAPPORT GENERAL, III, 59 If. (1958); Bericht des
Bundeskartellamtes iiber seine Tiitigkeit im Jahre 1959, op. cit. supra note 640, at
55· See also Verloren van Themaat, De Kartelpolitiek in de Europese Economische
Gemeenschap, 5 SociAAL EcoNOMISCHE WETGEVING 224, at 227 (1957) .
...,Verloren van Themaat, op. cit. supra note 649, at 227 (1957); Giinther, Die
Regelung des W ettbewerbs im 1"ertrag zur Griindung der Europ. Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 7 WuW 275, at 280 ( 1957); Schwartz, E.W.G.-1"ertrag und vertikale Bindung en, DER MARKENARTIKEL 317 (1959); but see Guglielmetti, Les exclusivites de
Vente, in LA LIBRE CONCURRENCE DANS LES PAYS DU MARCHE COMMUN (Journees
d'etudes de Caen, May 8-10, 1959), 1959 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN, 38, at 41
(Suppl. to No. 16).
861
See the decisions by the two German courts, supra note 639, and the decisions
by the German Cartel Office in the thread-cutting machinery case and their licensing
agreements, supra notes 632 and 640.
662
See supra part III, text at notes 532 and 533·
"""See the discussion of this point by Giinther, Marketing und Preisbindung der
zweiten Hand, 9 WuW 843, at_847, 848 (1959).
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nomic analysis of the pertinent market conditions. Whether, however, such procedure is needed even in those classes of cases which
are specifically enumerated is subject to considerable doubt. The
government experts on cartels apparently have not reached a definite
agreement on that point. 654
Particular doubts have been voiced about the status of exclusive
dealer franchises, whether territorially circumscribed or not, and of
requirement contracts. 655 It is not clear whether or not such agreements or certain types of them are included within the special category of Article 8 5 (I) (c), covering the division of markets or
sources of supply. If not, such arrangements would be considered as
anticompetitive only on the basis of their object or their likely effect
on the market. At any rate, frequently they should constitute proper
instances for a dispensation under Article 8 5 ( 3) and Article 8 8.
2. ENFORCEMENTS: SANCTIONS AT PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE LAW

a. Sanctions at Public Law
The enforcement of the prohibitions of Article 8 5 by public authorities has already been discussed in various respects. Basically the
Treaty of Rome adopts a system of decentralization, at least until
the issuance of regulations under Article 87. It differs sharply in
this respect from the regime of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty
which vests the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the existence of a
violation of its anticartel provisions in the High Authority. 656 The
national authorities, whether administrative agencies or courts imposing penalties, employ their own methods of procedure and sanctions, so far as made applicable, but they determine the legality or
illegality of the conduct in issue by reference to the prohibitions and
dispensations of Article 8 5 (I) and ( 3).
The form and scope of judicial review are likewise determined by
the national legal systems, 657 with the qualification, however, that
relevant questions as to the interpretation of the Treaty must be
resolved by the Court of Justice prior to a decision of a national
court of last resort. 658
""'See the report on the 5th meeting of the government cartel experts, BuLLETIN
OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Germ. ed. 46 (No. 4-59), 49 (No. 5-59).
665
See the report by Guglielmetti, Les exclusivites de vente, at the Caen meeting,
and the discussion thereof, op. cit. supra note 6 so, at 41 and 54; see also Schwartz,
op. cit. supra note 6so.
658
E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 65{4), para. 2.
7
"" Nebolsine, The 'Right of Defense' in the Control of Restrictive Practices under
the European Community Treaties, 8 AM. J. CoMP. L. 433 at 444 (1959).
"""E.E.C. Treaty art. 177.
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b. Private Law Consequences of f'iolations

Unquestionably the most perplexing problems in the application
of the Treaty rules on competition for enterprises concern the private law consequences of infractions. Generally speaking, such consequences may be of two principal types:
I) unenforceability (invalidity) of a proscribed transaction;
2) civil liability in tort for the proscribed practice (whether or
not constituting a transaction).
(I) Invalidity of anticompetitive agreements. Article
8 5 ( 2) declares flatly: "Agreements and decisions which are prohibited by this article are absolutely void." Despite the categorical
nature of this clause, its meaning and effect have been the object
of violent arguments, as was pointed out in the previous section. 659
The heart of the conflict as it remains 660 concerns the question of
whether this section applies unqualifiedly under the regime of Articles 88 and 89, i.e., prior to the issuance of regulations under Article
87, or whether during this period agreements remain enforceable
as long as the appropriate authorities have not determined their
illegality on the combined basis of Article 8 5 ( I) and ( 3). 661 If
unenforceability can be predicated only on an intervention by the
appropriate authorities, the further question arises as to whether
a finding of a violation by these authorities depends exclusively on
an extremely delicate interpretation of the Treaty. No conclusive
solution can be suggested until the Court of Justice has spoken.

( 2) Tort liability for participation in anticompetitive
practices. Even greater mystery surrounds the question as to the
possible tort liability of enterprises which actively participate in collective restrictive practices. Like Article 6 5 of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, Article 8 5 and the following Articles of the E.E.C.
Treaty contain no direct rules on the civil responsibility attendant
upon infractions. Hence the answer must depend on the complex
and delicate issue of how the Treaty discipline governing the competition of enterprises is interlaced with the general fabric of national law.
Certainly the indicated enigma will plague the profession until
the issuance of regulations under Article 87. Whether that Article
empowers the Council to determine the matter on a supranational
level is difficult to predict. Article 87 ( 2) (e) envisages the adoption
659
600
661

See supra text at note 634See supra text at note 646,
See the careful analysis of the various positions and arguments by Schumacher,

La politique de Ia GEE en matiere d'ententes, 1959 REVUE nu
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of rules "for the purpose of defining the relation between the national legal systems on the one hand and the provisions contained in,
or enacted pursuant to, the article." This may imply that the Council could specify whether or not violations constitute a tort under
national laws. If such an interpretation were rejected, the Treaty
provisions relative to the harmonization of the national legislation 662 might be the proper avenue for reaching uniformity.
Prior to such action, however, the situation is quite perplexing.
If the view is followed that the transitional regime of Articles 88
and 89 requires intervention by the public authorities before the
prohibitions of Article 8 5 (I) can be invoked by private parties, no
tort liability for violation under national laws could ensue, except
after disregard of such repressive action. Conversely, if the position
is taken that the invalidity of collective anticompetitive transactions
can be invoked by private parties directly and immediately, it would
be consistent to conclude that the same rule applies to the assertion of
illegality. Whether, however, such illegal conduct actually amounts
to a tort which entitles injured private parties to redress is a further
question which still would require additional analysis of both the
nature of the Treaty provisions and the basis of tort liability under
national laws.
In Germany, for example, as has been pointed out before, 663 tort
liability in such cases conceivably may be rested on four statutory
grounds (Civil Code, Sections 823 I, 823 II, 826, and Law Against
Unfair Competition, Section I), among which the second is the
most important one. It predicates liability in damages upon any
culpable violation of a "law, enacted for the purpose of protecting a
third party." The question thus reduces itself to the issue of whether
Article 8 5 is such a law or whether it is merely a regulation enacted
in the interest of guaranteeing a sound market policy. Since the
German Supreme Court has differentiated in that way even with
respect to various sections of its own national Restraint of Competition Act 664 no answer to the problem can safely be predicted at
this time.
662
E.E.C. Treaty arts. 10o-102. For a good discussion see Barmann, Die Europiiischen Gemeinschaften und die Rechtsangleichung, 14 }URISTENZEITUNG 553 (1959).
663
See supra part II sec. A, zb and part III, sec. B, 1b.
004
Thus the German Supreme Court has based tort liability vis-a-vis competitors
on the establishment of unregistered resale price maintenance schemes {Eau de
Cologne case, decision of Oct. 8, 1958, 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1075, at IOJ9 (1958))
and on discriminatory exclusion from a trade association (decision of Feb. z5, ·1959,
14 BETRIEBS-BERATER 356, 357 (1959)). Conversely, it has denied the quality of "a law
enacted for the protection of a third party" to the provisions of the Restraint of
Competition Law governing requirement contracts (decision of Oct. zo, 1959, 14
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It must clearly be understood, however, that a position according
to which a violation of the provisions of Article 8 5 is not a tort
in and by itself by no means compels the conclusion that all such
conduct is immune from civil responsibility. Rather, liability will be
entailed if such practice constitutes a private wrong by the separate
standards of national law.

C.

PROTECTION AGAINST MISUSE OF DOMINANT
MARKET PowER
I. SCOPE AND EFFECT OF ARTICLE

86

a. Scope of Prohibition

Like the Coal-Steel Community Treaty (in its Article 66(7)) the

E.E.C. Treaty (in Article 86) includes a special prohibition against
the abusive exploitation of a dominant position 665 within the Common Market or a significant part thereof by one or several enterprises, with, however, the important qualification that this injunction
applies only to the extent that such misuse is "capable of adversely
affecting the commerce among the Member States."
Again, as in Article 8 5 ( 1), the general clause of the prohibition
is followed by a catalogue of four types of practices in which such
misuse may consist in particular. These practices are:
I) the direct or indirect imposition of inequitable purchase or
sales prices or other business terms;
2) the limitation of production, outlets, or technical development to the prejudice of the consumers;
3) the application, vis-a-vis other parties in business deals, of
unequal terms for equivalent goods or services, thereby inflicting upon them competitive disadvantages;
4) predicating the conclusion of contracts upon the condition
that the other parties accept supplementary goods or services
which neither by their nature nor business usage are related
to the object of these contracts.
BETRIEBS-BERATER 1229) and to the rules against price discrimination in the E.C.S.C.
Treaty (decision of April 14, 1959, 30 BGHZ 74).
666
The Commission and the government experts on cartels, at their sth Conference
on restrictive practices of enterprises, studied the criteria and data by which the
existence of a dominant position ought to be determined. It was decided to embark
on a statistical inquiry covering various economic sectors in which special conditions
exist, such as the public utilities field, banking and insurance; see the reports in
BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMUNITY, Germ. ed. 46 (No. 4-59), 49
(No. 5-59); EUROPE, DAILY BULLETIN, EURATOM & MARCHE COMMllN No. 528 (Oct.
16, 1959).
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As can be seen, therefore, Article 86 in its structure is quite analogous to Article 8 5 (I). Accordingly, the same general problems as
to the interrelation of the various clauses arise. 666 There is, however, one important difference. Article 86 does not provide for dispensation from the prohibition. Nevertheless, it should be noted
that Article 87 does authorize the issuance of regulations "for the
purpose of defining the scope of applicability of Article 86 for particular branches of the economy." 667

b. Practical Significance
Article 86 can hardly be expected to be of paramount practical
significance especially if, as commonly assumed, Article 8 5 (I) is
to be construed to apply to purely vertical restrictive agreements
falling within the categories specifically defined in that article. In
such cases Articles 8 5 and 86 will be largely overlapping.
Nonetheless, it would be a grave mistake to conclude that there
cannot or will not be important types of situations in which Article
86, particularly its general clause and its first two classes of specially
proscribed practices, will furnish the only palliative against anticompetitive actions by enterprises with dominant market power.
This will be the case, in the first place, in all instances where such
enterprises create artificial scarcities or in other ways misuse their
economic power, without acting by means of agreements or in concert with other enterprises. In the second place, the special classes
defined in Article 8 5 (I) (a) and Article 86 (a) resemble one
another only in a most superficial fashion and actually cover quite
different matters. To be sure, both may relate to purely vertical
666
See the conclusions to that effect reached at the 5th Conference of government
experts on cartels, BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Germ. ed. 49
(No. 5-59).
667
A possible limitation of the applicability of art. 86 flows from the special provision of art. 90 (2). Art. 90 (I) prescribes in general terms that the Member States
shall not take or retain measures in conflict with this Treaty and, in particular, with
arts. 7 and 85 to 95 in respect to public enterprises or enterprises to which they have
accorded special or exclusive rights. Art. 90 (2), however, adds the following qualification: "Enterprises charged with the management of services of general public interest
or possessing the character of a fiscal monopoly are subject to the provisions of this
Treaty, especially the rules of competition to the extent that the application of these
provisions does not prevent, legally or factually, the performance of the tasks conferred upon them. The development of trade must not be impaired in a degree which
contravenes the interest of the Community." The interpretation of Art. 90( I) and
(2) has been the subject of study by the Commission's Directorate General for Competition and the government experts on reMrictive practices and of discussions with
the Member States, E.E.C. Commission, THIRD GENERAL REPORT III, 37 (I96o);
BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN EcoNOMIC COMMUNITY, Germ. ed. 50 (No. 5-59); Engl.
ed. 38 (No. 4-60).
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stipulations relating to prices and other business terms. But Article
85 ( 1 ) (a) concerns the fixing of prices or business terms which the
other party to the agreement must observe in its dealings with third
persons, while Article 86 (a) applies to bargains which the enterprise with dominant market power is able to exact from its suppliers
or customers for its own benefit.
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION

2. SANCTIONS AGAINST, AND PRIVATE LAW
CONSEQUENCES OF, MISUSE OF
DOMINANT MARKET POWER

Little needs to be added with reference to the sanctions against,
or the private law consequences of, misuses of dominant market
power. In every important respect the situation is parallel to that
existing relative to the collective restraints on competition.
Until enactment of the regulations under Article 87 the national
authorities and the Commission are jointly responsible for the suppression of misuses of dominant market power. 668 Although Article
86 declares flatly that the misuse defined thereby is prohibited, the
questions of whether, under the regime of Articles 88 and 89, agreements constituting such misuse are unenforceable without previous
intervention by the authorities and whether practices falling under
that article render the perpetrator liable in tort under national laws
will require answers depending on the same considerations and
reaching the same results as were discussed in the previous part of
this chapter.
D. PROTECTION AGAINST DUMPING

The treaty provisions against anticompetitive practices and measures, especially as contained in Articles 8 5-90, are supplemented
by Article 9 I which establishes a separate regime for the suppression of dumping, applicable during the transitional period. According to Article 9 I (I), if the Commission, upon request by a Member
State or an interested party, finds that a private enterprise or public
entity engages in dumping practices within the Common Market,
it shall direct a recommendation to cease and desist to the responsible person or persons. If the parties persist in the dumping prac... The Commission and the national authorities have worked out a consultation
procedure which must be followed prior to any decision under Articles 85 and 86
on the national level, E.E.C. Commission, THIRD GENERAL REPORT III, 36 ( 1960) ;
BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, French ed. 49 (No. I-6o); Bericht
des Bundeskartellamtes iiber seine Tiitigkeit im Jahrr 1959, Deutscher Bundestag, 3·
Wahlperiode, Drucksache I79S, at S7 ( 196),
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tices, the Commission shall authorize the injured Member State
to take the appropriate countermeasures as determined by the CommissiOn.
In order to arrive at a proper application of the mandates of
Article 91 (I), the Commission, on June 25 and 26, I959 1 convened a conference of government experts from the six Member
States. As the Treaty does not expressly define the term dumping
practices, it was decided to utilize the definition given in General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) Article VI as a
suitable working basis. 669
Article 92 ( 2) establishes a further palliative against dumping,
by making it unattractive for the parties to engage in such practices because of a device described as "boomerang." Article 9 2 ( 2)
provides that, from the entry into force of the Treaty, goods that
have been produced or have been in free circulation in one country
and have been exported to another country may not be subject to
customs duties, quantity restrictions or equivalent measures, if they
are re-imported to the country from which they were exported. The
details are left to a regulation of the Council. The pertinent regulation was issued on March 1 I, I 960. 670
660 For details regarding the interpretation and enforcement of Article 91 (I) see
E.E.C. Commission, THIRD GENERAL REPORT III 38-40 (1960).
670
[1960] J'L OFF. 597·

Chapter XI

Taxation
J. van Hoorn, Jr. and L. Hart Wright*
INTRODUCTION

This study on the foreign and United States tax implications
encountered by American industry in rendering services, or disposing of products, in the European Common Market is designed for
the benefit of those who have little or no understanding of the
subject matter. While this analysis constitutes the most comprehensive published integrated study of the subject, it falls far short
of answering every question with which a specialist in foreign tax
affairs must ultimately come to grips. After all, the economies
of the six nations which make up that market are almost as sophisticated as that in the States, and this means that their tax structures
will be almost equally complicated. While those nations do not
publish rulings and regulations in a degree comparable to the
Federal practice, and thus do provide less raw interpretative data,
nevertheless, one cannot expect in a few hundred pages to develop
in meaningful sequence all of the known variations in their tax
patterns, particularly if room is required to accommodate integration of relevant American tax principles and costs. The aim here
does not go beyond providing detailed orientation to a degree that
*Most of the basic data concerning foreign taxes was prepared in the form of a
rough draft by Mr. J. van Hoorn, Jr., in cooperation with the International Bureau
of Fiscal Documentation (Herengracht 196, Amsterdam) of which he is the managing
director. Mr. van Hoorn also serves as a tax consultant and is co-author of a three
volume treatise in Dutch on the principles of taxation, "Het Belastingrecht Zijn
Grondslagen En Ontwikkeling," (L. J. Veen's Uitgeversmij. N.V., Amsterdam, 1954,
zd ed.). In addition to authorship of other tax articles, he is director of the tax
volumes in the twelve volume series, "Recueils Pratiques du Droit des Affaires dans
les Pays du Marche Commun."
Revision of this Chapter into a final manuscript and original development of the
materials dealing with American tax implications were the responsibilities of Professor Wright (Professor of Law, University of Michigan; formerly Professor of
Tax Law, Advanced Training Center, Internal Revenue Service (1954-1956}; Consultant to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1956, 1959-1960}; author, "Basic
Income Tax Law For Internal Revenue Agents and Office Auditors," Internal Revenue
Service ( 1957) ; and author of various tax articles.)
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one may formulate tentative plans and identify those questions
which must then be referred to the specialist. To this end, the study
is divided into six PARTS, the sequence being geared generally to
the evolutionary stages through which an American business might
logically expand its foreign operations.
PART I contains a country-by-country survey of the tax systems
employed by the Common Market countries; it provides background essential to a true understanding of the tax differentials
later dramatized by functionalized comparisons in PARTS II, III,
and V. The discussion in PART i of each country's tax structure
has been arranged according to a more or less common pattern.
Consideration of a particular country's income and enterprise taxes
is followed by an analysis of its property and turnover taxes. With
respect to income taxes, immediately following a description of the
overall tax pattern and the rate structure applicable to individuals
and corporations, the focus shifts to the prevailing notion of gross
income including the treatment of capital gains. An analysis of
deductions and certain special problems follows. Included in the
latter are accounting problems, the matter of taxable years, and
differences in tax treatment where an American company establishes
a foreign subsidiary, as distinguished from a permanent establishment in the nature of a branch.
The truly functionalized comparative study, including integration
of American tax principles and costs, begins in PART II with
an analysis of the overall tax effects encountered by an American
company when it first seeks to enter the Common Market through
development of direct exports to customers situated there. The
first prime concern in that setting involves the extent to which
promotional and sales activity can be carried on in the Common
Market itself without subjecting any part of the export profits to
their income taxes. Compared also are the turnover taxes which
would be imposed by each member nation, including some indication of the way these may multiply, depending on the manner in
which the sale is handled. Integration of these into the American
tax pattern is followed by a consideration of the circumstances in
which exports can be immunized from the manufacturers' excise
tax. The direct export story then concludes with an analysis of the
considerations which affect the competitive tax position of American
exporters when compared to other exporters as well as with producers in the Common Market itself.
For a variety of reasons, an American exporter may conclude
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that those products destined for foreign markets should actually
be manufactured abroad, in whole or in part. Execution of a
licensing and "know-how" agreement between the American company and an established European firm may be preferred by the
less venturesome as against establishment abroad of an American
owned manufacturing facility. A complementary motive may be to
assure a ready outlet for certain components which will continue to
be manufactured at home. In any event, second only to the development of direct export trade-where also little capital, if any, is
ventured abroad-direct licensing arrangements enjoy the least
complicated foreign tax effects. Accordingly, it seemed appropriate
that the fairly simple comparative foreign income and turnover tax
effects, including integration of American tax costs, should also be
dealt with in PART II, immediately following analysis of the export situation.
Put off for discussion in PART III are the more sophisticated
sales and licensing arrangements, involving use of the same organizational devices which might house a manufacturing facility,
specifically a foreign permanent establishment in the nature of a
branch or a foreign subsidiary. In order to facilitate comparison
of the foreign tax effect on these in each of the member nations,
the discussion in PART III proceeds first, in Sections B and C, on
the assumption that a facility is to be established to serve only one
member nation. Comparison is made in Section B of the total direct
tax load (income, enterprise, and property taxes) which each
country would impose if it were chosen as the locale. Integration
in Section C of the American tax costs also provides the occasion
for a basic analysis of the reasons why, and instances where, there
are differences in the overall or combined tax costs of doing business through a foreign branch as distinguished from a subsidiary.
Emergence of a differential which generally favors the subsidiary
arrangement is traced, leading, inter alia, to a more or less complete discussion of the provisions regarding the deductien and
credit for foreign taxes allowed by the United States in the setting
of a single-tier foreign facility. Discussion of the limitations of the
credit will serve, illustratively, to explain-in terms of preferred
tax locales-why a country like Belgium, which relies primarily on
an income tax, enjoys a relative advantage over a country like
Germany which looks also to annual net wealth taxes on corporations as well as on individuals for a significant part of its direct
tax revenue.
TAXATION
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The foreign and American tax ramifications of the next stage in
the life line of an expanding Common Market facility, i.e., the circumstance where it begins to engage in direct exports to customers
in other member nations, is taken up in Section D of PART III.
An analysis of the bilateral income tax treaties among nations of
the Common Market is followed in that Section by an indication of
the arrangements which serve to whittle down the likelihood of
multiple turnover taxes. The Section concludes by supplying the
reasons behind an admonition bearing on the tax considerations
which should be taken into account in choosing a locale for that
facility which will export into other member nations.
The succeeding Section E examines the further foreign and
American tax ramifications which will arise if the operating facility
in one member nation intensifies its development of markets in
other member nations by establishing therein its own branch or
a sub-subsidiary. Discussion of the extent to which there will be
two foreign income taxes on the second facility's profits-the likelihood depending on the organizational nature of the facility and the
choice of locale, is followed by an examination of the way the
American credit for foreign taxes would respond to such a two-tier
arrangement.
Compared with the foregoing, in the following Section F, are
the tax implications which would be associated with the American
parent company's own establishment of "sister" branches or subsidiaries.
Widespread and expanding operations of that type logically
focus attention, in Section G, on the tax advantages which could be
achieved if a foreign holding or "base" company were superimposed
on the operating facilities, provided, of course, a favorable tax
climate for the holding company could be found. The importance
of this latter condition is highlighted by comparing, as possible
locales, certain Common Market countries with certain so-called
"tax havens" located adjacent to that market, the indication being
that the Netherlands and in a lesser degree, Luxembourg, provide
a tax regime as favorable as any.
PART III then concludes with an indication of the tax implications encountered where a foreign facility in the Common Market
exports directly to customers outside the Community.
It seemed unwise to interrupt PART III's evolving and integrated tax story of an expanding and ever more penetrating foreign
operation with diversions into certain American tax matters which,
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together, might be subsumed under a tax accounting label. Accordingly, the methodology and timing aspect, as they relate to conversion of foreign profits into American dollars, are covered in
PART IV in the setting of blocked as well as unblocked foreign
currencies. Also dealt with there is the conversion problem as it
relates to the American credit for foreign taxes.
Even the most simple penetration of a foreign market, a direct
export arrangement, may lead an American company to assign certain American employees abroad as promotional representatives.
The likelihood is even greater if a permanent establishment or subsidiary is created in the Common Market. The function of PART
V is to compare the foreign tax loads which would be imposed on
such persons, indicating at the same time the way in which American tax law responds to the situation. Foreigners employed by the
Common Market facility, as well as Americans stationed there,
may be expected to make brief business visits to the States-combined perhaps with a vacation. Other Americans, normally stationed in the States, may also make brief business trips abroad.
The ensuing tax complications and the degree to which the interested nations have avoided double taxation in these circumstances,
are also subjects of discussion in PART V.
Whereas the first five PARTS are concerned with the tax
pattern existing in July 196o,l PART VI attempts to survey
changes which might be expected in the future with respect to
Common Market taxes and such American tax principles as affect
companies interested in the market outlet provided by the European Economic Community.
Mr. van Hoorn would like to acknowledge the contribution of
his assistants, Messrs. W. H. J. Charbon, J. P. C. Huiskamp, and
D. A. van Waardenburg, as well as aid received from correspondents who checked his findings, as follows:
-Belgium: Me. Paul Sibille, Brussels (Attorney at law at
the Court of Appeal, and director of the "Ecole Superieure de Sciences Fiscales");
-France: Jean H. Rothstein, H.E.C,. Paris (tax consultant, national reporter to the 1 2 volume "Recueils
Pratiques du Droit des Affaires dans les pays du
Marche Commun," and author of various publications
on international tax law) ;
-Germany: Dr. Albert J. Radler, Dipl. Kfm., Munich
1

After the original manuscript was prepared, PART III was revised to accommodate certain changes made in August 1960 by Congress.
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(Assistant in the Institute of International Tax Law
at the University of Munich); and
-Italy: Dr. Giancarlo Croxatto, Genoa (Assistant, University of Genoa; co-author of various publications in
the field of international tax law, national reporter to
the 12 volume, "Recueils Pratiques du Droit des Affaires dans pays du Marche Commun").
-Acknowledgment is also made to R. Mees & Zonnen,
Rotterdam, for permission to use in Part III, infra,
certain formulae which first appeared in a publication
prepared for that firm by International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Company Taxation in Western Europe (1959).
Professor Wright would like to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Mrs. Elizabeth H. G. Brown, Research Associate,
University of Michigan Law School, and by Mr. Robert Wartell,
his research assistant.

PART I. THE TAX SYSTEMS OF
COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES

(A Country By Country Survey)
SECTION

A.

BELGIUM

SUBSECTION I. INCOME TAXES

(a) In general.-Unlike the single federal income tax utilized by the United States, the Belgian national government employs
a series of different income taxes. Income of individuals and juridical
entities is first divided by reference to its type into three primary
categories, each of which is subjected to a different tax. A fourth
tax, applicable only to individuals, is superimposed on these separately scheduled assessments; it is applied to the aggregate income
from the three primary sources. A fifth tax, enacted during the
critical days of the 1930's and known as the Contribution Nationale
de Crise, is imposed on selected items of income belonging to two
of the three primary categories, as well as on distributed profits of
some juridical entities.
The first of the prime categories comprises income from all real
property situated in Belgium. Whereas gross income for American
tax purposes would normally include the actual income from such
property, only an estimated amount has been included in Belgium.
This estimate, made according to a Land Register (cadastre),
is often much less than the actual income. Once made by reference
to average net yield, the estimate thereafter remains constant for
a period of 20 years. The contemplated periodic revision of the
estimates has not been undertaken in recent years, though a new
estimate-expected to be much closer to actual income-is under
considerationY This "income" is subject to a modest flat rate national tax (Contribution Fonciere) ; to this is added the progressive
rate of the national crisis tax and substantial local surcharges.
Another, but different, flat rate tax (Taxe Mobiliere) applies to
actual income from investments in personal property, though here
'"This method has the advantage that the tax will be the same, irrespective of
whether the property is used by the taxpayer himself or leased,
349
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variations in the flat rate do exist, depending on whether the income
item is a dividend, interest, royalty, etc. It applies also to income
from real property situated abroad. Where such an investment is
made by a silent partner of a partnership or of a Belgian private
company, the income is subject also to the national crisis tax and
at progressive rates. Foreign partnership or private company income is subject to Yard of the ordinary rates of this latter tax. 2
A graduated tax, known as the Taxe Professionnelle, is applied
to the third basic type of income, i.e., to that derived from the
conduct of a trade or business, including also professions, vocations, or an employment. Corporations with outstanding shares may
avoid the greater part of this progressive tax by distributing their
profits. But in such case, a flat rate tax under the selective Contribution Nationale de Crise is assessed against the corporation by reference to the amount of the gross dividend. At that same point the
shareholder would be assessed under the basic, separately scheduled
and previously described, flat rate Taxe Mobiliere.
A final type of tax (Impot Complementaire Personnel) is applicable only to individuals. It is designed to apply a graduated rate
to the individual's aggregate income from the three basic sources
first mentioned (real property, personal property, and business or
employment activity).
A more detailed analysis of the cumulative effect of these various
taxes follows.
(b) Taxes on estimated income from realty.-Apart from
the progressive tax on an individual's aggregate income from all
sources, at least three different taxes are applied to administratively
determined advance estimates of "imputed" income derived by
juridical entities or individuals from ownership of real property.
The first, a national 6% flat rate, is complemented by the graduated
national crisis tax, the progressive rates of which range from 2 to
15%. Local units then surcharge the national flat rate imposition,
and these surcharges are said to approximate an average rate
of about 36%. 3 Table I A indicates the cumulative effect of the
three rates.
One procedure, very similar to that followed by American states
in imposing real property taxes, has served in practice to cushion
what might seem to be a rather high cumulative rate pattern. The
• For the tax treatment of foreign income, see sub-topic ( j), infra.
• This average differs from that given in a Belgian official publication, where a
figure of 30% is used.
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REAL PROPERTY RATE SCHEDULE
Estimated Income
Belgian Frann
From
0

g,ooo
10,000

zs,ooo
50,000
100,000

To
2,999
9.999
2-h999
49.999
99.999
149.999
199.999

ISO,ooo
200,000 and over

Dollar.<
From

$

0

To

$

59

6o
199
200
499
soo
999
1,000
1,999
2,000
2,999
3,000
3.999
4,000 and over

o/o re Flat

o/o re the
National

Rate Tax

Crisis Tax

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

2
3
4
6
8
10
12-5
15

/1 dditional Tax

(Local Gov't)
Average
g6
g6
36
36
36
36
g6
36

o/o

Total

o/o

44
45
46
48
so

52
54·5
57

administratively determined amount of estimated income from each
piece of real property remains unchanged for long periods of time.
Because the economic criteria used in fixing the present effective
base pre-dates the Second World War, the amount of estimated
income assigned to any given piece of real property is not nearly
as high as the present true annual use value. The effective base,
according to one authority, constitutes not more than one-fifth of
the true amount. This compensating factor is offset in part, but only
in the case of real property used in connection with industrial
activity, in that the base otherwise determined is increased by
one-half.
Accordingly, if the true annual use value of a small factory
building and the tract of land on which it is situated approximates
$6,ooo (B.Frs. JOO,ooo), the taxable estimated income is not
likely to exceed $I,8oo ($6,ooo X Yo X I~) for which the typical
stated cumulative average rate is so% or $900, which means an
effective rate of I 5%.
(c) Taxes on income from investments in personalty.-The
Taxe Mobiliere, generally collected on a withholding basis, incorporates different flat rates for various types of income derived
from investments in personal property. Dividends received from
companies, the capital of which is divided into shares, are taxed at
30% while debenture interest and royalties are taxed at I 8%
though this latter rate is reduced approximately to I 2.2% if the
debtor, rather than the creditor, actually bears and pays the tax. 4
• Profits distributed to a silent partner of a partnership are taxed at zso/o under the
Taxe Mobiliere and at 2% to 15% under the national crisis tax.
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Assessment of this tax against stockholders with respect to
dividends is complemented by a flat rate national crisis tax, assessed
against the corporation, on the same gross dividend. Moreover, if
the shareholder is an individual, the dividend will be aggregated with
his other income in fixing the base against which a third tax, the
progressive Impot Complementaire Personnel, is applied. These
two additional taxes are considered in more detail below.
The Taxe Mobiliere is also applicable to income from foreign
real property, but, as is true in the case of income from foreign
personalty, the rate is reduced to a flat 12%.
(d) Taxes on retained income from trade or business activity.-The Taxe Professionnelle applies a graduated rate to income derived from a profession, employment, or from trade-orbusiness activity carried on by corporations, partnerships, or individuals. It differs from the American federal income tax in two
major respects. First, income from investments in personal property, such as stocks or bonds, as well as any imputed income derived
from real property is beyond the reach of this particular tax.
Second, in the case of corporations and partnerships, this exaction
is only applied to undistributed profits. The type of taxes applied
to distributed profits depends, as is later noted, upon the character
of the distributing juridical entity. Because these latter taxes do
serve as a substitute for the Taxe Professionnelle in the case of
distributed profits, a credit arrangement has been worked out to
accommodate those situations where retained profits which have
been subjected to the Taxe Professionnelle are distributed in a
later year, at which time they become subject to the other taxes.
The progressive rate schedule of the basic tax applicable to undistributed business profits of juridical entities appears in Table I B.
TABLE

I B

On That Part of Taxable Income:

Belgian Francs
From
o to
150,000
From
1 so,ooo to
soo,ooo
From
soo,ooo to I,ooo,ooo
From I,ooo,ooo to Io,ooo,ooo
From IO,ooo,ooo and over

U.S. Dollars
From$
oto $ 3,000
From
3,oooto Io,ooo
From 101 000 tO 20,000
From 2o,ooo to 200,000
From 200,000 and over

Rate
25.0%
3o.o%
35.o%
37·5%
4o.o%

In appraising this schedule, account should be taken of two additional factors. First, the Taxe Professionnelle is actually levied
on the income of businesses and liberal professions in the year
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following the year in which the income was derived, and in principle
the amount, as distinguished from the rate, of tax is increased by
20%. But this increase may be avoided en toto if the ultimate tax
was accurately estimated and paid in advance, i.e., before the 15th
day following the first half of the taxpayer's taxable year (accounting year). Again, the increase will amount only to 10% if an accurate estimate was made and paid before the I 5th day following
the close of the taxpayer's taxable year. Absent advance payment,
or where the amount paid in advance is less than the tax ultimately
due, the amount which has not been paid in advance is increased by
20%. In effect, the portion of the income not reflected in the estimates would, if otherwise subject to the 40% rate, suffer a 48%
rate.
Second, unlike the American income tax, on the final due date
in the year succeeding the taxable year, the professional tax becomes a deduction in computing the taxable profits of that same
succeeding year. The effect of this feature can be illustrated by
reference to that part of any yearly profits subjected to the stated
40% ceiling rate. In the first year in which an enterprise operates,
that ceiling rate would, of course, be the effective rate on income
falling in the top bracket. In the second year, the stated 40% rate
on such income would become an effective 24% rate, and in the
succeeding years, the stated 40% rate would be tantamount to a
shifting effective rate ranging between 30% and 28%.
The quite different rate schedule, applicable under the Taxe
Professionnelle to the net business or employment income of an
individual, is presented in Table I C.
TABLE

I

c

RATES ON NET INCOME AFTER ITEMIZED OR
STANDARD DEDUCTIONS
On That Part of Taxable Income:
Fra11cs
From

Dollars
Frum
To

Tu

150,000
250,000
150,000
250,000
500,000
1,ooo,ooo
500,000
1,ooo,ooo and over
0

$

0

$ 3,000

J,OOO

5,000

s,ooo

10,000

20,000
10,000
20,000 and over

Tax Rate
From o to 27.5%
27·5%
3o.o%
32-5%
35.o%

The remuneration of corporate directors who are members of
the board of control and do not have a regular job with the company is subject to the normal rates with a 20% surcharge.
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This surcharge is independent of, and its application will precede,
the quite different and previously discussed additional tax of zo%
which is applied against the amount ultimately due if the latter was
not paid in advance either through withholding or estimated payments. Illustratively, if a corporate director's basic rate under the
regular income tax is 30%, the special surcharge added with reference to remuneration received as a director will increase the rate
to 36% ( zo% X 30% = 6%), and this will be increased again by
another zo%, bringing the rate to 43.2% ( 20% X 36% = 7.2%),
if not paid in advance.
Generally, the tax on salaries and wages (including those paid to
company directors) is withheld at the source, the exception being
the tax payable by managers (working partners) of the so-called
socihes de personnes (partnerships, limited partnerships, and
closely held corporations).
(e) Taxes on distributed profits of an enterprise.-As previously noted, the Taxe Professionnelle applies only to undistributed business profits. Selection of the particular taxes which apply
to distributed profits turns on the character of the distributing
juridical entity.
Entities, the capital of which is divided into shares, pay a flat
national crisis tax of 20% on gross dividends. Viewed separately,
this would mean that a corporation would need a profit of $120 in
order to distribute a $roo gross dividend. However, since the $20
is not itself distributed, the corporation will also be burdened with
the Taxe Professionnelle, which at the maximum 40% rate, would
give rise to an additional tax of $8 on the $20 of retained earnings.
The overall maximum effect is that a corporation must enjoy a
profit of $r28 in order to pay a $roo dividend. 5 The two taxes just
described will then be complemented by the previously discussed
personal property income tax (Taxe Mobiliere), assessed on a
withholding basis, against the shareholder, the rate being a flat
30% against the gross dividend of $roo. Apart then from the yet
separate progressive tax on an individual's aggregate income from
all sources, that part of a corporation's profits which is distributed
8
will suffer a maximum tax of approximately 45% eo+
JO ).
128
Where the capital of a jointly conducted enterprise is not divided

+

5 It must be understood that this is the maximum possible effect. As the share of
current profits which are distributed increases, the likelihoood that the enterprise will
reach the stated rate of 40% under the Taxe Professionnelle decreases. Moreover,
that part of the Taxe Professionnelle attributed to retained profits used to pay the national crisis tax will become a deduction in computing a later Taxe Professionnelle.
This would whittle the true effective cost to a figure below $8.
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into shares, any portion of the profits distributed to active partners
is subject to two different progressive taxes. The first involves the
progressive rates under the Taxe Professionnelle applicable to
individuals, the second being the complementary personal tax which
applies a graduated rate to an individual's aggregate income from
all sources. Distributions to silent partners of such an enterprise are
subject, on the other hand, to three different taxes, the personal
property income tax (Taxe Mobiliere) at a flat 25% rate, a graduated national crisis tax ranging from 2 to I 5%, and the regular
progressive income tax applicable to an individual's aggregate income. However, the first two of these taxes constitute deductions
in arriving at the tax base of the third.

(f) Complementary progressive tax on individual's aggregate income.-In addition to the three separate taxes on income
from personal property, real property, and business, individuals pay
a graduated tax with respect to the aggregate income from all of
these sources. However, the three separately scheduled taxes as well
as any overall complementary progressive tax paid during the
period are deducted from gross income in arriving at the tax base
against which the overall progressive tax is applied. These deductions, together with certain deductible personal items to be discussed later, are important in appraising the actual impact of the
graduated rates in Table I D.
TABLE I D
TAXABLE INCOME

First
Next
Next
Next
Next
Next
Next
Next
Next
Balance

Francs

Dollars

50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
300,000
200,000
200,000

$r,ooo
1,000
r,ooo
! 1000
1 1000
1 1000
6,ooo
4,000
4,000

Rate
o.5%
3

5
IO

14
20
24
26
28
30

%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

(g) The Belgian concept of gross income.-The types of
income embraced by the various basic taxes have been previously
described. Since most of the previously mentioned income taxes
relate to narrowly defined items, the practical meaning of gross
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income need be considered only in the setting of the more far ranging progressive tax on business income and the complementary
progressive tax on an individual's aggregate income. Compared to
American standards, the most unique principle relates to the treatment of capital gains and income which is not ordinary business
tncome.
Generally speaking, such gains do not constitute a part of gross
income. The range of this immunizing principle is limited, however, by the fact that any gain realized from the sale of specific
business assets is considered a business profit and is taxed under
the applicable rate schedules as such. There is some recognition
that such gains are illusory to the extent they are products of a
piecemeal inflation which started in Belgium following World War
I. The formula used in determining the amount of gain allows the
vendor first to increase the historical cost basis by a coefficient, the
amount of which depends on the year in which the asset was acquired. From the sum thus determined, depreciation previously
allowed for tax purposes is deducted in arriving at the net basis.
Table I E presents a schedule of the coefficients.
With reference to the Taxe Professionnelle, as well as the complementary progressive tax on income derived by individuals from
TABLE

Date of Acquisition
I 9 I 8 and before
I919
I920
I92I
I922
1923
I924
1925
I926
I927 to I934 inclusive
I935
1936 to I943 inclusive
I 944 to I 948 inclusive
1949
1950 et seq.

I E
Coefficient

6

I6.33
1.49
6.I5
6.30
6.43
4·37
3·89
4.02
2.72
2.J5
1.86
1.70
I.I4
1.10

I

I.O

• These coefficients apply only to industrial or commercial buildings and equipment,
as well as to securities held for more than five years.
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all sources (Impot Complementaire Personnel), a further immunity
has been granted, but only temporarily-i.e., during the calendar
years 1959 to 1963 or counterpart fiscal years, if the realized gain
from the disposition is reinvested within a certain period. Satisfaction of the prescribed standard leaves only %th of the gain subject to tax. And none of the gain will be recognized if the reinvestment is made in certain districts which have suffered particularly
.
serious economic dislocations.
The fact that gain realized on the disposition of business assets
is generally includible for tax purposes also has significance in the
instance where a proprietorship is converted into a limited liability
company. The gain, determined by subtracting the net basis just
described from the fair market value of the shares received, will
be taxed unless the owner himself ceases all trade. In the latter
event, only the profit stemming from the transfer of goodwill
(clientele) is reached.
\V"ith reference to a business's income, it will be recalled that only
income from actual business activity is subject to the professional
tax. Dividends received by enterprises (other than those which
operate in the financial field as such) are subject to the personal
property income tax (Taxe Mobiliere) but are excluded 7 from
both retained or distributed income of the enterprise for the purpose of computing its other taxes. In other words, dividends received by an enterprise are taxed under a complementary progressive tax only to its shareholders. The same applies to other investment income as well as to royalties (except where the enterprise
mainly or exclusively exploits patent rights) and to income from
immovable property (again, except in the case of a building society
or the like) the estimated amount of which is subject to previously
described special taxes. Finally, it bears repeating in connection
with the professional tax that only retained profits are taken into
account.
TAXATION

(h) The Belgian concept of ((taxable" income.-Deductions
which may be taken from gross income in arriving at the tax base
are primarily important only in connection with the tax on business
or employment income, and with respect to the complementary tax
paid by individuals on their aggregate incomes. While the special
tax on income from personal property is also geared to a concept of
net income, the fact is that expenses in such settings-illustratively
7
This method is similar to the dividends received deduction allowed in the United
States, only the percentage is 100 instead of 85.
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with respect to dividends-are not frequently incurred. But where
expenses are suffered in acquiring such income, e.g., banker's fees,
they may be deducted. On the other hand, the special tax on "esti~
mated" income from real property is not geared to actual income,
gross or net. As a consequence, actual expenses may not be deducted
from the tax base fixed by the administrative authorities.
The net income concept employed by the special tax on business
income is quite similar to that used in the United States. Permissible
deductions include wages, salaries, rent paid for the use of personal
property, interest-including any reasonable amount which a subsidiary pays a parent in connection with a loan, indirect taxes, such
as those on sales, and depreciation.
The provisions regarding depreciation are not, however, quite
so favorable as they are in the United States. Accelerated depreciation methods which are available in America are not generally
allowed, though in particular cases, for example in the case of
ships, the useful life over which the property may be written off is
relatively short. Depreciation is generally based on the straight line
method as applied to historical cost, though other methods may be
used as long as they follow the diminishing value of the asset. Depreciation on the basis of replacement value is not allowed except
that the historical cost of certain assets has been hiked by a formula
in that instance where the asset was acquired before World War II
and was still in use thereafter.
For the calendar years I 9 so and I 960, and counterpart fiscal
years, a type of investment allowance has been created with respect
to the Taxe Professionnelle, but not for purposes of the complementary graduated tax on individuals. This allowance, applicable only
to certain investments, amounts to 30%, and is to be spread evenly
over a 3-year period.
The treatment of closing inventories corresponds roughly to
practices followed in the United States. Normally closing inventories must be valued at cost or market, whichever is lower. However, in identifying the goods on hand, neither LIFO nor the base
stock method may be used.
The most striking d~parture from American practices involves
the provision which permits taxes on business income to be deducted in the year finally due in computing the business income of
that year. The degree to which this practice reduces the impact of
a theoretical rate structure has been previously considered.
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In the case of individuals on salary or wages and others engaged
in the exercise of a liberal profession, a standard deduction, set
at ~ th of the gross income, is allowed to accommodate their
business expenses. However, the standard deduction includes a
ceiling. It may not exceed B. Fr. 6o,ooo ($1,200) plus deductible
taxes. 8 To a void this ceiling, a taxpayer is required to itemize his
deductions and must be prepared to submit appropriate evidence
that they do in fact exceed the standard allotment. Though this
tax ( Taxe Professionnelle) is imposed on business income, certain
personal deductions as well as credits for dependents are allowed.
These are identical to those applicable in the case of the complementary tax on an individual's aggregate income.
The personal deductions common to both taxes involve premiums
paid for life insurance and old age pensions. And, in both cases, a
credit against taxes payable on the first B. Fr. 250,000 ($5,000)
may be taken with respect to dependents. These credits range from
5% of the tax in the case of one dependent to 100% in the case of
8 dependents. 9
Since the complementary tax on an individual's aggregate income
is intended to reach only his aggregate net income, deductions
allowed with respect to the other three separately scheduled basic
taxes are in effect also allowed. In addition, a deduction may be
taken against his gross income for the amount of those separately
scheduled taxes as well as for the aggregate income tax paid in that
year. A deduction is also allowed for interest paid on non-business
loans and for alimony. Finally, 15% of business or employment income, otherwise subject to the Taxe Professionnelle, may be deducted, to a maximum of B. Frs. 30,ooo ( $6,ooo).
(i) Payment and the taxable year.-All of the previously
described taxes are assessed on a yearly basis. Only in the case of
the tax on business income may losses of one year be carried forward to offset gains of a later year. This carryover, limited to 5
years, is not complemented by provisions regarding carrybacks.
. The taxes on estimated income from real property and on actual
income from personal property (Contribution Fonciere and Taxe
Mobiliere) are paid in the year in which the income is realized. For
example, the income tax against a stockholder, deducted at the
8 In the case of company directors, the standard deduction equals s% of their gross
income plus deductible taxes.
0
10% for 2 dependents, 20% for 3 dependents, 30% for 4 dependents, 50% for 5
dependents, 70% for 6 dependents, 90% for 7 dependents.
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source on the distribution of a dividend, is the tax for the year in
which the dividend is received. The tax on business income (Taxe
Professionnelle), on the other hand, is not due in a final sense until
the year immediately following the taxable year. However, as previously noted, unless payment is made in advance, the taxpayer will
suffer a substantial increase in the effective rate. For example, in
early I 960 a corporation must estimate its profits for that year and
also anticipate the amount which will be distributed. Assuming a
calendar year taxpayer, the tax on the anticipated undistributed
profits must be paid before July I5 of I96o; otherwise the first
of the previously described increases in the tax will take effect. 10
It is important to understand that the advances are truly prepayments. For example, when it is said that the Taxe Professionnelle is a deduction in computing the profits for a given year, the
deduction in our example would take place in the succeeding year,
I 96 I, when the tax is finally due, not in the year in which payment
was made on account. The tax administration recognizes, as an
extra-statutory concession, that taxes paid may be deducted even if
the taxpayer has not yet received an assessment.

(j) The relevance of residency, and the comparative cost
of retaining and accumulating income.-Only in the case of the tax
on income from real property situated in Belgium (and the national
crisis tax applicable thereto) is the reach of the tax law the same
with regard to residents and non-residents.
Residents and entities domiciled in Belgium are reached by the
other taxes without regard to the place from which the income
originated. But where the income originated and was taxed abroad,
a reduced rate is applied. On business income of this type, the rate
under the Taxe Professionnelle is 7tth of that normally applied.
And where a corporation distributes such foreign earned income, its
own national crisis tax is only 7tth of the normal 20% rate. Also,
instead of the regular 30% rate applied to the recipient shareholder, a flat I2% is assessed on dividends distributed out of such
foreign income. Again, the graduated rate of the national crisis tax
normally applicable to silent partners with regard to such distributed profits is reduced to Yard of the normal rate.
The place from which income originated is also important in the
case of non-residents and corporations domiciled outside of Belgium. As is generally true of other countries in such circumstances,
10 The increase, 10% of the amount otherwise payable, is hiked to zo% if payment
is delayed beyond the I 5th day following the close of the taxable year.
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Belgium asserts its jurisdiction only with reference to income which
has its source there.
But assuming for the moment that Belgium is the source of income derived from business activity, the particular business form
in which that operation is conducted can also make a great deal of
difference in the way in which three significant taxes are applied.
Assume, for example, that an American enterprise also plans to
operate a facility in Belgium. If that facility is housed in a subsidiary corporation domestic to Belgium the business profits-so
long as they are retained-will be subject only to the graduated
Taxe Professionnelle, the stated rates ranging from 25% to 4o%Y
However, because the amount of such tax due in one year is deducted in computing the business profits of that year, any profit
which falls in the stated 40% rate will not, following the first year,
be taxed at an effective rate in excess of 30%.
A corporation which desires to use its profits for expansion may
capitalize those earnings 12 by distributing stock dividendsY These
are not considered taxable income in Belgium. However, the capitalization will be more expensive than leaving the profits in the
form of surplus, for certain registration duties and fees are encountered.
On the other hand, where profits of a subsidiary are distributed
in cash, the effective combined ceiling rates of the various taxes will
be one third higher, i.e., will be 45·3% determined as indicated in
Table I F.
TABLE

I F

TOTAL TAXES ON DISTRIBUTED PROFITS
OF SUBSIDIARY
Stated rate of national
crisis tax against subsidiary; payable from
undistributed profits,
and applied to gross
dividend.

zoo/o

Stated ceiling rate
of Taxe Professionnelle, applied
against that part of
undistributed profits
used to pay nationa! crisis tax.
40% X zo%

= 8%

Stated flat rate of Effective combined
Taxe Mobiliere,
ceiling rate of all
against the share- taxes.
holder on w /h
basis re gross dividend.

30%

20

+ 8 + 30
128

45·3 o/o

11
Of course, the tax on any estimated income from real estate will be applied whether
or not profits are distributed and without regard to the form of the enterprise.
12
It should be noted that Belgium does not have any penalty taxes on accumulated
profits.
13
These should generally be issued in a later year than that in which the profits
have been made.
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If profits are to be distributed instead of being ploughed back
for expansion purposes, there will be some tax saving to the subsidiary as well as to the parent if the investment is represented in
part by loans reflected in a bond issue to the parent. Interest, but
not beyond a reasonable amount, constitutes a deductible expense
to the subsidiary, and the tax to the parent on interest is I 8%
(I 2.2% if the subsidiary bears and pays the tax), contrasted with
the 30% tax on dividends.
If the facility is operated as a branch of the American parent,
rather than through a subsidiary, the very form of the operation
rules out "dividends" as such. The parent will own the profits of
the branch as they come into being. Thus the national crisis tax
and the Taxe Mobiliere, which normally apply to dividends, are
rendered inapplicable. The foregoing is another way of saying that
in this setting the question of whether profits are retained or distributed is immaterial. The Taxe Professionnelle reaches the entire
profit in either case. But instead of the graduated rate applicable to
local corporations, in this instance Belgian law applies a stated flat
rate of 40%. But again, the fact that the professional tax due in
one year is deducted in computing the business profits of that year
means that, in the second and succeeding years, the effective rate
will not exceed 30%.
Nonresident individuals suffer the progressive tax on aggregate
income only where they hold a dwelling house situated in Belgium
or exploit a permanent establishment located there, and then only
to the extent income is derived from these sources.
(k) Disposition of an enterprise.-As in the United States,
the Belgian tax provisions relating to the disposition of an enterprise are rather complex. Accordingly, only a general comment can
be made here. If a corporation disposes of its assets, any realized
gain to it is, in principle, taxable income. However, the bases of the
assets are multiplied by a coefficient before determining the amount
of its gain. If the proceeds are then distributed to the stockholders
(or to silent partners in the case of the sociitis de personnes), the
distributed amount will be subjected to three taxes (national crisis
tax, personal property income tax, and the complementary progressive tax) to the extent the stockholder's basis (the capital originally
paid in), multiplied by a coefficient, is exceeded by the distribution.
However, the impact of the first two of these is cushioned by what
is tantamount to a credit equal to that tax paid by the enterprise on
that business income which in turn is being distributed.

TAXATION
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER SIGNIFICANT TAXES

(a) Belgian taxes on capital and property.-Belgium does
not utilize a property tax as such. But if real estate is transferred
for consideration in money or ·money's worth, a so-called registration duty is payable. The rate normally depends on the character of
the person to whom the transfer is made and on the nature of the
real estate transferred. The normal rate of I I% of the selling price
or value is whittled down, in the case of sales to charitable institutions, to 6% and in some cases to 1.5%. The rate is also 6% with
reference to sales of small lots and modest dwelling houses.
Incorporation of assets or subsequent increases in paid-in capital
also give rise to fairly significant registration duties, the rate being
1.6% in the case of Belgian companies. Nonresident companies
which have a "permanent establishment" in Belgium must also be
registered there and must pay . 1% on total paid-in capital with a
ceiling, however, of I,ooo,ooo Belgian francs ( $zo,ooo) and a
minimum of rS,ooo francs ( $360). With reference to its real
estate, a registration duty of 1.6% is levied.
Belgium also employs a gift tax, but, unlike the arrangement in
the United States, the complexion of the tax is similar to that of the
Belgian inheritance tax. The latter is levied not on the estate as
such, but on each individual acquisition by heirs or legatees. In the
case of both taxes, the rates depend on the relationship between
the donor (deceased) and the donee (heirs or legatees) as well as
on the value of the acquisition. Both taxes are generally imposed
only where the donor (deceased) is domiciled in, or is a resident
of, Belgium. However, real estate constitutes an exception to this
rule; donative or testamentary transfers of such are reached if the
property is situated in Belgium.
(b) Taxes on turnover.-Income taxes are supplemented in
a most significant way by turnover taxes on transfers of unfinished
as well as finished products and on licensing, royalty, and many
service contracts.
The general turnover tax (Taxe de Transmission), normally
carrying a rate-except for luxury items-of 5%, is a multiple stage
arrangement in that it applies to each transfer which may take
place in the course of developing a finished product, the only important exemption relating to a transfer to the ultimate individual
consumer. The importance of this exemption is not to be discounted,
for the product at that point will have reached its maximum value.
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Since the tax on each successive vendor, in the chain of those
who contribute to the finished product, includes the value on which
his predecessor had paid as well as the value added, goods which
are converted by one taxpayer from the basic raw material into the
finished product will normally suffer less tax cost than will goods
which have to go through several hands. 14
In the case of imports, the tax is first assessed at the point of
importationY However, presumably for the purpose of facilitating
exports, an exporter may acquire unfinished goods free of the tax
and may also export the finished product free of the tax.
The other turnover taxes are complementary to the Taxe de
Transmission (luxury tax and similar taxes), and include taxes on
the rendition of services, royalties, transport, etc.
(c) Other miscellaneous levies.-Among other miscellaneous taxes are (I) stamp duties which are levied on instruments and
documents, ( 2) excises imposed on the production or importation
of certain commodities such as beer, wine, and tobacco, and ( 3)
amounts levied annually by reference to the horse-power of passenger or freight motorcars.
SECTION

B.

FRANCE

SUBSECTION I. INCOME TAXES

(a) In general.-Since I948, the over-all income tax arrangement regarding individuals has differed from that applicable
to corporations, though in the case of profits derived from industry
and commerce a more or less common tax base has been used.
Until I9 59, individuals were subjected to two different income
taxes. The first, a proportional income tax (Taxe Proportionnelle),
was geared to a system of separate schedules which differed in that
each reached a different type of income. Though the tax was separately applied to each of the various sources, after I 948 a more or
less common rate had been used. The second tax (Surtaxe Progressive) was a surtax levied on the individual's aggregate income from
all sources and at progressive rates.
For this dualistic individual income tax system, a reform in
December I959 substituted a single general tax on income. Genu On 31 goods, there is a special non-multiple tax. This contractual transmission tax
is designed to avoid differences which would otherwise arise depending on the number
of hands through which they pass.
1.5 Details regarding the application of turnover taxes to imports are more fully considered in Section A of PART II, infra.
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erally speaking, this new tax is assessed according to those rules
which had governed the old progressive surtax. For budgetary and
psychological reasons, the old proportional tax with its separate
schedules was not abolished outright. In other words, the reform is
to be implemented in stages. At the moment, the proportional tax
temporarily survives under the name of "Taxe Complementaire,"
but at a considerably reduced rate. The rates of the old progressive
surtax, operating now under its new name ( lmpot sur le Revenu
des Personnes Physiques) , were increased. Also special measures
were taken to see that income previously exempt from the old proportional tax (e.g., wages and salaries) will now be fully taxed.
On the corporate side, generally speaking, there is only one income tax ( lmpot sur les Societes) , and it is imposed at a flat rate.
Partnerships ( socihh en nom collectif) may also elect this treatment instead of one which would subject the individual partners to
individual income taxes on their respective distributive shares.
A third arrangement ( versement forfaitaire), applicable to every
business enterprise, is intimately related to the income tax scheme.
Before the recent reform, instead of requiring that wages and
salaries be included in one of the proportional tax schedules filed
by employees, employers themselves suffered an assessment geared
to three different rates, the choice depending on the total amount
of annual remuneration paid a given employee. This arrangement
survived the reform. Moreover, as before, employees will continue
to include wages and salaries for purposes of the separate progressive surtax.
Employers will pay the versement forfaitaire at the rates as
shown in Table I G.
TABLE

I G

SCHEDULE
Remuneration
New Francs
Dollars
$o to 6,ooo
0 to JO,OOO
6,ooo to I 2,ooo
Jo,ooo to 6o,ooo
Excess over 6o,ooo
Excess over I 2,ooo

Rate Applicable to the
Portion Indicated

s%

IO%
I6%

In any case where an employer does not suffer the versement
forfaitaire, e.g., with reference to wages paid French employees
by foreign employers, the employee himself pays this tax.
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The question of whether a company director's remuneration is
assessed against him or is instead assessed as a charge against the
employer-company by reference to the above described rates of the
versement forfaitaire, turns on whether his duties go beyond those
normally performed by directors and are such as to give rise to the
additional relationship of employer and employee. In this connection, managing directors are generally considered employees. In
the case of private companies ( sociitis responsabilite limitee),
special rules exist.
By statute all dividends are subject to a 24% withholding tax
which normally serves as a credit against the recipient's general
income tax. A bilateral treaty with the United States reduces the
rate to I 5% in the case of dividends paid residents or entities in
the United States, and when the recipient is an American parent of
a French subsidiary, this will normally constitute the final levy
against the parent.
A statutory withholding pattern similar to that above applies to
interest paid foreigners, except that the withholding rate on interest
from French industrial bonds is only I 2%.

a

(b) The progressive surtax on an individual's income.The income tax, levied on an individual's aggregate income from
all sources (including wages or salaries subject to the versement
forfaitaire), conforms to the graduated rates as in Table I H.
TABLE

I H

Aggregate Taxable Income
New Francs
Dollars
0 to 2,200
$o to 440.
2,200 to J,soo
440. to 700.
J,soo to 6,ooo
700. to I,200.
6,ooo to 9,000
I,200 to I,Soo.
9,000 to I5,000
I,8oo to J,OOO.
I 5,000 to JO,OOO
J,OOO to 6,000.
30,000 to 60,000
6,000 to I 21000.
Excess over 6o,ooo
Excess over I 2,ooo

Rate Applicable to the
Portion Indicated

5%
IS%
20%
25%

a
a
a, b
a, b

35%

a, b

45%

a, b

55%

a, b

6 5%

a,

b

• For salaries and wages etc. subject to the versement forfaitaire, rates are o%;
ro%; rso/o; zoo/o; 30%; 40%; soo/o; 6oo/o, respectively.
• An additional surcharge of ro% of the tax otherwise computed is applied if taxable income exceeds 6,ooo N.F. or $r,zoo.

The effect of the foregoing rate schedule is cushioned by an arrangement which is applicable to married persons or those with
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dependent children and is similar to the "split-income" arrangement allowed under American law. In the case of a married couple
without dependent children, the figures for a given income bracket
are doubled though the rate remains constant. One dependent child
counts just one-half as much as a spouse. Whereas the coefficient
for a married couple is 2, it is zY2 for a married couple with one
child and would, by way of further example, be 3 if they had two
children. Accordingly, the graduated scale reflected in the schedule
set forth in Table I H would be modified in the case of a married
couple with one dependent child, the coefficient being 2 Y2, as shown
in Table I I.
TABLE

I I

Aggregate Taxable Income
New Francs
Dollars
o to 5,500
$o to 1,100
5,500 to 8,750
11 100 to 1,750
8,750 to 15,000
1,750 to 3,ooo
15,000 to 22,500
3,000 to 4,500
22,500 to 37,500
4,500 to 7,500
37,500 to 7 5,000
7,500 to 15,000
75,000 to 150,000
15,000 to 30,000
Excess over r 50,000 Excess over 30,000
• See footnotes a and b re previous schedule.

Rate Applicable to the
Portion Indicated a

5%
15%

zo%

25%
35%

45%
55%
65%

(c) The complementary tax on individuals.-While this
modern flat rate version of the old proportional tax is deemed to
be only a temporary levy for the years 1959 and 1960, it may
remain in force for a longer period. Though it reaches the majority
of income items, salaries, wages, pensions, and. the like are excluded. The rate is 9% for 1959, and 8% for 1960. Certain types
of income enjoy a basic exemption of $6oo ( J,ooo new Francs)
or $88o (4,400 new Francs).
The impact of this tax is reduced by an arrangement which
,permits the amount of tax in one year to be deducted from the
taxpayer's income of the following year in computing his general
income tax.
(d) Cumulative effect of complementary and progressive
income tax on individuals.-The cumulative effect of the two income
taxes applicable to individuals can be best illustrated, as in Table
I J, by the case of a married couple (neither of whom is on salary
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or wages) who have one dependent child, their taxable income
(appropriate deductions have been taken) being 37,soo N.F.
($7,soo).
TABLE

I

J

New
Francs Dollars

New
Francs

Dollars

Taxable Income
37.SOO $7,soo
I. The 8% complementary
$6oo
6oo
3,000
tax
3,000
2. Amount subject to general
tax
34.SOO 6,900
3· General tax Computation
s,soo N.F..... 27s N.F.
s% on
IS% on next 3,2so N.F.
487.so N.F.
20% on next 6,2so N.F.
1,2so N.F.
25% on next 7,soo N.F.
1,87s N.F.
3S% on next 12,000 N.F.
4,2oo N.F.
34,500 N.F.
8,087·SO
10% surcharge
8o8.7 s
8,826.2S 1,779
Total
tax
(effective
rate
of
about
32%)a
II,896.2S
$2,379
4·
• The effective rate of 32% relates to taxable income; because of certain standard
deductions, it will actually be lower.

(e) Corporation income tax.-The French corporate income tax ( Impot sur les Societes) reaches the aggregate net income
in a manner similar to that of the United States corporate tax. The
two most notable distinctions between the two systems involves,
first, the rate structure; France applies a flat so%. Second, it
reaches only income derived from French sources.
Another major distinction involves the treatment of dividends
received by one corporation from another in which the former holds
shares. In evaluating this arrangement, it must be remembered that
the distributing corporation's own profits will be subject to the flat
so% corporate income tax. Then when it declares a dividend from
that profit which is left after taxes, it must withhold a tax which
represents an assessment against the recipient corporation, the
amount normally being 24% of the gross dividend. Even so, the
dividend is includible in the gross income of the recipient corporation for the purposes of computing its regular so% corporate
tax though at that point it enjoys a credit for the 24% previously
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withheld. When the recipient corporation itself declares a dividend
to its shareholders, it too must withhold a 24% tax. And those
shareholders, if individuals, will also suffer the previously described
income tax on individuals, the 24% withholding tax being treated
as a credit.
In one circumstance, the multiple impact suffered under the
regular corporate tax as a result of inter-company arrangements is
largely eliminated. That circumstance involves the case where the
recipient corporation is French and owns at least 20% of the share
capital of the original distributing corporation. 16 The recipient
corporation will first receive a dividend-received deduction, much on
the order of that allowed in the United States, in computing its own
regular corporate tax. Limitation of the deduction to 7 5%, instead of allowing a full IOo%, represents an attempt on a standard
basis to accommodate the fact that a part of the recipient corporation's general expenses will have been attributable to dividends received. Secondly, while the 24% dividend tax must be withheld by
the recipient corporation when it declares a dividend, this withholding principle is not applied to the extent its declaration is out
of dividends which it earlier received from the original distributing
corporation.

(f) The French concept of gross income.-With regard
to business income derived by individuals or corporations, the concept of gross income is similar to that in vogue in the United States,
the three prime differences being noted below.
The first difference relates to capital gains which are not taxed
in France unless (a) they are regularly and professionally made by
the taxpayer or (b) they involve business property. But even in the
circumstance related in (b), the gain will not be recognized if it
is reinvested within a specified period.
Where the gain is reached, ordinary rates are applied except
where the gain is realized in connection with the termination of the
business through liquidation or merger. In the latter event, lower
rates are applied.
If a given capital gain would fall into the taxable category, the
taxpayer may use a system of coefficients to upgrade the historical
cost which would otherwise be used in computing his gain, the aim
being to neutralize in some measure the effect of changes which have
taken place over the years in the value of the franc. The schedule
16
Pursuant to the reform of 1959, the tax authorities may grant the same privilege
to corporations which own less than zoo/o of the participating rights.
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of coefficients with datelines representing possible points of purchase appears in Table I K.
TABLE I K
Year

Coefficient*

Year

Coefficient

204.I
142·9
108.9
74·9
6I.2
59·1
40.8
61.2
65·9
51
43·5
38·7
29.8
32·7
32·7
33·3
37·5
40.8
47·7
52·4
54·4
61.2
51

I937
1938
I939
T940
I94I
I942
1943
1944
I945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
I953
I954
1955
1956
1957
I958

36. I
31.9
30·7
24.6
22.5
20.4
14·9
13·7
6.8
4·3
3·4
1.9
1.6
1.4
1.05
1.05
I.IO
I. I 5
I. I 5
1.10
1.05
I

I 9 I 4 and prior years
I915 . . . . . . .
I9I6
- .....
1917
I9I8
I919 . . . . . . . . . . .
1920
I92I
1922
I923
.......
1924
1925 . . . . . . . . .
.......
1926
I927 . . . . . . . . . . .
I928
1929
I930 . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
I93I
......
I932
.........
1933
.......
I934
........
1935
.......
I936

*

(*Fixed by Decree No. 59-289 of 14th February, 1959.)

That portion of any gain which is immunized from the regular
corporate income tax only because of the impact of the above coefficients, i.e., because of revaluations in the currency, must be reflected on a balance sheet as a special revaluation reserve and
presently suffers a special 3% tax. The ordinary withholding tax
applies, however, if that reserve is distributed, though in some cases
the withholding rate is reduced to I2%.
A second major difference between French and United States
concepts of gross income arises in the circumstance where a branch
is shifted into a subsidiary. In France, one-half of any difference
which exists between the book value and the current fair market
value of the branch's assets is subjected to the ordinary corporate
tax rates, provided the branch existed for less than 5 years. For
older branches, only 10% of the gain is reachedP
17

The rate is only 6.6% in the case of private enterprises.
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A third prime difference between the two systems with regard to
the meaning of gross income involves private enterprises with
relatively small turnover. In France, these may be taxed on the
basis of a presumptive profit.

(g) The French concept of ((ta."<:able" income.-In a business
setting, the deductions which may be taken from gross income under
French law, in arriving at taxable income, are similar to those
allowed in Belgium and the United States. In other words, the aim
is to reach only net income and is accomplished through allowance
of deductions for those expenses incurred in properly carrying on
the enterprise, provided, of course, that the expenditure did not
involve an increase in inventory or capital equipment. For example,
interest on loans is deductible, even if paid by a subsidiary to a
parent, provided the loan relates to the commercial aspects of the
enterprise and the interest is fair and reasonable. 18 Again, in principle the indirect taxes suffered by an enterprise are deductible in
computing taxable income.
The annual French "amortization" ( amortissement) deduction,
designed to take account of normal wear and tear arising out of
use of buildings, equipment, etc., differs in one major respect from
the American depreciation allowance. Because of marked changes
which have taken place in the actual value of the franc, France has
found it necessary to make standard modifications in the historical
cost against which depreciation would otherwise be computed. The
procedure involves use of the coefficients previously described in
connection with the discussion of capital gains. After applying the
appropriate coefficient for the year of purchase to historical cost,
previous depreciation-computed on the basis of historical cost for
purposes of the current computation-is multiplied by the coefficients appropriate for the years of earlier write-offs. Following
subtraction of the re-valued earlier depreciation from the re-valued
historical cost, the normal rules regarding depreciation are applied,
i.e., the balance is spread over the remaining useful life of the
property. As in the States, determination of "useful life" ultimately
depends on the way the taxpayer will use the property; extraordinary usage, for example, will be taken into account in making the
determination. Certain general rate patterns have also been issued
by the government to accommodate typical cases, and in some instances, for example with reference to hotels, quite detailed schedules have been promulgated. Until the recent tax reform, only the
18
However, interest paid to a parent or other shareholders is onlv deductible to the
extent the loan does not exceed soo/o of the subsidiary's capital,
.
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straight line method was permitted, except in the instance where
some additional depreciation was allowed to facilitate modernization of equipment. Now, however, the declining bal"ance method
may also be used with reference to a majority of investments.
Inventory is valued at cost or market whichever is less. It is not
possible, however, to use the LIFO inventory method.
In the case of individuals, certain standard deductions may be
taken in lieu of itemizing business expenses. The standardized
figure for those working for salary or wages is ID% of the salary
or wage; for commercial travelers, such as a salesman, the figure
is 37%. In computing the general income tax, the taxpayer may also
deduct his flat rate complementary tax, if any, and any versement
forfaitaire which he may have suffered as an employer of domestics.
Other items of an equally personal sort which are deductible include a limited amount of life insurance premiums on policies contracted before 1959, charitable contributions with a ceiling of .s%
of taxable income, and alimony paid pursuant to the French civil
law.
In addition to the foregoing deductions (including the standard
business expense deduction), an abatement of zo% is allowed for
salary and wage earners.

(h) Payment and the taxable year.-While the calendar
year is usually the taxable year, an enterprise may elect a different
fiscal year comprising not more than 12 months. However, losses
of one year may generally be carried forward for a period up to
5 years.
While the tax due in one year relates to the income of the
preceding fiscal year, in most cases a system of pre-payment exists.
Generally, a choice does not exist as to the matter of accounting
methods. Special rules and regulations govern the matter of timing
as it relates to different types of items, but in general the accrual
basis constitutes the proper accounting method.
(i) The relevance of residency as it affects individuals.As to resident-individuals, France asserts a less sweeping jurisdiction in assessing its flat rate complementary tax than it does with
reference to the general income tax. Applicability of the former
tax rests, in general, on a principle of territoriality, the tax applying only to that part of a resident's income which has its source in
France. The only major exceptions relate to dividends and interest
which, absent treaty provisions, are included regardless of source.

TAXATION

373

The general income tax, on the other hand, quite generally reaches
all of a resident's income, without regard to source. A combination
of these divergent general jurisdictional principles means, except for
dividends and interest, that the foreign "sourced" income of residents suffers a smaller total tax than does domestic income. 19
Nonresidents enjoy an even more favorable status. Since they
suffer either tax only with reference to income which has its source
in France, the residency of an individual under French law may
assume considerable importance. Normally a foreigner ·residing in
France will not be treated as a resident unless he has transferred
his sphere of interest to France or remains there for at least 5
years. Until one or the other of these tests is satisfied, the foreigner
will suffer tax only on his French income, though in the absence of
such he will be taxed on an amount five times the rental value of
his dwelling. When one of the alternative tests for residency is
finally satisfied, the foreigner may still be immune from the general
income tax with reference to non-French income if he is able to
demonstrate that he is properly taxed on such by the country of
which he is a citizen.

(j) The relevance of residency as it affects corporations.
-In general, the corporate tax follows the principle of territoriality with reference to domestic as well as foreign corporations.
Thus both are taxable generally only on profits deemed to have
a source in France. In the case of a foreign corporation, this includes income arising from a complete cycle of economic transactions in France as well as those earned there by a foreign-owned
permanent establishment. 20
Since even a French corporation will suffer the regular corporate
tax on its foreign income in only rare circumstances, the most important difference between French and foreign corporations relates
to the separate 24% tax which it must withhold as a charge against
stockholders on gross dividends. The French corporation must
withhold this tax without regard to the geographical source from
which it derived the income from which the dividend was paid. The
non-French corporation, on the other hand, must withhold the 24%
tax only on that part of the dividend which corresponds to its
French business.
19
Accordingly, there is less pressure in France for unilateral tax relief in the case of
foreign income than would otherwise be the case.
"'Pursuant to a bilateral tax treaty with the United States, the industrial and commercial profits earned by an American corporation will be taxed in France only if
it has a "permanent establishment" there.
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Section B of PART III, infra, indicates two modifications of the
foregoing pattern as it affects American residents and entities.
First, the withheld dividend tax, payable illustratively on dividends
distributed by a French subsidiary to an American parent, is reduced by a bilateral tax treaty to 15%. Second, while the French
subsidiary will also have previously paid its own so% corporate tax,
the latter is the only income tax suffered if an American company
conducts its affairs in France through a permanent establishment
in the nature of a branch located there. In that event, the base
would consist of income properly attributable to the permanent
establishment, as is more fully explained in PART III, infra.
(k) The comparative cost of retaining and distributing corporate profits.-In Belgium, it will be recalled, distributed profits
encountered a different corporate tax pattern than undistributed
profits. This is not so in France. Distributed and undistributed
profits are taxed alike. France does not even employ the type of
additional penalty tax which may be encountered in America with
regard to unreasonable accumulations. In this connection, a flat
unavoidable temporary levy of 2% on reserves-an outgrowth of
the extraordinary expenses incurred in Algeria-was terminated at
the close of I 9 58.
While the corporate tax itself remains the same, whether or not
profits are distributed, it must be remembered that the corporation,
upon distribution, will be required to withhold, as a charge against
stockholders, the 24% tax on dividends, a figure which is reduced
to 15% in the case of payments to American residents or corporations.
A French corporation which decides to retain certain earnings
may capitalize them, without prejudice to the stockholders, by distributing a stock dividend. Only if the recipient stockholder later
receives a liquidating dividend will his earlier receipt of the stock
dividend have any tax significance to him. For tax purposes, the
nominal (par) value of his original shares will have been spread
in proper proportion to include also the dividend shares. Illustratively, if his original shares carried a par value of $roo, receipt
of a 100% stock dividend would lead, for tax purposes, to a new
allocation of a $50 par value to each of his original and dividend
shares. And only that amount could be recaptured tax free at the
point of liquidation.
(l) Disposition of an incorporated enterprise.-If a corporation sells its assets as a preliminary step to liquidation, that part
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of the gain, if any, attributable to capital assets will be taxed at the
special rates previously indicated, i.e., at 10% on gain from any
such assets held for over 5 years and at so% on one-half of the gain
realized from any such assets held for a lesser period. Then on
distributing the after-tax balance, the corporation must withhold
the 24;~ dividend tax.
A merger out of which stockholders derive new shares of stock
is not treated as a liquidation; gains which would have otherwise
been taxed on liquidation enjoy an immunity in the case of merger,
the distinction resting on the fact that here there is a continuity of
interest on the part of all concerned. The constituent corporation
which is absorbed in the merger will, however, file a separate corporate tax return covering the ordinary profits of the partial year
concluded by the merger.
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER FRENCH TAXES

(a) Taxes on capital and property.-France does not impose taxes on capital or property simply because of its ownership.
However, fairly significant amounts may be exacted when property
is transferred. If the transfer is for money or money's worth and
the deed must be registered, a registration duty must be paid. This
registration fee, upon the sale of real property, is apart from a
low tax and must be paid at the rate of 16.6%. However, the rate
is only 2.2% when real property is brought into a corporation. On
the establishment of a corporation a different fee of 1.6% is levied
on the share capital.
(b) French turnover taxes.-An unusual type of turnover
tax is actually more important to the French government than the
income tax. The former tax differs markedly from the turnover
taxes of other member nations. Most countries impose a tax on each
transfer, measured by the delivery price. As a consequence, an
integrated company may have a real advantage over a nonintegrated company. In France, however, the net effect is to tax
only that value which each successive entrepreneur adds to the
product, thus depriving integrated companies of the advantage they
enjoy in other countries. While the French tax base is smaller than
that of other countries, it will also later be noted that the rate in
France is somewhat higher.
In effect, the technique by which only the added value is reached
involves two separate steps. First, the full effective rate is applied
against each vendor on the delivery of goods, the amount of the tax
being separately reflected by him on the invoice which is delivered
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to the buyer. Before paying the tax, as a second step, the vendor
deducts the amount of turnover taxes reflected on invoices which
he received covering his purchase of components, services, and
equipment (including such things as machinery and industrial buildings). The practical effect, if the rates are always the same,~ 1 is that
the manufacturer, e.g., will usually pay a tax on ·the difference between his selling price and the lesser sum which he paid for raw
materials, etc.
The turnover tax is also applied at the point goods are imported.
However, at the point of export, any tax paid at import or with
respect to intermediate domestic transfers is wholly refunded.
The normal French rate is stated to be zo%, but since the base
against which it is applied includes the tax itself, the normal
effective rate which is reflected on an invoice is 25%. Transfers
of certain types of goods call for special rates, some higher and
some lower than the normal rate. The stated rate for services is
8.5%,22 the effective rate being 9.23%.
While these rates are higher than those of most member nations,
thus neutralizing in one degree or another the use by the French
of a smaller base, account must also be taken of two other considerations in reckoning the total impact of its turnover taxes. One of
these involves the immunity of the retailer's mark-up from this
tax. In other words, retail vendors-normally the last in a chain
of successive vendors-are exempt from the added value turnover
tax. Indeed, in some significant circumstances, wholesalers are also
exempt. However, the exemption of retailers is itself in part neutralized by local turnover taxes levied on the entire retail sales price
at a stated rate of 2.75%, the effective rate being 2.83%. The
difference between the tax load borne by retailers and that borne
by others is not as great as one might suppose. The tax on the retailer covers the entire price, not just the value added. In other
words, he is not permitted to deduct earlier turnover taxes paid by
those from whom he acquired his merchandise.

(c) Miscellaneous taxes.-French business is subject to a
number of taxes in addition to income, conveyancing, and turnover
taxes. One involves the previously described "versement forfaitaire" which is assessed against employers with respect to
salaries and wages paid employees. Another is closely akin to a
21

The rate will not always be the same, particularly with reference to services.
This same rate normally applies to royalties. However, under certain bilateral tax
treaties, including one with the United States, royalties derived by nonresident inventors are usually exempt. See PART II, infra.
201
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business license tax (contribution des patentes), the amount being
dependent upon four factors: (a) the scale of the business; (b)
the location or municipality in which the business is located; (c)
the rental value; and (d) the number of employees.
Special duties are also levied on certain types of consumers'
goods, such as wine, meat, coffee, and tea. On the other hand, controlled monopolies have taken over the sale of certain other products, such as tobacco, explosives, and matches.
Motor vehicles are also subject to a special tax, one which differs
from that levied on freight carriers. The latter also enjoy freedom
from the turnover tax.
SECTION

C.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC

OF GERMANY

SUBSECTION I. INCOME AND NET WEALTH TAXES

(a) In general.-The basic pattern of income taxation in
Germany, as it affects individuals, differs substantially from the
previously described Belgian system. Whereas the latter country
generally exacts two different income taxes from individuals, Germany imposes only one 23 ( Einkommensteuer), with progression in
the rate structure rising to a ceiling of 53%. A limited exception to
this unified arrangement involves a separate substitute withholding
tax on income from certain kinds of bonds. Though that substitute
exaction may be a final levy, under certain conditions a taxpayer
is permitted to aggregate this type of bond income with other
types of income in computing the more general income tax, the
amount previously withheld being treated in such case as a credit.
Other withholding taxes, such as those on wages and dividends, are
generally treated as integral parts of, and serve as credits against,
the general income tax.
Germany's corporate income tax differs from the previously described counterpart found in France. It will be recalled that the
latter does not discriminate at the corporate level between distributed and undistributed earnings; its flat rate tax is imposed uniformly, for the year income is earned, without regard to dividend
policy. Germany, like Belgium, does discriminate at the corporate
level. While the former imposes only one corporate income tax,
the rate on distributed profits is much lower than the rate on those
corporate profits which are not currently deflected to stockholders.
23
The important churches are permitted to levy a church tax as a surcharge on the
income tax, but in an amount not exceeding 8o/o of the income tax.
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However, as later explained, the impact of this differential on certain smaller corporations which must look to internal financing for
expansion has been whittled down through application of a special
rate structure. In either case, however, distributed profits will suffer
another tax in the hands of shareholders, as in Belgium and France.
Corporations as well as individuals are also subject to a flat rate
tax on net wealth (V ermogensteuer) though only individuals may
deduct this tax in computing the general income tax base. In
addition, enterprises, whether owned by a corporation or individuals, suffer a municipal enterprise tax ( Gewerbesteuer), which uses
income as one of the factors in fixing the amount of the exaction.
The amount of this tax constitutes a deduction for both individuals
and corporations in determining that income subject to the general
income tax.
(b) Income, enterprise, and net wealth taxes on individuals.
-The income tax on individuals caters to married persons and,
up to a point, progressively also to those with children.
The split-income system which is normally utilized by married
persons in the United States is also available in Germany. The tax
on a married couple is twice the amount which would otherwise
be due on one-half of the combined income of the two spouses.
Where the two spouses earn different amounts, the effect is to
spread their incomes equally between the two, confining the income
to lower rate brackets.
Taxpayers who file a separate return enjoy a personal allowance
of $400 (DM I ,680); husbands and wives who file a joint return
have two such allowances. There is also a modest allowance for
old age; single taxpayers over 50 years of age may deduct $200
( DM 840) from gross income; those over 70 enjoy an additional
allowance of $8 5 ( DM 360), this amount being doubled in the
case of married persons.
Allowances for children, accommodated through deductions from
gross income, are progressive in amount up through the third child,
at which point they level off-as follows:
First child
Second child
Third child, and each added child

Dollars
$215.
400.
429.

D!v!
900.
1,68o.
1,8 IO.

The significance of the personal allowances and the right of
married persons to split their incomes on filing a joint return can
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be illustrated by the case of a male taxpayer whose total earned
income, all being derived from employment, is $9,524 (DM 40,ooo). As a single person, he would pay $3,060 (DM I2,843),
the effective rate being 3 2% compared with an effective rate of
25% if, as a married taxpayer, he filed a joint return, and with
22% for married taxpayers with two dependent children. Those
who reside in Berlin would also enjoy a 20% tax reduction.
Individuals also suffer a flat I% deductible tax on net wealth.
This means that a taxpayer whose income is derived from a stock
portfolio will suffer larger cumulative taxes than will a taxpayer
who does not own property but derives from employment a like
amount of income. The difference can be illustrated by the previously mentioned single taxpayer whose total net income equalled
$9,524 (DM 4o,qoo). Whereas his effective rate was 32% when
all of such income was derived from employment and subject only
to the income tax, the cumulative effective rate of both taxes would
be 39% if one-half of his income had been derived from stocks
valued at $I19,047 (DM 5oo,ooo).
The net wealth tax, like the general income tax, applies whether
the individual is a property-owning employee or is engaged in the
operation of a business. However, the businessman also incurs a
three-factor municipal enterprise or trading tax, the rates of which
vary among municipalities. The basic rate is progressive up to 5%
on profits and is .2% on net worth and wages. Surcharges with
respect to profits and net worth reach a maximum of twice the
basic charge, increasing the tax to I 5% on profits and .6% on property. Surcharges with respect to the tax on wages may, on the
other hand, increase that basic levy tenfold. This three-factor tax
is deductible, however, in computing taxable income for purposes
of the general income tax, and may be treated as a debt in calculating the net amount of property owned. Inter alia, the foregoing
principle means that the trade tax which is paid is deductible in computing that portion of the trade tax which turns on profit, for that
net income which is used in computing the general income tax is also
the income which is used in computing the trade or enterprise tax.

(c) Income, net wealth, and enterprise taxes on juridical
entities.-The corporate income tax ( C.I.T. Korperschaftsteuer)
reaches the aggregate net income of all juridical entities (Aktiengesellschaft, Gesellschaft mit beschrankter H aftung, etc.), the prime
rate being a flat 51%. However, this is reduced to IS% with
respect to that portion of the income which is currently distrib-
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24
uted. Except in one instance, however, distributed profits are
further subject to a 25% withholding tax against stockholders who
apply it as a credit against their own general income tax. 25 The one
exception is intended to avoid multiplication of the tax load in the
case of certain inter-corporate dividends. If the distributee is another German corporation which has shares outstanding and which
owns 2 5% or more of the stock interest of the distributing corporation, the latter is not required to withhold the dividend tax.
Nor will the recipient corporation be required to include the dividend in its own gross income, provided that dividend is immediately
distributed to its own stockholders. In such case, it will, however,
withhold the 25% dividend tax. Moreover, if it retains the dividend, it must pay a special tax of 36% ( 5 I% less I 5%). This
special levy was designed to prevent avoidance of the 5 I% rate
where profits of a subsidiary are not effectively distributed to the
ultimate equity owners, i.e., stockholders of the parent. Absent this
special arrangement, it was thought that subsidiaries might avoid
the 5 I% tax by distributing dividends to a parent which, instead of
distributing the profit to its own shareholders, might then loan
the funds back to the subsidiary.
Because of the marked differential between the normal corporate
rates on distributed and undistributed profits, a special cushion has
been designed to facilitate internal financing by small corporations
which have a net worth not exceeding $I,I85,ooo (DM 5,ooo,ooo),
provided their shares are in registered form and are owned, to
the extent of 76% or more, by individuals. In such case, a progressive rate-the maximum charge being 49% on a profit of $II,850
( DM 50,000), is applied to the undistributed profit. But the tax
on distributed profits of such a corporation is 26.5% instead of
the normal I 5%.
Juridical entities also pay the flat I% tax on net wealth as well
as the special municipal enterprise tax on their profits and net
wealth. The basic rates and surcharges of the latter are similar to
those described above in the setting of individuals. Also, as in the
case of individuals, there is a 20% rate reduction in taxes for
enterprises in West Berlin.
(d) Combined impact of corporate and individual direct
taxes.-In calculating the cumulative effect of direct taxes imposed,
.. The Is% rate is applied to the so-called "beriicksichtigungsfiihige Ausschiittungen."
Literally translated, this means "distributions that may be taken into account." In
effect, the low rate will apply only to those distributions which are made pursuant to a
resolution adopte<l. at a shareholders' meeting.
25
Applicable only to distributions by German corporations.
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for example, on a manufacturing corporation and its stockholders,
account must always be taken of three taxes on the corporation
(general income tax, trade or enterprise tax, and net wealth tax)
and, if any profits are distributed, of two taxes on the individual
stockholders (income and net wealth taxes) . It does not follow,
however, that a constant percentage of corporate profits will always be absorbed by these five taxes. Because the normal corporate
rate of 51% differs from the reduced 15% corporate rate on those
profits actually distributed, there will be differences in the total tax
load depending on whether all, part, or none of the corporate
profits, after taxes, are distributed. Moreover, if it is contemplated
that all of the profits, after taxes, of various corporations will be
currently distributed, there will still be differences in the degree to
which those profits are absorbed by direct taxes. In the first place,
the ratio between corp'orate net wealth taxes and corporate profits
will not be the same for all industries. Nor, with reference to the
net wealth tax on stockholders, will the ratio between stock values
and dividends be constant. Again, the ratio of the corporate trade
or enterprise tax to corporate profits will vary among municipalities
because of differences in rates applied to the three base factors;
variation with reference to this tax will also exist among corporations within a municipality because of differences in ratio between
two of the contributing factors (net wealth and wages) and corporate profits. Finally, with reference to the general income tax
itself, there is a difference in the rate structure for those small
corporations which pay 26.5% on distributed profits and others
which pay 15%, just as there are differences in the progressive rate
applicable to stockholders who enjoy varying amounts of income.
Only if one indulges in certain assumptions is it possible even to
measure the cumulative effect of the 3 direct corporate taxes. For
example, if it be assumed ( 1) that all corporate profits (after
corporate taxes) are currently to be distributed, ( 2) that the corporation's profits before taxes bear a 10% ratio to its net wealth
which, in turn, is subject to the non-deductible net wealth tax, ( 3)
that the normal corporate income tax rate structure (51% with
a reduced rate of 15% on distributed profits) is to be applied, and
(4) that the municipal trade tax is levied at more or less maximum
rates on profits and net wealth ( 15% and .6% respectively), it is
possible, through application of a complicated formula, to predict
that direct corporate taxes will absorb 53.04% of the company's
profits, leaving 46.96% of such profits for distribution. In the foregoing circumstance, of the total corporate tax of 53%, approxi-
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mately I 8.2% is attributable to the municipal enterprise tax, 10%
to the net wealth tax, and 24.8% to the corporate income tax. That
the corporate income tax absorbed almost 2 5% of the profits, as
computed before taxes, may come as something of a surprise in
view of the assumption that all profits, after taxes, were distributed
and that one rate on distributed profits was only IS%· However,
the latter rate is applicable only to that portion of corporate profits
actually deflected to stockholders; in effect the 5 I% rate is applied
to that portion of the profits absorbed by the tax collector.
Using the same assumptions, except that now 40% of the profits
after direct taxes will be distributed, the tax collector would absorb
through direct corporate taxes almost 65% of the corporate profits
as contrasted with almost 70% if none of the profits were to be
distributed.
The minimum separate impact of a distribution on stockholders
can be illustrated by returning to the case where all of the aftertax corporate profits (47% of pre-tax profits) were distributed. If
the stock yields only 4% on its value, the I% tax on the shareholder's net wealth will absorb 25% of the dividend. And if it be
further assumed that the taxpayer is single, ·and that he derives all
of his modest income 26 ( $2,380 or DM Io,ooo) from dividends,
his personal exemption and deductions will convert the first bracket
income tax rate of 20% into an effective rate of I o. 7 4% of the
dividend. Thus in this case, corporate and individual direct taxes
would have the following cumulative effect:
Corporate profits
Less corporate taxes
Dividend
Less individual direct taxes:
Net Wealth Tax

$IOO.

_i1:.

$ 47·

-25%X47% =II.75
Income Tax

- I0.74% X 47 =

5.05

Church Tax

- 8% X 5.05

.40

% of Corporate profits after all direct taxes

q.20
$ 29.80.

(e) German concept of gross income.-As a general proposition, the gross income of an individual includes all of his profits,
with certain exceptions the most important of which relates to
"'The standard deduction for expenses has been taken into account (DM ISO),
The property tax is deductible as a personal expenditure,
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capital gains. While these are generally excludable, the immunity
does not extend to three frequently recurring situations. Profits
derived from sales of property used in an enterprise, such as office
equipment or obsolete machinery but not land, is considered a business profit and must be included. Speculative gains, if they equal
$238 (DM r,ooo) or more a year, are also includible. A gain is
deemed speculative if it is realized from the sale of immovables
held for less than 2 years or from movables held less than three 27
months. Finally, profit in excess of a certain amount, derived from
the sale of certain corporate shares, will be taxed, though at special
rates, even though such shares do not constitute a part of the normal
trading assets of the taxpayer. This principle is applied in the instance where the taxpayer actually or constructively owned a "considerable interest" in the corporation. The taxpayer will be treated
as though he owned such an interest if, immediately before the sale
or within the 5 preceding years, he, his wife, fiancee, or certain
relatives owned more than 25% of the nominal paid in capital.
The special rates are fixed by the tax authorities and range from
ro% to 30%. Usually a rate equal to one-half of the rate applied
to the taxpayer's total income will be used. While profits of this
type are taxed only if they exceed a certain amount, that minimum
standard varies and depends on the portion of the enterprise's
capital which is sold.
With one prime exception, all profits realized by a corporation
are taxable, including capital gains. The one exception relates to
the previously discussed immunity extended to inter-corporate dividends where a recipient German corporation holds at least 25%
of the shares in a distributing German corporation. However, as
previously noted, the recipient corporation will be required to pay
a 36% tax if it does not make a current distribution of the dividend
to its own shareholders. A corporation may also transfer a branch
to a subsidiary without recognition of gain, if any, provided the
subsidiary continues to reflect the assets at the value at which they
were carried on the parent's balance sheet. 28
With certain modifications, the income factor of the municipal
enterprise tax is also calculated according to the profits concept of
the general income tax. The modifications relate to deductions as
well as inclusions. For example, interest paid on long-term debts
""A tax reform bill will extend this period to six months.
Whether this applies to a foreign corporation with a German branch has not been
settled. The statute is not wholly clear on this point, and there are no interpretative
decisions.
28
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and salaries paid to shareholder-managers who own a significant
interest ( 2 S% or more) must be restored to income. On the other
hand, income from foreign permanent establishments may be excluded. In keeping with the philosophy of the first of the foregoing
modifications, involving restoration to income of interest paid on
long-term debt, it should also be noted that the long-term debt itself
is treated as a part of the company's net worth for purposes of
the separate net wealth factor.

(f) German concept of utaxable" income.-ln the case of an
individual, deductions from gross income include personal as well
as business expenses.
Personal or non-business expenses (Sonderausgaben) which may
be itemized, apart from the previously described basic exemptions
allowed for the taxpayer and his dependents, are of three types.
First, the entire net wealth and church taxes paid by an individual,
as well as interest on personal loans, may be deducted. Second, up
to a certain maximum amount, deductions may be taken for premiums for social security as well as life, health, and accident insurance, and subject to a separate maximum limitation-amounts
contributed to charity and the like. In lieu of itemizing these first
two types of personal expenses, the taxpayer may take a standard
personal deduction. If his total income is derived wholly or partly
from employment or consists of periodic payments, the standard
minimum is $ISO (DM 636); in other cases it is $48 (DM 200).
Finally, so-called extraordinary charges associated with illness,
death, etc., are separately deductible to the extent they exceed a
minimum amount. Even extra expenses for a housekeeper may be
fitted into this category under certain conditions. The minimum
amount which a taxpayer must absorb without benefit of a deduction varies, depending upon the taxpayer's income and family st~tus.
Itemization of an individual's business expenses can also be
avoided by his election to take certain standard business deductions.
For wage and salary earners, a minimum amount of $IJS (DM
s64) is allowed. With respect to income from capital, the standard
deduction is $3S (DM ISO) or twice that amount for a married
couple, and for periodic payments the standard is $48 ( DM 200).
The categories of business expenses which may be itemized are
quite similar to those in the United States, and include wages,
salaries (but not remuneration paid directors 29 ), rents, depreci29
In German law, the term, "directors," may refer to "Vorstandsmitglieder" (managing directors) or to "Aufsichtsratsmitglider" (members of the board of directors).
Only the latter group is meant here.
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ation, interest (including reasonable interest charges paid to a
parent company or other shareholder), excise duties, turnover
taxes, and the enterprise tax. The net wealth tax is deductible, however, only by individuals and as a personal item; it is not deductible
by corporations.
Enterprises may compute depreciation by straight-line, accelerated, or other methods, depending on which is the more suitable,
but subject to certain legal limitations. Beginning with I958, a deduction under the accelerated method cannot exceed 25% 30 of the
base nor can it be more than 250% of that which would be allowed
under the straight-line method. Perhaps because of its rapidly expanding economy, Germany does not presently complement its
regular depreciation allowances with additional first-year incentive
allowances.
Inventory valuation must generally conform to the so-called
"Niederstwertprinzip," i.e., cost or market whichever is lower.
Although it was thought that the law permitted taxpayers to reflect
inventory at cost even though the replacement market price was
lower, court decisions have reached a contrary result. In any event,
generally speaking, valuation of assets for tax purposes must conform to those valuations reflected on balance sheets for commercial
purposes.
Also with reference to the matter of inventory, the Supreme
Tax Court has determined that the taxing statute does not permit
the use of LIFO or the base stock method. This limitation may not
be particularly important in the German setting, for there has been
little inflation in recent years. Nevertheless Section 5 I of the taxing
statute authorizes the Minister of Finance to promulgate regulations, with the approval of Parliament, allowing the creation of
replacement reserves. Such a reserve is authorized only where there
has been a price increase of 10% or more in the taxpayer's replacement market during the year. Moreover, within a period of six
years the reserve must be restored to profit.
(g) Payment and the taxable year.-The tax must generally be computed by reference to a period of I 2 months, and most
taxpayers use the calendar year. However, in order to accommodate
cases of fluctuating income, commercial losses of one year may be
carried forward, if need be, into each of the 5 succeeding taxable
years-offsetting the income of those years. Carrybacks are not
permitted.
30

A tax reform bill will limit this to zo%.
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Most businesses are required to reflect their incomes according
to an accrual method of accounting.
Much of one's tax is paid currently, either through withholding
or quarterly estimated payments. In general there are two types
of withholding. The first relates to the Jo% withholding rate
( Kapitalertragsteuer) applied to interest on certain bonds, a levy
not ordinarily applied to nonresidents. The taxpayer may elect to
treat the amount withheld here as a final payment, in which case the
interest itself is excluded from his aggregate income in applying
the progressive rates of the general income tax. The other withholding taxes on income, such as that applicable to wages (Lohnsteuer) or to income derived from other forms of capital ( Kapitalertragsteuer) are thought of as integral parts of the general
income tax itself, serving as credits. This is particularly important
with reference to the withholding tax on dividends, for a flat 25%
is withheld. In the case of nonresidents, however, this latter figure
is usually the final levy.
While the withheld wage tax is generally treated as a credit, in
one instance it too may constitute the final levy.31 This will be so
where the taxpayer ( r) derives compensation (or a pension) from
only one employment, ( 2) the amount is not in excess of $5,700
( DM 24,000), and ( 3) his income from sources other than employment does not exceed $190 (DM Soo).
A special director's tax (Aufsichtratsteuer), applicable only to
nonresident members of a company's board of control, is also
handled on a withholding basis. Resident directors, however, handle
their fees under the general income tax; indeed, such fees are not
even subject to the general withholding tax on wages.
(h) The relevance of residency.-The tax base of a resident of Germany includes income derived from without as well as
that derived from within the country, without regard to his nationality. However, a unilateral provision, much like an arrangement in force in the United States, serves to avoid double taxation.
Foreign income taxes paid on amounts derived from without Germany may be taken as a credit against the German tax.
Nonresidents are subject to taxation only with reference to income derived from German sources. Aside from this jurisdictional
limitation, the principles which govern the calculation of a resident's gross income generally apply to a nonresident. A variation
31
However, there may be adjustments at the end of the year. The arrangement is
called Lohnsteuerjahresausgleich, for it involves annual averaging of the wage tax.
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exists, however, with respect to one of the three exceptional cases
where capital gains suffer tax incidence. In the case of a nonresident,
so-called speculative capital gains ai:e taxed only where derived
from the sale of land.
Except in two primary instances, a minimum 2 5% tax rate applies
to nonresidents. This minimum is not applicable to wage earners
who are taxed by reference to the normal tables. Also, in lieu of
the regular minimum, nonresident corporate directors pay a flat
30% tax on their remuneration as a final levy.
(i) The comparative costs of retaining and distributing
corporate profits.-Sub-topic (a), supra, points up the difference
which exists in the rates applied to distributed as distinguished from
undistributed profits. In effect, this difference ( I 5% on distributed
profits compared with 5 I% on undistributed profits) constitutes a
penalty tax on the use of undistributed profits for purposes of expanswn.
There is only a slight variation on the foregoing theme in the
instance where a German facility is owned directly or indirectly
by an American corporation. If the facility is operated as a branch,
a progressive rate, ranging up to 49%, is applied without regard
to whether the profits are transferred to the United States. If all
of the profits are to be distributed, it may be less expensive, taxwise, to operate through a subsidiary. In that event the subsidiary
will pay at the I 5% rate (as distinguished from the 5 I% if the
profits are retained) and will withhold a dividend tax which is
limited by a tax treaty to I5%. 32 These two levies will not, however, represent exactly 30% of the subsidiary's profits. In the first
place, that portion of the subsidiary's profits which is absorbed by
the corporate levy will be taxed at the rate of 5 I%, for to that
extent the profit is not actually distributed to stockholders. Secondly,
the I 5% dividend tax is applied, not to the subsidiary's total profit,
but only to that part (subsidiary's profit after taxes) of the profit
actually distributed to stockholders. There is one other basic tax
difference between operation through a branch and through a subsidiary. Even if a branch could be financed through loans from the
American parent, any so-called interest would not be deductible by
the branch. A subsidiary, however, may obtain such a deduction in
computing its taxable jncome for income tax purposes, but not for
purposes of the municipal enterprise tax.
•• A change in the existing Germany-U.S. treaty is being negotiated, the German aim
being to restore the withholding tax on intercorporate dividends to 25%.
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(j) Disposition of an enterprise.-Where a corporation
disposes of its business, the income tax will be applied to the difference between the adjusted basis and the selling price of the assets.
And upon liquidation of the corporation a shareholder will suffer
a tax on his realized gain if he has a significant interest ( 2 5% or
more) in the corporation or, in the case of residents, if his gain
fits into the so-called speculative category (holding period 3 months
or less).
While the foregoing suggests that a disposition of an enterprise
is generally a tax reckoning event, under certain conditions it is
possible to effect a merger of corporate enterprises without immediate income tax cost but in effect, of course, tax incidence is only
postponed until a later tax reckoning event-such as a liquidation.
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER GERMAN TAXES

(a) German taxes on capital and property.-In the case
of resident corporations and individuals, the previously described
net wealth or property tax (Vermogensteuer) is applied to property
wherever situated. Nonresidents are reached only with respect to
property situated .within Germany. While the rate is normally I%,
a minimum base of $23,8Io (DM IOO,ooo) is assumed for a corporation and $4,762 (DM 2o,ooo) is assumed for a private company ( Gesellschaft mit beschrankter H aftung). All enterprises also
pay the previously described enterprise or trade tax. There is also
a very modest land tax ( Grundsteuer) running from . 5% to I%
of the rental value of the property. To this, surcharges may be
added.
A registration duty ( Grunderwerbsteuer) is also payable upon
the transfer of real estate for money's worth-the normal rate
being 7%. While this registration duty is avoided in the case of a
gift, such a transfer will be subject to a gift tax which is integrated
with the German death duty (Erbschaftsteuer )-common principles being applicable to inter vivos and testamentary transfers. The
rate is progressive, running up to 6o% on gifts in excess of $2,380,ooo (DM IO,ooo,ooo) where the donor and donee are strangers.
(b) Turnover taxes and excise duties.-Revenue from the
German income tax is supplemented substantially by a multiple stage
turnover tax which is applied to the rendition of services as well
as to each transfer of goods in the course of developing a finished
product. While every turnover is taxed, the normal rate of 4% is
reduced to I% in the instance where one entrepreneur transfers an
item to another entrepreneur without changing its nature.
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Laying aside the matter of tariffs, imports might be said to enjoy
a tax advantage, for a flat 4% tax is applied at the point of importation regardless of the number of stages through which the
imported product may have previously gone. 33 In certain cases, however, this rate may be increased up to a ceiling of 6%.
Export transactions enjoy even more favorable treatment. In
order to make German products more competitive in the world
market, these have been exempt. In fact, at the point of exportation, refund may be obtained-according to certain fixed standards
-of any turnover taxes paid on prior transfers. The formula
which governs such refunds is not, however, always generally
thought to be sufficiently generous to accommodate the entire actual
amount of turnover taxes previously paid.
While the turnover tax rate for luxury goods is the same as for
other goods, special excise duties do exist with reference to a number of products, e.g., tea, beer, coffee, sugar, tobacco, playing cards,
etc. On the other hand, some products, such as bread, are immune
from the turnover tax.

(c) Registration duty on capital contributions .-When new
capital is contributed to a corporation or is devoted to a branch
of a foreign corporation, a registration duty ( Gesellschaftsteuer)
of 2.5% must be paid. On issuance of bonds, a similar 2.5% levy
(Wertpapiersteuer) is imposed.
(d) Miscellaneous.-Other taxes utilized by Germany include those on motor vehicles (differentials frequently being geared
to cylinder volume or weight) and testamentary transfers. The
latter is geared to a progressive rate schedule which looks to the
value transferred as well as the character of the relationship between the decedent and the beneficiary. It applies if a residentbeneficiary receives property from a nonresident as well as where
the decedent was a resident. If neither party is a resident, it applies
if the property is situated in Germany.
SECTION

D.

ITALY

SUBSECTION I. INCOME TAXES

(a) In general.-The Italian income tax system is quite
similar to that of Belgium in that it consists of a series of different
income taxes. Income of individuals and juridical entities is first
divided by reference to its type into four prime categories, each of
83
This matter, as it relates to exports from the United States to Germany, is more
fully covered in PART II, infra.
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which is subjected to a different tax rate. The four separately
scheduled assessments relate, respectively, to (I) estimated income
from rural property, ( 2) income from the active conduct of an
agriculture or farm enterprise, (3) estimated income from urban
property, and (4) income from labor, from movable capital (including interest but not dividends), and from industrial and commercial activity.
Superimposed on these separately scheduled assessments is a fifth
tax, applicable only to individuals, covering aggregate income. A
sixth tax, applicable only to corporations, is more closely akin to an
excess profits and property tax than to an income tax.
On behalf of municipalities, a family tax is also imposed on the
aggregate income of all members of a family. Municipalities,
provinces, Chambers of Commerce, and certain others may also
levy surcharges on other taxes, and these will differ from place to
place.
A more detailed analysis of the cumulative effect of these various
taxes follows.
(b) Separately scheduled taxes on income from rural property.-The first separately scheduled tax relating to rural property
(Imposta sui Terreini) is applied to imputed income, determined
by reference to values reflected in a land register, rather than to
actual income. Because the base itself is quite unrealistic, the land
register not having been brought up to date after a substantial
monetary devaluation, the rate applied to the base is very high.
The basic rate of 10% is multiplied by a coefficient of I 2; surcharges by various units may increase the resulting rate to I467%
of imputed (not actual) income.
Assuming the owner does not use the property in the active conduct of farming or, alternatively, in industrial or commercial operations, his actual income from the property, as distinguished from
the imputed income, will not be assessed under any of the other
separately scheduled assessments, though it will be subject to the
complementary personal tax on aggregate income or to the corporate excess profits tax, as the case may be. On the other hand, if
the owner uses the property in connection with industrial or commercial activities, the imputed income is not subject to the first
separately scheduled assessment but the actual amount will be subject to the fourth separately scheduled tax on industrial and commercial activity, as described below in sub-topic (d).
·
A second and quite distinct tax on rural property actually relates

39I
to income from the active conduct of farming operations (Imposta
sui Reddito Agrario). While the basic rate is ro% multiplied by a
coefficient of r 2, surcharges by various units may increase the
total to 300% of imputed (not actual) income. If the land is rented
instead of being actively used by the owner, neither party will pay
this tax. The owner will pay the previously described tax on imputed income from rural property not actively used by him, and
the lessee will pay the fourth separately scheduled assessment on
income from industrial and commercial activity, described-as
noted above-in subtopic (d) below.
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(c) Separately scheduled tax on income from urban property.-The separately scheduled tax relating to urban property
(Imposta sui Fabbricati) is applied to the actual income therefrom,
though imputed income is sometimes used as an audit yardstick.
Surcharges added to a basic rate of 5% can run the total to as high
as 3 I% of the actual income.
This tax does not apply to income from urban property occupied by an enterprise engaged in industrial activity, the building
being used to house machinery and the like. In that circumstance,
but only that circumstance, the income will be reached by the fourth
separately scheduled tax relating to industrial activity. In all cases,
however, the complementary personal tax on aggregate income or
the corporate excess profits tax will be applied.
(d) Separately scheduled tax on income from certain capital,
labor, and industrial or commercial activity.-The separately scheduled tax on income from capital and/or labor (Imposta sui Redditi
di Ricchezza Mobile), generally known as R.M., is further divided
into four basic classes.
Class A includes only that income which is derived from capital,
i.e., interest 34 and the like, but excluding dividends. Surcharges
increase the basic rate of 23% to 26.32%.
Class B includes income from a combination of capital and labor,
usually relating to commercial and industrial profits. In the case
of individuals and partnerships, the first $387 ( 24o,ooo Lire) of
this income is exempt; from $387 to $I 548 ( 96o,ooo Lire), the
federal rate is 9%; on income from $1548 to $6840 an I 8% rate
is applied; any excess over $6840 suffers a 20% rate. A flat rate of
I 8% is applied to the first $6840 realized by corporations; any
excess is subject to a 20% rate. However, both corporations and
"The .26.32% rate is temporarily reduced by one-half with respect to interest paid by
corporatiOns.
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individuals suffer additional local taxes and surcharges, the effect
being to increase the top rate of 20% to 31.23%.
Class C-I covers only income from liberal professions. Again,
the first $387 ( 24o,ooo Lire) is exempt. Income in excess of that,
up to $I 548 ( 96o,ooo Lire), suffers a 4% rate. The top federal
marginal rate of 8% on the balance is further increased by additional local taxes and surcharges, rising to I3.95%.
Class C-2 covers income from employment in other than a liberal
profession. While the exemption and basic rate structure applicable
to the latter is carried over to this fourth class, additional local
taxes and surcharges here increase the top 8% rate only to 9· I 5%.
The employer is responsible to withhold this tax.
(e) The complementary progressive tax on. an individual's
aggregate income.-ln computing an individual's aggregate income
for the purpose of determining the complementary progressive
tax, a general personal allowance of $3 87 ( 24o,ooo Lire) is first
deducted from gross income. Another deduction of $8 I ( so,ooo
Lire) is allowed for each dependent. Life insurance premiums as
well as the previously described separately scheduled taxes may
also be deducted from gross income. In the end, the progressive
complementary tax will not actually be charged unless the individual's aggregate income, before the foregoing allowances, exceeds
$I I6I (72o,ooo Lire).
The progressive scale on the amount actually subject to tax begins
with a basic rate of 2% (increased by surcharges, etc., to 2.24%)
on taxable amounts up to $387 ( 240,000 Lire), and extends upward to so% (increased by surcharges, etc., to 54%) on taxable
amounts in excess of $8o6,4 52 ( soo million Lire). Progression
is not nearly as intense as in America for moderate incomes. For
example, the marginal basic rate (before surcharges) for $25,000
(ISY:! million Lire) is approximately 10%, and for $5o,ooo (3I
million Lire) it approximates I4 %.

(f) The complementary tax on corporate excess profits and
capital.-The corporate tax which complements the separately
scheduled assessments is not a typical income tax nor are the rates
progressive. It is more closely akin to a combined capital and excess
profits tax. First, a rate of .7 5% is imposed on capital and reserves.
Coupled with this is a IS% tax on those profits which exceed 6%
of the capital and reserves. In computing these profits, the previously described separately scheduled assessment ( R.M.) on, business income is deductible.
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In the case of foreign corporations, the capital levy only reaches
investments in Italy.
(g) Cumulati'Ve effect of taxes imposed on distributed business income of corporations.-While income derived by a corporation from the conduct of business suffers a separately scheduled
corporate assessment as well as the complementary tax imposed on
corporate enterprises, dividends received by individual shareholders are not subject to another separately scheduled assessment.
They are subject, however, to the complementary progressive tax
imposed on individuals. The same immunity from a second separately scheduled assessment applies if the shareholder is a corporation; but the dividend will be included in the recipient corporation's
profits for the purpose of computing its complementary excess profits
tax, if any. American parent companies would not even pay this
tax, however, with respect to dividends received from an Italian
subsidiary.
If it be assumed that the distributing corporation's taxable profits
equalled 10% of its capital and reserves, its tax load would be computed as in Table I L.
TABLE

I L

Separately scheduled assessment
-Effective rate under Category 3 (R.M.)
Capital tax
-Effective rate on capital
·75%
-Ratio of capital to profits
roX
-Effective rate on taxable profits
Excess profits tax
-rs% of o/io of profits; effective rate
Total effective corporate rate

35

31.23%

7·5

%

6.

%

44·73%

Since an individual does not suffer a separately scheduled tax
on dividends, the tax impact on him, as distinguished from the corporation, depends on the moderately progressive rates of the complementary tax on his aggregate income. Subjection of dividends to
but one tax in the hands of individuals has the net effect, if the
corporate tax is ignored, of creating a substantial tax differential
between dividend income and other forms of income. The differ35

It will be recalled that this rate applies only to income in excess of $6480; lower
incomes are subject to a basic rate of 18%, increased by surcharges to 27.85%.
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ence is particularly striking in the case of low and moderate incomes. The substantial character of the differential in these settings
arises out of the fact that the effective rate of the additional separately scheduled assessments on other types of income, e.g., employment income, begins with a higher rate and rises more quickly than
the progressive rates of the complementary tax on aggregate income. Illustratively, the cumulative effect of both taxes on employment income of $2,640 ( 11h million Lire) earned by a single taxpayer is 7.22% contrasted with an effective single tax rate of 2.89%
for a like amount of dividend income. A married taxpayer with
two children, on like amounts of income, would suffer a total
effective rate of 6.8o% on employment income and only 2.47% on
dividend income.
(h) Italian concept of gross income.-The gross income
concept is roughly similar to that in the United States with two
prime exceptions. First, income from rural property is always based
on an estimate as is other income in the absence of adequate records.
Second, capital gains are not always included in the tax base. For
example, an investment purchase of one house followed shortly
thereafter by a sale will not lead to inclusion of any of the realized
gain. But the converse will be true if the taxpayer regularly speculates, i.e., regularly buys and sells houses, securities, etc., and in
such case the ordinary rates are applied. This speculative element is
always implied in the case where an enterprise sells fixed business
assets. With respect to those entities taxed on the basis of their
balance sheets, capital gains may be taxed before they are realized,
i.e., earlier-when and if entered in their accounting records.

(i) Italian concept of "taxable" income.-Permissible deductions from gross income in arriving at taxable income are similar
to those in the United States. Special comment need be made only
with reference to the deductions for taxes, interest, and depreciation, together with the treatment of inventory.
In computing taxable income for purposes of the corporate or
individual complementary taxes, deduction may be taken for the
separately scheduled assessments (including the R.M. tax) as well
as indirect taxes incurred in the production of income.
Interest actually paid on loans associated with the production of
income is quite generally deductible, even where paid to a parent
company, provided the charge does not exceed a reasonable amopnt.
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Depreciation is generally computed by the straight line method,
suggested rates having been worked out by the Finance Department,
in consultation with industry and commerce, for various types of
items. Accelerated depreciation may also be used in connection with
construction of new plants or modernization of old plants. Indeed,
allowances in addition to normal depreciation may be taken in the
first four years up to a total of 40% of cost, but not exceeding
IS% in any one year.
Inventories are valued at cost or market, whichever is lower.
Identification may be made according to LIFO as well as other
methods.
TAXATION

(j) Payment and the taxable year.-While income is calculated on a yearly basis, Italy now allows operating losses to be
carried forward, if need be, into the five succeeding years. Carrybacks are not permitted.
Income is generally reported according to the calendar year,
though entities which report their income on the basis of balance
sheets use their respective accounting years.
The tax is levied in two installments, a provisional levy designed
to facilitate current reporting, and then a definitive levy. The provisional levy uses the past experience of the taxpayer as a yardstick. For example, in the case of individuals and partnerships, the
provisional tax for I 96 I is determined by reference to that income
which was produced in I959 and declared in March, I96o. The
definitive tax is then assessed on the actual income of I96I, as
declared in I962. Corporations which are taxed on the basis of their
balance sheets, according to their accounting year, use more recent
past experience in computing the provisional tax. The provisional
tax for I 96 I is determined by reference to income produced in I 960
and declared in I96r. But again the definitive tax for I96I will be
that year's actual income, as declared in I 962.

(k) The relevance of residency.-The principle of territoriality governs the basic separately scheduled taxes (income from
rural and urban property, from farming, and the R.M. tax). These
reach only income derived from sources in Italy, the residence of
the taxpayer being irrelevant. However, in the case of an Italian
business enterprise, for the purposes of these basic taxes the entire
income will be deemed to have its source in Italy, except to the
extent it is earned by a foreign permanent establishment which has
its own administration and accounting system. Income earned by
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a permanent establishment located in Italy is deemed, of course,
to have its source there.
A slightly different theory of jurisdiction governs the complementary progressive tax on individuals and the excess profits tax on
corporations. Resident citizens of Italy are subject to the former
tax with respect to their entire income, regardless of origin. Resident aliens, on the other hand, initially suffer this tax only with
respect to income having its source in Italy, but income from foreign
sources will be reached when remitted.
The excess profits tax on corporations, like the complementary
progressive tax on individuals, reaches the entire income of Italian
corporations without regard to the place of origin. On the other
hand, foreign corporations and other entities with a permanent
establishment in Italy are subject to this tax only with respect to
their income from the establishment.

(l) The cost of retaining versus the cost of distributing
profits to an American enterprise.-Because of the cumulative effect of two principles, Italian direct taxes will generally be the same
whether an American enterprise conducts its affairs in Italy through
a branch (permanent establishment) or through an Italian subsidiary. The first contributing principle is to the effect that the corporate tax in Italy is unaffected by the question of whether or not
profits are distributed. The second involves the fact that, by treaty,
American corporations are free from direct taxes with respect to
any dividends received from an Italian subsidiary. Accordingly,
with reference to I tal ian direct taxes, the form in which the American enterprise conducts its affairs in Italy, and the question of
whether it plans to have the foreign facility retain or distribute
profits, are not material considerations. Because of the neutral
position reflected by the Italian tax system toward these matters,
Italy does not need, nor does it have, a penalty tax on unreasonable
accumulation of profits.
If the foreign facility is housed in a subsidiary corporation, its
retained profits can be capitalized without direct tax costs through
the issuance of stock dividends. Such shares would not be deemed
income even under Italian national law. Nor would there be a
direct tax on such shares at the point of disposition or liquidation,
for Italy does not reach such capital gains. 36 However, capitaliza36
This relates only to the shareholder. A corporation would be taxable according to
the ordinary rates if it realized a capital gain in the course of winding up its affairs.
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tion would lead to certain indirect tax costs in the forms of registration fees and stamp duties.
( m) Disposition of an enterprise.-Disposition and liquidation of a corporate enterprise can give rise to three different gains.
Realized gain by the corporation, on the sale of fixed assets will
normally be deemed taxable speculative gain. Any hidden reserves
must also be restored to profit in computing the corporation's income. Finally, the shareholders, on relinquishing their shares, will
be deemed to realize taxable income but only if the gain fits in the
previously described speculative category, i.e., was enjoyed by a
taxpayer who frequently buys and sells securities. Also only in this
latter case would a merger result in any tax on shareholders.
Death of an individual who owns all or a part of an enterprise
(proprietorship or partnership) does not serve to terminate the
enterprise and will not be deemed a taxable disposition where the
business is carried on by his surviving heirs or partner.
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER SIGNIFICANT TAXES

(a) Taxes on capital and capital transfers.-There are
only two taxes in Italy which resemble a property tax, and these
have a limited sweep. The most general of them relates to the complementary tax on corporations. It will be recalled that one of the
factors associated with that tax involves a .7 5% flat rate tax on
the corporation's capital and reserves.
The second and a more limited type of property tax involves
a flat rate .05% annual levy on industrial bonds issued by Italian
corporations.
\Vhile Italy does not have a general property tax, documents
which must be registered, and these include those involving the
transfer of property for money's worth, are subject to registration
duties or fees. The general rate is 4%.
Italy also employs a gift tax, using rates identical to those
associated with succession duties which are applicable to inheritances. Testamentary transfers are also subject, however, to an
estate tax. In terms of jurisdiction, the gift tax is imposed on all
gifts made within Italy, and this includes all of those which are
registered in that country. Succession duties and the estate tax, on
the other hand, are imposed only on property situated within Italy
at the time of the decedent's death, his domicile, residence, and
nationality being irrelevant.

398

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

(b) Turnover taxes and excise duties.-Italy relies upon
indirect taxes to a much greater degree than most western countries.
And the Imposta Generale Sull' entrata (gross receipts tax) is the
most important of its indirect taxes. The normal rate is 3-3%
though retail sales are fully exempt. Since some tax is imposed on
each transfer of goods (except at retail) and rendition of services
for money's worth, the effect is to increase the total tax load by
reference to the number of enterprises through which goods pass in
the course of developing and disposing of a finished product. In
many of the cases where this cumulative principle would provide
integrated companies with a substantial competitive advantage,
Italy, like Belgium, has selected one common type transfer as the
point of impact for a single turnover tax.
To whittle down at least some of the tax advantage which imports might otherwise enjoy (laying aside the matter of tariffs),
the turnover tax is first imposed at the point of importation. 37 On
the other hand, to neutralize the effect of the tax on export trade,
exports are freed from the tax. In fact, turnover taxes previously
charged in connection with the development of the exported item
are refunded.
In addition to the foregoing general turnover tax, special excise
duties have been placed on certain consumers' goods, such as liquor,
sugar, tobacco, and mineral oils. Moreover, the state has monopolized the tobacco and salt industries.
(c) Other miscellaneous taxes.-Miscellaneous revenue
measures include fees for the registration of all types of legal documents and stamp duties on the instruments themselves. There is
also a motor vehicle tax, imposed on the basis of horsepower or
deadweight.
Most important to local units is the Imposta di Famiglia. This
tax is levied on the total income of a family, the progressive rates
ranging from 2 to I 2% (I 6% with surcharges).
SECTION

E.

LUXEMBOURG

SUBSECTION I. INCOME, NET WEALTH, AND
ENTERPRISE TAXES

(a) In general.-During World War II, Germany converted Luxembourg into a province, and the latter's tax system
31
This matter, insofar as it relates to exports from the United States to Italy, is
covered more fully in PART II, infra.
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was redesigned so as to conform closely to that prevailing in Germany. While Luxembourg made some post-war changes, the two
systems are still quite similar today, the most striking difference
being that Luxembourg does not discriminate between distributed
and undistributed profits in determining a corporation's income tax.
Generally speaking, individuals are only subject to one national
income tax, the progressive rates of which are applied to aggregate
income and, in the case of single persons, reach a maximum effective
rate of 54%. The remuneration of a corporate director (member of
board in control) is also subject, however, to a second special tax.
In addition, individuals pay a general property tax, the rate being
.5% of net wealth. Finally, businessmen suffer a three-factor municipal enterprise tax, geared to profits, net wealth, and payroll. 38 This
assessment is deductible in computing taxable income for federal
purposes as well as in computing the profit factor associated with
this same tax.
Corporations are also subject to a national income tax. With the
exception of small enterprises, however, a flat rate is used. This is
complemented also by a flat rate tax on net wealth and by the
deductible three-factor 39 municipal enterprise tax.
While corporate dividends are also generally subject to the national income tax, an effort has been made to reduce the degree of
multiple taxation of corporate earnings by freeing inter-corporate
dividends from tax in those instances where the receiving corporation holds a substantial interest in the distributing company.
(b) Income, enterprise, and net wealth taxes on individuals.
-The general progressive income tax on individuals (Impot sur le
Revenu des Personnes Physiques) reaches all types of ordinary income except for a limited exclusion in cases where a total of $6o
(L. Fr. J,ooo) or less is derived from incidental services. While
remuneration received for performing the role of corporate director
is subject to a separate flat rate 20% withholding tax, in effect, the
net amount of remuneration received-i.e., the remuneration less
the withheld 20% tax-is also separately subject to the progressive
rates of the general income tax or, in the case of a nonresident
director, to a flat 8% general income tax, provided the remuneration does not exceed $I,o6o (L. Fr. SJ,OOo). In effect, while a
38
Not all municipalities use the third factor, payroll, though a number of the important ones do. The basic rate is .2% and surcharges increase this to an average total
of 1.2%.
89

Ibid.
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director's remuneration is subject to both taxes, the special flat
20% tax itself is deductible from gross income in computing the
taxable base of the general income tax. If all of a resident director's
gross remuneration would fit, say, into the 40% bracket of the
general progressive tax, the privilege of treating the additional
flat 20% as a deduction from gross income has the effect of reducing
the added impact of the special tax to 1 2%. This effect is to be
contrasted with that which stems from other withholding taxes
which are integral parts of, and serve as credits against, the
general income tax itself.
Built into the tables reflecting progression in the rate structure
are allowances for married men and additional amounts for those
with children. The table of effective rates, appearing in Table I M,
indicates the significance of those allowances and the degree of
progressiOn.
TABLE

Income

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

$
Fr.

720
36,000
1,000
50,000
2,000
100,000
4,000
200,000
6,ooo
300,000
8,ooo
400,000
1o,ooo
500,000
15,000
750,000
20,000
1,ooo,ooo
25,000
1,25o,ooo
30,000
1,5oo,ooo
35,000
1,750,000

Single
Taxpayer

Married
Taxpayer

I M

Married
and
I Child

Married
and2
Children

Married
and4
Children

Married
ands
Children

.56%
6.oo%

2.oo%

14·73%

8.76%

6.57%

4·33%

24.08%

15-32%

12.6o%

10.12%

5-96%

4.10%

30.01%

19.81%

17·36%

14.88%

10-74%

8.81%

34·33%

24·45%

22.22%

19-95%

16.o3%

14.21%

37·71%

28.43%

26.45%

24·44%

20.89%

19-24%

43·94%

36.o5%

34·53%

32·99%

30.24%

28.92%

47·71o/o

40.82%

39·68%

38.52%

36·45%

35-47%

49·51%

44-06%

43-23%

42-22%

40-56%

39·79%

50-42%

46-48%

45·72%

44·95%

43·57%

42-92%

50·94%

48.27%

47.62%

46-96%

45·77%

45-22%

Individuals also pay a flat .5% tax on net wealth (Impot sur
la Fortune). The consequent extent to which the national direct
tax load on income from capital exceeds that on earned income

401
(e.g., from employment) can be illustrated by a case where a taxpayer derives his entire income from capital which yields 10% on
its market value. In this circumstance, absent other considerations,
the .s% tax on net wealth would be equivalent to an additional
5% tax on the income therefrom.
In addition to the two foregoing taxes, those engaged in the
conduct of a business are also subject to a three-factor municipal
enterprise tax (Gewerbesteuer). 40 Basic rates of 4% on profits in
excess of $4,000 (L. Fr. 200,000) for individual proprietors, and
in excess of $1,600 (L. Fr. 8o,ooo) for companies, have been surcharged in varying amounts, increasing the municipal tax on profits
to between 5. 5% and 8 ·4% and the tax on net wealth to between
.28% and .42%. However, the ultimate impact of this tax is reduced by the fact that it is deductible in computing the base of the
national income tax and may also be a debt in determining one's
net wealth.
TAXATION

(c) Income, net wealth, and enterprise taxes on corporations.-All juridical entities (e.g., societe anonyme and the societe
responsabilite limitee) are subject to a national income tax ( Impot
sur le Revenu des Collectivites) on aggregate income, the normal
rate being 40%. Progressive rates are applied, however, to enterprises with small incomes. Because the applicable rate in the progressive schedule is applied to the small company's entire income,
not just to that portion falling within a given bracket, it was necessary to add a marginal relief schedule in order to even out rate
changes. The basic progressive rates, and the marginal relief provisions, follow.
Basic Rate
Corporation's
Applied To
Marginal Relief:
Total Profit
Total Profit
Tax Shall Not Exceed
I. $8,ooo (Fr. 40o,ooo)
20%
2. In excess of $8,ooo (Fr.
$1,6oo (Fr. 8o,ooo) plus
JO%
40o,ooo) but under
so% of profit over $8,$2o,ooo (Fr. 1,ooo,ooo)
000 (Fr. 40o,ooo)
3· Over $2o,ooo (Fr.
$6,ooo (Fr. JOO,OOO)
I,ooo,ooo)
plus 72% of profit over
$2o,ooo (Fr. I,ooo,ooo)

a

The basic rates of the three-factor 41 municipal enterprise tax
(4% on profits and .2% on net wealth) and the varying surcharges
"'Ibid.
n Ibid.
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are the same for corporations as individuals. Since corporations,
like individuals, may deduct this tax in computing the general income tax base, the prime difference between the two relates to the
fact that only individuals enjoy an exemption for the first $Io,ooo
(L. Fr. 500,000) in computing the net wealth factor.
Also in the case of corporations and private companies (societe
responsabilite limitee), for purposes of the net wealth tax, minimum property holdings are assumed, the respective assumed
amounts being $Io,ooo (L. Fr. 500,000) and $4,000 (L. Fr.
2oo,ooo).

a

(d) Combined impact of corporate and individual direct
taxes.-As noted earlier in the setting of Germany, certain variables
affect the degree to which corporate earnings will be absorbed by
direct taxes on corporations and their stockholders. The progressive
character of the income tax's rate structure, as applied to individuals (and small corporations), is one such variable. Differences in
the amount of surcharges added by various municipalities to the
basic rates of the municipal enterprise tax is another. Further variables, associated with net wealth taxes on corporations and individuals, include· the relationships of corporate net wealth to corporate earnings and of stock values to dividends. These will vary from
industry to industry and among corporations within an industry.
The cumulative effect of direct taxes on distributed corporate
earnings can be measured, however, and compared to the tax load
on an individual's earned income, by making certain assumptions.
Those indulged in here are similar to those made in discussing the
tax loads of other countries and include an individual with modest
income ($2,380 or L. Fr. II9,ooo), municipal enterprise tax rates
of ·4% on net wealth and 8% on profits, and a corporation which
earns 10% on its net wealth while its stock yields 4% on its market
value.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the corporation would have
to earn approximately $4,925 (L. Fr. 246,203) in order to pay a
dividend of $2,380 (L. Fr. I 19,000), the effective total rate of the
three taxes (income, net wealth, and enterprise) on its earnings
being 51.67%.
An unmarried individual whose entire income was derived from
a dividend of $2,380 (L. Fr. II9,ooo) on stock worth $59,500 (L.
Fr. 2,97 5,000) would pay a property tax of $287.50 (L. Fr. 14,37 5), an amount equal to I 2% of his dividend, and an income tax
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of $379.10 (L. Fr. 18,955), this being 15.9% of his dividend.
But when his personal tax load is treated as a percentage of the
original corporate earnings, rather than a percentage of his dividend, the following cumulative effect emerges.
Total corporate direct taxes
Individual direct taxes
Property tax
Income tax
Total direct tax load
Original corporate earnings

$2,545·

(Fr. 127,203)

288.
379·
$3,212.

(Fr. 14,37 5)
(Fr. 18,955)
(Fr. 160,533)

$3,212.

(Fr. 160,533)
(Fr. 246,203)

$4,925

65.2%

The cumulative effect of direct taxes on this type of capital may
be compared with an individual who earns $2,380 (L. Fr. 119,000)
from employment. His total tax of $345 (L. Fr. 17,237) 43 would
be only 14% of his income.
(e) The Luxembourg concept of gross income.-In practice, gross income, as such, is not actually computed. The aggregate
income against which the rates are applied actually consists of the
net incomes from each of the various sources.
In the case of individuals, exclusion of capital gains is much more
significant than the one other common tax free benefit, specifically,
an amount not in excess of $6o (L. Fr. 3,ooo) derived from incidental services. The immunity accorded capital gains, such as those
derived from the sale of stock or a home, is lost, however, if the
transaction is deemed speculative in character. And that characterization is applied, except for certain exceptions relating to shares in
Luxembourg corporations and indebtedness running against residents, whenever movables are held less than 1 year or, in the case
of immovables, less than 2 years. Also included in the taxable category are profits derived from the sale of assets used in the taxpayer's business, such as office equipment. In fact, even the conversion of a proprietorship into a limited liability company is
deemed a taxable event except where the realized gain is less than
$2,000 (L. Fr. 10o,ooo). Finally, as is true in Germany and the
Netherlands, gains derived by an investor from the sale of domestic
42

The standard deduction for personal expenses ($8o) was taken into account.
The standard deductions for personal expenses and business costs were taken into
account, being, respectively, $So and $r2o,
43
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or foreign corporate stock will be taxed if the individual holds a
"considerable interest" in the corporation. Such an interest will be
deemed to exist if the taxpayer or certain related parties owned
more than 25% of the nominal paid-in capital either at the moment
of sale or at any point during the preceding 5 years. But even in
such cases, small profits are ignored; the gain will not be taxed
if not more than I% of the corporation's capital stock is sold and
the amount of the resulting gain falls below a certain figure. Even
where capital gains are taxed, in the case of individuals, a special
rate is applied, ranging from I2% to 27%. Normally a rate equal
to one-half of that applied to the taxpayer's ordinary income will
be used.
There are two significant instances where corporations depart
from the profit concept applicable to individual businessmen. First,
corporations reflect all of their capital gains just as they reflect income from regular business activity. Second, the so-called Schachtelprivileg permits dividends received by a corporation to be excluded
if the recipient holds at least 2 5% of the stock in a domestic distributing corporation.
The profit concept utilized by the various municipal enterprise
taxes is quite similar to that associated with the national income
tax. The prime differences, in the case of the enterprise tax, relate
(I) to the non-deductibility of interest on long-term indebtedness
and of salaries paid to corporate managers who have substantial
stock interests ( 2 5% or more), and ( 2) to the permitted exclusion
of income from foreign permanent establishments.
(f) The Luxembourg concept of <<taxable" income.-In
computing the income tax base, individuals are allowed to deduct
certain personal expenses, such as interest. Also up to a certain
amount, individuals may deduct premiums paid on life, health, and
certain other types of insurance. Finally, deduction is allowed for
certain extraordinary personal expenses (illness, death, etc.) in
excess of a minimum amount which depends upon the taxpayer's
income and family status. Instead of itemizing the personal expenses, the taxpayer may elect to take a standard deduction of $8o
(L. Fr. 4,000) plus the allowance for extraordinary charges. Also
in lieu of itemizing business expenses, wage and salary earners may
take a second standard deduction of $I 20 (L. Fr. 6,ooo).
Deductible business expenses are very similar to those in the
United States, and include wages, salaries, rent, interest-including
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reasonable amounts paid to a parent company or other shareholder,
excise duties, enterprise taxes, and depreciation.
Prime differences between the two systems in the business expense
area relate to the non-deductibility under Luxembourg law of director's fees and property taxes (on net wealth) and to certain
differences in the treatment of depreciation and inventories.
While depreciation is usually computed by the straight line
method, in some cases the declining balance method is permitted.
As previously noted, upon the sale of business assets, the difference between book value and the selling price is generally taxed.
To compensate for earlier inflation, however, it has been necessary
to adjust the basis by reference to a system of coefficients. Table
I N sets forth the table of coefficients which apply both to historic
cost and to its adjustment for depreciation previously taken.
TAXATION

TABLE IN
Accounting
year closed in
I9I~ or
prevrous years

I9I9
I920
I92I
I922
I923
I924
I925
I926
I927
I928
I929
I930
I93I
I932
I933
I934
I935
I936

Coefficients

26.57
I2.09
6.47
6.63
7· I I
6.oi
5·35
5. I I

4·3 I
3·42
3.28
3·05

3·3·35

3.86
3·87
4.02
4.IO
4.08

Accounting
year closed in

I937
I938
I939
I940
I94I-I944
I945
I946
I947
I948
I949
I950
I95I
I952
1953
I954
I955
I956
I957 and
succeeding
years

Coefficients

3.86
3·75
3·77
3·46
2.23
1.78
1.42
1.36
1.28
1.2 I
1.17
1.08
1.06
1.06
1.05
1.05
1.05
1.00

Apart from regular depreciation, a special additional allowance
was authorized for investments in new plant and equipment during
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the years I 9 59 and I 9 6o. A total additional allowance equal to
20% of cost, up to a maximum deduction of $Ioo,ooo (L. Fr.
5,ooo,ooo), could be spread over a minimum 4-year period.
While inventories must generally be reflected on the basis of
historic cost, the listed selling price of an entire stock may be used
if it is lower than cost. Generally, too, goods on hand will be identified by reference to FIFO, though LIFO is an available alternative.

(g) Payment and the taxable year.-While income must
generally be determined by reference to the calendar year and the
accrual method, businesses may select a fiscal year coinciding with
their accounting year. Provision has also been made for a two-year
carry-forward, but no carry-back, in the case of operating losses.
Two devices are used to keep payments on a current basis. A
system of quarterly provisional payments, which serve as credits
against the later definitive assessment, is complemented by provisional withholdings in the case of certain types of income. Tax
is usually withheld on interest at the rate of 5%, on dividends
(lmpot sur les Revenus des Capitaux) at the rate of 15%, and on
wages ( Impot sur les Salaires) according to a progressive table
which takes account of personal allowances and the two standard
deductions ($8o or L. Fr. 4,000 for personal expenses and $I20
or L. Fr. 6,ooo for business expenses). The regular withheld wage
tax is treated as a final levy only where the taxpayer has but one
source of employment or pension income which does not exceed
$2,800 (L. Fr. 14o,ooo) and then only if his income from other
sources does not exceed $roo ( L. Fr. 5,ooo).
(h) The relevance of residency.-Residents of Luxembourg, corporate or individual-and in the latter case without
regard to nationality, are liable for income tax on income from
without as well as that from within the country. The only unilateral
provision dealing with double taxation involves allowance of the
foreign tax as a deduction in computing the income tax base. Peculiar to the Luxembourg system is the notion that certain persons
will be treated as residents for tax purposes though they do not
live within the country. This category includes owners, managers,
and deputy managers of corporations resident in Luxembourg. It
also includes any director who is also actively associated with a
management function.
Nonresidents are only taxable on that income which is deemed
to have its source in Luxembourg. This includes income derived
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from domestic agricultural enterprises, from non-agricultural permanent establishments or through a representative, from renting
domestic property, from the independent exercise of a profession
or other employment within Luxembourg, and income derived from
movable capital, such as shares and debentures of Luxembourg
corporations and indebtedness against other residents-including
also profit from the sale of shares where (a) the vendor owned
a "considerable interest" in the corporation or (b) the profit fits
into the so-called speculative category. The nonresident is also
reached with reference to any income mentioned in § 22 of the
Income Tax Act insofar as tax is withheld at the source or where
speculative gain is derived from the sale of land.
Subject to the foregoing jurisdictional differences, those principles which determine a resident's income also apply to nonresidents.
Illustrative are the previously mentioned special rules relating to
capital gains. Nonresidents who are other than wage earners are
subject, however, to a minimum income tax of 12%. This is also
the percentage withheld on royalties. Nonresident directors' fees
are subject to the special 20% director's tax as well as the regular
income tax. Accordingly, to the withheld 20% special tax, Luxembourg has added an additional 8%, the total amount withheld being 28%.
With reference to the net wealth tax, nonresidents pay only on
that property situated in Luxembourg, such as immovables or assets
associated with a permanent establishment located there.

(i) The comparative costs of retaining and distributing
profits.-In contrast to the situation in Germany, a corporation's
own taxes will be the same whether it retains its profits for expansion or distributes them to stockholders. Luxembourg does not
even have a penalty tax, like that in the United States, relating to
unreasonable accumulation of profits. Since that part of the profits
which are distributed will normally be taxed to the stockholders, it
is less expensive to expand out of profits than to have those shareholders contribute additional capital from dividends which they
have received. For example, where a parent company in the United
States holds the shares, the subsidiary's use of its own profits for
expansion will serve to avoid the 15% withholding tax (Impot sur
les Revenus des Capitaux) imposed by Luxembourg on dividends
distributed to an American parent company. Where the subsidiary's
profits are ploughed back in this fashion, the total tax load imposed
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by Luxembourg will equal that which would be imposed had the
expanding facility been operated as a branch of the American
corporation. The Luxembourg tax load will be different, however,
at that point when profits are no longer needed for expansion and
are to be extracted by the parent. Profits of the branch will be taxed
only once, in the year earned. A subsidiary will have suffered a
like tax, and, in addition, dividends distributed to the parent will
suffer a second tax, 15% of the dividend being withheld. This
disadvantage of the subsidiary arrangement can be partially offset
if the parent company's original capital contribution consisted, in
part, of loans. The subsidiary could deduct the annual interest payments in computing its income tax base, but not its municipal enterprise tax base. A branch, of course, could not enjoy such a deduction
under either tax.

(j) Disposal of an enterprise.-Disposition by a corporation of its assets is a taxable event, the difference between its adjusted basis and the amount realized being includible in gross income. Upon liquidation of the corporation and distribution of the
proceeds, any gain enjoyed by a shareholder, measured by the difference between the adjusted basis of his shares and the amount
realized, will be taxable if he has a "considerable interest" ( 2 5%
or more) in the corporation or, in the case of residents, if his gain
fits into the so-called speculative category. Corporate shareholders
must also include such gains in their income.
Normally, a merger is also deemed a taxable event, the amount
realized by the corporations again being the difference between the
adjusted bases and fair market value of their assets. But under
certain conditions, if it can be guaranteed that this differential will
suffer a tax later on, the gain realized at the point of amalgamation
will not be recognized for tax purposes.
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER LUXEMBOURG TAXES

(a) Turnover taxes and excise duties.-The general turnover tax is a multiple stage arrangement in the sense that it is applied to each transfer of goods which may take place in the course
of developing a finished product. To reduce the impact on middlemen, i.e., on entrepreneurs who deliver merchandise to another entrepreneur without changing its basic nature, the normal rate of 2%
is reduced to .s%. Retail sales to consumers, however, bear the
regular rate. Indeed, big retail stores which enjoy a 7 5% retail
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turnover pay 2¥2%, provided their previous year's turnover reached
$8oo,ooo.
The turnover tax applies pretty much across the board. Services
bear the same rate as goods. But certain goods, e.g., a common
necessity like bread, are taxed at a reduced rate of I%. While
transfers of luxuries normally suffer only the regular 2% rate,
separate excise duties are imposed on certain products such as beer,
tobacco, etc.
Tax equality between domestic and foreign products is achieved
in some degree by imposing the regular rate on imports at the point
of importation. 44 To make domestic products more competitive on
the world market, export transactions themselves are free of the
tax. But no attempt is generally made to refund turnover taxes
previously paid in connection with earlier stages of production or
distribution. Metallic products, such as wagons and machinery, are
exceptions; a refund of . 5% is allowed.
(b) Registration and stamp duties.-A number of transactions are subject to a registration duty (Droit d'Enregistrement).45 These include the issuance of corporate bonds, shares, and
the sale or donation of real estate. While a flat 6% is applied to
sales of real estate, donations suffer a progressive duty, running
from 1.5% to I2%.
Companies also pay an annual tax on their share capital and
indebtedness (Droit d' Abonnement). A number of documents also
suffer special stamp duties.
(c) Miscellaneous taxes.-Three of the most important
miscellaneous taxes involve levies on motor vehicles, measured by
weight or horsepower, succession duties, and a communal land tax.
The death duty (Droit de Succession) is imposed upon the heirs
of a person deceased in Luxembourg, and is measured by the net
value received. Progressive rates, dependent upon the relationship
between the parties and the amount acquired, run from o to I 5%.
Where the decedent is a nonresident, a different tax (Droit de
Mutation par Deces) with about the same rate schedule is imposed;
it reaches the gross value of his real estate in Luxembourg.
The communal land tax ( Impot F oncier) is measured by the
.. This matter, insofar as it relates to exports from the United States to Luxembourg,
is more fully considered in PART II, infra.
45
Registration duties and the like are more fully considered in Section G, PART III
infra, in connection with the consideration of Luxembourg as the site for a holdin~
company.
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value of real estate, and carries basic rates which vary from
to I%. Local surcharges on this rate also vary.
SECTION

F.

.5%

NETHERLANDS

SUBSECTION I. INCOME AND NET WEALTH TAXES

(a) In general.-Contrary to the case in Belgium and
France, individuals in the Netherlands are generally subject to but
one income tax, the progressive rates of which are applied to aggregate income and reach a maximum effective rate of approximately
70% for single persons. Only the remuneration received by a member of a corporate board of directors is subject to a special income
tax, and it is in addition to the regular tax. Except in the case of this
tax, amounts which are withheld in connection with the system of
current payment are generally integrated with the regular income
tax, serving as credits.
Because earned income was not given preferential treatment in
the income tax legislation itself, the Netherlands have for years
imposed a separate flat rate property tax. It differs from that traditionally used by local units in the United States in that the base
consists only of net wealth, rather than the gross value of items in
which the taxpayer has an equity.
Corporations are subject to what is generally a flat rate income
tax, though slightly more modest rates are applied in the case of
those with little income. While dividends are also generally taxable
in full, extreme multiple taxation is avoided by immunizing one
type of inter-corporate dividend, specifically one received by a corporation which has substantial interest in the distributing company.
(b) Income and net wealth taxes on individuals.-The general progressive income tax on individuals (Inkomstenbelasting)
reaches all types of ordinary income. While any remuneration of a
corporate director 46 is also subject to an additional flat 30% withheld tax on amounts in excess of $263 (Fl. I ,ooo) plus another
20% on amounts in excess of $I ,J I 5 (Fl. 5,ooo), only the net,
after that special tax has been withheld, is actually included in the
general income tax base. This reduces, of course, the actual degree
to which the special director's tax is an additional burden. For
example, if the gross remuneration would have otherwise fitted into
.. The word "director" (commissaris) is used here to refer to any member of the
board in control (commissarissenbelasting), not to the single so-called managing director ( directeur).
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the 40% bracket of the general income tax, allowance of what is
tantamount to a deduction for the special director's tax is equal to a
reduction of the latter's 30% rate to 18%.
Personal allowances for married persons and those with dependent children are built into the general progressive rate schedules which, in the case of single persons, reach a maximum effective
rate of 70.5% on that part of one's taxable income in excess of approximately $2o,ooo (Fl. 76,ooo). Table I 0 provides some idea
of the impact of the tax and the degree of progression.
TAXATION

TABLE
Total Income

Dollars

$

394
526
656
789
1,578
2,367
3,156
3.949
5,260
6,575
7,898
10,520
13,150
19,725
26,300

Fl.
fl.

1,500
z,ooo
2,500
3,000
6,ooo
9,000
12,000

15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
75,000
100,000

I 0

Approximate Effective Rate on Total Income

I
Single

II
Married

lll/I
M+z

Ill/2
M+2

lll/4
M+-1-

III/6
M+6

1.5 %
4·5%
6.o%
8.8%
16.3 %
21.1 %
25.1 %
28.7%
33·7 %
38.2%
47·8%
46·9%
50·7%
56·7%
60.04%

0
0
2.9%
4-7%
n.oo/o
14-9%
184%
21.8%
26.9%
31.2%
34-8%
4o.o%
43-9%
50.6%
54·9%

0
0
0
2.o6%
8.7%
12.8%
16.5 %
20.1 %
25-2 %
29·9%
33·5 %
39-0%
43-1 %
50.0%
54-4%

0
0
0
0
6.5%
10.8%
14.6%
18.2%
23-4%
28-4%
32·3%
38.1%
42.2%
49-4%
53-9%

0
0
0
0
2.7%
7-1%
11.0%
14-75%
20.3 %
25·7 %
29.8 %
36.0%
40·5%
48.2%
53·0%

0
0
0
0
0
3-75%
7·65%
11.4 %
17.25%
22-9%
27·5%
34·1 %
38.8%
47·0%
52.0%

While a separate net wealth tax has usually been imposed at a
normal rate of .5%, this has been temporarily increased to .6%
for 1959 and 1960. Exemptions serve to immunize the following
amounts:
-Single taxpayer
-Married taxpayers
-Additional amount
for each dependent child

(Fl. 22,500)
(Fl. 3o,ooo)
(Fl. 7,5oo)

Laying aside the matter of exemptions for the moment, if it be
assumed that the taxpayer's capital yields only 4% on its market
value, the .6% tax on net wealth would be equivalent to 15% of
net income. And this entire amount constitutes an additional burden,
for in contrast to certain other Common Market countries, the net
wealth tax is not deductible in determining the regular income tax
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base. There is then a significant difference between the tax loads
borne by earned and unearned income in the Netherlands.

(c) Income tax on juridical entities.-The corporate income
tax (Vennootschapsbelasting) is also applied to aggregate income,
the usual rate being 47%. A lower rate is applied only where the
total income is less than $IJ,I50 (Fl. 50,000) in which case the
first $I o, 5 I o (Fl. 40,000) is taxed at 44% with the remaining
$2,640 (Fl. Io,ooo), if any, being taxed at 59%.
While dividends are generally includable in gross income, an
exception is made in that case where inter-corporate dividends are
received by a corporation which owns at least 25% of the distributing company's shares. This immunity is extended even to
dividends received from foreign corporations (in contrast to the
practice in Germany and Luxembourg), provided the distributing
foreign corporation was itself subject to a foreign income tax. An
investment company (holder of a so-called investment fund) is
entitled to this privilege even though it holds less than a 2 5% interest, provided the company meets certain conditions. The Minister
of Finance is authorized to grant the same privilege to other corporations which have small holdings, and usually does if the distributing corporation is engaged in a line of business related to that
of the corporate stockholder and the particular stockholder-corporate relationship is deemed to be in the public interest.
(d) Combined impact of corporate and individual direct
taxes.-While certain variables affect the degree to which corporate earnings will be absorbed by direct taxes on corporations and
their stockholders, the number of such variables is not as great in
the Netherlands as in certain other countries. This is due to the fact
that a multiple-factor separate enterprise tax does not exist in the
Netherlands nor is its net wealth tax applicable to corporations.
Consequently, variables in the ratio of corporate assets to corporate
earnings are not material. The prime variables involve a stockholder's particular income tax bracket and-in taking account of the
personal net wealth tax-the changing ratios between the market
value of his stock and its yield, as well as the relative significance
of the exemptions to his total portfolio.
In order to neutralize these variables, Table I P assumes that
the stockholder's shares yield 4% on market value and that his
entire income is derived from these shares. Column 7 reflects the
combined impact of corporate and personal taxes, and may be com-
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pared with column 8 which reflects the percentage which would be
absorbed by direct taxes if income equal to that earned by the
corporation had been earned by a single individual through employment.
TAXATION

TABLE

Company's
Net
Income

Corporation Income Tax

Dividend

I p

Personal In- Property
come Tax
Tax

Total
Tax

Total
Tax%

Total Tax
%if Col. I
Were EmPloyment
Income

5
6
7
8
4+
533 53.30%
9.82%
123
1,173 58.65%
16.91%
759
7,185 71.85%
45.16%
1,554
15,854 79.27%
56.42%
3,939
43,261 86.52%
66.o9%
7,914
89,435 89-44 o/o
67.66%
79,464
920,270 92.o3o/o
70.22o/o
(In the above example deductions for old age premium have been taken into account.
$1. =fl. 3.8)
I

$

1,000
2,000
10,000
20,000
5o,ooo
100,000
I,ooo,oco

2

$

470
940
4,700
9,400
23,500
47,000
470,000

4

]

$

530
1,060
5,300
10,600
26,500
53,000
530,000

$

19
IIO
1,726
4,900
15,822
34,521
370,806

(e) The Netherlands concept of gross income.-In practice, gross income, as such, is not determined. The tax base is calculated by aggregating the net incomes from each of the various
sources, and from this amount certain allowable personal expenses
and losses are deductible.
The previously described immunity for certain inter-corporate
dividends constitutes the most significant exclusion for corporations.
The latter do not enjoy, on the other hand, the most fundamental
exclusion allowed individuals, that relating to capital gains. Even
the gain technically realized by a corporation on shifting the assets
of a branch into a newly created subsidiary is normally taxed. In
contrast, the immunity extended to individuals embraces even speculative capital gains, though gains of two other types are includable.
First, it was easy to jump from the notion, that all profits made
by a business-including, e.g., even interest and dividends-ought to
be included, to the conclusion that profits from the sale of fixed
business assets were also includable. By statute, however, gain
realized on the sale of immovables belonging to an agricultural
enterprise are not taxed provided such sales do not constitute a
part of the enterprise's regular business activity.
The second major type of taxable capital gain is intimately related to the first. It involves gain derived from the sale of corporate
shares by an individual investor who owns a considerable interest
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in the corporation, domestic or foreign. Sale of shares in that circumstance has a practical resemblance in some degree to sale of
business assets. Accordingly, the profit is taxable if at the moment
of the sale or during the preceding five years the stockholder or
related parties owned more than 2 5% of the nominal paid in capital. Such profit is not aggregated, however, with his other income;
nor are the regular progressive rates applied. Instead, a separate
tax is imposed, with rates ranging from 20% to 40%, depending
upon the size of the taxpayer's other income.

(f) The Netherlands concept of utaxable" income.-Business expenses incurred by individuals serve as deductions in arriving at the tax base. Itemization of these may be avoided by wage
and salary earners (including also those in the so-called liberal
professions) through election to take a flat standard business
deduction of $26 (Fl. 100). If it can be demonstrated that the
actual expenses did at least exceed that amount, the standard
jumps to 5% of taxable income but in any case not in excess of
$I 58 (Fl. 6oo) . Business deductions by wage or salary earners in
excess of that amount are dependent upon itemization. In any event,
certain personal expenses may also be deducted, including life annuity premiums to a maximum amount of $94 7 (Fl. 3 ,6oo), charitable contributions the maximum deduction for which depends upon
the size of the individual's income, and finally so-called extraordinary charges (illness, death, etc.) in excess of a minimum amount.
As previously noted, additional personal allowances peculiar to
married persons and those with dependent children are reflected
in the rate tables, an extract from which appears in sub-topic (b),
supra.
Business deductions enjoyed by individuals or corporations engaged in the active conduct of an enterprise are quite similar to
those in the United States, and include wages, salaries, rent, interest-including reasonable amounts paid to a parent company or
other shareholders, losses, charitable contributions up to a certain
percentage of income, turnover taxes, and excise duties, but not
income or property taxes. Particularly favorable arrang~ments for
depreciation and the treatment of inventory deserve added comment.
Basic depreciation allowances are determined on the basis of
historic cost, and, peculiar to the Netherlands, the first period
may begin with execution of a purchase contract. Taxpayers are
given considerable leeway in fixing the rate of depreciation, pto-
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vided a consistent and sound policy is followed. Frequently the
matter is handled through agreement with the tax inspector. Both
fixed and variable rates, geared either to original cost or the adjusted basis (cost less depreciation previously taken), and dependent, for example, upon intensity of use, have been authorized.
Provision has also been made for accelerated depreciation and
a special investment allowance. Originally, accelerated depreciation
took the form of an initial deduction of %rd of the cost price in
the year an item was ordered or bought. However, the Minister of
Finance has regularly used a complementary power to require that
this initial allowance be spread over a longer period. In most cases
he presently requires a four-year spread, not more than 7bth of
the cost price being deductible in the first year. Accelerated depreciation in the case of buildings is restricted to 6% a year, and may
not be applied at all to office furniture or passenger cars.
A so-called investment allowance is quite distinct from the accelerated depreciation provision. The latter, but not the former,
serves to reduce the book value of an asset. This incentive allowance, serving in effect to exempt rather than postpone the tax on
income, was intended to promote industrial activity and incidentally
compensate for some decline in the purchasing power of money. In
this latter connection, the Nether lands does not utilize the system
of coefficients used elsewhere.
The constantly changing provisions regarding the investment
allowance now authorize a deduction, spread over two years, of
w% of historic cost.
As in the case of basic depreciation, taxpayers have considerable leeway in their treatment of inventories provided the method
chosen is consistently followed and sound in terms of business practice. Valuation may be at cost, market, or at cost or market, whichever is lower. LIFO or the base stock method may be used as well
as FIFO.
TAXATION

(g) Payment and the taxable year.-A system of current
payment is accomplished through withholding taxes and provisional
payments. The withholding tax on dividends (Dividendbelasting)
is at the rate of 15%; withholding on wages (Loonbelasting) is
geared to progressive tables which take account of deductible social
security contributions. These two withholding taxes, like provisional
payments and in contrast to the withheld tax on corporate directors'
remuneration, generally serve as credits against the later definitive
income tax assessment. The withholding tax on wages is itself the
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final levy, however, where income from employment (including
pensions) does not exceed $I ,8 I 5 (Fl. 6,900) 47 and income from
other sources is not in excess of $53 (Fl. 200).
While the calendar year normally serves as the taxable year,
businesses may elect a fiscal year corresponding to their regular
accounting year. The provisions regarding net losses are also quite
favorable. Generally they may be carried back one year and carried
forward 6 years, if need be. Moreover, losses incurred by new
business during the first six years of operation may be carried forward indefinitely.
In terms of accounting methods, only very small businesses may
use the cash basis; others must use the accrual method. The existence of effective accounting records has assumed special tax significance in that only then may certain privileges be availed of, such as
those regarding investment allowances and the unlimited carry
forward permitted new enterprises.

(h) The relevance of residency.-The basic jurisdictional
principle regarding residents (corporate or individual, and without regard to nationality) calls for inclusion in gross income of
income derived from without as well as that derived from within
the country. But this notion has been restricted in sweep, except
for interest, dividends, and royalties, by unilateral provisions designed to avoid double taxation. Roughly speaking, these serve to
exempt foreign income arising from personal labor performed
abroad or that derived from commercial and industrial activities
performed by· a foreign permanent establishment, provided the income was subject to tax in the foreign country. That the foreign
income did not actually suffer a foreign tax is not decisive; it may
have been sufficiently low to be covered by exemptions. The pivotal
question is whether it was subject to a foreign tax. Exempt income
will be aggregated, however, with a taxpayer's domestic income in
determining the place his domestic income fits into the progressive
rate brackets. Corporations will suffer very little from this requirement, for, practically speaking, a flat corporate rate is used in the
Nether lands.
In contrast to the sweeping basic premise regarding residents,
a nonresident is generally subject to the Netherlands income tax
only with reference to income deemed to have its source there.
In the case of a business, this embraces profits derived from an
agricultural enterprise in the Netherlands, or those from a nonHThis amount will probably be increased to $r,96r (Fl. 7450).
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agricultural enterprise if derived through a permanent establishment or regular representative located there. Included also in this
latter category is any profit from the sale of shares in a Dutch
corporation, provided the shareholder had a so-called "considerable interest" therein.
With reference to personal services, a nonresident must include
income from employment in the Netherlands, including that derived
from service as a manager or as one of the directors of a Dutch
corporation and any periodic payments received from a Dutch
governmental unit or from the State Civil Pension Fund. Income
from the independent exercise of a liberal profession will be
reached, however, only if carried on through a permanent establishment located there.
A nonresident's investment income will also be reached to the
extent it consists of (I) interest on debts secured by a mortgage
on Netherlands realty, ( 2) a share in the profits of a business or
profession which has its seat in the Netherlands, and ( 3) dividends
and interest from a Dutch corporation but only if the nonresident
has a so-called "considerable interest" and the securities or obligations do not constitute a part of the nonresident's business property.
While securities and obligations owned by a nonresident corporation will always be deemed to be a part of that corporation's business property, any immunity thereby achieved will be lost if in fact
the securities and obligations belong to a Netherlands permanent
establishment of the foreign corporation. Even where this is not
the case, a nonresident corporation will always suffer a flat I 5%
withholding tax (Dividendbelasting) on dividends received, except
where provision is made otherwise by treaty.
Except for the above differences relating to source, the question
of whether a particular gain is income is determined for a nonresident in accordance with the same principles which govern residents. Illustrative are the various principles relating to capital
gams.
The jurisdictional standards relating to the separate net wealth
tax on individuals have a practical effect similar to that associated
with the income tax. The initial premise is that the net wealth tax
applies to all of a resident's property, without regard to location.
But again, unilateral provisions and double taxation treaties restrict
that general principle so that in many cases only property deemed
situated in the Netherlands is reached. While, as expected, nonresidents suffer this tax with respect to real estate situated in the
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Netherlands and businesses carried on there, the securities which
they hold in Dutch corporations are free of the tax.

(i) The cost of retaining versus the cost of distributing
profits to an American enterprise.-Because of the cumulative
effect of two circumstances, direct taxes imposed by the Netherlands
will be the same whether an American enterprise operates its facility there as a branch (permanent establishment) or through a
foreign subsidiary. First, in contrast to the arrangement in Belgium,
a corporation's own direct taxes in the Netherlands will remain
the same whether or not its profits are distributed. The Netherlands
does not even impose a penalty tax on so-called unreasonable accumulations of earnings and profits. Second, dividends paid to an
American parent by a Netherlands subsidiary are freed from the
withholding tax otherwise applied in the Netherlands to dividends
received by certain nonresidents, such as parent corporations domiciled in Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg.
The primary exception to the rule, that the Netherlands will
impose the same total direct taxes on branch and subsidiary operations, involves the circumstance where the American parent's investment is represented in part by loans to a subsidiary (other than
loans secured by immovable property) . Advances to a branch operation will not be treated, of course, as loans. But a subsidiary will
be allowed to deduct interest paid, up to a reasonable amount, as
an expense. The interest received by the parent company-wherever situated-will not, on the other hand, be subjected to a
Nether lands tax.
If a subsidiary desires to retain its profits to facilitate expansion,
the profit can be capitalized through issuance of a stock dividend.
Dividends of this sort, received by parent companies in America,
France, Italy, or the Netherlands, will not be subjected to tax. But
if any part of such dividend is paid to individual stockholders in
the Nether lands, a tax will be imposed by reference to the nominal
or par value of the dividend shares. And if such a dividend is paid
to parent companies in Belgium, Germany, or Luxembourg, the
same rate as that applicable to ordinary dividends will be assessed,
IS%·

(j) Disposition of an enterprise.-A sale by a corporation
of all of its assets is a taxable event, gain, if any, being the difference
between the adjusted basis of the assets and the amount realized.
And if the corporation is then liquidated, the stockholders will be
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deemed to have received a taxable dividend to the extent the amount
received exceeds the paid-in capital.
Generally, too, a merger involves a taxable transaction to the
corporation, gain again being the difference between the adjusted
basis of the corporate assets and their real value. Only if a guarantee is made that the tax will be paid later on (e.g., where the newly
formed corporation is actually to be liquidated) will gain not be
recognized at the point of the merger.
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER NETHERLANDS TAXES

(a) Turnover taxes and excise duties.-The Netherlands
employ multiple stage turnover taxes, the normal rate of 5% being
exacted on each transfer of goods which may take place in the
course of developing a finished product. Generally speaking, this
means that an integrated company which converts basic raw materials into a finished product has an advantage over those which
depend upon suppliers to do part of the processing. One transfer,
however, is exempt-that from a retailer to an individual consumer.
Transfers directly from a manufacturer to a consumer do not enjoy
this exemption; a reduced rate of 4% is applied, however, on the
premise that this rate will produce the same amount of tax as that
which would have been produced by a 5% tax if the goods had
been transferred to a retailer. This premise assumes that the circumvented transfer to a retailer would have been at a smaller price,
allowing room for a 20% retail mark-up. On the other hand, it
ignores the fact that there is also a .7 5% tax on transfers by one
dealer of finished goods (e.g., a wholesaler) to another dealer.
Because the turnover tax was designed to be an internal consumption tax, the regular 5% rate, and sometimes an even higher
rate, is imposed at the point of importation. 48 Export transactions,
on the other hand, are exempt, and this exemption is coupled with
a refund of tax levied at earlier stages, the amount of the refund
normally being a percentage fixed by Royal Decree. The effect of
this overall pattern is to deprive imports of any advantage over
domestically produced items, and to make the latter, if exported,
competitive on the world market.
A number of basic necessities, such as bread, milk, etc., are immune from the turnover tax. On the other hand, at the manufacturing level, certain luxury and semi-luxury goods suffer a turnover
•• This matter, insofar as it relates to exports from the United States to the Netherlands, is more fully dealt with in PART II, infra.
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tax in excess of the normal rate. Moreover, special excise duties
are levied on the production or import of such products as beer,
wine, tobacco, etc. Finally, services, including those rendered by a
business representative, are taxed at 4%.
(b) Land tax and registration duty on transfers of realty.
-The previously described net wealth tax on individuals was an
indirect device designed to give preferential treatment to earned
income, such as that from employment. In contrast to its base-the
net value of one's equity, a separate land tax is imposed on the
rental value of all improved and unimproved real estate situated
in the Netherlands. The rental values utilized fall far short of the
current market, however, for they are still based on estimates made
in the 19th century.
In addition to the foregoing, there is a registration duty on
transfers of real estate for money or money's worth, the rate being
s%. While donative transfers are free of this exaction, they are
subject to the gift tax described below.
(c) Succession duty and gift tax.-The succession duty is
not levied on the estate as such, but on individual acquisitions by
heirs and legatees of those who die domiciled in the Netherlands.
The rate is progressive depending on the relationship of the parties
as well as on the value acquired.
A nonresident decedent's property situated in the Netherlands
is free of the succession duty except with respect to real estate on
which a flat 6% rate is levied.
Provisions covering the succession duty also include a gift tax on
inter vivos transfers. The structure and rates of this tax correspond
to those associated with the succession duty.
(d) Miscellaneous taxes.-Other taxes include one imposed
annually on motor vehicles, the assessment being based on weight,
and stamp duties levied on diverse types of instruments and documents.

PART II. OVERALL TAX EFFECTS RE DIRECT
EXPORTS AND SIMPLE LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS
SECTION

A.

INTRODUCTION

Many American manufacturers first introduced their products to
foreign countries through sales to New York purchasing offices of
foreign import companies. Thereafter, direct orders from overseas
were received from others who had seen the product in foreign
markets. Further exploitation may then have been attempted
through arrangements entered into with foreign independent commission agents or brokers. As a substitute for the latter, or to complement their activities, promotional representatives may have been
sent from the United States to one or more countries, and these may
or may not have opened display offices.
The discussion which follows deals first with the overall tax
effects of these simple export arrangements. Comparative tax effects in the Common Market countries will be integrated with the
domestic tax implications. Put off for discussion in PART III,
however, are the more sophisticated sales arrangements, involving
use of a foreign sales office with general contracting powers or creation of a foreign sales subsidiary.
Eventually, and for a variety of reasons, an American exporter
may conclude that those products destined for foreign markets
should actually be manufactured abroad, in whole or in part. The
prime motive may run all the way from avoidance of freight costs
to avoidance of customs duties and minimization of foreign turnover taxes-all of which would affect pnces. An alternative to construction of its own facilities in a member nation is the opportunity
to conclude a licensing arrangement with an established European
firm. Such an arrangement might actually be entered into for the
purpose of stimulating export sales, rather than as a complete substitute for them. The aim, for example, may be to provide a better
and more certain outlet for special parts or components to be manufactured in, and exported from, the United States, the ultimate
product to be finished by the licensee.
Again, inadequacy of capital or an unwillingness to risk available
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capital in a foreign country may be the prime motive for entering
into a royalty-producing licensing arrangement instead of constructing a foreign facility. It might be further contemplated that the
American company, in consideration of additional periodic payments, would keep the licensee abreast of any newly acquired technical knowledge and methods, instructing the licensee's employees in
such "know-how" to the extent necessary.
Discussion of licensing arrangements in this PART will be limited, as in the case of exports, to simple arrangements, involving
taxpayers who seek to avoid significant activity on foreign soil.
PART III, infra, will take account of the more complex and sometimes more advantageous tax effects which follow when a license
and "know-how" agreement are complemented by creation of a
foreign subsidiary.
SECTION

B.

CoMPARISON oF FoREIGN TAxEs ON
DIRECT ExPORTs

(a) Foreign income taxes.-Unilateral statutory provisions
preceded bilateral conventions in fixing the extent to which European income taxes would reach profits made by a nonresident, such
as an American enterprise, on exports into Common Market countries. The statutes of three member nations (Germany, Luxembourg, and the Nether lands) specifically provide that such profits
are reached by their respective income taxes only if made through
a "permanent establishment" located there. While the domestic
laws of the other three members have been construed with more or
less similar effect, treaties with a like thrust-between the United
States and five of the members 1-actually do more than codify in
permanent form this established principle. The treaties serve the
additional function of establishing bilaterally acceptable standards
with respect to the meaning of "permanent establishment" in, inter
alia, export settings.
On the one hand, the definitional aspects of the term, "permanent
establishment," had already been resolved in some measure in most
countries. That expression was thought in general to relate to a
fixed place utilized by the nonresident in carrying out his profitable
activities. But not all subscribed to so limited a view. 2 Moreover,
1
A tax treaty has not yet been concluded with the sixth country, Luxembourg.
• For instance, according to the national laws of Italy and France, the standard was
satisfied whenever a nonresident person regularly or habitually performed activities
which constituted a complete cycle of business.
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there were important "grey" areas, just as there are instances where
one cannot be sure under American law whether a given nonresident
will be deemed to be "engaged in a trade or business in the United
States." Though the language in the treaties does not provide a
ready answer to all export situations, the provisions do constitute
an improved point of departure in resolving definitional difficulties.
According to all five treaties, the mere fact that an American
enterprise handles its European sales through a bona fide independent commission agent or broker, acting in his regular capacity
as such, will not, standing alone, lead to the taxation of its export
profits. Indeed, all five recognize that an American enterprise's own
employed representative in the Common Market will not himself
be deemed a permanent establishment, though engaged in sales
promotion work, provided he (I) does not have, nor habitually
exercises, "general authority to negotiate and conclude contracts on
behalf of" the American enterprise, and ( 2) does not have "control
over a stock of merchandise from which he regularly fills orders
on behalf of such enterprise."
Four of the treaties do not specifically deal with the case where
a mere sales promotion representative also has a small stock to
accommodate emergency cases or for display purposes. Such a
person would not be "regularly" filling orders; nor would he
necessarily have, or be "habitually" exercising, general authority to
negotiate and conclude contracts on behalf of the American enterprise. These considerations were sufficiently impressive to lead the
American government to publish an interpretation favorable in the
reverse setting to some nonresidents who send promotional representatives to the United States. 3 Foreign governments, however,
TAXATION

'United States regulations pertaining to its treaty with Belgium are perhaps the
most informative with respect to the American interpretation of treaties falling in this
group. T.D. 6r6o, Section 504.104{b) {8) (ii) provides: "If the enterprise has an
agent in the United States who has power to contract on its behalf, but only at fixed
prices and under conditions determined by the enterprise, it does not thereby necessarily
have a permanent establishment in the United States. The mere fact that an agent of
a Belgian enterprise-assuming he has no general authority to negotiate and conclude
contracts on behalf of his principal-maintains samples, or occasionally fills orders
from incidental stocks of goods maintained, in the United States does not of itself mean
that the enterprise has a permanent establishment in the United States. The mere fact
that salesmen, employees of a Belgian enterprise, promote the sale of their employer'•
products in the United States or that a Belgian enterprise transacts business in the
United States by means of mail order activities does not mean that the enterprise has
a permanent establishment in the United States." Section 504.105(b) adds: "Similarly,
if during the taxable year, the enterprise were to secure orders in the United States
for such merchandise through its sales agents whose sole function in the United States
is sales promotion, the orders being transmitted to Belgium for acceptance, then the
profits arising from such sales would not be includible in gross income and would be

424

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

seldom publish general interpretations. At an extreme point, it must
also be remembered that three of the above mentioned four
treaties do go on specifically to state that a "warehouse" does
constitute a permanent establishment, and the other would probably
subsume that characterization under the shotgun expression, "or
other fixed place of business." Thus, in the case of a stock of goods
kept on hand for emergencies, at some point one will encounter
the supplementary question: How large a stock can be on hand,
and how frequently can resort be made to it, before the storage
arrangement will be characterized as a warehouse? In this setting,
not much comfort can be derived from the further fact that two
treaties (Germany and Italy) specifically exclude the "casual and
temporary use of mere storage facilities" from the definition of a
permanent establishment.
The fifth treaty, one with Germany, stands alone in specifically
mentioning the matter of displays. But there, displays are first conjunctively associated with a sales office in a proscription to the effect
that a "permanent display and sales office" will be deemed a permanent establishment. It then goes on to say that a warehouse
maintained "for convenience of delivery and not for purposes of
display shall not of itself constitute a permanent establishment." 4
In the case of most countries, one may be more secure in relying
on information obtained from tax authorities in the country concerned or, in the case of emergency stocks, arrange to have such
exports remain under customs seal in that country. While published
rules do not exist even with reference to the immunity of this practice, it is not believed that such stocks would be deemed a permanent establishment. Moreover, with reference to all exported items,
this arrangement provides added advantages in connection with the
matter of turnover taxes, a matter discussed under the next subtopic.
Finally reference should be made to PART III, infra, for conexempt from United States tax." United States regulations relating to the treaty with
the Netherlands also adopt a liberal interpretation for the benefit of foreigners, providing as follows: "The mere fact that an agent (assuming he has no general authority
to contract on behalf of his employer or principal) maintains samples or occasionally
fills orders from incidental stocks of goods maintained in the United States will not
constitute a permanent establishment within the United States." T.D. 5778, § 7.853 (a).
Regulations relating to the treaty with France are somewhat similar: "However, the
mere fact that a commission agent or broker through whom a French enterprise carries
on business in the United States maintains a small stock of goods in the United States
from which occasional orders are filled shall not be construed as meaning that such
enterprise has a permanent establishment in the United States." T.D. 5499, § 7·413(a).
• Art. II(I} (c).
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sideration of the way income taxes are affected by various organizational arrangements, should an American enterprise desire to
create a permanent establishment in a member nation in connection
with export operations.
(b) Comparative effect of Common Market turnover taxes
and excises on direct American exports into a member nation.-The
turnover tax patterns in the Common Market countries are so
complicated and varied as to preclude doing anything more here
than provide a general comparative orientation of the way in which
they might affect direct American exports.
The country-by-country survey in PART I indica ted that each
Common Market nation exempts its own exports from its turnover
tax. Each does, however, impose its tax on imports. Otherwise
imported items would not suffer the same tax burden as domestically produced items designed for consumption within the country.
In keeping with the logic of this theme, a particular import may
enjoy an exemption or suffer luxury or semi-luxury rates if domestically produced competitive items are so treated. The classification
of luxury items varies, of course, from country to country.
In comparing the turnover taxes of member nations, it will be recalled that in four countries (France, Germany, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands), the effective rates of the local turnover tax are
slightly higher than the stated rates, for the tax is imposed on
a sales price which includes the tax itself. The cumulative character
of turnover taxes in all countries but France has also given rise to
further differentials regarding the turnover tax on imports. A single
transfer rate, if imposed on certain imported items, would not be
sufficient to equalize the tax burden with that borne by domestically
produced equivalents which have gone through more than one taxable transfer in the course of development. To compensate for the
difference, four countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and theN etherlands) may impose on certain imports a rate which is greater than
that imposed on a single transfer of a domestically produced item. 5
Since the difficulty stems from the multiple stage character of turnover taxes, the amount of increase is frequently lower for various
raw materials than for finished or semi-finished products. These
increased rates are usually imposed irrespective of the country of
origin, the one exception relating to an immunity from such increase
of items imported into Belgium from Luxembourg.
"Luxembourg may also apply increased rates, but rules pertaining to such have not
yet been issued.
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Table II A reflects the normal stated and effective rates, the stated
and effective rates for luxuries, and the maximum by which these
rates might he increased on certain imports over that rate borne by
a single transfer of domestically produced equivalents.
TABLE

Normal
Stated
Rate
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands

5%
2o%
4%
3·3%
2%

5%

Normal
Effective
Rate

5%
25%
4·17%
3·3%
2.04%
5-26%

II A

Luxury
Stated
Rate
11

or 13%
25%
4%
8.3%
2%
18-zo%

Luxury
Effective
Rate

Max.IJ.mt. by
Which Other Rates
May Be Increased

or 13%
33·33%
4·17%
8.3 o/o
2.04% 6
22-25% 7

II

1oo/o 8
2%

7o/o

The foregoing rates are normally imposed on the same value as
that used for the purpose of customs' duties adjusted for certain
matters, the most important of which is usually the amount of import taxes themselves.
An American enterprise which makes direct exports to customers
in member nations. should take account of the possibility that turnover taxes might be levied more than once before his product
reaches the ultimate consumer.
The first such possibility may be affected by the way in which he
designs the sale. Except in Belgium and Italy, one turnover tax
may be levied by reference to the act of import and another on the
delivery to the customer if the sale, as defined under the member
nation's law, is deemed to take place there. For example, delivery
under reservation of title until payment is effected may give rise
to such multiple taxation. Again, in the Netherlands, title to goods
shipped from New York via public transport is normally deemed
to pass upon delivery to the customer, not upon delivery to the
transport agency. In that country, however, multiple taxation can
be avoided in two instances. First, tax free delivery in a sea-port is
permitted, but only in the case of staple commodities. Second, with
respect to other goods, multiple turnover taxation can be avoided
by keeping the goods under customs bond until delivery can be
effected. The double tax problem is much less acute in Germany;
6

Ibid.
The stated rate for cars is 7%, yielding an effective rate of 7.5%.
8
In practice, the increase does not exceed 6o/o.
7
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actual delivery, as such, is less significant there in determining passage of title. For example, title to goods shipped from New York
via public transport, if addressed to the purchaser, is deemed to
pass upon delivery to the transport agency.
In those circumstances where multiple turnover taxes are applied,
first on import and then again on actual delivery, the same rates
are usually applied to the two events except in the case of the
Netherlands where the wholesaler's rate of . 7 5% is imposed on
one of the two events. Indeed, a second tax will not be imposed
there if the delivery is to a person who buys the goods for his
private consumption. In the event both circumstances are taxed
in France, a credit in the amount of the first tax will be allowed
against the second tax, for in effect France quite generally taxes
only the value added, not the value transferred.
The discussion above involved the possibility of multiple turnover taxation in effecting delivery to an American enterprise's own
customer. In analyzing its competitive position, the American enterprise must also take account of the fact that its own customer will
also suffer a turnover tax, though perhaps at a different rate, if it
holds the goods for re-sale, for that tax will affect the ultimate
price paid by the consumer. Table II B compares the rates which
would normally be applied to an importer's re-sale.
TABLE

Country
Belgium
France

II B

Rate If Re-sale
Is to Person
Who Buys Other
Than for His
Private Consumption

5%

zo%

(There is a credit for tax
previously paid)
Germany

I%

Rate If Re-sale
Is to a Person
Who Buys for His
Private Consumption
0

zo%
(Credit is also allowed
here for tax previously
paid)

(Wholesaler's rate)
Italy
Luxembourg

3·3%

-5%

(Wholesaler's rate)
Netherlands

·75%

(Wholesaler's rate)

0
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In Germany and the Nether lands, the foregoing tax can be
avoided in the case of staple commodities which enjoy immunity at
the point of delivery in sea-ports and for the first delivery outside
these sea-ports. In Belgium and Italy, multiple taxation can be
mitigated for a number of different items with respect to which one
tax, though usually higher than normal, covers all stages from the
manufacturer or importer to the consumer.
As indicated in the country-by-country survey in PART I, each
member nation imposes certain excise duties, usually at very high
rates, on specific goods, as distinguished from turnover taxes which,
in general, apply to transfers of all goods. It is not possible within
the confines of this study to list all of the goods subject to such
excises nor all of the rates which are constantly changing. Examples
include alcoholic beverages, sugar, tobacco, and mineral oils. Italy,
more than others, impose excises on a very long list, and these are
equally applicable to imports.
SECTION

c.

AMERICAN TAXES RE EXPORTS DIRECT
To FoREIGN CusTOMERS

(a) Introduction.-The effect of the federal income tax
on export profits derived by an American enterprise from direct
sales to foreign customers turns on two questions. The first involves
the extent to which such profits are includible in gross income. The
second relates to the other side of the ledger: To what extent is a
deduction or credit allowed for any foreign taxes paid with respect
to such transactions?
The separate discussion below of these two questions indicates
that the American income tax affects a simple export arrangement in
a manner quite similar to that associated with domestic sales. A
third sub-topic goes on to examine the overall competitive tax position of an American exporter, due account being given to the tax
patterns of the more significant federal excise taxes.
(b) Gross income as affected by export profits from sales
direct to foreign customers.-Congress has acknowledged that profit
from a foreign sale of personal property produced in the United
States is derived partly from sources within, and partly from
sources without, the United States.9 But this is primarily significant only to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. Beginning
with the first income tax act passed pursuant to the Sixteenth
• I.R.C., § 863 {b).
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Amendment, Congress has required domestic corporations to include in their gross all income without regard to the source from
which it was derived. 10
This assertion of world-wide jurisdiction, applicable also to individual citizens and residents, was sustained by the Supreme Court
in the face of contentions of unconstitutional discrimination by
reference to the fact that nonresident aliens and foreign corporations were required only to include that income which was derived
from sources within the United StatesY
As a result of that determination, a domestic corporation's gross
income from direct exports will not be affected by the question of
whether title and the risk of ownership changes in the United States
or in Europe. Its entire profit will be includible in either event. As
a practical matter, however, this need mean only that the manufacturing profit will be within the reach of the Internal Revenue
Service. All or a portion of the· remaining profit associated with
the distribution process-getting the product into the hands of the
ultimate foreign consumer-may be free of the American income
tax and be subject only to what may be smaller direct taxes of a
foreign country, thus reducing the total amount of direct taxes
which the whole process must absorb.
The extent to which the distribution profit will be immune from
the federal tax depends on the choice of media through which distribution is to be handled. Illustratively, sales to an unrelated
foreign incorporated wholesale export house with a purchasing office
in New York, or to a foreign import house with a purchasing office
in a Common Market country, would confine the American vendor
to the manufacturing profit. Even if both wholesalers consummated
their purchases in the United States, the distribution profit could
be placed beyond the range of the federal treasury. Since a foreign
corporation's profit is includible in American gross income only to
the extent it is derived from sources within the United States, the
two wholesalers could avail themselves of the further statutory
provision which treats profit derived from the purchase of personal
property within, and its sale without, the United States as derived
entirely from sources without this country. 12 It would be essential
'"Rev. Act of 1913, § G(a), now I.R.C., § 61.
"National Paper and Type Company v. Bowers, 266 U.S. 373,45 S. Ct. 133 (1924),
A like result was reached in the case of the foreign income of a citizen resident abroad,
Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 44 S. Ct. 444 (1924), and of an alien resident in the United
States. Bowring v. Bowers, (2d Cir. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 918, cert. den., 277 U.S. 6o8, 48 S.
Ct. 603 ( 1928).
12
I.R.C., § 862(a) (6).
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to immunity, of course, that the wholesalers' dispositions take place
outside this countryY
A somewhat similar effect would be accomplished, but by virtue
of different principles, if the sale to the ultimate foreign consumer
is effected by the American vendor through a foreign independent
commission agent, as distinguished from a foreign merchant. While
the American vendor's gross would be fully includible in its gross
income, the sales commission would be deductible as a selling expense.H And this is so though the foreign agent's distributing commission is free of American tax, suffering instead the direct taxes of
the appropriate foreign country.
For at least a period of time, it is even possible for the American
manufacturer to immunize the distribution profit without dividing
it with strangers. It could create its own foreign subsidiary. The tax
advantages associated with this more dramatic penetration into a
foreign country are considered, however, in PART III infra. With
reference to the American manufacturer who is not yet quite ready
to become so involved in foreign soil, it is important to note here,
however, that the prime tax advantages associated with a foreign
sales subsidiary are not available to an ordinary 15 domestic subsidiary which might be created to handle direct export sales. This
latter arrangement would serve only to divide between two domestic
corporations that gross income which would otherwise be enjoyed
by the parent. The one advantage in this relates to the possibility
of creating a second exemption from surtax, the subsidiary's first
$25,000 of taxable income being subjected only to the normal tax
rate of 30%. 16 Assuming the parent company is in the 52% bracket,
the consequent 22% yearly saving on the first $25,ooo ($s,soo)
will be more than offset, however, by the tax on inter-corporate clivi·
dends 17 if the subsidiary's pre-tax sales profit approximates $135,ooo or more. At that point, its after-tax income of approximately
"' For federal purposes, generally the place where the benefits and burdens of owner·
ship pass fixes the place of sale. LT. Regs., § r.861-6; U.S. v. Balanovski, (2d Cir.
1956) 236 F. (2d) 298, cert. den., 352 U.S. 968, 77 S. Ct. 357 (1957); Commissioner v.
East Coast Oil Co., S.A., (sth Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 322, cert. den., 299 U.S. 6o8, 57
S. Ct. 234 ( 1936).
u I.R.C., § 162.
15
The relevance of the proposed Foreign Investment Incentive Tax Bill of 1960 (the
so-called Boggs Bill) is mentioned in PART VI, infra.
16
I.R.C., § 1r. Even this advantage might be lost under some circumstances, by
reference to I.R.C., §§ 1551, 269, or 61. E.g., see James Realty Co. v. United States,
(D.C. Minn. 1959) 59-2 USTC para. 966o; Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. No. 65 (1959).
11
Inter-corporate dividends are deductible by the recipient only to the extent of
8s%. I.R.c., § 243.
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$70,000
would suffer an inter-corporate dividend tax equal to the
earlier saving. This tax on inter-corporate dividends can be avoided
only if the parent files a consolidated return which carries with it
loss of the added exemption otherwise enjoyed by the subsidiary and
an additional 2% charge on the total income derived from domestic
as well as export sales.
To avoid the difficulties just mentioned, a parent company might
seek to confine the domestic subsidiary's profits by setting unrealistic
limitations on its sales commissions or by charging unrealistically
high prices for items purchased by the subsidiary for re-sale. Obviously the Internal Revenue Service does not, and cannot, officially
approve such practices whatever a given revenue agent may allow
in a specific case. The Code contemplates that transactions between
parent and subsidiary will conform to commercial practices followed
by those who bargain at arm's length. 19
TAXATION
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(c) Deductions or credits for foreign taxes re exports direct
to foreign customers.-Congress began in 1913 to take account of
all foreign taxes paid by an incorporated American enterprise, the
arrangement coinciding with that traditionally associated with state
and local taxes. 20 A deduction from gross income was allowed in
arriving at the net to which the American rates were to be applied.
In that day, income taxes imposed by states were more or less de
minimus. 21 World War I costs, however, led foreign countries almost immediately to increase substantially their income and excess
profits taxes. Congressional accommodation of those charges only
by way of a deduction meant that the federal government absorbed
only that percentage of the foreign tax equal to a domestic taxpayer's American rate. The enterprise itself had to absorb the
balance. In 1918, for the asserted purpose of reducing the "very
severe burden" which followed the double taxation of foreign
earned income, Congress created a credit, allowing American enterprises to elect to offset the domestic tax itself with any foreign
"income, war profits, or excess profits taxes" imposed on income
'"On a gross income of $•3s,ooo, the subsidiary would pay 30% on the first $25,000
($7,500) and sz% on $uo,ooo ($s7,2oo), a total tax of $64,700 leaving $70,300
available for dividends.
10
I.R.C., § 482.
20
Rev. Act of 1913, § G{b) [s] (fourth). Individuals were not al!owed this benefit
until 1916. Rev. Act of 1916, § s(a). Cf. Rev. Act of 1913, §(B) [7] (third). Both
are now accommodated by I.R.C., § 16421 The first state income tax was not passed in the United States until 19n, and by
1919 the total yield in all states approximated only $so,ooo,ooo. HELLERSTEIN, STATE
AND LOCAL TAXATION 7 (1953).

43 2
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET
derived "from sources within such [foreign] country." 22 Of course,
provision was made to prevent an electing taxpayer from doubling
up by deducting from gross income any tax for which the credit
arrangement had been elected. 23 While the privilege to elect a
credit was later extended to other types of taxes, this was so only
where the other tax was imposed in lieu of an income, war profits,
or excess profits tax otherwise generally imposed. 24
Since an American enterprise engaged only in direct exports to
customers in the Common Market is not likely to incur foreign
taxes of a type which satisfy the credit provision, the refinements
limiting the credit are considered in PART III, infra. That such
taxes are not likely to be encountered in the circumstance under consideration stems from the fact, as noted in Section B supra, that the
United States has a bilateral tax treaty with all member nations
except Luxembourg. And these conventions free "industrial and/or
commercial profits" of American enterprises from foreign income
taxes except in the instance where a "permanent establishment" is
maintained abroad.
Under this standard, an American enterprise engaged only in
direct export sales could retain immunity even if the sales arrangement called for the burdens and benefits of ownership to pass in
Europe, rather than in the United States. As a business matter, however, this may be neither practicable nor desirable. Moreover, as
noted in Section B, supra, the effect may be to multiply the number
of times the foreign country's turnover tax will be applied, once at
the point of import and again on delivery. While such taxes would
be deductible in computing gross income for American purposes, the
credit provision would not apply 25 with the consequence that the
manufacturer's competitive position might be prejudiced.
Providing for the benefits and burdens of ownership to pass in
the United States may in one circumstance, on the other hand, entrap an American company into double taxation of its export profits.
Suppose that the American company, while operating under this
arrangement, sends a promotional representative to a Common
Market country intending to so limit his function as to preclude the
foreign government from asserting that a permanent establishment
22
H. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. II (1918); Rev. Act of 1918, §§ 222(a) (1)
and 238(a) (1), now, as modified, I.R.C., § 901 et seq. (Italics added.)
28
Rev. Act of 1918, §§ 214(a) (3) and 234(a) (3), now I.R.C., § 164(b) (6).
"'Rev. Act of 1942, § 158(£), now I.R.C., § 903.
25
E.g., Eitingon-Schild Co., Inc. and Subsidiarie~, 21 B.T.A. u63 (1931). Inapplicability of the credit provision to turnover taxes is more fully discussed in Section D,
infra, in the setting of royalties received from licensing arrangements.
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has been created there. Later, to accommodate business requirements, the promotional representative informally assumes added
responsibilities to a point where the foreign government, while
acknowledging that the matter falls into the "grey" area, asserts,
nevertheless, that a permanent establishment has been created. It
might go on to assert that profits from the export sales are attributable to that establishment even though the benefits and burdens of ownership passed in the United States. The United States,
on the other hand, might deny that a permanent establishment was
created and deny that any credit is allowable against the American
tax for the asserted foreign income tax. As a general proposition,
bilateral tax treaties require the United States to grant a credit only
to the extent provided for in the Internal Revenue Code. 26 And in
an equally general sense, credit for foreign income taxes is allowed
only where the taxpayer derived income from a foreign source. 27
The American government might contend that passage of the benefits and burdens of ownership in the United States meant that the
export profit had its source in this country/ 8 rendering inapplicable
the credit arrangement. While diplomatic channels might be available in any effort to conform the foreign country's interpretation of
the so-called "grey area," this type of remedy may be small comfort
to a taxpayer whose foreign activities-as viewed by the foreign
government-have slipped just over the "permanent establishment"
line.

(d) Comparing the competitive tax positions of American
exporters with that of other exporters, and with producers in a
Common Market country.-The foregoing discussion indicates
that an American enterprise may export items direct to customers
in a member nation without incurring any income tax liability under
the latter's laws, provided only that sales are not handled through
its own "permanent establishment" located there. The shape of the
internal laws of the member nations is such that the same result
would generally follow even in the absence of bilateral tax treaties
with the United States. 29 It follows from this that competitive
enterprises in other exporting countries can also avoid Common
"'The usual practice in the treaties is first to freeze the American credit provisions
as they existed at the time the treaty goes into effect. It is then provided that this shall
not restrict allowance of any credit otherwise allowed by the national laws of the
contrasting states. See, e.g., the treaty with Belgium, Articles XII and XX.
"'I.R.C., § 904. This is discussed more fully in PART III.
28
See note 13, supra.
20
However, see note z, supra.
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Market income taxes even though the exporting country does not
have bilateral tax treaties with the member nations. On this score,
the only difference between the position of such an exporting enterprise and one in America relates to slight variations which may
exist between the way "permanent establishment" is defined under
the national laws of member nations and the way it is defined in
the American bilateral tax treaties. 30 Generally, however, these
differences are not likely to have great practical significance. For
example, where the transactions are handled through an importer,
both exporters may want to deal only with an independent firm in
order to avoid any contention that they maintain a taxable permanent establishment in the member nation.
Nor, with respect to Common Market turnover taxes-standing
alone, will the competitive tax position of American exporters
differ from that of other outsiders who export into the Common
Market. Turnover taxes of member nations do not generally differ
by reference to the origin of imported items.
It is the relationship of the outsiders' domestic income tax systems to their own respective turnover tax systems that controls the
competitive tax position inter se. Where the former taxes are high,
the latter will be relatively lower, and vice versa. Accordingly, an
exporter in an outside country with relatively low income taxes and
relatively high turnover taxes which are refunded at export will
enjoy a competitive tax advantage over another outsider from a
country with an opposite tax pattern, and vice versa. As between
outsiders from different countries, Common Market taxes will have
a neutral effect; neither outsider will be subject to the income taxes
of member nations and both will suffer the same Common Market
turnover taxes.
The same domestic relationships generally control the competitive tax positions of exporters from outside the Common Market
with those from within with respect to exports to other member
nations. Finally, an outside exporter in a country with a relative
low income tax and relatively high turnover taxes which are refunded at export will enjoy a competitive tax advantage over a
local producer in a given member nation which, relatively speaking, has an opposite tax pattern. Both will suffer approximately the
same turnover taxes-hypothetically the low one imposed by the
member nation, and by hypothesis the local producer is subject to
the greater income tax.
30

Cf., e.g., note

2,

supra, with the discussion of the treaty provisions in Section B.
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The foregoing problem is not peculiar to comparisons between
outside exporters and producers within the Common Market. It
exists within the Common Market itself. Indeed, from the beginning
of "Benelux" and the Coal and Steel Community, tax experts have
worked diligently, without much practical success, to resolve the
difficulties growing out of the differentials.
While American industry is burdened with a relatively high income tax and with some non-refundable indirect taxes, at least with
reference to certain rather widely applied excises it does enjoy a
position generally comparable to competitors situated in countries
which immunize exports from turnover taxes and refund those
previously paid. In this connection, the United States imposes a
manufacturers' excise tax on the sale of a variety of items, including,
e.g., automobiles, appliances, refrigerators, musical instruments,
phonographs, records, radios, television sets, photographic apparatus, light bulbs, pens and mechanical pencils, lighters, and business
machines. 31 The most typical rate is 10%. Until 1958, the practice
followed under the then existing law with regard to these items 32
allowed a manufacturer to make a tax-free sale, regardless of the
number of subsequent intermediate purchasers, 33 as long as he had
advance knowledge that the article was destined for exportation
before any other use was to be made of it. In one sense, however,
the tax was only suspended; the manufacturer had to obtain proof
within 6 months of his shipment or sale (whichever was earlier)
that the item had actually been exported. 34 Many manufacturers
were concerned with problems associated with proof of eventual
exportation in that instance where several intermediate purchasers
were involved. 35 Accordingly, beginning with the revision in 1958,
manufacturers have been permitted in the export setting to make
tax-free sales only where the sale itself was "for export, or for
resale by the purchaser to a second purchaser for export . . . "
prior to any other use. 36 This was coupled with another provision
bearing on the instance where tax had to be charged because there
would be more than one intermediate purchaser; a refund, the
benefit of which would actually be enjoyed ultimately by the exporter, could be obtained in that instance, provided the necessary
TAXATION

31
I.R.C., Chapter 32, § 4061 et seq.
.. Tobacco products are dealt with separately in I.R.C., § 5704 (b).
81
H. Rep. No. 2596, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958).
"'This goes back to an interpretation under the old code (I.R.C. (1939), § 2705) in
Treas. Reg. 46 (1940), § 316.25 •
.. H. Rep. No. 481, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1957).
06
l,R.C., §4221(a) (2),
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conditions were satisfied. 37 One of these conditions traces back to
an interpretative position taken by the government under earlier
law, to the effect that sales could be made tax free or refund obtained
only if the manufacturer had advance notice that the product he
was selling was ultimately destined for export prior to any other
use. 38 To some, this was an objectionable limitation. 39 Others
thought it served a useful purpose. For example, automobile manufacturers urged that only through this advance notice requirement
would they be in a position to see that an exported automobile was
properly equipped for driving in the foreign country. 40 In the end,
the limitation in question survived the revision of 1958 as to a host
of articles, though not all. The rule continues to apply, e.g., in the
case of automobiles, refrigeration equipment, appliances, radio and
television sets, and phonographsY
In spite of the relatively favorable treatment of exports under
the manufacturers' excise tax, the over-all competitive tax position
of American exporters will be less favorable than that of an exporter from a low income tax country unless the latter's turnover
tax provides an inadequate rebate system for exports. Because items
competitive with American products might come from any one of a
hundred countries, it is not possible to lay down fixed rules. At the
moment, the American exporter can do little more than determine
whether his product would be competitive price-wise under the
existing price structure within a given member nation. No advantage
would be derived from shipping goods to one country for re-shipment to a member nation. While the first country's turnover taxes
could be avoided, the turnover taxes of the country of destination
would apply just as in the case of direct exports to that country.
SEcTION D. FoREIGN AND DoMESTIC TAXEs RE SIMPLE
LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS

(a) Introductory note.-For any one of the reasons indicated in the Introduction to this PART, an American enterprise
may eventually choose to have its product manufactured, in whole
or in part, in one or more of the Common Market countries. Simple
licensing arrangements and "know-how" agreements with estab•• I.R.C., § 6416.
38
H. Rep. No. 2596, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958) and H. Rep. No. 481, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 72 (1957).
80
See H. Rep. No. 481, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1957) •
.., s. Rep. No. 2090, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (I 958).
"The limitation survives as to manufacturers' excises imposed by I.R.C., §§ 4061 (a},
4111, 4121, 4141, and 4201. See H. Rep. No. 2596, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 8 (1958).
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lished foreign firms, the over-all tax effects of which are considered
below, may be entered into as a substitute for establishment by the
American company of its own facility abroad. Later, in PART III,
account will be taken of the additional over-all tax advantages which
may follow when such arrangements are complemented for one or
more reasons by creation of a foreign subsidiary.
TAXATION

(b) Comparison of foreign income taxes on royalties from
licenses.-If the American enterprise licenses its patent to an independent European firm, the latter may treat royalties paid as a
business expense fully deductible from gross income in computing
its own income tax. For purposes of the German enterprise or business tax, however, only one-half the amount is deductible. Again,
with reference to the income tax properly so-called, in the case of
dependent corporate licensees (a subsidiary or majority-owned
company), such royalties are deductible only to the extent they are
fair in amount and do not represent a "hidden" distribution of
profits.
In the absence of a bilateral tax treaty, all member nations except the Netherlands would compensate themselves for the loss of
revenue flowing from the deduction by treating royalties paid to
nonresidents as taxable income to them. The Netherlands does not
impose a tax on royalties paid a nonresident except where the latter
has a Dutch permanent establishment. With respect to the other
member nations, again in the absence of a treaty, in all but one
a special income tax rate would actually be applied, and thenexcept in Germany-only to the net royalty which remains after
payment of a turnover tax the rates of which are discussed in the
next sub-topic. The special income tax rates which would be applied
to the net amount follows :
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg

18%
24%
25%
23.62% on% of the
gross amount
1 2%

The United States has concluded tax treaties with all member
nations except Luxembourg. These, like similar treaties between
other countries, generally exempt from the income tax otherwise
imposed by the licensee's country any royalties paid to a nonresident
American licensor in consideration, for example, of "the right to
use copyrights, patents, secret processes and formulae, trademarks,
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and other analogous rights." 42 In effect then, the American enterprise's royalties would generally be subject to a member nation's
special rates only where the licensee is a Luxembourg firm.
The immunity otherwise enjoyed is subject, however, to an important limitation, i.e., that the American firm does not maintain
a permanent establishment in the member nation in question. The
consequence which would follow from maintenance of such an establishment is still open to dispute. One possibility is that the royalty
will be subject to the special rates set forth above. The other is
that the royalties will be deemed to be a part of the income of
the permanent establishment and taxed according to the rates applicable to its income. The difficulty arises from the fact that all
five treaties literally exempt only those American firms "not having
a permanent establishment" in the member nation. Discussions are
still being carried on with the aim of identifying which result should
follow under various circumstances. At the moment there seems to
be a tendency to treat such royalties as part of a permanent establishment's income only if conclusion of the licensing agreement can
properly be considered a part of the permanent establishment's business activities.
A somewhat different interpretative difficulty which may arise
involves possible differences between royalties properly so-called
and additional payments for providing continuous technical assistance. At some point, the technical assistance to be rendered may
include an element of service, as distinguished from an act of communicating in a practical way the nature of the "right" grantedfor the use of which "right" the consideration is aptly characterized
as royalty. The foreign income tax problem will not be complicated,
of course, where the additional service, if any, is performed within
the United States. In such case, compensation for the service would
have its source in the United States. But a problem may arise where
instruction, etc., is to take place abroad. Even in this case, however,
it must be remembered that normally the treaties do immunize payments for the right to use secret processes and formulae as well
as more concrete intangibles such as a patent. And meaningful communication of the "right" is indispensible, i.e., part and parcel, to
its use. Sterile written instructions may well fall far short of communicating the exact nature of the right granted. In the reverse
.. All of the treaties except that with Germany use language almost identical to that
quoted. Two of the treaties project the immunity only to one other case; those with
Belgium and France go on to provide that the term royalties shall be deemed to include rentals in respect to motion picture films. The other three also include rentals
and like payments for the use of industrial, commercial, and scientific equipment,
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situation, where an American company was the licensee and was to
be given instruction in the United States with reference to the
foreign licensor's "know-how," the line of reasoning just indicated
led the Internal Revenue Service to react as follows:
The essence of the contract is the making available to
the domestic corporation the technical knowledge,
methods, experience, that is, the "know-how" of the foreign corporation. While manufacturing "know-how" is of
a rionpatentable nature, it is something that its possessor
can grant to another for a consideration. The right to use
such "know-how" is not materially different from the
right to use trade-marks, secret processes and formulae,
and, if the right thereto is granted as part of a licensing
agreement, it becomes, in effect, an integral part of the
bundle of rights acquired under such agreement.
The payments made under the contract are applicable
both to the specific rights therein granted, that is, the
right to use the "know-how," and to services performed
abroad in instructing and training the employees or technicians of the domestic corporation. Such payments should
therefore be allocated between the license to use the
"know-how" and the personal services. Since the personal
services have only nominal value apart from the license
to use such "know-how," all but a nominal sum should be
allocated to the license. 43
As indicated in the next sub-topic, one Common Market country
has indicated, at least for purposes of its turnover tax, that consideration paid for those practical steps essential to a meaningful
communication and practical utilization of the right granted will be
deemed royalty. Notice was given, however, that accessory operations going beyond that line would not be so classified. 44
(c) Comparison of foreign turnover taxes on royalties from
licenses.-All Common Market countries treat the benefit rendered
by the licensor as a service to the licensee, with the consequence
that the gross amount of the royalty is subjected to a turnover tax.
The t:ates vary as follows.
Belgium
France
Germany

-s%
-8.5%
-4%

Italy
-3%
Luxembourg-2%
Netherlands -4%

While the French rate is higher than that of others, It IS Important to note that under an agreement between France and the
.. Rev. Rul. 55-17, C.B. 1955-I, 388 at 389.
"Proces-Verbal with France, effective February 15, 1956, CCH Tax Treaties, para.
2876.
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United States, an American licensor (company or individual) will
be completely exempt if the licensor can qualify as the inventor. 4 "
It is also significant that a similar agreement exists between France
and several other countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Under the agreements, where an American firm transfers its
patent to a holding company in, for example, Switzerland, that
holding company can obtain the exemption if the American. parent
itself can qualify as the inventor. The extension of immunity in this
case is subject, however, to approval of the French tax administration.
It may well be that Common Market countries will contend for
purposes of their turnover taxes that additional payments literally
earmarked as consideration for furnishing "know-how" should also
be treated as royalties. The reasoning which might justify such a
contention, and the limitations applicable thereto, were indicated
in the preceding sub-topic. In this connection, France, on agreeing to
immunize royalties paid an American inventor, adopted the following line:
The exemption will cover not only the royalties collected in consideration for the licensing of the right to
utilization of the inventions mentioned above (paragraph 1) but also the royalties paid for the whole group
of steps necessary for the practical utilization of the invention (know-how), for the protection of the invention
and for the technical assistance which is indispensable to
the exploitation of the invention (for example, making
available to the French licensee the American licensor's
technicians in connection with getting the invention
started; supervision of the putting into place of the installations necessary for the exploitation of this invention
and the utilization of blueprints; instruction of the licensee; supervision of the initial manufacturing results).
On the other hand, this exemption will not apply to royalties relating to accessory operations, such as the hiring of
labor, the furnishing of supplies, advertising, carried out
on French territory. 46
(d) American tax treatment of foreign earned royalties.
-While the Internal Revenue Code attributes to a foreign source
'"This arrangement was consummated by an exchange of letters between the Treasury and the French Minister of Finance. Prior thereto, and for a long period, France
had not imposed its turnover tax on royalties paid to nonresident licensors. A decision by the French government to ove\turn this earlier administrative practice was
followed immediately by protests from American licensors. The above mentioned exchange of letters grew out of the negotiations undertaken by the two governments.
•• Proces-Verbal, effective February 15, 1956, CCH Tax Treaties, para. 2876.
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any royalties or rentals received by an American company for the
right to use its patents, secret processes, etc., outside the United
States, 47 such income-like other income from a foreign sourcemust be included in its gross. 48 Deductions which may then be taken
in arriving at taxable income will be comparable to those enjoyed
with reference to a like amount of domestic income. For example,
in determining the amount of costs amortizable over the useful life
of a patent, the question of whether such costs will include research
and developmental expenditures will turn on whether the taxpayer
invoked the right under § 174 of the Code to deduct research and
developmental costs in the year incurred.
Since five of the six Common Market nations are precluded by
treaty from imposing their respective income taxes on royalties received by American companies which do not maintain permanent
establishments abroad, only those received from Luxembourg would
require and enjoy the credit against American tax which § 901
of the Code grants for any "income, war profits, or excess profits
taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign
country. . . . "
Computation of the amount of credit allowable in this latter
instance may be more complicated than usual if the licensing agreement also requires the American company, for additional stated
periodic consideration, to provide intermittent instruction in the
United States for employees of the foreign licensee with reference
to the licensor's "know-how." While details regarding the computation of the credit are covered in PART III, infra, it should be
noted here that credit is generally allowed only for that tax attributable to income which had its source in the foreign country. 49
On this point, Luxembourg might contend that the entire consideration constituted a royalty for the right to use, all of which had its
source there, and that the United States was simply the place where
the nature of the right granted was communicated in practical terms.
In a somewhat related setting, the United States acknowledged
that "the personal services have only nominal value apart from
the license to use such 'know-how,'" but went on to indicate that the
"nominal sum" which should be attributed to the service rendered
would have its source in the United States, 50 the balance being
allocated to the license and having its source abroad. 51
TAXATION

"I.R.C., § 862(a) (4) .
.. I.R.C., § 61.
•• I.R.C., § 904·
50
See I.R.C., § 861 (a) (3).
01
Rev. Rul. 55-17, C.B. 1955-1, 388; cf. International Standard Electric Corp. v.
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With reference to turnover taxes, it is most unlikely that the
previously quoted language from § 901 of the Code would authorize any credit for taxes of this type which five of the six countries
would always impose on royalties and which France, the sixth,
would assess except in the instance where the licensor or its affiliate
can qualify as the inventor. 52 Admittedly the impact of such taxes,
when imposed on royalties, is equivalent to a tax on gross income.
But turnover taxes, have an even more general sweep, embracing
also gross receipts from sales, etc. An over-all perspective regarding
an earlier French turnover tax which had been applied to American
exports led the Board of Tax Appeals to conclude that it was something other than a profits tax. It was deemed an "excise tax on the
privilege of carrying on in France businesses of the kinds enumerated . . . ," and this was thought to be none the less true though
in reaching gross sales of services the tax was measured by the
"equivalent of gross income or profits." 53 This same over-all perspective constituted one reason why the Internal Revenue Service
more recently ruled against allowance of a credit for the German
turnover tax imposed on royalties received by an American firm
not having a permanent establishment there. 54 The Service, however, had to go on to deal with the question of whether a credit
was allowable under another provision in the Code which authorized such in the case of any foreign tax paid "in lieu of a tax on
income, war profits, or excess profits otherwise generally imposed
by . . . [such J foreign country. . . . " 55 The taxpayer claimed
that it was enough under this language that the royalty would
suffer only a turnover tax, having been freed by a bilateral tax
treaty from the reach of a German income tax which was otherwise generally imposed. The Service concluded, however, that the
turnover tax was not a quid pro quo for the relief granted against
the German income tax. The latter relief was simply a concession to
avoid double income taxation. Consequently, the turnover tax did
not satisfy the alternative requirement that it be "in lieu of" an
income tax.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (2d Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 487, cert. den., 323
u.s. 8o3, 65 s. Ct. 56o (1945) .
.. For details regarding such qualification and the meaning of inventor in a ProcesVerbal made effective as of February 15, 1956, see CCH Tax Treaties, para. 2876
et seq.
58
Eitingon-Schild Co., Inc. and Subsidiaries, 21 B.T.A. 1163, 1174 (r93r) •
.. Rev. Rul. 56-635, C.B. 1956-2, 501.
65
I.R.C., § 903.

PART III. COMPARATIVE TAX EFFECTS OF CONDUCTING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE THROUGH FACILITIES IN
THE COMMON MARKET
SECTION

A.

INTRODUCTION

(a) Alternative business arrangements .-An American
enterprise which has been shipping goods to Europe in response to
orders received directly from its European customers may believe
that something more than a promotional representative is needed
there. From a business standpoint, apart from tax considerations,
it may favor establishment of a permanent sales office. Or tariff
walls, together with transportation and comparative production
costs, may suggest that its goods would be more competitive if
manufactured or assembled there. Rather than enter into the previously discussed licensing arrangement with an existing European
firm, it m;n prefer to establish its own foreign manufacturing
facility.
Whether it chooses to establish a sales office or a manufacturing
facility, it must also decide whether to operate through a permanent
establishment, in the nature of a branch, or transact its affairs
through a foreign subsidiary. It must also choose the country in
which to base its operations and decide whether and how its foreign
business can be best extended into other member nations. Tax
considerations may contribute, of course, to the shape of the final
plan.
In order to facilitate comparisons, discussion in this PART
proceeds first on the assumption that a facility is to be established
in only one country and that trade will be confined within its boundaries. Data regarding the tax loads in each of the six countries
will be compared in the settings of a branch operation and an
incorporated foreign subsidiary, and then integrated with American tax implications.
Thereafter the discussion will assume that trade is also to be
carried on with one or more other member nations. It is in this
circumstance that the tax implications arising from exports by the
one foreign facility to the other member nations are compared
443
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with those which would arise from creation of yet another facility.
That second facility might be either a subsidiary or a branch of the
first. Or it might be a sister branch or subsidiary directly controlled by the American parent. And if it takes on the form of
a sister subsidiary, the parent may want to create a foreign holding company to hold the shares of the two different subsidiaries.
The tax implications of all of these possibilities will be considered
in turn on a comparative basis, i.e., concurrently in the setting
of each member nation. Some attention will even be given to the
way tax costs may be affected if a holding company is established in
a so-called "tax haven" outside the Common Market.
Finally, the relative tax costs of exporting goods from within
the Common Market to non-member nations will be compared
with the establishment in those non-member nations of permanent
establishments or subsidaries owned or controlled by Common
Market corporations.
(b) Need for caution in assessing comparative data; also
the varying roles of direct and indirect taxes compared to national
product.-One must be careful not to place too much stress on
the type of comparative data which can be reflected in this type
of study. In this connection, assume that a campany has a gross
profit of $r,ooo,ooo. The ultimate taxable profit to which comparisons must be geared may be quite different depending on
whether it is located in one country or another. Depreciation arrangements, stock valuation methods, special investment allowances, and loss carry-over privileges are only illustrations of matters about which there may be differences from country to country.
Again, the tax on distributed profits may differ from that on undistributed profits. There are also varying property taxes, the
impact of which in terms of a percentage of income will differ
depending on the ratio between profits and the invested capital
of the particular business. The danger of being misled through overemphasis on the comparative data set forth in this PART will be
less, however, in the case of those who have studied the countryby-country survey which appears in PART I.
Comparative data regarding the total tax load borne by all
taxpayers in each country can be equally misleading. Much depends
on the way tax revenues are used by the different governments. Illustratively, part of these may be used by a given country to finance
social security, whereas another supposedly lower tax country
may finance old age benefits by direct contributions from those
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covered, and this may affect wage rates. Again, a country with
high taxes may provide an excellent system of railroads and highways, whereas a low tax country may have an inferior transportation system complemented by higher costs in doing business. Indeed,
in assessing the comparative data which appears in Table III A
regarding the total tax loads borne in various countries in terms
of a percentage of national product, account must even be taken
of differences which may exist among the countries in calculating
the national product, the income, and the net wealth of its people.
TABLE

III A

TOTAL TAX BURDEN'

Gross Natl.
Product
per Person

Country
Belgium

$1,196}
59.780
France
$ 931}
Fr. Fr. 46 5,400
Germany
$ 969}
DM
4,070
Italy
$ 5 19}
Lire 322,340
Luxembourg
$1,388}
B. Fr. 69,410
Netherlands
$ 845}
3,210
Fl.
B. Fr.

Tax
%of Total
Revenue Taxes De- % of Total
rived from
Taxes
as a%
of Gross Income and Derived
Natl.
Net Wealth from Other
Product
Taxes
Sources

I?%

47%

53%

IS%

40%

6o%

20%

53%

47%

I?%

30%

70%

20%

59%

41%

23%

6o%

40%

In terms of a percentage of gross national product, total revenues derived by the federal, state, and local governments in the
United States would align it alongside the Netherlands, the latter
being the Common Market country the taxes of which absorb
the highest percentage of its product. In this connection, however,
it must be remembered that the gross national product of the United
States, per person, is approximately 8 5% more than the amount
produced by the most productive Common Market country.
The federal government's tax collections are also about 27'2
1

MONTHLY BULLE'l'!N OF STATISTICS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Central Bureau of Sta-

tistics, The Hague.
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times that of states and local units. While it relies far more heavily
on the income tax than do the Common Market countries, the
combined yield of this source to all three units would approximate
the same percentage of total tax revenues as is derived from this
source by the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany. Table
III B reflects data of a character comparable to that presented
above with reference to the Common Market countries.
TABLE

III B

TOTAL TAX BURDEN-UNITED STATES

U.S. Federal govt.
State and local
Combined Federal,
State and local

Gross Nat/.
Product
per Person
$2,58o •

-

Tax
Revenue
as a% of
Gross Nat/.
Product
17.6% 3
6.3%.
24.%

%of Total Taxes Derived From:
Property
Other
Income Taxes
Taxes
Sources
5
26.3o% •
73-70%
10
10.65% •
46 %"
43·35%
57·

%7

10.9%

32.10% U

• This figure was arrived at by dividing the Federal Reserve Bulletin's estimate of
the 1959 gross national product ($479,soo,ooo,ooo) by the World Almanac's estimated
population for the United States in 1959 (177,399,000). Fed. Res. Bull. (March, 1960)
p. 328 and the World Almanac for 1960 (New York World Telegram and The Sun)
p. 257·
3
The ANNUAL REPORT, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (1959), p. 3, indicated
that federal tax collections in fiscal 1959 amounted to $79,797,973,000. See note 2, supra,
for the gross national product.
'The Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1960, indicated that state and local tax collections
in 1959 approximated $29,ooo,ooo,ooo. For the gross national product, see note 2, supra.
5
See note, 3, supra.
• This is the figure for the year 1956. The percentage is based on data appearing in
MICHIGAN TAX STUDY, LEGISLATIVE CoMMITTEE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1958)
pp. 40 and 41. It is not likely that the percentage has changed substantially since that
date.
7
This involves a combination of the 1959 figures for the federal government and
the 1956 figures for state and local governments. It is be Iieved, however, that the
figure would be substantially correct today.
8
This percentage is based on data appearing in MICHIGAN TAX STUDY, LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1958) p. 39·
0
Excise taxes, including those on alcohol, tobacco, retailers, manufacturers, estates,
and gifts yielded 15.1% of total federal tax collections. The balance (11.2%) came
from employment taxes designed mainly to accommodate old age benefits and disability
insurance.
10
Of this, 2.4% is derived from "business taxes" of which some resemble an income
tax in one degree or another.
11
This combines federal figures for fiscal 1959 with state and local figures for 1956.
However, it is believed that the figure would be approximately correct today.
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COMPARING FOREIGN TAX COSTS OF
MANENT EsTABLISHMENT WITH

A

A

PER-

SuBsiD-

IARY SERVICING ONE MEMBER NATION
SUBSECTION I. COMPARING FOREIGN DIRECT TAXES

(a) Comparing the role of treaties re permanent establishments and subsidiaries: In general.-As previously noted, the
United States has concluded tax treaties with all Common Market
countries except Luxembourg with which a treaty is under negotiation. These are intended to limit tax liability to a greater degree
than would otherwise be the case under national laws. This is
particularly so in the cases of Italy and France. According to the
national laws of both countries, a nonresident person becomes
liable to tax if he regularly and habitually performs activities
which constitute a complete cycle of business. Under the tax treaties
with them, as with others, the nonresident individual or corporation is only taxable if a "permanent establishment" is maintained
there. National laws relating to jurisdiction remain important in
such cases only where the treaty creates an ambiguity regarding
the meaning of "permanent establishment" in a given setting. While
the treaties generally go beyond national law in sharpening the
definition of a "permanent establishment," a given nation may be
inclined to resort to its own historic definition in the event of an
ambiguity in the relevant treaty.
The effect of tax treaties on subsidiary companies is quite different
in character. Generally, the treaties exclude subsidiaries, as such,
from the definition of a permanent establishment. Under the
national laws of all countries, profits of a corporation, domestic
to them, are taxed twice, once to the corporation and then in one
way or another to the stockholders on receipt of dividends. The
latter tax is usually withheld at the source, at least in part. The
tax treaties are designed either to avoid, as in the case of the
Netherlands, or mitigate, as in the case of France or Germany,
the second tax, i.e., the one which would otherwise fall on dividends
received by the American parent company. It is possible for a subsidiary to occupy a dual role, i.e., be fully taxable on its own profits
and also serve as a "permanent establishment" for the parent.
For example, a manufacturing subsidiary located in a member
nation might also serve as sales agent for products manufactured
by the parent company in the States. The subsidiary's own manu-
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facturing profits and agency fees would be fully taxable to it by
the member nation, while the American parent company would be
liable for tax on the profit derived from sales which it made
through its permanent agent, the subsidiary.
(b) Comparing direct taxes of member nations on "permanent establishments."-Under the tax treaties, an American
enterprise would not generally be taxable on commercial or industrial profits derived from trading in a member nation unless
it transacts business through a "permanent establishment." While
the enumeration of facilities covered is not always the same, most
treaties define this to include a branch, factory, office, warehouse,
workshop, mine, stone quarry, or permanent display and sales
office, and all close by referring to the most common underlying
denominator, "or other fixed place of business."
In only two significant instances does the concept "permanent
establishment" go beyond that common characteristic.
The first of these instances was discussed earlier in PART II
where it was noted that all treaties include an agent who has, and
habitually exercises, a general authority to negotiate and conclude
contracts on behalf of the American enterprise or who has a stock
of merchandise from which he regularly fills orders on behalf of
the enterprise. However, the concept does not include business
conducted through a bona fide independent commission agent,
broker, or custodian acting in the ordinary course of his business
as such, nor does it include a fixed place used exclusively for the
purchase of goods.
The second instance where a treaty goes beyond the concept of
a fixed place of business involves the arrangement with Germany
regarding construction projects. Under Germany's national law,
the notion of "permanent establishment" includes a construction
or assembly project the duration of which exceeds or is likely to
exceed 6 months. The treaty serves only to extend the dateline
to r 2 months. While the national laws of the Netherlands are
similar to those in Germany, the treaty between the former and
the United States does not characterize a construction project,
standing alone, as a permanent establishment with the consequence
that the matter of timing in that setting is now irrelevant. Luxembourg poses the third alternative. Its national laws are similar
to those in the Netherlands and Germany. Since the United States
has not yet concluded a treaty with Luxembourg, a construction
or assembly project the duration of which exceeds 6 months will
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be deemed a permanent establishment, the profits of which will
be taxed by Luxembourg.
While a permanent establishment is considered separate from
the American enterprise for the purpose of determining how much
profit was earned by the facility, that calculated profit is deemed
to be owned by the American enterprise as it is earned and is, therefore, taxable to it without regard to the question of whether the
profit has been transferred to the States.
Calculation of the amount of profit which is properly attributable to the permanent establishment, and thus taxable by a member nation, is not always easy. Where an American enterprise's facilities in the United States carry on business with a European
permanent establishment which in turn carries on business activity
in a member nation, the total profit must be divided between the
two, for only that properly attributable to the permanent establishment is taxable by the member nation. Most treaties face up
to this problem by attributing to the permanent establishment
the industrial or commercial profits which it might be expected to
derive if it were an independent enterprise engaged in the same
or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and
dealing at arm's length with the enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment. In keeping with this principle, expenses reasonably allocable to the permanent establishment, including a proper
share of executive or general administrative expenses, are deductible by it in determining its taxable profit.
Set forth in Table III C is a comparison of the direct taxes
which each member nation would impose on a permanent establishment.
(c) Comparing direct taxes of member nations on subsidiary
arrangements.-An American enterprise can create a subsidiary,
i.e., an independent entity, domiciled in any one of the member
nations. All would permit its organization as a limited liability
company or, except in the Netherlands, as a private company (a
societe a responsabiliti limitee in Belgium, France, or Luxembourg;
a societa a responsabilita limitata in Italy; a Gesellschaft mit
beschrankter H aftung, GmbH, in Germany).
The subsidiary would be taxed by the appropriate member nation
in the manner described in the country-by-country survey set
forth in PART I and later summarized on a comparative basis
in this PART. Bilateral tax treaties with the United States would
have no effect on that tax. At most, the treaties only influence the

-!>

'0

Italy

Belgium
France
Germany

Country

12

31.23 o/o
(Maximum)

30%
so%
49%

Corporation
Income Tax

----------

Deductible for corp. income tax
purposes.
2. Calculation:
a. Basic rate of s% of profit,
multiplied by coefficients
fixed by municipalities averaging 2.7; plus
b. Basic rate of .2% on value
of property multiplied by
same municipal coefficients;
plus
c. Basic rate of .2% on wages
paid, municipal coefficients
averaging 9.'"

1.

Business Tax

TABLE

c

See last column

30% 13
so% ..
57% 15
(Including property factor of
business tax)

Approximate
Percentage
of Profits
Absorbed by
Income and
Business Tax

III

I
I

·75% on net
value

I o/o on net value

Property Tax
( o/o of Profit
Depends on
Ratio Between
Profits and
/1 alue of
Property)

I

IS% on profits
in excess of
6% on value
of property

Excess
Profit Tax

3I.23% on
profits up to
6% on value
of property;
and
2. 46.23% on
profits in excess of 6%
on value of
property
1.

Approximate
Percentage
of Profits
Absorbed
by Income
and Excess
Profits Tax

I

I

"'...

-!>

Netherlands

Luxembourg

II

-

c. Basic rate of .z% on wages
paid, multiplied by coefficients from 5 to 6.

Deductible for corp. income tax
purposes.
z. Calculation:
a. Basic rate of 4 o/o of profit,
multiplied by coefficients
fixed by municipalities averaging 2.1; plus
b. Basic rate of .z% on value
of property, multiplied by
same coefficients; plus

I.

47%

45%17

.5% on net
value
I

•• This is the effective rate, account having been taken of the fact that the income tax
of one year is a deduction in computing taxable profits of the next year.
'"In addition, there are small municipal taxes which are levied at variable rates,
depending on the amount of energy used, number of employees, etc.
14
The franchise tax (contribution des patentes) has not been included. It is a small
variable burden, depending on the place of business, kind of industry, number of
employees, rental value, etc.
15
This percentage is very rough. It would be slightly higher, e.g., if all three factors
of the deductible business tax applied significantly to a given enterprise.
16
This last factor is not applied in all parts of Germany. Where it is not, the average
coefficients relating to the other two factors are usually higher than would otherwise
be the case, except in small municipalities.
17 This approximation will vary, of course, with variations in the amount of the
deductible business tax.

40% where profit
over $zo,ooo with
marginal relief for
first $2o,ooo
47% (If profits do
not exceed $x3,200
the rate goes down
to a low of 44%)

30% where profit
under $zo,ooo with
marginal relief re
first $8,ooo

zo% where profit
under $8,ooo
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member nation's treatment of dividends and interest paid by the
subsidiary to the American parent company.
Conceptually speaking, the two primary differences between
utilization by an American enterprise of a foreign permanent establishment in the nature of a branch and a foreign subsidiary appear most dramatically in that circumstance where all profits of
a new foreign facility are to be retained abroad either to discharge
indebtedness created in connection with establishment of the facility or to finance further expansion. In the case of a permanent
establishment, the Common Market country would include the
entire profit, as earned, in the gross income of the American company. The United States would do likewise, though according to
the discussion in Section C, infra, a credit for the foreign income
tax would serve to cushion or completely neutralize the effect of
an otherwise double tax.
While the profit of a subsidiary would also be taxed in full by
the member nation, in the absence of a distribution the American
parent company would not be subjected to the member nation's
dividend tax, if any, nor would it immediately suffer an American
tax. Any attempt to compare the income and property taxes which
would be exacted from such a subsidiary by each member nation
can be quite misleading, for the reasons outlined in the Introduction to this PART. This difficulty is minimized, but not eliminated,
if the comparison is directed to a common fact situation. For example, while an assumption that the subsidiary earned $4oo,ooo
(before direct taxes) on its assumed net worth of $4,ooo,ooo
( w%) 18 accommodates itself to progressive rate variations or
to the fact that a given member nation might be exacting its toll
through two different income taxes with varying rates, such an
assumed situation ignores differences which may actually exist
among member nations with regard to depreciation and other deductions which may be taken in arriving at taxable profit. It is also
difficult to take into account the deductible direct trade or enterprise taxes which, as discussed in PART I, are levied in all countries, except the Netherlands, and are imposed primarily by reference to profits and net wealth, except in Italy where it constitutes
a surcharge only on the national income tax. Nevertheless, for
illustrative purposes, the income and property taxes which would
be exacted from such a subsidiary by the member nations are
18
If the ratio is higher than Io%, the tax burden will be relatively lower in Germany
and Luxembourg and higher in Italy. If the percentage is less than 10%, the reverse
would be true.

4S3
compared in Table III D. Insofar as practicable, the figures reflecting those taxes have also been adjusted to take account of the
more significant corporate enterprise taxes.
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TABLE

III D

Income
and Property
Taxes Payable
by the Subsidiary

Belgium 20
France 21
Germany 22
Italy 23
Luxembourg 24
Netherlands 25

19

Profits Remaining
for Expansion (apart
from that retained
as a consequence of
initial or other special
investment deductions)

27-47%

72·S3%

69·95%
44·67%
SI.67%
47%

30.05%
55·33%
48·33%
53%

so%

so%

19

The figures set forth here and the formulae which appear in notes 20 through 2 5,
30, and 31, infra, are taken, with the consent of the author and publisher, from INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL DocUMENTATION, CoMPANY TAXATION IN WESTEltN EUROPE
(R. Mees & Zoonen, Rotterdam, 1959).
20
From PART I, it will be recalled that a Belgian corporation pays the Taxe Professionnelle on undistributed profits, a National Crisis Tax on distributed profits, the
Taxe Professionnelle on that part of the profits used to pay the National Crisis Tax,
and that the Taxe Professionnelle is allowed as a deduction in determining taxable
profits.
The formula for the computation of the tax is as follows: TP
d
p (P- TP- e).
The symbols in that formula carry the following meaning: TP is the Taxe Professionnelle; d represents the TP which is levied before reaching the rate applying to
the next bracket; p is the percentage applying to the next bracket and this is reached
after deduction of the amount on which d was calculated, and is represented by e.
The amount on which p is levied is thus equal to the profit (P) less the Taxe Professionnelle (TP), this being a deductible item, and less e.
By reference to the rate brackets set forth in PART I, Section A, a tentative tax
can be computed as follows:

= +

First bracket
Second bracket
Third bracket
Fourth bracket

$3,ooo
7,000
1o,ooo
18o,ooo

X
X
X
X

zso/o
30%
35%
37¥.!%

$750
2,100
3,500
67,500
$73,850

Top bracket: Over $zoo,ooo at 40%
Under the previously stated formula, the value of d is $73,850, p is 40%, and e is
$zoo,ooo. The formula can then be applied as follows:
40 (4oo,ooo- TP- 2oo,ooo)
TP = $ 73,8so+100
TP
$153,850- 0.4 TP
TP
$109,893. (27.47% of the pre-tax profit of $400,000; leaves $290,107 or 72.53%
in the corporation.)
:.n The only French tax on corporations is the Impot sur les Societtfs of so% on total
income, whether or not distributed.
""The German formula is as complicated as that used in determining the Belgian tax.

=
=

(Footnote continued on nrxt page.)
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While the comparisons just drawn assumed that none of the
profits would be currently distributed in the form of dividends,
some interest on indebtedness running to the parent company may
have been paid.
(Footnote continued.)
Under the Korperschaftsteuer, a German corporation is subject to a 51% tax on
retained earnings and a 15% tax on distributed profits. The German Gewerbesteuer
or enterprise tax (3 factor: profits, net wealth, and payroll) is subject to a multiplication factor fixed by each municipality. The formula below takes account only of net
wealth and profits, and at maximum rates. Where a municipality does not use the
payroll factor, rates regarding the other two factors may be somewhat higher. The
enterprise tax is a deductible item. Finally, the f7 ermogensteuer or net worth tax of 1o/o
is also imposed.
With K, G, and V representing the three above named taxes, and y the total tax,
the basic formula would be y = K + G + V. That formula becomes the following:
6
I5
(I) G =
NW + Ioo (P- G) when NW =net worth and P =profit
1000
6
G = -IOOO
- X $•.,., ooo ' ooo + 100
.!L ($4ooooo
'
- G) -G = 24,000 + 6o,ooo -

..!L G
100

G =$73,043
(2) V = 1% of NW = $4o,ooo.
(3) K =

_2.!..
IOO

(P- G) =

,.i!.

IOO

(4oo,ooo- 73,043) = $I66,748

y = I66,748 + 73,043 + 40,000 = $279,79I or 69.95%
There remains in the corporation $120,209 or 30.05%
$4oo,ooo or I~
23
The Italian formula must accommodate the Imposta sui redditi di Ricchezza
Mobile (R.M.), and the Imposta sulle Societii (I.S.) on profit and net worth. If y
equals the total tax, the formula would be y = R.M. + I.S. or:

(I) R.M. = 27.85 X $6,450 + 31.23% X $393.550 =

$124,701

6

(2) I.S. = ·75% X $4,000,000 + I5o/o (P- ~ NW) = 54,000
100
(3) Tax Amount (44.675% of pre-tax profit)
$I78,701
(4) Profit remaining in the corporation (55.325%)

$22I,299

"'Luxembourg levies the following taxes on corporations: Impot sur le revenu des
collectivitis (IC); Impot sur Ia fortune (IF); and Jmpot commercial or Business Tax
(BT) which includes, at maximum rates, a ·4 o/o tax on net worth (NW) and an 8%
tax on profit (P). Thus the basic formula could be applied as follows:
(I) y=BT+IF+IC
4~

8
8
NW + - - (P- BT) = - 4- X 4,ooo,ooo + - - (4oo,ooo- BT)
Iooo
Ioo
IOoo
IOO
BT = I6,ooo + 32,ooo- o.o8 BT.
BT=
5
IF= - - NW = - '- X 4,ooo,ooo =
$ 20 ooo
IOOO
IOOO
'
IC = 40% of (P- BT) = o.4(4oo,ooo- 44,444) = $142,222
$206,666

(2) BT =

Total tax amounts to
$2o6,666 or 51.67%
There remains in the corporation $I93,334 or 48.33%
$400,000
1oo.oo%
"'The Dutch tax is always 47% of total income. But see PART VI, note I, infra,
with respect to pending legislation calling for reformation of the Dutch tax system.
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In all countries, such interest would be deductible in computing
the subsidiary's profit, provided the amount is fair and reasonable
and does not represent a disguised dividend. 26 In the absence of
a bilateral treaty, the national laws of three of the six member
countries would make the nonresident parent company liable for
tax on the interest received. Germany, the Netherlands, and in
some cases France would immunize the parent company, provided
the loan was not secured by a mortgage on real property.27 While
the immunity in France does not cover interest on bonds, by treaty,
both France and Belgium have agreed to place a ceiling on the
rate which would otherwise be applied to any interest taxed under
their respective national laws. Table III E indicates the rate under
national laws as well as ceilings pursuant to treaty arrangements,
if any.
TABLE

Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands

III E

National Law Rate
r8%, or 12.2% if tax
is paid by the debtor
Bonds generally, 24%
Industrial bonds, 1 2%
0

25.18%

5-%
0

Ceiling
Fixed by Treaty
I5%

28

IS%

Exemption
No limitation
No treaty
0 29

The foreign direct taxes associated with the previously described subsidiary arrangement may change in two respects when
the subsidiary reaches the point where some of its current profits
can be distributed as dividends, say 40% of that which remains
after allowance for the subsidiary's own foreign direct taxes.
26
In France the deduction is limited by a ceiling; interest is deductible only to
the extent the loan does not exceed half of the corporation's capital. Moreover, in
Germany, interest on long term debts is not deductible for purposes of the business tax.
27
Immunity under the national laws of the Netherlands would not extend to interest received by one owning 25% or more of the stock of the company except where
the shares are considered business property of the stockholder. T.he latter exception
would always apply in the case of a parent corporation.
28
The treaty provisions relating to interest are limited to cases where the American enterprise does not have a permanent establishment in the Common Market nation.
29
The treaty with the Netherlands does not limit taxability of interest if the creditor
owns more than so% of the voting stock in the debtor corporation. However, under
its national laws, the Netherlands does not normally reach interest received by a
nonresident shareholder where the shares constitute a part of the latter's business
property. In such case, interest is taxed only if the loan is secured by a mortgage on
real property.
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The first additional tax implication involves the member nation's
treatment of the American parent company with regard to the
dividend received by it. In the absence of a tax treaty, dividends,
as distinguished from interest, would have been reached by the
national laws of all member nations except Italy. However, by
treaty three of the other five countries have agreed to reduce their
withholding tax on dividends to a percentage below that otherwise
applicable under national law. Rates applicable under national
law, and reductions required by treaty, if any, appear in Table
III F.
TABLE III F

Withholding Tax
per National Law
Belgium

JO%

France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands

No treaty

IS%

Ceilings Fixed by Treaty
(Exemptions in treaty do not
apply to the 30% Taxe Mobiliere)
IS%
IS%
(Ceiling fixed by treaty is
higher than the tax actually assessed under local law)
IS%
0

The second additional tax implication arising from distribution
of a part of the profits involves a change in the income tax load
which would be assessed against the subsidiary itself in two of
the six countries. In Belgium, the Taxe Professionelle which is
applicable only to undistributed profits would be substantially
reduced, with the National Crisis Tax, applicable only to distributed
profits, absorbing much of that reduction. In Germany, while the
enterprise or trade tax would remain more or less constant, as
indicated in PART I the subsidiary would enjoy a substantially
reduced rate under the income tax with respect to that part of the
profit distributed.
Table III G compares the income, property, and significant
corporate enterprise taxes which would be levied by each member
nation on the subsidiary in that year when 40% of its after-tax
profits are distributed, and the amount of dividends which would
be received by the American enterprise after paying foreign dividend taxes, if any.
At some point, the previously described subsidiary may have
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III G

Net
Income
WithDiviand Propholddends
erty Taxes
RePayable Profit Re- Profit ing Tax
Dison divi- ceived in
tained for
by the
Subsidiary Expansion tributed dends 33 U.S.A.
2
I
3
%of
%of
%of
%of
pre-tax
pre-tax
pre-tax
pre-tax
%of
profit
profit
profit
profit
Clm. 3
Belgium 30
France
Germany 31
Italy
Luxembourg 32
Netherlands

24·9

so.

64.89
44·67
sI.67
47·

4S·06
30.
2I.066
33·20
28.998
3 I.8

30.04
20.
I4.044
22.I3
I9·332
21.2

2 !.028
I7.
I 1.9374
22.I3
I6.4322
2!.2

30.
IS.
IS.
0
IS
0

30
The formula used in note 20, supra, is more complicated here because of the need
to take account of the National Crisis Tax (NCT). The formula would run as follows:
•
(I) y = 0-4 (P- (NCT + TP)), where y is the distributed profit, and NCT represents the National Crisis Tax of 2oo/o thereon.
(z) NCT = o.2 y
( 3) TP = d + p ( P - y - TP - e)
04
" y
( 3) TP = $73,8 so + 0.4 ( 4oo,ooo - y - TP - 2oo,ooo) = 109,893 -

Formula (I) becomes:
(I) y=o.4 [4oo,ooo- {73,8so+o.4(2oo,ooo-y-TP) +o.2 y}J =
=o.4 [4oo,ooo- (I53,850-0-4 y-o-4 TP+o.2 y)] =
04
=o.4 [40o,ooo- (109,893y+o.2 y)] =
I-4
2
= 0.4 (290,I07 + O.I y)

1.4

1.4

y = $12o,I63 or 30.04 o/o of total profit
The German formula used in note 22, supra, also becomes more complicated when
account must be taken of distributed profits. The formula would run as follows:
31

(I) y=o.4 {P- (G+V+K)}
As in note 22 G = $73,043
V=$4o,ooo

24

(2) K= ..!i.. Y+ i!._ (P-y-G) = .!..Ly+ ..5.!... (4oo,ooo-73,o43) _.i!... y
100
IOO
IOO
IOO
IOO
36
K = I66,748 -~ y
By substitution, formula (I) becomes:
(I) y=o.4 [4oo,ooo- {73,043 +4o,ooo+ (I66,748- .1§_ y)}J =
IOO
Y = 0.4 (286,957- I66,748 + _3£ y) = 0.4 (120,209 + ~ y)
IOO
IOO
Y=$56,I72 or I4.043% of total profit
33
The figures are pursuant to Luxembourg's national laws, as a bilateral tax treaty
has not yet been concluded.
38
See Table F for the withholding tax which would be assessed in the absence of the
bilateral tax treaty with the United States.
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discharged its indebtedness and abandoned further plans for
expansion. Current distribution of all of that part of the $400,000
in earnings which remain after payment of the subsidiary's own
tax will serve, as in the immediately preceding case, to change the
subsidiary's own tax liability in two of the six member nations,
Belgium and Germany. And for the reasons cited in discussing
the immediately preceding case, the net change in those two countries involves· a further reduction, as is indicated in Table III H.
TABLE III H

•
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg 34
Netherlands

Income
and
Property
WithholdTaxes Paying Tax on
able by the
Profit
Subsidiary Distributed Dividends 35
I
2
3
%of pre- %of pre%of
Clm. 2
tax profit
tax profit
21.34

78.66

53·04
44·67
SL67
47·

46-96
55·33
48·33
53·

so.

so.

30%
15%
15%
0
15%
0

rate
rate
rate
rate

Net Dividends
Received
in U.S.A.
4
%of pretax profit
55·062
42·5
39·9 16
55·33
41.0805
53·

SUBSECTION 2. COMPARING PRIMARY INDIRECT BUSINESS
TAXES OF MEMBER NATIONS

(a) Turnover taxes.-Each member nation's turnover taxes
were discussed in the country-by-country survey in PART I, and
certain general principles evolving from that discussion were applied in PART II in connection with an analysis of the tax effects
of direct exports. The intention in Table III I is to chart a comparison of the effective rates which will normally be applied by
each member nation at various stages of the manufacturing and
distribution process. Effective, rather than stated, rates are used
because in all countries except Belgium and Italy the turnover
tax itself forms a part of the tax base (price) to which the stated
"'See note 32, supra.
05
See Table F for the withholding tax which would be assessed in the absence of a
bilateral tax treaty with the United States.
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rates are applied. Normal rates only are shown; legislation bearing on such taxes is so complex as to preclude a chart of all possibilities.
TABLE

III I

To Be
Added
to
Wholesaler's
price on
Manufacturer sells to:
Sale to
Wholesaler
Retailer Consumer Retailer
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands

5· %
5· %
25. % * 25. % *
4·17%
4·17%
3·30%
3·30%
2.04%
2.04%
5.26%
5.26%

0%
5· %
25. % * 25. % *
1.01%
4·17%
3·30%
3·30%
o.52%
2.04%
0.76%
4·17%

To Be
Added to
Retailer's
Price
on Sale to
Consumer

0%
2.83%
4·17%
0%
2.04%
0%

(*Since the French tax is actually a tax on added value, any such tax paid in earlier
stages may be deducted by manufacturers or wholesalers except in the instance where
the wholesaler pays only the local turnover tax of 2.83 %. In fact, the manufacturer
could even deduct turnover taxes previously paid on acquiring machinery, from
turnover taxes due on the sale of his products. In case a manufacturer, in the capacity
of a retailer, sells direct to consumers, instead of paying the 25% on the whole price,
he may pay 25% on a hypothetical wholesale price plus 2.83% on the whole price.)

From Table III I, it appears that the amount of tax a consumer
will ultimately bear depends in some instances on the character
of the outlet from which his purchase is made as well as on the
number of times the product has "turned over" prior to his purchase. In order to chart a comparison of the way the variable tax
impact would affect the total price he would pay for a product from
each outlet in each of the various countries, certain non-tax constants
must be assumed. Table III J assumes that the pre-tax price
charged by each outlet (manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer)
would include a flat $20 net profit margin, the first such margin
being included in the manufacturer's net pre-tax price of $100
to wholesalers. It is further assumed that if a manufacturer or
wholesaler sells directly to consumers, he will also enjoy the net
profit margin which would have been normally received by the
omitted outlets. Thus, a manufacturer selling directly to consumers would contemplate a pre-tax price of $140.
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TABLE III

J

Manufacturer to Consumer

Through
Wholesaler
and Retailer
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands

Through
Retailer Only
I46.oo
I74·8o 36
I 51.05
I43·96
I45·36
I46.3 I

I5 1.25
I74·8o3637
I 51.48
I47·37
I45·58
I46.2I

Direct
I40.00
172·7 5 36
I45·84
I44·62
J42.86
I45·84

(b) Registration and stamp duties.-Each member nation
imposes registration and/or stamp duties in connection with payment of capital into a subsidiary or capitalization of its reserves.
The varying percentages charged on amounts originally paid in are
reflected in Table III K.
TABLE III K

Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands

Registration Duty:

Stamp Duty:

Total:

1.6 %
1.6 %
2.5 %
I%-2.5 % *

·7%

2.3 %
1.6 %
2.5 %

.J2%

2.5 %

$.02-$I.90
( IO-I,200 Lire)
·4%

·75%

·72%

3· 25%

*The r% is applied to cash; 2.5% is applied to other capital assets brought into the
business.

After formation of the subsidiary, subsequent increases in the
subscribed or paid in capital may be subjected to somewhat different
rates.
Introduction of capital into a permanent establishment, as dis•• As previously noted, if the French manufacturer, on the purchase of raw materials,
auxiliary goods, machines, etc., has paid a turnover tax, he may deduct the amount
thereof from the tax payable by him on the sale of his product. This means that he is
able to charge a selling price to the wholesaler (all other things being equal) which
will be lower than that of his competitors in other countries. The actual consumer's
price may, therefore, be lower than the amounts stated above.
37
If the wholesaler pays the local turnover tax of 2.75% (effective rate, z.83o/o in
lieu of the value added tax (see PART I). the priee will be $173.88,
'
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tinguished from a subsidiary, is also subjected to somewhat similar taxes in two of the six countries, Belgium and Germany. Illustratively, in Belgium the basic rate is . 1% of the nominal paid
in capital, with a minimum tax of $360 (B. fr. r8,ooo) and a
maximum of $2o,ooo (B. fr. r,ooo,ooo).
SECTION C. INTEGRATION OF FoREIGN TAxEs INTO AMERICAN TAXATION OF BRANCHES AND FOREIGN
SUBSIDIARIES SERVING ONE MEMBER NATION

(a) lntroduction.-Earlier discussion in Section B of this
PART indicated that direct taxes imposed by some Common Market countries differed by reference to the fornt in which the operation there was conducted. The difference between carrying on business there through a permanent establishment, as distinguished
from a foreign subsidiary, can also give rise to substantial differences in the amount of income taxes imposed by the United States
on any profits derived from abroad.
One will also discover that the American tax cost associated with
activities carried on through a foreign subsidiary will vary, just as
there was a variation in the tax cost imposed by some member nations, depending on whether profits are distributed or are plowed
back into the operation.
In order to dramatize the practical significance of these various
differences in American tax costs and in the total costs imposed domestically and abroad, discussion in this section will be confined,
like that in preceding sections dealing solely with foreign tax costs,
to operations which do not extend beyond the boundaries of a given
member nation. Discussion of American and total tax costs in more
expansive settings will be dovetailed between later sections which
look only at the foreign tax costs of the same kind of expanding
operation.
The analysis here will be divided into four parts. Discussion of
the basic differences between American taxation of foreign branches
and foreign subsidiaries, in terms of income, deductions, and credits,
will be followed in Subsection 2 by an attempt to integrate the foreign and domestic tax costs associated with these two forms. Subsection 3 will consider the problem of allocating income and deduction items between American and foreign operations in the instance
where the two conduct business with each other. Finally, Subsection
4 will focus on certain special or unusual problems which may be
encountered in connection with the credit for foreign taxes.
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The discussion with reference to all of these matters is based on
the American tax pattern as it existed in September, 1960. Pending
legislation which, if adopted, would dramatically alter the existing
pattern, is discussed in Section B of PART VI, infra.
SUBSECTION I. BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN
TAXATION OF FOREIGN BRANCHES AND
FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES

(a) Introductory note.-The fact that United States taxes
on profits earned abroad can differ markedly, depending on whether
an American corporation chooses to conduct its Common Market
business through a foreign branch or foreign subsidiary, is actually
due to a quite limited number of conceptual differences in basic tax
patterns, affecting however, all three parts of the ledger {gross
income, deductions, and credits). From these few conceptual differences spring a host of practical tax differences.
The discussion below approaches the matter first by reference to
differences in the amount of American gross income created by the
two different forms. Analysis of the variation between those two
settings in deductions and credits allowable for foreign income taxes
then follows.
(b) American "gross" income differences between brt_Jnch
and subsidiary operations.-Differences on the gross income side
are attributable to four basic tax concepts. The first is jurisdictional
in nature; a domestic corporation's gross includes income earned by
every branch or department from all sources, foreign as well as
domestic. 38 Thus, jurisdictionally speaking, a foreign branch's gross,
like that of a domestic branch, is includible as it is earned, whether
or not remitted to the home office.
The second relevant basic tax concept relates only to operations
conducted through a foreign subsidiary and, generally speaking, involves recognition of it as a taxable entity separate and apart from
the domestic parent. 39 This notion of separateness, coupled with
""I.R.C., § 6r. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 38 S. Ct. 432 (1918).
39 This basically stems from I.R.C., §II. The concept of separateness here exceeds
even that applied to a parent and subsidiary in a wholly domestic setting. Contrary to
the case in the latter circumstance, a parent may not file a consolidated return with a
foreign subsidiary. I.R.C., § I 504 (b) ( 3). Nor is the 85% dividends received deduction
allowed. I.R.C., § 243. The one circumstance where the corporate form of a foreign
corporation is penetrated involves foreign personal holding companies the "undistributed foreign personal holding company income" of which may be taxed to American shareholders even though not distributed.
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the third basic concept-another jurisdictional principle to the effect that a foreign corporation itself is taxable by the United States
only on income having its source within the States, 40 serves in our
situation to immunize the foreign subsidiary itself from American
taxation. However, when the notion that the two corporations are
separate is coupled with the first mentioned jurisdictional principle,
the effect will be to swell the domestic parent's own gross by the
amount of any dividend received from the subsidiary.
The fourth relevant basic concept involves the matter of accounting methods, a much more detailed discussion of which appears later
in Section B of PART IV. While it is theoretically true, jurisdictionally speaking, that the gross income of a foreign branch is includible in American gross income, for accounting purposes, i.e., in
terms of an accounting method, only the branch's separate pre-tax
net profits-computed according to American standards-need actually be brought across the ocean in the more usual circumstanceY
Equally important, but again only as a matter of accounting, computation of those separate net profits may include reflection of any
shift in the net worth of the branch's current assets by reason of
changes in exchange rates, though nothing is actually remitted to
the home office. 42 The current asset accounts of a subsidiary, on the
other hand, are not normally penetrated in this fashion, for it is a
separate entity. 43
These diverse conceptual patterns can have more than one practical effect on American u gross" income.
First, the American gross from a branch operation will normally exceed the amount which would be included if the foreign operation is conducted through a subsidiary. Even if it is decided that
a subsidiary will not retain any of its net profits for expansion, the
dividend which will be included in the parent's gross will relate only
to that part of the subsidiary's profit which remained after payment of any foreign income taxes. For example, of a subsidiary's
pre-tax profit of $4oo,ooo in the Nether lands, only $2 r 2,000 would
be available for dividends, the balance being absorbed by that country's 47% income tax. From a branch operation located there, how•• I.R.C., § 882(b).
"O.D. 550, C.B. 2, 61 ( 1920). Also, American Pad & Textile Co., 16 T.C. 1304
(1951), discussed more fully in Section B, PART IV, infra.
'"Vietor & Achelis v. Salt's Textile Mfg. Co., (D.C. Conn. 1928) 26 F.(2d) 249,
discussed more fully in Section B, PART IV, infra.
43
G.C.M. 4954, C.B. VII-2, 293 (1928), cited with approval in American Pad &
Textile Co., 16 T.C. 1304 (1951). Cf. the agreement between the government and
a taxpayer, reflected in Anderson, Clayton & Co., (Ct. Cl. 1958) r68 F. Supp. 542·
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ever, the American parent's gross would be enhanced by the branch's
entire pre-tax profit of $4oo,ooo.
The ultimate American tax differential in this instance is not as
great, however, as the difference between the two amounts of American gross income ( $2 I 2,ooo and $4oo,ooo) might suggest. Discussion in the next subtopic discloses in a branch setting that the
domestic corporation may treat the foreign income tax of $I88,ooo
as a deduction from gross income 44 or as a credit against the American tax itself. 45 But it is also indicated there that some difference in
American tax costs will remain even if, under the subsidiary arrangement, all of its after-tax profits are remitted to the parent.
The exclusion from American gross income of that part of the subsidiary's profit devoted to the foreign income tax is one of the
contributing factors, for that exclusion is economically equivalent
to a deduction for the foreign tax. Nevertheless, in addition to that
exclusion, the parent will enjoy a credit for a part, and in this
instance a substantial part, of the subsidiary's foreign income tax. 46
In the branch setting, it will be recalled, a choice between the two
methods of accommodating foreign taxes (deduction and credit)
had to be madeY
Going back, however, to the gross income side of the ledger, the
determination of the amount to be included by the American company depends, in the case of both forms of operation, on American
tax concepts, not on those of a foreign country. When applied, however, this notion gives rise to certain peculiar twists, and whet). commingled with the circumstances where foreign tax law plays a slightly
different role, it can give rise to a second kind of difference in the
amount of American gross income, one wholly apart from the difference attributable to reasons explained in the preceding paragraphs.
The basic idea, that the amount to be included in American gross
income is determined by federal tax concepts, is easy to see in the
setting of a branch. Theoretically, i.e., at least for jurisdictional
purposes, all of its transactions are reached at the gross income
level by § 6 I of the Code. 48 Again speaking jurisdictionally, since
both domestic and foreign operations are housed in one corporate
.. I.R.C., § 164(a) and (b) (6).
45
I.R.C., § 901 .
•• I.R. c., § 902.
7
' See note 44, supra•
.. Since Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 38 S. Ct. 467 ( 1918), it has been
recognized that American tax statutes have not formally taken gross receipts as the
point of departure.
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entity domiciled in the States, after integrating the foreign transactions with domestic ones at the gross income level, deduction for
expenses on both sides of the water, but only as permitted by American law, would be taken in arriving at a consolidated American
version of "taxable income." The fact, for accounting purposes,
that the net profits of a foreign branch are actually computed in the
usual case separate from those attributable to domestic operations
means only that integration in fact relates just to the net result,
not that the latter is computed by reference to something other
than the American version of "taxable income." 49
Applicability of this same choice-of-law principle to operations
housed in a foreign subsidiary is less obvious only because there is
a difference in the jurisdictional reach of the United States over
profits earned by the two different forms of operation. Whenever
a foreign subsidiary does distribute property to its American parent,
thus bringing the item within the taxing jurisdiction of the United
States, the extent to which that item will be deemed a "dividend"
and, therefore, includible in the parent's gross income, dependsaccording to § 3 16 of the Code-upon the distributing foreign corporation's "earnings and profits" structure calculated by reference
to federal rules. 50 Illustratively, if a foreign corporation distributes an amount greater than its earnings and profits as computed
under foreign tax law, the entire amount of the distribution may
still be treated as a taxable dividend, fully includible in American
gross income, if the total amount could be accommodated under
the American version of that foreign corporation's "earnings and
profits." 51 But one should not suppose from this that the shape
of foreign tax law will never affect the amount of American gross
income. Suppose that the foreign country imposes a 52% corporate
tax, but that it allows less by way of deductions than would be
permitted under American law. Since the foreign corporation will
normally not distribute more than its after-tax profit, foreign
tax law has had the indirect effect of reducing American gross
income, for the latter will not include more than the amount of
dividend actually paid. In a branch setting, however, the differential just noted would not affect American gross income, though, as
•• The fact that a foreign branch's operations will usually be conducted in terms of
a foreign currency does create problems in computing taxable income which are peculiar to foreign operations. But these too are resolved according to American tax
concepts. See Part IV, infra.
50
Untermyer v. Comm'r, (2d Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 1004. For the general definition
of "earnings and profits," see I.T. Regs., § 1.312-6.
61

Ibid
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we shall later see, the credit allowed for foreign taxes may be
affected in both cases.
The factual situation at the other extreme, i.e., where all profits
of the foreign operation are to be retained there to discharge indebtedness or facilitate expansion, highlights the difference in
America's taxing jurisdiction and dramatizes the third and most
striking practical difference in the amounts of American gross
income which would be derived from the two different methods
of operation. While the parent would still have $4oo,ooo in gross
income from a branch-the remission of profits being a neutral consideration, the absence of a dividend in the setting of a subsidiary
would immunize its foreign profits from the American tax. Something more than mere deferral for a short period may be involved,
for dedication of those profits to machinery, bricks, and mortar
may well mean that those profits are isolated from the reach of
the American treasury for the entire period during which business
will be conducted through that subsidiary, though increased profits
generated by the expansion may lead to larger dividends in the
interim.
The opportunity through a foreign subsidiary arrangement to
isolate foreign earnings from the domestic parent's gross income
and, therefore, from American tax is most advantageous in a
country with a tax pattern like that of Belgium. The total Belgian
and American income taxes suffered by the profits of a permanent
establishment in Belgium will equal the effective rate of that country which imposes the greater tax, here the 52% figure, imposed
by the United States which will then give a credit for the smaller
Belgian tax. A foreign subsidiary which derived its entire income
from Belgian sources could, on the other hand, retain more than
70% of its earnings for further development, suffering only Belgian
income taxes of less than 30% during the retention period. The
retained profit would also be sheltered from the American penalty
tax on unreasonable accumulations; 52 since the foreign profit has not
yet taken on the complexion of American gross income, it could
not be "accumulated taxable income" to which this U.S. surcharge
relates. And this would be so even if the profit were deposited in
an American bank, provided the foreign subsidiary made the deposit without declaring a dividend to the parent. Nor, according
to the discussion in PART I, do any of the Common Market
countries have a counterpart penalty tax on unreasonable accumu.. I.R.C., § 53 r et seq.
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lations. Section C of that PART did indicate, however, that Germany's regular corporate income tax imposed a much higher rate
on a subsidiary's retained profits than on its distributed profits, the
rate on the former usually being higher than that imposed on a
branch operation.
Any advantage enjoyed by a subsidiary arrangement over a
permanent establishment solely because of the opportunity of
the former to store up profits free of the American tax necessarily
becomes less significant as the foreign rate on undistributed profits
begins to approximate the American rate. Illustratively, if one
considers only stated comparative rates, the flat 47% Netherlands
rate on the retained profits of a subsidiary domiciled there is not
markedly different from the 52% American rate which, being
the greater of the two, would create a higher, though only slightly
higher, tax cost for a permanent establishment. The flat so%
French rate on retained profits is an even more persuasive illustration of the same principle.
Going back to the first factual situation, i.e., where all profits
were currently remitted, it will be recalled that the two forms
would create different amounts of American gross income only
because that portion of a subsidiary's profits used by it to pay
foreign income taxes would not come within the jurisdictional
reach of the United States, it being otherwise in the case of a
branch operation. From this principle emerges a fourth practical
difference in the amounts of American gross income which would
be derived from the two forms of operation. This fourth difference
is attributable to the fact that the tax pattern used by a Common
Market country with reference to permanent establishments may
differ from that associated with subsidiary arrangements. In both
cases, the Netherlands imposes only one 4 7% tax. Belgium, however, again illustrates the effect of a variable tax pattern. A
Belgian subsidiary distributing all of its after-tax profits would
suffer a 20% National Crisis Tax on the gross dividend. Whereas
the foreign subsidiary itself would suffer the more demanding
30% effective rate of the Taxe Professionnelle only with respect
to that part of its profits used to pay the lower zo% National
Crisis Tax, the higher rate of the Taxe Professionnelle would apply
to the entire income of a permanent establishment. Even in the
absence of this variation, there would, of course, be a difference
in the amount of American gross income created by the two
different forms; as previously noted, that portion of a subsidiary's
TAXATION

468

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

profits used to pay its own foreign income taxes is not includible
by the parent, the opposite being true in the case of a branch.
This constant difference is further affected in degree, however,
by the variation in the tax imposed directly on the two forms by
the foreign country. Even so, one should not jump merrily to the
conclusion that the total Belgian income tax associated with a
subsidiary arrangement is actually less than that associated with
a branch in the instance where all profits are distributed. In fact,
as we saw in Section B supra, the contrary is true. Again assuming a
foreign pre-tax profit of $4oo,ooo, in addition to the $85,360
tax borne by the foreign subsidiary itself, Belgium would also withhold 30% of the $314,640 dividend as a tax against the recipient,
this being another $94,392. While the latter tax will not reduce
American gross income, it will bring the total Belgian tax on the
subsidiary arrangement to $179,752, compared with $120,000
assessed against the permanent establishment. But again, it is
important to distinguish between the effect of the foreign tax on
American gross income and its quite different effect on the American
tax itself. Indeed, as we shall later see, because of the peculiar
way in which the American credit for foreign taxes works in this
type of case, the total two-country tax associated with the subsidiary arrangement will be less than that borne by the branch
operation.
Loss situations furnish a fifth circumstance in which the amount
of American gross income will be affected by the organizational
arrangement. Operating losses suffered by a foreign branch will
serve immediately to offset income earned by the parent in the
United States. Integration of this type is not permitted, however,
where the loss is suffered by a foreign subsidiary. Its affairs may
not even be integrated with that of the parent on a consolidated
return. 511 Outside of the Netherlands, a subsidiary's operating
losses can only be used to offset its own income in future years
through resort to foreign carry-over provisions. As indicated in
PART I, all Common Market nations permit such a carry-over.
The usual limitation is 5 years, though Luxembourg confines
the privilege to 2 years, and the Netherlands extends it to 6 years
and to an indefinite period in the case of new businesses. The
Netherlands is also the only member nation which permits the
loss to be carried back, a refund being available through an offset
53

1.R.C., §1504(b)(3)·
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of income of an earlier year. This privilege is limited, however,
to the year immediately preceding the loss year.
Also with respect to loss operations abroad, differences in the
effect of the two forms may arise in the event a foreign facility
which started as a loss operation continues downhill to a point
where the American company decides to rid itself of the undertaking. The character which the Internal Revenue Code would
assign to losses arising from disposition of a foreign permanent
establishment's assets would depend upon the exact nature of each
separate asset. 54 Illustratively, inventory losses would offset ordinary income realized by the American company from its United
States operations. Losses from the sale of depreciable equipment
or buildings might also be treated in this favorable fashion; under
§ I 23 I, it would seem that these should be packaged with like
transactions growing out of American operations, and if the net
effect of all such transactions is a loss, the foreign dispositions
are not treated as sales or exchanges of capital assets. 55
On the other hand, loss arising from an American company's
sale of stock in a foreign subsidiary would normally be treated
as a capital loss, deductible only against the parent's capital gains,
if any. 56 The one prime exception to this involves the case where
the stock of an almost wholly owned foreign subsidiary becomes
completely worthless, in which case the American domiciled parent
corporation will usually enjoy an ordinary loss deduction in the
year the stock became worthless. 57 Partial worthlessness, i.e., a
mere reduction in value below the parent company's adjusted basis,
cannot, however, be so treated even though realized by a sale of
the stock. Absent complete worthlessness of the parent's stock,
the same unfavorable capital loss treatment would follow if the
foreign subsidiary first sold its assets and then, on liquidation,
distributed proceeds to the parent in an amount less than the
latter's adjusted basis. 58 Of course, as is sometimes attempted in
wholly American settings, an effort might be made to liquidate the
subsidiary prior to disposition of its assets, the thought being
that those assets would then be sold by the American parent while
64

This principle goes back to Williams v. McGowan, (zd Cir. 1945) 152 F. (zd) 570.
While the Service has generally recognized that the profits of a branch are to be
computed separately (see note 41 supra), it is doubtful that it intended, or is free, to
disregard the mandate of § 1231 in determining the character of income.
58
I.R.C., §§ I22I and IZI I (a).
57 I.R.C., § r65(g).
08
I.R.C., §§ 331 (a) (r) and rzzr.
65
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the foreign facility occupies its new status as a permanent establishment. The aim of the parent corporation, to shift what would
have been a capital loss on sale of stock to the more favorable
treatment which might be accorded a loss on sale of inventory and
§ 123 !-property, will not be realized, however, if the added tax
benefit constituted one of the principal purposes behind the subsidiary's earlier liquidation. 59
If current operating losses are incurred by facilities in the
United States rather than those in a foreign country, a foreign
branch's profit, if any, will serve immediately to reduce the loss,
for it must be integrated into the parent's gross income whether
or not remitted to this country. But a foreign subsidiary's profit
will not be integrated so as to offset a part of the operational loss
in the United States unless it is paid out as a dividend. Using the
previous illustration of a $400,000 pre-tax profit in the Netherlands
as an example, a dividend of the subsidiary's after-tax profit of
$2 I 2 ,ooo would neutralize that much loss in United States operations. While a branch's entire profit of $4oo,ooo would be
integrated with the American loss, election to deduct the foreign
income tax of $I88,ooo would lead to a result similar to that which
followed a subsidiary's distribution of its after-tax profit of $2 I 2,ooo. In both cases, losses attributable to the American operation
would be offset by a net of $2 I 2,ooo.
(c) Origin of the "deduction" for foreign taxes, and the
difference in its applicability to subsidiary and permanent-establishment operations.-The first income tax act passed pursuant
to the Sixteenth Amendment authorized corporations, but not individuals, to deduct from gross income taxes "imposed by the
government of any foreign country." 60
While something more than foreign income taxes was accommodated by this provision, income itself was not thereby confined,
even in terms of ultimate effect, to taxability by but one country.
The effect on a corporation which conducted its affairs abroad
through a permanent establishment was to shift the economic
burden of foreign income taxes to the federal treasury only to
59

I.R.C., § 367.
Rev. Act of 1913, Section II, G(b) (Fourth). Like provision for individuals was
made in Rev. Act of 1916, § s(a) (Third). The present counterpart of the early provision makes it clear that the deduction would also be available to a corporation in
the case of taxes imposed by foreign states, provinces, or local units of government
except where assessed against local benefits of a kind tending to increase the value of
the property assessed. I.R.C., § 164(a) and (b) (5).
60
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the extent of the corporation's effective domestic rate. Illustratively,
the highest rate imposed on corporations prior to World War I
was 2%. 61 The over-all ultimate effect then was that a domestic
corporation, operating a foreign permanent establishment, actually had to bear all of the American tax load plus 98% of the
direct taxes imposed by the foreign country. While this was not
very critical at a time when corporate rates were so low, in the
following sub-topic we shall see that Congress was to view the
adequacy of the deduction in a different light as the world moved
into the higher tax rates required by World War I.
Where an American corporation chose to operate abroad through
a foreign subsidiary, it could, of course, deduct any withholding
tax which the foreign country might impose directly on the parent
with reference to dividends received from the subsidiary. 62 But,
unlike domestic corporations which housed foreign operations
in a permanent establishment, the American parent could not deduct foreign taxes imposed directly on its subsidiary. Like other
deductions, this particular deduction then, as now, was generally
available only to the person or entity upon whom the expense was
directly imposed. 63 As a practical matter, however, it must be
remembered that the subsidiary would normally confine distributions to those profits which remained after payment of its own
foreign taxes. In effect, and contrary to the circumstance in the
setting of a permanent establishment, that portion of the subsidiary's profits absorbed by foreign taxes was actually excluded
from American gross income. And this exclusion, available only
in the case of operations conducted through a foreign subsidiary,
was just as beneficial as the deduction to which the permanentestablishment arrangement was then confined. Thus, in terms of
over-all effect, the deduction provision did not actually discriminate
against foreign subsidiary arrangements. In fact, insofar as one
looked only at America's total response to foreign taxes, parity
between the two different organizational arrangements had been
achieved as this country approached World War I.
TAXATION

(d) Parity retained: Denial of a deduction for intercorporate dividends received from a foreign corporation.-Ameri61

Rev. Act of 1916, § 10.
It is not always easy to determine whether a dividend tax is imposed on the
recipient or on the distributor. Illustrative of the difficulty, see Rev. Rul. 56-289, C.B.
1956-1, 321•
.. Biddle v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 573 58 S. Ct. 379 (1938); Ritter Lumber Co., 30 B.T.A.
231 (1934); Rev. Rul. 56-289, C.B. 1956-1, 321; and I.T. 2235, C.B. IV-2, 82 (1925).
6!l
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ca's entry into World War I and the concurrent increase in rates
was accompanied by elimination of the double domestic tax which
fell on those corporate profits earned by domestic subsidiaries. 64
Until I 9 r 7, profits on which a domestic subsidiary had paid a tax
were again taxed when received as a dividend by the domestic
parent. The provision adopted in that year, freeing intercorporate
dividends from the second tax, is now characterized as the 8 5%
dividends received deduction, meaning that 15% of such dividends
will not now enjoy immunity at the dividend stage. 65 However,
care was taken then, 66 as now, 67 to deny this benefit to dividends received from a foreign subsidiary, the reason being that the latter,
unlike a domestic subsidiary, was not itself taxed by the United
States with reference to its foreign profits. Looking at the matter
only in terms of domestic taxation, the double tax difficulty did
not exist in such case.
In the instance where a foreign subsidiary distributed all of its
after-tax profits as a dividend, the foregoing statutory limitation
served to keep the American tax on a par with that which would
fall on a permanent-establishment arrangement. The deduction
which the latter enjoyed with respect to foreign taxes was matched
by an exclusion of that part of the subsidiary's profits devoted to
foreign taxes.
(e) Parity eliminated: Origin and differences between the
"direct" and ((deemed-paid" credits, and their basic relationship
to the deduction for foreign taxes.-Because of increased costs
associated with the conduct of vVorld War I, to a new regular
corporate rate of 12% in 1918, 68 the government tacked on an
increase in the tax on excess profits, the first bracket of which was
now subjected to a rate of 30%. 69
On the one hand, because of the deduction allowed for foreign
taxes, the higher rate schedule meant that the United States
Treasury would be assuming an increased share of a corporation's
own foreign tax load. But this was small comfort when account
was taken of the fact that foreign countries were also tacking
on much higher war profits taxes, a substantial part of which-in
"'Rev. Act of 1917, § 4·
I.R.C., § 243.
""Rev. Act of 1917, § 4 limited the immunity to dividends received from a corporation "which is taxable upon its net income as provided in this title . . . ."
"'I.R.C., § 243 limits the deduction to dividends received from a "domestic" corporation.
68
Rev. Act of 1918, § 23o(a).
"'Ibid., § 301 (a).
65
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spite of the deduction-had to be borne by the American enter~
prise. It was in response to this circumstance that Congress, in
19 r 8, authorized corporations, as well as individuals, to take a
credit against their American tax liability for foreign "income,
war profits, and excess profits taxes" paid or accrued during the
taxable year. 70
While the new provision did not deprive taxpayers of the right
to deduct from gross income any foreign tax which, because of
its type, was ineligible for the credit, benefits with reference to
qualifying types could not be doubled by also taking the previously
permitted deduction. 71 In fact, the present counterpart of the
earliest prohibition prevents a taxpayer from availing himself
of the deduction with reference to qualifying taxes if he "chooses
to take to any extent the benefits" of the credit. 72 While more
will be said of this matter later, in practice the limitation means
that taxpayers will deduct qualifying taxes, instead of taking a
credit, only where they are interested in increasing the amount of
a current net operating loss which can be carried back for Immediate refund purposes.
Standing alone, the basic provisiOn regarding the credit did
not accommodate all of the foreign income taxes which might
be imposed in connection with a foreign subsidiary arrangement.
Contrary to the case where the foreign business was carried on
through a permanent establishment, foreign income taxes imposed directly against a subsidiary itself were not taxes, qua taxes,
against the American parent. Accordingly, the latter, by reference
only to the basic provision, could have taken a credit only for
such income taxes, if any, which the foreign government might have
assessed, and withheld, against the parent in connection with dividend payments. In 1918, however, the Senate Finance Committee
was also concerned with a second and quite different problem, the
tentative resolution of which ultimately had an effect on the right
of a parent to enjoy some credit for a foreign subsidiary's own
income taxes.
That committee felt that affiliated corporations, even those
engaged only in domestic activities, were not properly allocating
the burdens and benefits of inter-company transactions. Moreover,
it was thought that the then existing law "put an almost irresistible
70
Rev. Act of 1918, § 238. See also Section C, PART V, infra re individuals. H. Rep.
No. 767, 65th Cong., zd Sess. I I ( 1918). Italics added.
71
Rev. Act of 1918, §234(a)(3).
72
I.R.C., § 164(b) (6). Italics added.
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premium on a segregation or a separate incorporation of activities
which would normally be carried as branches of one concern." 73
Over and above these considerations, it was also felt that "the
principle of taxing as a business unit what in reality is a business
unit is sound and equitable and convenient to the taxpayer and to
the Government." 74 The proposed solution: to require affiliated
corporations to file a consolidated return under regulations prescribed by the Treasury. 75 Since this would have the effect of converting a subsidiary into a branch for American tax purposes, as
applied to a domestic parent and a foreign subsidiary it was only
right that the same Committee went on to propose allowance of a
full credit against the consolidated tax for any qualifying foreign
taxes of the subsidiary 76 as well as of the parent. Because of this
credit, though American gross income would have included the
pre-tax profit of the foreign subsidiary, a further deduction against
consolidated gross income for qualifying foreign taxes was to be
prohibited. 77
For unstated reasons, a conference committee eliminated the
consolidated return requirement as it related to foreign affiliates, 78
thus freeing that part of a foreign subsidiary's income sourced
abroad from the reach of the Treasury except to the extent such
was distributed as a dividend to the parent. But with some revision,
the committee retained and the Congress adopted the provision
which authorized the American parent, upon receipt of a dividend,
to take some credit for qualifying foreign taxes paid by the foreign
subsidiary. 79 This result was accomplished by saying that the parent would be "deemed" to have paid such taxes.
While that early statute did go on expressly to deny a deduction
for those same taxes, 80 it completely ignored the fact that elimination of the consolidated return requirement, of which the passthrough arrangement as to foreign taxes was originally only a
part, had the effect of enabling the parties to exclude from American
gross income that part of the subsidiary's profits used to pay the
foreign taxes. Thus, if the foreign subsidiary distributed its entire
'"S. Rep. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 8-9 (1918).
,. I d. at 9·
10
See the Senate's version of H.R. 12863, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918), § 240, later
adopted in Rev. Act of 1918, § 24078 Ibid., Senate's bill, § 24o(c).
77
Id., §234(a)(3).
78
H. Rep. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919), C.B. 1939-1 (Part 2) 130 at 143·
711
Ibid. Revenue Act of 1918, § 24o(c).
80
Rev. Act of 1918, § 234(a) (3).
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after-tax profit, exclusion from American gross income of that
part of its profits used to pay its own taxes was the economic
equivalent of a deduction for those taxes. Moreover, in this factual
circumstance, the added benefit of the "deemed paid" credit-under
the provision as originally enacted-apparently related to all of
the subsidiary's qualifying taxes, subject to one limitation not
relevant to the present discussion. 81 And this was so though that
part of its profits used to pay the foreign tax was not itself being
taxed by the United States. Three years later, however, the
language of the earlier credit provision was changed; under the
1921 Act, as today, the parent, upon receipt of a dividend, was
deemed to have paid only that proportion of the qualifying taxes
as were paid by the subsidiary "upon or with respect to the accumulated profits of such foreign corporation from which such
dividends were paid, which the amount of such dividends bears to
the amount of such accumulated profits. . . . " 82
While a very substantial controversy arose thereafter as to the
reason for this change, and over the question of whether a meaningful change had in fact taken place, the Supreme Court finally
decided that the law had taken on a new complexion. 83 Illustratively, suppose that out of its pre-tax profits of $ 10o,ooo for
the current year, a foreign subsidiary paid $26,ooo in income
taxes to a Common Market country, remitting the balance of
$74,000 to an American parent as a dividend. The American
Chicle Co. case 84 decided that the pre-dividend "accumulated
profits" in this situation would amount only to $74,000 with the
consequence that the fraction mentioned in the statute's propor.
$74 000
I
twnal formula, quoted supra, was$ '
or-. By the same token,
74,000
I
the ultimate statutory multiplicand to which this fraction was to
be applied ("taxes paid by such foreign corporation. . . . . upon
or with respect to the accumulated profits from which such divi000
dends were paid") 85 amounted to $26,ooo X $7 4 '
or $19,240.
$1oo,ooo
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I d., § 24o(c). See the discussion in American Chicle Co. v. U.S., 316 U.S. 450, 62
S. Ct. 1144 (1942).
""Rev. Act of 1921, §238(e), now I.R.C., §902(a).
83
One of the difficulties, e.g., was the fact that an explanation on the Senate floor
was opposite to the specific result which the Supreme Court reached. See statement of
Senator Smoot, 61 Cong. Rec. 7184 (1921).
"'This example is similar to one used in the lower court's decision American Chicle
Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 537, but the result was affirm:d in 316 U.S. 450,
62 S. Ct. 1144 (1942).
""Italics added.
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In other words, $6,760 or 26% of the subsidiary's own income
tax was paid to the foreign country with respect to something other
than its "accumulated profits" of $74,000. Specifically, the $6,760
was linked to that part of the subsidiary's pre-tax profits which
was absorbed by the foreign tax itself ( $26,ooo). Two countries
were not, of course, taxing that part; of the $100,000 taxed by the
foreign country, only $74,000 (the dividend) remained tube taxed
by the United States.
Thus, out of the chronology previously related emerged two
basic ideas which prevail to this day:
( 1) Time-wise, whereas the permanent-establishment arrangement enables an American corporation to take a direct credit for
a branch's qualifying foreign taxes in the year the foreign tax is
paid or accrued and without regard to the matter of remittances
to the States, the availability of the quite different "deemedpaid" credit to an American parent of a foreign subsidiary was
linked to the former's receipt of a dividend; and
( 2) Using the earlier example again as an illustration,
whereas a permanent-establishment arrangement would have led
to an American gross income of $ 10o,ooo with the American
corporation having a choice between a credit or deduction in
the amount of the full foreign tax of $26,ooo, the subsidiary
arrangement gave rise to an exclusion of that same $26,ooo,
leaving American gross income (a dividend) of $74,000-the
American tax on which could also be credited with $19,240 or
74% of the foreign tax which, in its entirety, had been the subject of the previously mentioned exclusion.
While it was assumed in the latter illustration that the foreign
tax was the same under the two arrangements ( $26,ooo), the net
effect of the foregoing developments on the American tax created
a difference in the two settings, and because of this the combined
foreign and domestic income taxes suffered by the two arrangements differed. Assuming a flat 52% American rate, the net American tax in the setting of a permanent-establishment arrangement
would also be $26,ooo ($10o,ooo X 52% less the direct credit
for foreign taxes of $26,ooo), and this, coupled with the foreign
tax of $26,ooo, resulted in combined foreign and domestic taxes
of $52,000. Where a permanent establishment is used, the combined income taxes will always be 52% in that instance where
the foreign tax is less than the American tax.
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A different result is reached, however, in the case of a foreign
subsidiary which has declared a dividend of all of its after-tax
profits. Pursuing the original illustration further, the net American
tax would be only $19,240 ($74,000 dividend X 52%= $38,480
less the deemed-paid credit of $19,240) as against $26,ooo in the
permanent-establishment setting. The combined taxes of the two
countries with reference to the subsidiary's profits and subsequent
dividend would then be only $45,240 or 87% of that suffered if a
permanent establishment were used.
It will be noted that the effective foreign rate in our illustration
( 26%) was exactly half the American rate (52%). Assuming a
subsidiary distributes all of its after-tax profits, this particular
rate relationship represents that point where the subsidiary arrangement will have the greatest tax advantage over the permanentestablishment setting. The tax advantage of the former arrangement decreases in the assumed situation (full dividend) as that
rate relationship is changed, up or down.
If the foreign country does not resort to income taxation at all,
the effective rate being o, the subsidiary type of organization
will provide no advantage whatever over a branch arrangementassuming again that the subsidiary distributes all of its profits as
a dividend ( $ IOo,ooo dividend X 52% = $5 2,000 less o deemedpaid credit). Indeed, pursuant to that same assumption of full
dividends and laying aside for the moment any comparison to permanent establishments, the combined income taxes of the two
countries on a subsidiary arrangement will be less if the foreign
country imposes some income tax than if it imposes none at all,
provided only that its tax is not as great as the tentative (precredit) American tax.
This startling result stems from the fact that the foreign income
tax enjoys the equivalent of a deduction (exclusion) as well as
some credit.
Returning to the comparison with permanent establishments, and
to the fact that the subsidiary's advantage during a period of full
dividends will also be reduced as the foreign country's effective rate
moves from the mid-point ( 26%) to the other extreme corresponding to the American rate of 52%, it will be noted that a foreign
tax of 52% will alone equal the combined tax in the setting of a
permanent establishment, $5 2,ooo. The American tax on a subsidiary's dividend will also be completely neutralized in such case
( $48,ooo dividend X 52% = $24,960 less a deemed-paid credit of
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$24,960 computed as follows: $5 2,ooo X $ 4 S,ooo = $24,960).
$roo,ooo
The ultimate advantage which the foreign subsidiary type of
arrangement may enjoy over a branch-the exact degree being
dependent upon the foreign rate and attributable to the combined
exclusion and credit allowed for that foreign tax, would be lost,
of course, if dividends received by an American parent from such a
subsidiary were "grossed up" by the amount of the foreign income
tax, full credit for that tax then being allowed as in the case of a
branch. Present congressional interest in such a "gross up" requirement is dealt with in Section B of PART VI, infra, in the
setting of other projections regarding possible future changes in
both foreign and American tax patterns.
While it appears under the present pattern that the advantage
of the subsidiary in a period of full dividends gradually decreases
as the effective rate of the foreign tax moves up or down from a
mid-point fixed at exactly half of the American rate, equally
important are two other correlative principles.
The first of these is most dramatically illustrated in that circumstance where a subsidiary retains all of its after-tax profits
in order to discharge long term liabilities or facilitate expansion.
The deemed-paid credit, since linked to dividends, will not presently
be available; but neither will there be any American gross income.
The total current tax liability will be determined solely by reference to the effective foreign rate.
In terms of current tax liability, the subsidiary's advantage over
a permanent establishment increases in the last assumed situation
(no dividends) as the foreign rate moves downward from 52%.
In the setting of our original illustration of a 26% foreign rate,
the current combined tax load on the subsidiary arrangement would
be just half of that amount suffered by the permanent-establishment arrangement.
The difference in the amount of advantage enjoyed by the subsidiary arrangement in the absence of dividends, and that enjoyed
by it even where all after-tax profits are distributed, is whittled
down if the subsidiary distributes even a part of its after-tax profits,
retaining the balance. Illustratively, if it distributes half of its aftertax profits of $74,000, the numerator of the previously quoted
statutory fraction governing the deemed-paid credit becomes
.
b .
$37 ooo dividend
$37,ooo, the fractiOn then emg $
'
d
fi or
74,000 accumu1ate pro ts
%. Multiplied by the ultimate statutory multiplicand ($26,ooo
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X $$7 4 •
or $19,240) which remains unchanged, the deemedIOo,ooo
paid credit allowed with reference to the $37,000 dividend turns
out to be $9,620 ($I 9, 240 X Y2) which is set off against the
tentative American tax liability of $19,240 ($37,ooo X sz%),
producing a net American tax of $9,620 ($19,240 tentative tax
less deemed-paid credit of $9,620). This, together with the foreign tax of $26,ooo, results in a combined current tax for the subsidiary arrangement of $35,620 compared with $52,000 which
would be assessed in the setting of a permanent establishment.
The second important correlative principle, discussed more
fully in the next subtopic, has the effect, inter alia, of foreclosing
the chance that the credit for foreign taxes might neutralize American tax liability on income which the parent corporation derives
from sources within the United States. Thus the combined taxes
can be greater than 52% if the effective foreign rate exceeds the
effective American rate.
TAXATION

(f) The per-country limitation.-It was in 1921 that Congress first acted to prevent credits for foreign taxes from offsetting any part of one's tax attributable to income earned within
the States. 86 While that provision, known as the "over-all" limitation, was later discarded and then revived in 1960, a complementary
and in some respects more confining ceiling, first enacted in 1932 87
and characterized as the per-country limitation, has remained intact
since its inception. 88 Its general thrust is to the effect that the total
credit claimed for qualifying taxes paid or accrued to a particular
country should not exceed the amount of tax which the United States
would impose, before credits, on income having its source in that
foreign country.
That part of the provision's limiting fraction which is most likely
to be applied to the taxpayer's pre-credit American tax, the aim
being to fix a ceiling on the total direct and deemed-paid credits
otherwise available for taxes paid or accrued to a particular country, reads as follows:
"Taxable income from sources within such country"
"Entire taxable income for the same taxable year"
80

89

Rev. Act of 1921, §238{a).
Rev. Act of 1932, §131(b).
88
I.R. c., § 904·
89
The limiting fraction can never be more than I, for the provision adds, in the
case of the numerator, that it may never exceed the "taxpayer's entire taxable income," and this latter figure will always correspond to the denominator.
87
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This fraction has three main features, the first of which is a
direction to the effect that the numerator and the denominator
be determined solely by reference to American tax concepts, foreign tax notions being irrelevant. One such concept, expressed quite
clearly in both elements of the fraction, involves the term "taxable
.mcome. "
The requirement, that the computation of this limiting fraction
be guided exclusively by the American concept of "taxable income,"
comes into play only in calculating the final ceiling on credits,
and must not be confused with certain other less demanding ideas
which bear on initial computation of the credit-a matter governed
by quite different provisions of the Code. Illustratively, one of
these other provisions is to the effect that a credit will not normally be allowed in the first instance with respect to any foreign
tax other than "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes."
As is later more fully explained in Subsection 4, here too American
ideas will be used in determining whether a given foreign tax
measures up to the characterization, "income tax," but in this
instance the test may be satisfied though the foreign levy does not
conform precisely 'to American notions regarding gross income
and deductions. Again, assuming this more general standard is
satisfied in a given case, the entire amount of foreign income taxes
paid or accrued may actually enjoy the credit though the foreign
income tax law allowed more by way of deductions or did reach
some items of income sourced there which the United States exempted or subsumed under a nonrecognition provision. 90 In other
words, with respect to the credit, it is only after the initial computation, i.e., when one reaches the limiting fraction of the per-country
limitation, that the American notion of "taxable income," and its
precise standards regarding gross income, deductions, exemptions,
nonrecognition provisions, etc., can affect the amount of the credit,
and then only by way of establishing the ceiling. 91 In the end,
00
But in practice it has not always been so. A 1936 decision, Hubbard v. United
States, (Ct. CJ. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 93, cert. denied, 300 U.S. 666, 57 S. Ct. 508 ( 1937),
was to the opposite effect insofar as the foreign tax was attributable to an item which
would not have been subject to taxation by the United States. But Helvering v. Nell,
(4th Cir. 1944) 139 F.(2d) 865, and I. B. Dexter, 47 B.T.A. 285 (1942), acq., C.B.
1948-2, 1, took a contrary view. And this was adopted for a time by the government
in G.C.M., 25723, C.B. 1948-2, I3J. Its subsequent modification of that ruling, in
G.C.M. 26062, C.B. 1949-2, no, was abandoned, however, in Rev. Rul. 54-15, C.B.
1954-1, 129, on the basis of the Tax Court's decision in James H. Brace, I I T.C.M.
906 (1932).
91
However, in the case of individuals, estates, and trusts, I.R.C., § 904(b) provides
that no allowances for personal exemptions can be taken under I.R.C., §§ 151 or 642(b).
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however, this calculation may turn out to have been in vain, for
the initially computed credit will stand as the final credit if the
foreign tax actually paid or accrued turns out to be less than the
per-country limitation. An illustrative case is one where the amount
of the foreign tax paid or accrued equalled an effective rate of,
say, 40%-as determined by reference to American notions of
taxable income, with the effective rate in the States being higher.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the ceiling itself could be
o. Illustrative would be a case where the foreign operation would
have operated at a loss except for an income item which, while
taxed abroad, would be in an exempt class in the United States.
In this event, the numerator of the limiting fraction would be
o, with the consequence that the fraction would become o.
A second American tax concept relates only to the numerator
of the limiting fraction and is implied from the interdependent
structure of the Code; it is to the effect that American rules of
jurisdiction will be employed for the purpose of determining that
part of the taxpayer's taxable income which will be deemed to have
its "source" in the particular foreign country. 92 For example, prior
thereto, it was possible that the United States and the foreign
country would each claim to be the source of the profit made on an
exported item. While the United States looked to the place where
title passed in resolving this question, 93 other countries sometimes
used a different test. And in that event, because of the applicability
of American standards, it was possible that the numerator of the
limiting fraction would be o, thus foreclosing the opportunity to
take a credit for the foreign tax. 94 The importance of this feature,
in the case of those doing business with five Common Market countries with which the United States has a tax treaty, has been somewhat reduced by the adoption of those treaties. Pursuant to the
tax treaties, the five Common Market countries have agreed to
forego any tax on an American corporation's export profit except
in the instance where that corporation is engaged in a trade or
business through a permanent establishment situated in the foreign
country in question. 95
In the setting of a foreign-subsidiary arrangement, the two
92
In effect, I.R.C., § 904 incorporates the source rules of Subchapter N, particularly
§§ 862 and 863.
93
U.S. v. Balanovski, (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F.(2d) 298, cert. den., 352 U.S. 968, 77
S. Ct. 357 ( 1957) ; Comm'r v. East Coast Oil Co., S.A., (5th Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 322;
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 6o8, 57 S. Ct. 234 ( 1936) .
.. Burk Brothers, 20 B.T.A. 657 ( 1930).
"" See PART II, supra.
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American tax concepts incorporated in the numerator of the limiting fraction ("taxable income" from the foreign country, and the
domestic rules fixing the source) will have one effect which can
be easily overlooked as applied to the credit for foreign taxes paid
on dividends. The Code provisions fixing the source of income in
a foreign country deal first with the matter of gross income. 96
They then go on to provide that from such gross income, in arriving at "taxable income" from the foreign source, there shall be
deducted the expenses, etc., "properly apportioned or allocated
thereto, and a ratable part of any expenses, losses or other deductions which cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class of
gross income." 97 The Tax Court has insisted that a part of the
general administrative expenses of the parent corporation must
be allocated to the dividend in arriving at the numerator of the
fraction, and in this it has been affirmed on appeal. 98
Since foreign taxes normally will have been paid with a part
of the foreign currency received in the course of operations abroad,
questions relating to timing, as it affects the initial determination
of income and credits for both cash receipts and accrual taxpayers,
are considered, together with the conversion problem, in PART
IV, infra. It should be noted here, however, that the per-country
limitation creates a separate timing problem. The numerator and
the denominator are calculated by reference to the accounting
period used for federal tax purposes, and the limiting fraction is
then applied to the credit for foreign taxes properly paid or accrued within that period. Because variation between the United
States and the foreign country with respect to the matter of timing
could, inter alia, lead the per-country limitation to spring into
operation where it would not otherwise do so, three steps at the
federal level have been taken.
The first involved congressional action; cash basis taxpayers
were allowed to elect the accrual method for purposes of the
credit, thus in general permitting such taxpayers to link the credit
to the year foreign taxable income was earned. 99
The second step was accomplished by administrative action; a
ruling was designed so as to accommodate the situation where the
96

I.R.C., § 862(a).
I.R.C., § 862 (b). Italics added .
.. International Standard Electric Corporation, I T.C. 1153 (1943), aff'd, (2d Cir.
1944) 144 F.(2d) 487, cert. den., 323 U.S. 803, 65 S. Ct. 56o (1945); South Porto Rico
Sugar Co., 2 T.C. 738 ( 1943 ).
00
Rev. Act of 1924, §§ 238(c) and 222(c), now I.R.C., § 905(a). See PART IV,
Section E, infra.
91
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foreign tax was based on a fiscal year different from that of the
American tax. In such case, those properly using the accrual method
were permitted to accrue on a pro rata basis the foreign income
tax for a particular foreign-tax year, allocating that tax between
the two American tax years in which the foreign year fell. 100
There were still other timing matters which created fluctuations
of a type prejudicial to a taxpayer because of the way the percountry limitation worked. Illustratively, for federal purposes, the
taxpayer might have elected to report sales on the installment basis
though such method was not permitted by the foreign government.
Again, differences between the two countries in inventory practices
or in depreciation methods could in effect lead to differences in the
year in which profits would be reflected. The same difficulty could
be encountered in connection with the fact that only the Netherlands permits a carry-back of net operating losses, and even that
carry-back does not coincide in point of years with the practice
followed in the United States. As indicated in PART I, most Common Market countries permit only a carry-over.
Problems such as these led a congressional committee in 1958
to conclude as follows :
Double taxation can occur at present because of the
manner in which this country-by-country limitation works
where the methods of reporting income are different in
the United States and the foreign country. These differences may result in the same income being reported in one
year in the United States and in another year in the foreign country. When this occurs the foreign tax credit available will tend to be less than the taxes paid or accrued to
the foreign country in the year the income is reported in
that country but not in the United States. In another year
when this income is reported in the United States but not
the foreign country, the credit which would be available
under the limitation will tend to exceed the foreign taxes
paid or accrued. 101
It was for the asserted purpose of cushioning the impact of
these difficulties that the committee induced Congress to adopt a
new provision permitting a carry-back and carry-over of such
portion of a foreign country's income tax as may exceed the ceilI.T. 4033, C.B. 1950-2, 52.
H. Rep. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1957), C.B. 1958-3, 8n at 837. The Committee also mentioned differences in fiscal years as an operating difficulty. On the one
hand, it may have been questioning the vitality of the ruling in note 100, supra, or it
may have been referring to cash basis taxpayers with respect to whom that ruling is
inapplicable.
100
101
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ing fixed by the per-country limitation. The excess may be carried
back successively to the 2 prior years and then forward to the
5 succeeding years, being used in those years-provided election
is made to take a credit rather than a deduction-to the extent
the foreign taxes for such years are less than the amount allowable
under the country-by-country limitation. 102 Carry-backs to years beginning before January r, 1958, are not permitted, however.
This carry-back and carry-forward was about as attractive as
any cushion Congress might have provided with respect to an
American company of the type assumed here, namely, one which
established a facility in, and suffered the income tax of, only one
foreign country. In fact, even before the adoption of this cushion,
in cases where the total foreign effort involved only one foreign
country, the effect of the per-country limitation was similar to that
associated with the older, but for a time discarded, overall limitation.
It was only where the American company, directly or indirectly,
suffered income taxes of two or more foreign countries that a
difference could arise with respect to the two types of limitation. The
overall limitation quite generally permitted taxes of two or more
foreign countries to be averaged, thus leveling out the highs and
lows and making it less likely that the effective foreign rate would
exceed the American rate. The discussion infra, in Sections E, F,
and G of this PART, indicates that the same was and is true,
oddly enough, with reference to multi-country operations carried
on by certain organizational forms which come under the percountry limitation. That this is not so, however, with respect to
other forms, and because one limitation is not consistently more
advantageous than the other, furnished the reasons for the determination by Congress in 1960 to allow any domestic taxpayer to elect
to submit its foreign tax credit to an "overall" limitation, rather
than to the per-country limitation. Since such a shift will actually
be meaningful only where the American taxpayer's foreign operations spread across two or more foreign countries, the newly revived
alternative overall limitation will be discussed later in connection
with such settings, in Sections E, F, and G, infra.
SUBSECTION 2. INTEGRATING AMERICAN AND COMMON
MARKET DIRECT TAXES RE PERMANENT
ESTABLISHMENTS AND SUBSIDIARIES

(a) Introductory note: need for caution ·in assessing comparative data.-Section A of this PART indicated the reasons why
'""Tech. Amendments Act of 1958, § 37, now I.R.C., § 904(c).
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one should not place too much stress on comparative data which
can be presented in this kind of study regarding direct tax loads
imposed by Common Market countries. For those reasons, as
well as others, like caution is essential with reference to comparisons
of the integrated direct tax costs, American and foreign, of doing
business abroad. Assumptions previously made in looking only at
foreign tax costs, including a specific set of facts, must also be
availed of here. In addition, because the Internal Revenue Service
has not published rulings identifying all of those Common Market
taxes which will be deemed to satisfy the American credit provisions, some assumptions, based on analogy, must also be made
with reference to this question.
The comparisons below deal first with the integrated direct
tax costs incurred by an American corporation which conducts
its foreign activity through a permanent establishment. The same
comparison is then made in the setting of a foreign subsidiary
arrangement. The story concludes with a comparison between
these two arrangements.
As in Section B of this PART, it is assumed that the American
company has only one foreign facility which earned $4oo,ooo
(before direct taxes) on an investment of $4,ooo,ooo. To facilitate comparison, it has again been necessary to assume that the
Common Market countries and the United States would follow
identical concepts with respect to income and deductions in arriving at the $400,000 in pre-direct tax profit.
(b) Comparing integrated direct tax costs in the setting
of a permanent establishment.-Since the income of a foreign
permanent establishment is included in that of the American corporation whether or not remitted, the effective rate in the United
States will always fix the minimum integrated direct tax cost of
this kind of an arrangement. Normally, the total direct tax costs
would actually exceed this in only two circumstances.
The first involves that situation where the effective foreign
income tax rate, calculated as a percentage of the pre-direct tax
profit of $4oo,ooo, exceeds the effective American rate expressed
in terms of that same base, in which instance the American tax
would be completely neutralized by the direct credit which is allowed.
The second instance where foreign direct taxes may in effect establish the minimum borne by a permanent establishment involves
those foreign countries which, in addition to an income tax, impose
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other types of direct taxes which will not qualify for the American
credit, being only deductible for U.S. tax purposes. In other words,
the effective American tax rate fixes only the minimum income tax
burden; other types of foreign direct taxes which do not qualify
for the credit will constitute an additional direct tax burden to
the extent not absorbed by the American treasury as a result of
the deduction which presumably would be allowed under § I 64 in
arriving at the American tax base.
Only if the assumed permanent establishment is situated in
Germany are both of these circumstances likely to be encountered.
That both will arise in that setting rests on the two-country effect
of Germany's three primary taxes, as follows:
(I) On the one hand, because the three-factor German
enterprise tax is deductible from the pre-direct tax profit of
$4oo,ooo in arriving at the amount subject to the regular German income tax rate of 49%, the effective rate of the latter,
as applied to the pre-direct tax profit, is considerably less than
49%;
( 2) On the other hand, the profit factor of that three-factor
enterprise tax is itself an income tax, 103 and more than offsets
the deductible effect of the whole, thus increasing the effective
rate of the two-pronged German income tax, as applied to the
$4oo,ooo, almost to 52% ; and
( 3) While the other two factors of the three-factor German
enterprise tax and the separate German 1% net wealth tax
serve as additions to the final two-country income tax load, they
also serve as deductions from the $4oo,ooo in arriving at the
American tax base to which the stated 52% is applied/ 04 the
effect being to reduce the effective American rate to a point below
52% of the $4oo,ooo pre-direct tax profit and below the percentage absorbed by the two-pronged German income tax (the
regular and the profit factor of the enterprise tax).
As a consequence of the foregoing, the total two-country income tax load is determined by the German pattern, to which must
be added its net wealth tax and two factors of its enterprise tax,
leaving less than 33% of the $4oo,ooo remaining after direct
taxes.
If the setting is shifted to Luxembourg, that portion of the
100

See discussion infra, Subsection 4 (d) of this Section.
'"'Germany's 1% net wealth tax is not deductible, however, in computing that
country's own income tax base as applied to the permanent establishment.
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$4oo,ooo absorbed by the American income tax would not be
exceeded by Luxembourg's two-pronged income tax (regular and
profit factor of its enterprise tax). And this is so though the nonprofit factors of the latter's enterprise tax and its net wealth tax
would be deducted from the $4oo,ooo in arriving at the American
tax base. 105 However, in calculating the total integrated or twocountry direct tax costs, to the effective American rate which fixes
the minimum income tax load, one must add the two Luxembourg
direct taxes which fail to satisfy the credit, specifically, the nonprofit factors of the enterprise tax and the net wealth tax, producing total integrated direct taxes equaling approximately 57%
of the $4oo,ooo.
Presumably, Italy's property tax would also fail to satisfy
the American credit though it could be deducted from the $4oo,ooo
in arriving at the American income tax base. In effect, that portion
not absorbed by the United States treasury through the deduction
would constitute an additional direct tax burden, for the effective
American income tax rate would fix only the minimum income tax
load. The total integrated direct tax costs of the assumed permanent
establishment, if located in Italy, would then approximate ss%
of the $4oo,ooo.
If the foreign permanent establishment is just a sales office,
the peculiar incidence of property taxes in the three countries
mentioned above will be markedly reduced or perhaps completely
eliminated. In the latter event, only the two-pronged German income tax rate schedule is likely to exceed the American rate and
fix the ultimate total direct tax burden.
According to the earlier country-by-country survey and the comparisons in Section B, supra, the other three member nations,
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, do not impose significant
property taxes, and since their effective income tax rates (3o%,
so%, and 47%, respectively) do not exceed the effective American
rate, the latter will equal the amount of the integrated direct tax
costs.
:-·T
(c) Comparing integrated direct tax costs of fore.ign subsidiaries which retain all profits for expansion.-If a foreign
subsidiary retains all of its after-tax profits in order to facilitate
expansion or discharge indebtedness, the integrated direct tax
lOIS Since the profit factor of the Luxembourg enterprise tax is quite similar to that
in Germany, it is assumed that the Service would consider the profit factor as an
income tax for purposes of the credit. Cf. Rev. Rul. 59-208, C.B. 1959-1, 192.
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costs will be confined to foreign taxes. In the absence of a dividend,
the subsidiary's profits will not be included in those of the American
parent; nor will the latter currently enjoy the deemed-paid credit
with reference to the subsidiary's own income tax.
A comparison of the foreign direct taxes which would be imposed in this setting, if the facts were like those just assumed in
the setting of permanent establishments, appears in Section B,
supra, and can be summarized as follows :
Direct Taxes

Direct Taxes
Belgium
France
Germany

27·47%

so.

69·95

Italy
Luxembourg
Nether lands

44·67%
5!·67
47·

(d) Comparing integrated direct tax costs of subsidiary
arrangements where all after-tax profits are distributed.-ln the
situation discussed above, where a foreign subsidiary retained all
after-tax profits, Belgium provided the locale where the lowest
total direct tax costs would be encountered. Subject to one caveat,
that locale will retain its favorable position even through a later
period when the subsidiary has matured to a point that all current
after-tax profits are to be distributed. In contrast to the intercountry comparisons drawn above, those drawn below with respect to this later stage require an integration of American tax
costs with the foreign direct tax costs. The isolated significance
of this will be more discernible and distinctions between the two
stages in the life-line of a subsidiary will also be more obvious if
one indulges in the same assumptions here as there, including the
fact that the subsidiary earns $4oo,ooo in pre-tax profits on
property worth $4,ooo,ooo. 106
The caveat mentioned earlier with respect to Belgium relates
to an assumption, which must be made in the absence of a published
ruling, to the effect that the Belgian withholding tax on dividends
will be deemed, for purposes of the direct credit provision in the
Code, to be an assessment against the American parent.
A combination of two factors continue to favor Belgium:
( 1 ) According to earlier discussion, an income tax is the
only really significant direct tax imposed against the subsidiary
itself, and its effective rate ( 21.34%) comes close to that point
,. Disregarded also is the fact that administrative overhead of the parent must
be apportioned in part to the dividend, in computing the per-country limitation on the
credit. See Subsection I, supra, and Subsection 3, infra.
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( 26%) where the greatest benefit is reaped from the combined
deemed-paid credit and exclusion enjoyed by the American parent
with regard to that amount which the subsidiary devoted to
foreign income taxes; and
( 2) While Belgium imposes an even larger withholding rate
( 30%) against dividends ( 7 8.66% of pre-tax profits), the
direct credit which presumably would he allowed with respect
to this entire tax will, when coupled with the deemed-paid credit
for the subsidiary's tax, approximate the tentative (pre-credit)
52% tax which the United States would impose on the dividend
(78.66% of pre-tax profits). 107
As a consequence of the two foregoing considerations, total
Belgian taxes, approximating 4 5% 108 of pre-tax profits, will come
very close to being the total direct tax load in our assumed factual
situation.
The importance of the first of the two foregoing considerations
is illustrated by the fact that while the two Belgian income taxes,
approximating 45% of pre-tax profits, are almost as great as the
single 4 7% which the Netherlands would impose directly on the
subsidiary in lieu of any withholding tax against the parent for
dividends received, the integrated direct tax cost of doing business
through subsidiaries in the two locales would actually differ by a
slightly greater amount, provided it be assumed that the same income and deduction concepts prevail in America as well as in those
two foreign countries. The 47% imposed by the Netherlands comes
close to one of the extremes (52%) where the combined exclusion
and deemed-paid credit for foreign income taxes yields the least
benefit. In fact, after taking the deemed-paid credit, an American
tax equal to more than 2Y:!% of the subsidiary's pre-tax profit
will remain, producing an integrated tax which absorbs almost so%
of the subsidiary's pre-tax profits. 109
France, the third and last country which, for all practical purposes, confines its direct taxes to those on income, would provide
a less favorable locale, taxwise, than the Netherlands.
107
Since the dividend is 78.66% of pre-tax profits, the tentative Amercan tax at 52%
would be 40.9% of the subsdiary's pre-tax profits against which a total credit of
40.38% of pre-tax profits could be taken.
108
To the tax on the subsidiary (21.34% of pre-tax profits), one must add the withholding tax of 30% on the dividend (30% X 78.66 of pre-tax profits), being another
23.6% of the subsidiary's pre-tax profits.
'""The American tentative tax (52% X 53% of the subsidiary's pre-tax profits) of
27.56% of pre-tax profits would be offset by a deemed-paid credit (47% X
53% of pre-tax profits
IOo%
) equal to 24.9% of pre-tax profits
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While the deemed-paid credit for the so% tax which the former
would impose on the subsidiary, when coupled with the direct
credit for the I 5% withholding tax on dividends, 110 would wipe
out the American tax liability, the two French taxes-standing
alone-would absorb around 57% of the subsidiary's pre-tax
profits.U 1
While Italy ranked next to Belgium in providing a favorable
direct tax climate during the period when the subsidiary retained
all of its profits, during a later period of full distribution one
ultimate consideration serves to eliminate the gap which existed
in the earlier non-distributive stage between Italy and the then
lower-ranking Netherlands, the two now being almost side by
side. Whereas the percentage of pre-tax profits absorbed by
integrated direct taxes in a Netherlands setting changed very little
between the two stages, integrated costs associated with an Italian
subsidiary will increase during the second or distributive stage
by an amount approximating 7% of pre-tax profits. Responsibility
for this fairly substantial increase can be traced ultimately to the
addition of an American tax which will not be completely offset
by credits even though American income taxes, approximating
29% of the subsidiary's pre-direct tax profits, 112 will actually be
less than the total Italian direct taxes of 44.67% of pre-tax profits.
This ultimate result is in turn traceable to two limitations on
the credit enjoyed by the American parent:
(I) While the Italian direct tax costs ( 44.67% of pre-tax
profits) will remain constant through the two periods, that
portion attributable to the Italian property tax (equal to 7·5%
of pre-tax profits) cannot be credited against the American
tax (approximately 29% of pre-tax profits) of 52% on a dividend
which equaled 55 ·33% of pre-tax profits;
( 2) Since Italy does not split its income tax assessments
between a corporate tax and a withholding tax on dividends,
imposing just the former, the deemed-paid credit only will be
applied in offsetting the U.S. tentative tax on the dividend. As
a consequence, the whole of the Italian income tax (37.17% of
pre-tax profits) 113 will not actually serve as a credit against
110
As in the earlier case of Belgium, it is again assumed that this tax will ultimately
also be deemed a tax against the parent, not against the subsidiary.
111
A xs% withholding tax on a dividend equal to so% of pre-tax profits is equal
to a tax on 7.5% of pre-tax profits.
112
52% on a dividend equal to 55·33% of the subsidiary's pre-tax profits equals
28.77% of pre-tax profits.
112
It is assumed that the Italian ex!'ess profits tax will also ultimately qualify for
the credit.
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the American income tax, for the deemed-paid credit is limited
to that portion of the Italian income tax which was actually
paid with respect to the distributed profit. The net effect: the
deemed-paid credit 114 will not even neutralize the whole of the
52% which the U.S. will impose on dividends.
Luxembourg and Germany, ranking, respectively, fifth and sixth
during both stages in terms of tax attractiveness, provided account
is taken of integrated direct tax costs, would share one problem
encountered by Italy were it not for a compensating consideration.
Both levy certain significant direct taxes which will not qualify
for purposes of the credit allowed against the American income
tax on the ultimate dividend. Nevertheless, in the case of subsidiaries located in those two countries, the total U.S. tax will be
completely offset by credits. In part, this is due to the fact that,
unlike Italy, both also levy a rs% withholding tax on dividends
which, presumably, is fully creditable, dollar for dollar. The relatively high direct tax costs associated with subsidiary arrangements
in Luxembourg and Germany during a period of full distributions
is traceable then to their own direct taxes which, according to the
earlier discussion in Section B, would absorb, respectively, 58.9%
and 6o. r% of pre-tax profits. These figures may be compared with
integrated direct tax costs during this stage of approximately 45%
of pre-tax profits in the case of a subsidiary located in Belgium,
of approximately so% in Italy and the Netherlands, and of 57%
where France is the locale.
In conclusion, it must again be emphasized that the total integrated direct tax costs could change substantially if the subsidiary
does not own substantial property; in that event, the integrated
tax problems growing out of the foreign property tax imposed
by three member nations would be eliminated.
TAXATION

(e) Comparing integrated direct tax costs of subsidiary
arrangements where 40% of after-tax profits are distributed.The circumstance where a foreign subsidiary distributes 40% of
its after-tax profits obviously falls between the two previously discussed situations involving subsidiaries which ( 1) retained all,
and ( 2) distributed all, current after-tax profits.
In terms of integrated direct tax costs, all countries but two
retain the relative rankings maintained in the previously discussed
The deemed-paid credit would appear to be only 22.24 o/o of pre-tax profits
(37.I7o/o X
~- 33 % o/t ). For the purposes of this formula, the term accumulated
IOO 0 - 7·5 0
profits would only be 92.5% of pre-direct-tax profits of $4oo,ooo: the other 7-5%·
represents non-qua Jifying property taxes.
m
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stage (full distribution) with reference to tax attractiveness. Italy
and the Netherlands "swap" places, the former regaining by a
margin of less than r% the position it held during the first stage
(no distribution), as the second most favorable locale tax-wise.
In the case of every country, however, the integrated direct tax
cost in this third stage falls in between that which would follow
where all profits are retained and where full distribution is made.
This is another way of also saying that the factors discussed in
the previous sub-topic are also at work in this third stage, though
to a lesser degree. And in this third stage, the integrated direct
tax costs run from approximately 34% of pre-tax profits where
the subsidiary is situated in Belgium 115 to 67% where the locale
is Germany, 116 the Netherlands falling closest to the mid-point at
48%.11 7

(f) Conclusion: Com paring a subsidiary-arrangement's integrated tax costs in all three stages with that of a permanent establishment.-As previously indicated, the integrated or twocountry direct tax costs of a permanent establishment would remain
constant during all three stages, i.e., without regard to whether
foreign profits are actually remitted. Table III L compares those
costs with the approximate integrated direct taxes which would
be encountered in all three stages of a subsidiary arrangement
provided one indulges in the assumptions previously made.
115
Since the subsidiary's own Belgian tax is 24.9% of pre-tax profits, a dividend
equal to 40% of the balance will run to 30.04% of pre-tax profits, and on the latter
figure a 30% Belgian withholding tax will absorb another 9% of pre-tax profits. The
U.S. tentative tax (sz% X 30.04% of pre-tax profits= 15.62% of pre-tax profits)
will be easily neutralized by the total of direct and deemed-paid credits, leaving the
total Belgian tax of 33.9% as final tax cost.
116
The German direct taxes on the subsidiary itself ( 64.89% of pre-tax profits)
leaves a dividend (4o% of the balance) of 14.044% of pre-tax profits out of which
the 15% withholding tax will absorb 2.1% of pre-tax profits, resulting in a total German tax of 67% of pre-tax profits. The U.S. tentative tax of 7·302% of pre-tax profits
( szo/o X 14.044%) will be neutralized by the total direct and deemed-paid credits
even though a part of the German direct tax was other than an income tax.
111
The Netherlands tax on the subsidiary (47%) leaves a dividend (40% of the
remaining profits) of 21.2% of pre-tax profits on which the U.S. tentative tax (52%
X 21.2%) would equal n.oz% of pre-tax profits. The deemed-paid credit would
fall a little short of neutralizing that tentative tax, being only 9.964 o/o of pre-tax
profits.
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TABLE

Locale

Permanent
Establishment

III L
Subsidiary Arrangement

40% of
All Profits
Retained
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands 118

SUBSECTION

52. %
52. %
67-4%

55.6%
57· %
52. %
3·

27-5%
so. %
70. %
44·7%

5!.7%

47·%

Aftertax Profits Distributed

All-Aftertax Profits Distributed

33-9%
53· %
67. %
47·3%
54-6%
48.%

45-5%
57-5%
6o. %
51.2%
ss.9%
49-6%

ALLOCATING INCOME AND DEDUCTION
ITEMS BETWEEN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN
OPERATIONS

(a) Introductory note.-Where an American enterprise conducts its foreign activities through a branch, i.e., through a nonseparately incorporated permanent establishment, proper allocation
of income and deduction items between the two operations is
essential to the determination of the foreign tax base as well as
the per-country limitation which has been imposed on the American
credit for foreign income taxes. Except with reference to the
latter limitation, the allocation problem in the branch setting is
not usually as important to American taxation as it is to foreign
taxation. The reason is attributable to the fact that net profits of
the foreign branch's operation, whether or not remitted, will
always be commingled with domestic profits in determining "taxable income" for federal income tax purposes. 119 This is not so,
however, where the foreign activity is conducted through a foreign
subsidiary. In that setting, proper allocation can be just as important in establishing the tax base of the parent for American
tax purposes, as it is in fixing the tax base of the subsidiary for
foreign tax purposes. Here, too, the problem can affect the credit
118

For a description of changes which would take place in the Netherlands' tax
structure pursuant to a bill now pending, see PART VI, Section A, infra.
110
See PART IV, Section B for the accounting aspects.
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for foreign taxes. Indeed, it could ultimately even affect the parent
company's basis for stock held in the foreign subsidiary.
Because the problems are slightly different in the two settings,
and because there is some variation in the basic legal data through
which the interested countries have sought to police the matter,
the discussion below deals separately with branch and subsidiary
arrangements.
(b) A /location between American operations and nonseparately incorporated foreign permanent establishments.-In the
case of a foreign branch, the integrity of the per-country limitation
on the American credit for foreign income taxes can be preserved
only if the United States has the power to assure proper allocation
of income and deductions between the domestic operation and
that of the branch. One of the statutory provisions to which it can
look is a sweeping catchall, for its allocation principles apply alike
to divided operations which are wholly domestic, to those which
are wholly foreign but split between two or more countries, as well
as to operations partly domestic and partly foreign. Its earliest
counterpart was inspired to a substantial degree, however, by related domestic and foreign operations actually conducted through
a subsidiary rather than through a branch. In 1921, a congressional
committee called attention to a practice designed to minimize the
amount of income which would be subject to American rates, noting:
Subsidiary corporations, particularly foreign subsidiaries, are sometimes employed to "milk" the parent corporation, or otherwise improperly manipulate the financial
accounts of the parent company. 120
The congressional enactment which followed, 121 to the effect that
the Commissioner could re-allocate income and deductions between
"related trades or businesses" in order to reflect the true circumstances, was the forerunner of § 482 of the present Code. Today,
the Commissioner's power to effect a re-allocation is said to exist
whether or not the two trades or businesses are separately incorporated and whether they are organized in the United States or
abroad. The power extends to gross income, deductions, credits,
and other allowances, provided such re-allocation is necessary "in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income
of any of such organizations, trades or businesses." 122
Complementing the foregoing wholesale type of provision are
""'H. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., xst Sess. 14 ( 1921 ).
Rev. Act of 1921, § 24o(d).
I.R.C., § 482.

21
'
122
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three sections of the code, §§ 861, 862, and 863, which-absent
a superseding treaty-fix the source of income, identifying whether
an item will be treated as domestic or foreign. On the income side,
two of those sections deal with items which are allocated exclusively
to one country or the other. 123 Both then go on to provide that expenses and other deductions shall be attributed to the income items
on the same basis; in addition, however, there must be a proper
apportionment of a "ratable part of any expenses, losses, or other
deductions which cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class
of gross income." 124 The third provision, § 863, deals with income
derived partly from within and partly from without the United
States, including, e.g., sales abroad of personal property produced
in the United States. In circumstances where this principle is applied,
apportionment of expenses and deductions is also required. However, in the case of simple export arrangements, earlier discussion
in PART II indicated that this third statutory provision (§ 863)
was less important with respect to sales in foreign countries with
which the United States has a tax treaty. By such treaties, the foreign countries have abandoned the right to tax an American enterprise's export profits except where it maintains a permanent establishment in the treaty country. Where such an establishment is
maintained, those treaties would apply an allocation philosophy
similar to that reflected in the sweeping provision now found in the
previously mentioned § 482 of the Code.
Illustrative is the treaty with Belgium, which provides that "there
shall be attributed to such permanent establishment the net industrial and commercial profit which it might be expected to derive if
it were an independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar
activities under the same or similar conditions." 125 Unlike the other
treaties, that provision-like certain rulings of the Service-goes
on expressly to require such net profit to "be determined on the
basis of separate accounts pertaining to such establishment." The
Belgian and French treaties, though not those with other member
nations, also add what would otherwise seem to be the case in any
event, namely, that the competent authority of a particular taxing
state may rectify such accounts, if need be, in order to reflect the
apportionment principle described above. 126 This recognition, that
each state may make its own interpretation of the way the appor123
I.R.C., §§ 861 and 862.
l.lUoJ.R.C., §§861(b) and 862(b), interpreted in G.C.M. 7592, C.B. IX-1, 213.
lll5 Art. IV ( 1). Accord, Art. III ( 3) of the German and Italian treaties, and Art.
III (z) of the Netherlands treaty. Cf. Art. 4 of the French treaty.
108
Belgian treaty, Art. IV(2); French treaty, Art. 4-
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tionment principle applies to a given case, is theoretically cushioned
by four of the treaties which expressly recognize the right of competent authorities in both countries to "lay down rules by agreement
for the apportionment of industrial or commercial profits." 127
While the basic allocation provision in the treaties generally deals
with net profits, three of the treaties add an express comment witli
regard to deductions. For example, the Belgian treaty authorizes a
permanent establishment to avail itself of deductions "wherever
incurred, insofar as they are reasonably allocable to the permanent
establishment, including executive and general administrative expenses so allocable." 128
(c) A !location between an American corporation and its
foreign subsidiary.-ln the case of a foreign subsidiary which conducts all of its activity in one member nation, an allocation problem
generally arises only in connection with inter-company transactions
and dividends. A 1959 case, decided by the Tax Court, is illustrative
of the former. There an American enterprise sought to deflect the
great bulk of its profit on foreign sales to its foreign sales subsidiary.
The latter was billed at a price which enabled it to enjoy 90% of the
total profit whereas sales through independent commission agents
were handled on a 20% commission basis. The Commissioner's
power to re-allocate under the previously discussed § 482 of the
Code was sustained. 129
Now, in the case of related corporations, tax treaties with five of
the six member nations include language very much like that found
in the earliest counterpart to § 482. For example, the Belgian
treaty provides that if the parent company, "by reason of its participation in the management or financial structure" of a Belgian
corporation "makes with or imposes on the latter enterprise, in
their financial or commercial relations, conditions different from
those which would be made with an independent enterprise, any
profits which, but for those conditions, would have accrued to one
of the enterprises may be included in the taxable profits of that
enterprise subject to applicable measures of appeal." 130 The Amer27
'
The quotation is from the German treaty, Art. III ( 5). Only the French treaty
lacks a provision to this effect. Italics added.
128
Art. IV(4). Also, German treaty, Art. III(4), and Italian treaty, Art. III(s).
Italics added.
""Jesse E. Hall, Sr., 32 T.C. 390(1959). For a different kind of example, see Asiatic
Petroleum Corporation, Ltd. v. Comm'r, (2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. {2d), 234, cert. denied,
296 U.S. 645, 56 S. Ct. 248 (1935).
,.. Art. V. Cf. the allocation language in Revenue Act of 1921, § 1331 (b); French
treaty, Art. s; and Art. IV of the German, Italian, and Netherlands treaties.
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ican regulation construing that provision notes that its obvious purpose is to achieve "tax parity with uncontrolled" enterprises, and
adds that the previously described § 482 of the Code will be followed in effecting the implementation. 131
A slightly different kind of allocation problem arises in connection
with dividends received by the parent. As noted elsewhere, by reference solely to American law, a proper portion of the parent's
general administrative or overhead expenses must be allocated to
the dividend in determining the amount of "taxable income" derived
by the parent from the subsidiary. 132
SUBSECTION

4·

SPECIAL PROBLEMS RE CREDIT FOR FOREIGN
TAXES OF A FACILITY SERVING ONE MEMBER
NATION

(a) Introductory note.-The more frequently recurring
mathematical aspects of the American credit for those foreign taxes
suffered by a facility serving only one Common Market country were
dealt with in Subsection I, supra. Within this same limited setting,
the discussion below focuses attention on certain special substantive
and procedural problems which may be encountered in connection
with the credit. Following a description of the treatment accorded
"delayed" distributions received by a parent from a foreign subsidiary, the discussion shifts to the fact that the deemed-paid credit
will generally be available only where the payment received is in the
nature of a "dividend." Thereafter, a quite different overall restriction, generally limiting both direct and deemed-paid credits to foreign "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes," is considered.
This Subsection then concludes with a description of the requirements relating to the procedure to be followed in claiming a credit.
(b) ((Delayed" distributions from accumulated earnings
and profits.-Directors who declare a dividend just before the close
of a taxable year normally contemplate that they are distributing
profits of that year. But such a declaration might also be made in
a loss year; the directors of a foreign subsidiary may have been unwilling to "pass" a regular dividend date because of the expectations
of certain foreigners who held some shares in the American enterprise's foreign subsidiary. Dividends are also frequently declared
131

T.D. 616o, § 504.106.
International Standard Electric Corporation, I T.C. II53 (1943), aff'd., (2d Cir.
1944) 144 F. (2d) 4&7, cert. denied, 323 U.S. &o3, 65 S. Ct. 560 (1945); South Porto
Rico Sugar Co., 2 T.C. 738 ( 1943 ).
132
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in the early part of one year, it being contemplated that the distribution was of the preceding year's profits.
In circumstances such as these, for purposes of the deemed-paid
credit it is necessary to determine which year's profit will be deemed
to have been distributed. Only then is it possible to identify which
year's foreign taxes are to be credited against the American tax
liability on the dividend.
The enactment of the deemed-paid credit in 1918 was followed
shortly thereafter by delegation of power to the Treasury to resolve
this question of timing in each case, subject to two important limitations.133 This same arrangement prevails today. 134
The first limitation is to the effect that dividends paid within the
first 6o days of any taxable year are to be treated by the Secretary
of the Treasury as having been paid from the accumulated profits
of the preceding year or years "unless to his satisfaction shown
otherwise. . . . " 135 In all other respects, according to the second
limitation, dividends are to be treated as having been paid from the
"most recently" accumulated profits. This latter rule means that
dividends declared in December 1960 in an amount exceeding the
profits of I 960 will normally be deemed, to the extent of the excess,
to have been paid first from profits of I 9 59, if any, and to the extent
not absorbed by the accumulated profits of that year, then from
those of 1958, etc. And to the extent the declaration was deemed
to be from I 9 58 profits, the deemed-paid credit allowed at the time
of the dividend in I96o will normally relate to foreign taxes paid by
the subsidiary on the 1958 profits. As a consequence, the deemedpaid credit attributable to the 1960 dividend could require separate
computations with respect to the subsidiary's foreign taxes for I960,
1959, 1958, etc., in order to determine for each of those years,
pursuant to § 90I, what portion of each particular year's tax was
paid on the profit actually distributed. 136 In other words, to each of
those years one first must separately apply the formula previously
discussed in Subsection I, supra, reading as follows:

133

Share of I96o Dividend
.
.
Attributable to Profits of
Foreign. ~ax Paid
a Particular year
by Subsidiary for X =--.-----~-a Particular Year
Entire Accumulated .
Profits of That Particular Year

Rev. Act of 1921, §238(e).
'"'I.R.C., §902(c).
The problem of proof is illustrated by P. H. Peavey & Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. 1932)
73 Ct. Cl. 6oo, 55 F. (2d) 516.
136
General Foods Corporation, 4 T.C. 209 (1944).
135
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The results from those separate determinations are then aggregated
for the purpose of determining the deemed-paid credit attributable
to the I 960 dividend. 137
It will be recalled also from the earlier discussion in Subsection I,
supra, that the per-country limitation will require a further computation. But this will be less complex. Its limited purpose, to prevent
the credit for a particular foreign country's tax on the distributed
profit from offsetting American taxes on income derived from
sources other than that foreign country, does not require the type
of unscrambling essential to the original computation of the credit.
The per-country ceiling on the total direct and deemed-paid credit 138
otherwise ascertained is determined by the same formula used
where the subsidiary distributes dividends only from current
profits, 139 namely:
Total Dividends
Parent's U.~.
From Country Y
Tax on Entire X P
t' E t'
T
bl I
aren s n 1re
axa e ncome
Taxable income
(c) Extent to which the deemed-paid credit is limited to
"dividend" situations.-From I 9 I 8 to I 9 54, a deemed-paid credit
could only be taken upon the receipt of a "dividend." 140 The significance of this limitation is illustrated by a decision of the Court of
Claims to the effect that a parent corporation could not take such
a credit in connection with liquidation distributions received from a
subsidiary even though the distribution included previously accumulated profits on which the subsidiary had paid substantial foreign
income taxes. 141 The Code treats such payments as proceeds from
an "exchange," rather than a dividend. 142 And because this is so, the
parent corporation will usually enjoy the preferential treatment
accorded capital gains, i.e., a 25% rate on the realized gain/ 43
rather than suffer the ordinary tax rate-assumed in this study to
be 52 %-on the entire proceeds. The Court of Claims, in restricting
the deemed-paid credit in accordance with the literal language of the
statute, was comforted by the supposition that Congress could not
137
Ibid.; Coca-Cola Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. 1944) 101 Ct. Cl. 729, 55 F. Supp. 616.
""United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. White, (1st Cir. 1937) 89 F. (zd) 363.
139
Note 136, supra, acq., C.B. 1946-1, 2; G.C.M. 24823, C.B. 1946-1, 246 revoking
G.C.M. 20286, C.B. 1938-2, 223.
""Rev. Act of 1918, § 24o(c), now reflected in I.R.C., § 902(a) through (c). The
term "dividend" is controlled by the definition in I.R.C., § 316
,.,Freeport Sulphur Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. 1958) 163 F. Supp. 648, addendum, (Ct.
Ct. 1959) 172 F. Supp. 462.
,•• l.R.C., § 33 I.
148
This assumes that the corporation is not collapsible. See I.R.C., § 341.
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have intended to allow both this preferential treatment and a credit
for foreign taxes. 144
Presumably the deemed-paid credit was not originally extended
to cover interest payments because of the absence of a double tax
problem with reference to such payments. Most foreign countries,
including all Common Market nations, allow a subsidiary to deduct
interest paid its parent, up to a reasonable amount, in arriving at
the subsidiary's foreign tax base. 145 This is not to say, of course, that
all member nations also immunize the parent with respect to the
interest payment it receives. Indeed, in the typical situation, four of
the six member nations will apply a withholding tax against the
parent. 146 But in this circumstance, the direct credit is allowed, 147
dollar for dollar, subject only to the per-country limitation upon
total credits attributable to income from the source country.
In I 9 54, for the first time, Congress did link the deemed-paid
credit to a type of payment which a foreign subsidiary might be
able to deduct in computing its own foreign tax base, specifically to
"property" paid "in the form of royalty or compensation" for
"property or services . . . furnished" by the parent to the subsidiary.148
In this instance, however, three conditions, otherwise not applicable to the deemed-paid credit, must be satisfied:
(I) In contrast to dividend situations where the deemed-paid
credit is allowed if the domestic corporation owns at least "ro%
of the voting stock" 149 of the foreign corporation from which it
received the dividend, here the former must own, directly or indirectly, "roo% of all outstanding stock" of the subsidiary; 150
( 2) In contrast to the dividend situation where the deemedpaid credit is available without regard to the nature of a sub'"In any instance where the deemed-paid credit would be more valuable than the
preferential treatment accorded capital gains, the subsidiary might stagger the distribution, declaring a large regular dividend before proceeding with liquidation. But
in such case, care must be taken or the Service may claim that all of the payments fall
on the liquidation side of the line.
140
See Section B, supra, and the country-by-country survey in PART I, supra, with
reference to the French and German limitations.
146
Ibid. Belgium and France are limited by treaty to 15% (Arts. VIII (A} and 6A,
respectively}; Germany must exempt such payments (Art. VII); Italy and Luxembourg
are free to apply their respective national laws (26.32% and so/o, respectively); and
the Netherlands own law does not normally provide for a tax except where the loan
is secured by a mortgage on real property. Cf. its treaty provision, Art. VIII.
147
Unlike the deemed-paid credit, the direct credit is available with respect to any
income item, so long as the foreign country also exacted a qualifying tax.
148
l.R.C., §9o2(d). The congressional committee reports say nothing about the
motive which led to this enactment.
149
I.R.C., § 902 (a).
'"'I.R.C., §9oz(d}(1).
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sidiary's foreign business activity, covering even sales subsidiaries,
this credit is extended here to the different type of payment only
if the subsidiary is engaged in "manufacturing, production, or
mining" ; 151
(3) Here the property received as royalty or compensation
must be pursuant to a contractual arrangement which must also
provide that the payment "shall be accepted in lieu of dividends
and that such foreign corporation shall neither declare nor pay
any dividends . . . in any calendar year in which such property
is paid to" the parent. 152
If these conditions are satisfied, then the property received by
the parent shall be deemed a "distribution" 153 and ultimately a
dividend-assuming the foreign subsidiary has adequate earnings
and profits to pay such 154-to the extent of the difference between
the value of that distributed and the cost to the parent of the "property or services so furnished" to the subsidiary.
By subsequently agreeing that the expression, "property" received, included money, the Internal Revenue Service has made this
provision much more meaningful. 155 The Service has also properly
called for a slight modification in the formula which is normally
otherwise used in calculating the amount of the deemed-paid credit.
The formula typically used,
.
Dividend
Foreign Taxes X ..,.......,--,,..,-,---,-~--~--=
Subsidiary's Accumulated
Profits Before Foreign Income Taxes,
contemplates that the denominator of the fraction will include the
subsidiary's profits for the year before deducting its income, war
profits, and excess profits taxes. In the case of this new special arrangement, the Service has ruled that the "dividend" portion of the
royalty or other compensation must be restored to the denominator
even though, pursuant to foreign tax law, it had been deducted by
the subsidiary. 156 Illustratively, assume that a domestic parent received $50 in service fees from a wholly owned foreign subsidiary,
the full amount having been deducted by the latter for foreign in151 Ibid.
'""I.R.C., § 902 (d) (2) and (3).
153
Controlled by I.R.C., § 301 except with respect to the amount and basis.
1
" ' See I.R.C., § 316.
"'"Rev. Rul. 55-312, C.B. 1955-1, 8o. This interpretation rested on the fact that
§ 902 (d) is expressly made dependent upon I.R.C., § 301 which uses the term "property"
as defined in I.R.C., § 317· The latter includes "money" in the definition.
"'"Rev. Rul. 59-71, C.B. 1959-1, 194, relying on the underlying philosophy of Biddle
v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 58 S. Ct. 379 (1938), and the fact that, for purposes
of the new § 902 (d), a portion of the distribution is a "dividend" under American
law, however it mav be treated by foreign law.
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come tax purposes, leaving it with $ soo in foreign income on which
it paid foreign income taxes of $200. The cost to the parent of the
service extended to the subsidiary amounted to $2. The deemed-paid
credit would be computed as follows:
.
$48 Dividend
$200 Foreign Tax X$
= $17.50 157
A
54 8 ccumulated Profit
Before Taxes
As indicated in PART II, Section C, supra, subsidiaries in all
Common Market countries may treat royalties paid a U.S. parent
-for use of a patent, copyright, etc.-as a deductible business expense, but only to the extent the royalties are fair in amount and do
not represent a hidden distribution of profits. One would certainly
expect this limitation to be policed most carefully in those cases
where the parent contractually commits itself, as it must under the
new § 902 (d), to accept the royalty "in lieu of dividends." Moreover, in the unlikely event a subsidiary did succeed in deflecting all
of its profit to the parent via deductible royalty payments, there
would be no foreign income tax against which the new § 902 (d)
deemed-paid credit could be applied. This suggests that the new
provision will be most useful over the long run in circumstances
similar to the illustration above, where the subsidiary retained its
own taxable profits for expansion, only a reasonable royalty having
been paid to the parent during the taxable year. And in this case,
again by reference to PART II, Section C, five of the Common Market countries are also precluded by treaty from withholding an income tax against the parent for the royalty it receives so long as
( r) the royalty related to "the right to use copyrights, patents,
secret processes and formulae, trade marks, and other analagous
rights," 158 and ( 2) the parent did not maintain a "permanent
establishment" in the country in question. 159
(d) Required characteristics of a foreign tax if it is to
qualify for the credit.-The credit for foreign taxes was originally
confined to foreign "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes." 160
157
While a part of the parent's overhead entered into the calculation of the $z in
cost, it may also be necessary, for purposes of the credit, to attribute another part of
the parent's overhead to the collection of the dividend, in which case the latter would
be less than $48. Cf. International Standard Electric Corporation v. Comm'r., (zd Cir.
1944) 144 F. (zd) 487, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 803, 65 S. Ct. 560 ( 1945).
158
PART II, Section C indicates those instances where coverage differs from this.
""'PART II, Section C outlines the dispute which exists with reference to this question.
""Rev. Act of 1918, § 238(a)[1], now J.R.C., § 901.
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In the middle of World War II, at a time when the United States
had tacked an excess profits tax on to increased regular corporate
rates, the Senate Finance Committee's attention was called to new
tax patterns which had been developed in Latin America, this being
the area to which American foreign trade had then become restricted because of war-time condi tions. 161 Several countries in that
area had encountered difficulty in determining the portion of an
American enterprise's profit which should be deemed to have its
source there. In some cases, tax administrators there found it impractical to attempt to unravel deductions covering expenses alleged
to have been incurred in the United States with reference to items
exported into Latin America. In other instances, the difficulty related to the proper allocation of profit derived from items exported
from Latin America to the States. International shipping operations
also presented difficult allocation problems. Because of these difficulties, some of the Latin American countries substituted more
simply designed special taxes for the income tax which the enterprise
would have otherwise borne. While at least some of these levies
were intended to produce an amount approximately equal to that
which the Latin American country believed should have been produced by their income tax in a normal year, the formal character of
the tax itself departed rather markedly from the typical net income
tax which had evolved in the States. That formal difference led the
Internal Revenue Service to deny that the taxpayer was entitled to
a credit, arguing that American tax concepts controlled the meaning
of the eligible categories, "income, war profits, and excess profits
taxes." 162
The Senate Finance Committee/ 63 and ultimately the Congress,
responded to this problem by providing that the eligible category
would also include "a tax paid in lieu of a tax upon income, war
profits or excess profits otherwise generally imposed" by any foreign
country. 164
This latter provision has been said to extend the credit to an
otherwise ineligible foreign tax only if the foreign country has in
force a general income tax to which the taxpayer would have been
subject in the absence of a special immunizing provision. 165 MoreTAXATION

'"1 Statement of Mitchell B. Carroll, Hearings, Committee on Finance, nth Cong.,
2d Sess. ( 1942) Vol. r, 206.
102
E.g., note the government's position in Seatrain Lines, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942),
and its subsequent nonacquiescence to the decision reached there. C.B. 1942-2, 31.
163
s. Rep. No. 1631, nth Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48, 131-132 ( 1942).
'"'Rev. Act of 1942, § 158 (f), now I.R.C., § 903.
166
l.T. Regs., §1.903-I(a).
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over, the government insists that the statutory phrase, "a tax paid
in lieu of" an otherwise eligible tax, means that adoption of the
former tax must have been the quid pro quo for that freedom which
the taxpayer received from the otherwise generally applied income
tax. 166 In other words, there must be a link between the two; if the
taxpayer's freedom from the general income tax was not attributable
to its payment of a special foreign tax, the in-lieu-of provision will
not apply. For example, the government denies that the provision
covers German turnover taxes on royalties received from Germany
even though such royalties were not subjected to the latter's income
tax. The denial was grounded on the fact that freedom from the
foreign income tax grew out of bilateral tax treaties designed to
prevent double income taxation rather than out of any arrangement
calling for substitution of a turnover tax. 167
Of more general interest than the in-lieu-of provision with respect
to the Common Market is the problem of identifying those taxes
which will be deemed "income taxes" under the original basic proviSIOn.

The courts have not fully agreed on the underlying standard or
yardstick to be used in determining whether or not a given tax will
be deemed an income tax. As previously noted, it is, on the one hand,
definitively settled that American, rather than foreign, income concepts control, 168 and as a consequence the typical gross receipts tax
will usually fall short of the mark. 169 For example, as was true of
the German turnover tax, 170 the Service has indicated that the
French registry tax imposed on the transfer of real estate by reference to the total purchase price is not eligible for the credit. 171
At the other extreme, it is also generally recognized that the foreign tax need not coincide at all points with our statutory concept.
For example, there may be some difference with respect to inclusions and deductions. 172 Indeed if this were not so, the congressional
aim in enacting the original credit provision would have been completely frustrated; all foreign income taxes differ in one degree or
166
Rev. Rul. 56-635, C.B. 1956-2, sox. Cf. Campania Embotelladora Coca-Cola, S.A.
v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. 1956) 139 F. Supp. 953 with Comm'r. v. American Metal Co., (2d Cir.
1955) 221 F.(2d) 134, cert. den., 350 U.S. 829, 76 S. Ct. 61 (1955).
181
Rev. Rul. 56-635, C.B. 1956-2, sox.
168
Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 58 S. Ct. 379 (1938).
169
Guantanamo & Western Railroad Co., 31 T.C. 842 (1959).
170
See note 167, supra.
171
Rev. Rul. 56-so7, C.B. 1956-2, 120. However, the tax may be deducted from gross
income by the person against whom it is imposed. Also, see G.C.M. 8478, C.B. IX-2,
224 ( 1930) re a special French turnover tax.
172
Helvering v. Campbell, (4th Cir. x944) 139 F. (zd) 865; LT. 4074, C.B. 1952-1, 87.
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another from the American statutory version. Uncertainty necessarily increases, however, as the differences become more marked;
for example, what result should be reached if the foreign tax reaches
gross income as distinguished from gross receipts, provision not
having been made for any of the more important deductions? One
court, pointing to the fact that the Sixteenth Amendment had been
held to embrace gross income, indicated that it was perhaps enough
that this constitutional norm be satisfied. 173 To this decision, however, the government filed a non-acquiescence. 174 On a later occasion,
the same court talked as though the American statutory concept
really constituted the basic point of reference, 175 only thereafter to
see the Service exclude a Mexican tax because "liability for the tax
arises at the time the operation to the tax takes place, whether or
not income in the [American J constitutional sense results." 176 Interestingly enough, these twists and turns came after the Supreme
Court, while deciding a related but admittedly different question
arising out of the credit provision, had stated in Biddle v. Commissioner:
The phrase "income taxes paid," as used in our revenue
laws, has for most practical purposes a well understood
meaning to be derived from an explanation of the statutes
which provide for the laying and collection of income
taxes. It is that meaning which must be attributed to it as
used in § 131 [now I.R.C., § 901 et seq. governing foreign tax credits ]. 177
That Court actually had before it a question which will be common, though quite probably less prejudicial, to all of the Common
Market withholding taxes on dividends. The issue was whether an
individual stockholder, at the point of receiving a dividend, was
entitled to a direct credit for his equitable share of the regular corporate tax suffered by the distributing company at the time its profits
were earned. While the stockholder, pursuant to British surtax provisions, "grossed up" the dividend by also including in his gross
income an allocate share of the corporate tax and then credited the
latter against his British surtax, the Court denied him an American
tax credit for his portion of the British corporate tax. That American tax laws-the basic yardstick-did not attribute taxes assessed
173

Seatrain Lines, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 1076 ( 1942 ).
""C.B. 1942-2, 31.
175
See Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Columbia, 26 T.C. 582 ( 1956) ; L. Helena
Wilson, 7 T.C. 1469 ( 1946).
178
Rev. Rul. 58-3, C.B. 1958-1, 263 at 264177 302 U.S. 573 at 579, 58 S. Ct. 379 (1938).

506

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

against the corporation to stockholders as such was said to be deCISIVe.

While the principle of the Biddle case, as applied to the United
Kingdom, was subsequently modified by treaty, 178 the point decided
there is still relevant to Common Market withholding taxes on
dividends paid by subsidiaries or by their sub-subsidiaries. Unless
foreign law treats those taxes as assessments against the distributee,
withholding serving as a collection device, so-called dividend taxes
paid by a foreign subsidiary on dividends distributed to the American parent will come under the deemed-paid credit provision, if any,
rather than under the direct credit provision. 179 And in like fashion,
the dividend tax withheld by a sub-subsidiary would come under the
special deemed-paid credit arrangement applicable to a sub-subsidiary's own tax, and would not be treated as a part of the distributeesubsidiary's own direct tax liability. 180
The same type of problem arises, of course, in connection with
the deduction allowed for other foreign taxes. For example, a foreign stamp tax is deductible only by the person against whom the
tax is imposed, even though another may actually suffer its economic
burden. 181
Unfortunately for those engaged in tax planning, the Internal
Revenue Service has not published many rulings directly responsive
to the foregoing questions in the setting of Common Market taxes.
This may be due to its realization that, at least theoretically, such
rulings would have a relatively short effective life in that each
amendment of a given foreign tax law would require reconsideration
of the government's position even though, in the end, it might not be
changed. 182 In any event, the paucity of published rulings plus the
possibility that amendments to a foreign law might lead the government to reconsider its position suggest that one engaged in planning
should, after making preliminary comparisons, seek advance rulings
before tentative plans are finalized.
In this connection, a final common problem involves the multiple
178

Article XIII; Rev. Rul. 56-289, C.B. 1956-1, 321.
Cf. Rev. Rul. 56-289, C.B. 1956-1, 321.
180
The credit arrangement, as it bears on a sub-subsidiary, is discussed in Section
E, Subsection 2, infra.
181
Rev. Rul. 56-507, C.B. 1956-2, 120. In holding that the French registry tax fell into
the deductible category, the Service avoided deciding on which person the tax was
imposed, saying only that it was deductible by the person who properly paid it
=E.g., since the last published ruling on the Netherlands income tax as applied to
dividends (I.T. 3371, C.B. 1940-1, 102), the tax pattern of that country has been
changed.
179
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base Common Market enterprise or trade taxes. On the one hand,
as previously noted, full credit-subject only to the per-country
limitation-may be enjoyed though the foreign tax includes within
its base some items which the United States does not in fact tax as
income. 183 For example, the Cuban income tax was not disqualified
even though it reached stock dividends/ 84 an item not in fact taxed
by the Internal Revenue Code 185 and perhaps even constitutionally
beyond its reach. 186 In explaining its favorable position in such cases,
the Internal Revenue Service has said:
When such a unified tax is imposed by a foreign country,
its predominant character will determine whether the tax
is an income tax and credit will be denied for the entire
amount or allowed for the entire tax subject to the limitations of section 904 of the Code [the per-country limitation] .187
This "ali-or-nothing" notion, geared to a balancing of the competing characteristics, will not be applied, however, if the foreign
assessment does not actually rest on a unified interdependent tax
base. Both the Tax Court and the Service have unraveled a multiple
base foreign assessment, qualifying the income tax component while
rendering ineligible the non-income tax factors. 188 One such instance
involved the German three factor enterprise tax, credit being allowed for the profit factor but not for that portion of the assessment
representing taxes on capital employed in the business and on wages
paid.ls9
Helvering v. Campbell, (4th Cir. 1944) 139 F.(2d) 865.
'"'LT. 4074, C.B. 1952·1, 87.
I.R.C., § 305.
186
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189 ( 1920). But see discussion to
the contrary in Wright, The Effect of the Source of Realized Benefits upon the Supreme
Court's Concept of Taxable Receipts, 8 STAN. L. REv. 164 ( 1956).
Contrary to the rationale of the stock dividend ruling was the decision denying a
credit to that part of a British income tax assessment based on the "annual value" of
real property. Woolworth Co. v. U.S., (2d Cir. 1937) 91 F. (2d) 973, cert. den., 302
U.S. 768, 58 S. Ct. 481 ( 1938). An earlier decision had allowed a credit for a somewhat similar tax imposed in France. Herbert Ide Keen, 15 B.T.A. 1243 (1929), approved in I.T. 2485, C.B. VIII-2, 252. Cf. denial of the credit for a so-called income
tax imposed by Canada on a legacy, L. Helena Wilson, 7 T.C. 1469 ( 1946).
187
Rev. Rul. 56-51, C.B. 1956-1, 320. Italics added.
188
Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Columbia, 26 T.C. 582 (1956) re a multiple
base income and property tax; Rev. Rul. s6-sx, C.B. 1956-1, 320.
186
Rev. Rul. 59-208, C.B. 1959-1, 192. The regular German corporate income tax
was viewed favorably credit-wise in I.T. 4026, C.B. 1950-2, 51; in Rev. Rul. 59-56,
C.B. 1959-1, 737 as applied to income derived from cutting and selling timber.
While the general income tax in Italy, known as "RM," was approved for credit
1&'!

186
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(e) Procedure in initially claiming the credit.-The Treasury designed Form I I 18 as the device by which to secure from corporations that information deemed essential to allowance and computation of the credit. 190 In claiming a credit for foreign taxes already paid, the receipt or sworn copy, 191 together with an accurate
translation, must accompany the form. In the absence of a receipt,
secondary evidence-such as a photostatic copy of the check or draft
-will suffice. 192 In the case of foreign taxes withheld from dividends, etc., secondary evidence-including submission of evidence
relating to the foreign country's rates and withholding proceduresmay be submitted absent direct evidence of the withholding. 193
Normally an appropriate copy of the foreign return must accompany Form I I I 8 if claim is made for accrued but unpaid foreign
taxes. 194 Excerpts from the taxpayer's accounts may serve, however,
as a substitute if need be.
The immediate future is likely to see some change in the amount
and type of information which must be furnished. In late 1960,
Congress adopted an additional policing measure, clearly establishing the right of the government to obtain from domestic parents
certain types of information relative to their foreign subsidiaries
and sub-subsidiaries, which information the Treasury had always
had the clear right to obtain with reference to foreign branches. 194a
Included among the types of information which the Treasury may
require are explanations regarding inter-company transactions,
balance sheets, and analyses of accumulated earnings and profits
covering even inclusions, deductions, etc. At this writing, regulations
implementing the new provision have not been issued.
Finally, with reference to accrued foreign taxes, the District Director may also condition allowance of the credit upon the submission of a proper bond.
Conversion problems as they affect the credit, and questions relating to the use of the cash and accrual methods, are dealt with
in Section E of PART IV.
purposes in S.M. I6I4A, C.B. IV-2, 203 (I925), certain other Italian taxes were denied
the benefit of a credit in S.M. 3982, C.B. IV-2, 204 (I925).
11 0
' LT. Regs., § I.905-2 also prescribes that Form I II6 will be used by individuals.
191
Or a certified or authenticated copy. I.T. Regs., § 1.905-2(a) (2).
190
I.T. Regs.,§ I.905-2(a) (2) and (b) (I).
""LT. Regs., § I.905-2 (b) (3).
1
"' A duplicate original or a certified, authenticated or sworn copy.
I.T. Regs.,
§ 1.905-2(a) (2).
1948
Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), § 6, adding a new § 6038 to the
Code, the old § 6038 being renumbered as § 6039.
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SECTION D. FURTHER FOREIGN AND AMERICAN TAX
EFFECTS WHERE FOREIGN PERMANENT
EsTABLISHMENT OR SuBsiDIARY IN ONE
MEMBER NATION EXPORTS DIRECTLY To
CusTOMERS IN ANOTHER

(a) Introductory note.-In developing plans for marketing
a product in more than one member nation, an American enterprise
may well consider, inter alia, creation of a foreign permanent establishment or subsidiary in one country with the expectation that it
will also export directly to customers in one or more other affiliates
of the Common Market. Potential tax implications of such an arrangement depend on: ( 1) whether the export profits will be taxed
by more than one member nation; ( 2) whether multiple turnover
taxes will be encountered; ( 3) whether one country, as distinguished from another, offers a more favorable direct tax climate;
and ( 4) the extent to which the increase in foreign taxes, if any,
will serve further to reduce American tax liability. These questions
are considered separately under the sub-topics which follow.
(b) Extent to which export profits will be taxed by the importing as well as the exporting member nation.-Under the respective national laws of member nations, the exporting country in which
the permanent establishment or subsidiary is located will, of course,
reach the entire profit made from direct export operations. For a
comparison of the direct tax load which each member nation would
impose if it were the exporting country, see the discussion and charts
in sub-topics (b) and (c) of Section B, supra.
With regard to the importing country, it should be noted at the
outset that the Common Market arrangement does not include a
multilateral tax treaty dealing with double taxation. Only bilateral
arrangements exist. The status of treaties of this sort is reflected in
Table III M.
Under the treaties in force or concluded but not yet ratified, the
importing countries will respond in a manner similar to that provided for in other bilateral tax treaties to which the United States
is a party. This means, according to the more detailed discussion in
PART II supra, that the importing country will not attempt to
reach any part of such profits unless a permanent establishment or
subsidiary has been established in the importing country.
The chart on the next page indicates that a treaty between
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III M

TREATY STATUS CHART
Meaning of Symbols
OFC-Old treaty in force, but to
F-In force
be replaced by new treaty
C-Concluded but not yet
which is concluded but not
in force
yet in force
N-Under negotiation
NONE-Treaty not even under negotiation
Lux em- Netherlands
bourg
Belgium France Germany Italy
F
F
F
Belgium
F
N
OFC
F
F
F
OFC
France
F
N
F
F
Germany
OFC
c
F
OFC
NONE
F
Italy
F,
NONE
F
F
NONE
Luxembourg
c NONE
Netherlands
F
F
F
Luxembourg, on the one hand, and Italy and the Netherlands, on
the other, is not even under negotiation. Accordingly, where the
former or the latter receives imports from the other, direct taxes
imposed by the two countries would depend entirely upon the character of their respective national laws. However, in the case of exports between Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the tax effect is
quite similar to that which would follow under a typical treaty.
While the exporting country will reach the entire profit, the importing country will not assess direct taxes if a permanent establishment has not been created there. A different consequence follows
in the case of exports from Luxembourg to Italy. The latter, as the
import country, will impose its income tax whether or not a permanent establishment exists there, provided the exporter is active in
Italy in a regular and habitual manner. While Luxembourg, as the
exporting country, will also tax the entire export profit, it will allow
a deduction against income for the amount of Italian taxes paid, if
any.
(c) Extent to which exports from one member nation to
customers in another will encounter multiple turnover taxes.-Generally speaking, as distinguished from customs duties, the turnover
tax imposed by a member nation at the point of import will not vary
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by reference to the different countries from which the goods could
have originated. Illustratively, the turnover tax imposed by Italy at
the point of import will be the same whether the goods originated in
the United States or in France. The one exception grew out of a
special formal economic relationship which includes Belgium and
Luxembourg. Pursuant to that arrangement, Belgium has agreed to
forego the increased turnover tax which it would otherwise assess at
the point products are imported from Luxembourg.
Earlier discussion in Section B of PART II indicated in some
circumstances that certain import countries (Nether lands, Germany, Luxembourg, and France) may assess one turnover tax at
the point of import and another at the point of delivery. In the
Netherlands, for example, reservation of title up to the point of
actual delivery will lead to a second taxable event (normal rate
. 7 5% at the point of delivery). The same result will follow in
Luxembourg and Germany if the goods are transported by the exporter's own vehicles ( 2% and 4% applied, respectively, if exporter
was the manufacturer or if he delivers the goods directly to private
consumers). The earlier mentioned discussion in Section B of
PART II, supra, also explores various means by which the second
taxable event might be avoided. While arrangements relating to delivery in France can also theoretically complicate the turnover tax
problem, the end result is less serious there because France's tax is
essentially one on added value with the consequence that the tax
paid on a second taxable event will be offset by a credit for the tax
paid on the first taxable event.
In all member nations, the exporting country will allow the export
transaction itself to be exempt from its turnover tax. But only four
of them (Netherlands, Germany, France, and Italy) quite generally
provide some kind of refund for turnover taxes paid in connection
with earlier transfers in the course of which the product was created.
While the German formula for computing the refund is less exact
than that of the Netherlands, in general both refund the turnover
taxes previously paid when the exporter bought the goods or the
raw materials out of which he manufactured the goods or, if imported by him, they refund the tax paid on that occasion. Under the
French system, on the other hand, the entire turnover tax burden
previously suffered by the product will be refunded, as well as that
portion of turnover taxes borne in connection with the acquisition of
capital goods which were used in manufacturing the exported item.
Administratively, it is easier for the French to calculate and refund
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the exact amount of turnover taxes previously borne by a product.
Under its turnover tax system, records of taxes previously borne
must be kept quite generally, for these serve as a credit against the
gross tax due at later stages, the aim being to reach only the value
added at any given stage. Finally, in Italy, factors reflecting a rough
approximation of turnover taxes previously paid are used in determining refunds allowed on special lists of various types of goods.
Belgium does not attempt at the point of export to make restitution of any turnover taxes previously paid. However, it is possible
to import goods or raw materials into Belgium tax free if they are
ultimately destined for export.
Luxembourg provides a modest restitution (. 5%) at the point
of export only in the case of certain metallic products.
(d) Conclusion: Foreign tax factors to consider if a foreign
permanent establishment or subsidiary is to engage in direct export
to customers in. other member nations.-All other things being
equal, differences in the direct tax structure of member nations may
well affect the location of a foreign permanent establishment or
subsidiary if it is also expected to export directly to customers in
other member nations. But in assessing the significance of direct
tax differences, the American enterprise may not be going far
enough, at least theoretically, if it compares just those burdens
which each member nation would impose if it were the exporting
country. Consideration should also be given to differences which
may appear if each were placed in the position of being an importing
country, instead of being the home of the permanent establishment
or subsidiary. The possible importance of this last feature is illustrated by a case where Italy is to be a significant market. In that
event, Luxembourg would suffer one disadvantage, at least in principle, if it were considered as the potential site for the permanent
establishment or subsidiary. It does not have an income tax treaty
with Italy. And as noted in sub-topic (b) supra, in some circumstances Italy, as an import country, would apply its income tax to
the trade profit. And Luxembourg would take account of the Italian
direct tax only by allowing a deduction from gross income, as distinguished from a credit against the Luxembourg tax itself.
In choosing the site for the permanent establishment or subsidiary, it is also necessary to compare turnover taxes of each member
nation, not just in terms of its possible role as an export nation, but
also by reference to its practices if cast in the role of an import nation. For example, from an export standpoint, France offers the
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most attractive turnover tax arrangement, because in principle all
turnover taxes paid prior to export are refunded. Thus on the export side, a permanent establishment or subsidiary located there
would encounter only the turnover taxes of those member nations
into which goods are imported. While on this same count, the
Netherlands and Germany constitute a close second and third to
France, Luxembourg would again, at least in principle, provide the
least attractive site. Turnover taxes paid there prior to the export
transaction itself are not refunded except in a limited amount in the
case of certain metallic products.
The foregoing discussion of direct as well as turnover taxes indicated that, in principle, Luxembourg suffered certain tax disadvantages as an export nation. In making comparisons, however, care
must be taken to distinguish disadvantages in principle from those
in fact. The two previously mentioned circumstances regarding
Luxembourg are in point. While it does not have an income tax
treaty with Italy, and though profits on exports to Italy might be
taxed twice in some circumstances, the prejudicial circumstances are
not in fact very great. Again, while Luxembourg does not refund
turnover taxes paid prior to the export transaction, it will be remembered from the discussion in Section B of this PART that, comparatively speaking, turnover taxes in Luxembourg are not very high.
Moreover, as previously mentioned in this Section, exports from
Luxembourg to Belgium enjoy particularly favorable turnover tax
treatment in the latter nation.
The difference between a disadvantage in principle and one in fact
can also be illustrated by the problem of resolving ambiguities in
the bilateral income tax treaties. In principle, the interpretative
process in France is less attractive than that of certain other countries from a taxpayer's viewpoint. There, more or less final interpretations are made by an administrative department, rather than
by the courts. In the general run of cases, however, it is not believed
that the effect has in fact been unfavorable.
(e) Extent to which the importing member nation's ta:'Ces
will serve to reduce American tax liability.-According to the previous discussion, the importing member nation will not normally impose an income tax on any portion of the profits derived in the exporting member nation from simple export arrangements. Therefore, the export arrangement will not normally further complicate
the computation of either the deemed-paid or direct credit for foreign income taxes in determining American tax liability, if any. The
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credit for income taxes paid the exporting member nation will be
available and determined, of course, in accordance with the principles described in Section C, supra. Subsection 2 of Section E, infra,
will indicate the complication which will arise should the importing
nation assess an income tax because it determines that a permanent
establishment was in fact created therein or if, as in Italy-with
respect to imports from Luxembourg, it is determined that the exporter was locally active in a regular and habitual manner.
To the limited extent the export arrangement may give rise to
multiple turnover tax liability, prices will be increased or profits
reduced. If a subsidiary corporation handled the export from the
first member nation, that part of its gross profit devoted to the increased turnover tax liability, if any, will never be declared as a
dividend and as a consequence will never be brought into the American parent's gross income.
If, on the other hand, the exports were from an American corporation's branch or permanent establishment in the first member
nation, the increased turnover tax liability would be deducted in
computing American "taxable income," provided the liability was
actually asserted by the foreign nation against the exporter and not
against the importing vendee. 195
SEcTION

E.

FuRTHER TAx IMPLICATIONS IF A

FoREIGN

OPERATING SUBSIDIARY IN ONE MEMBER
NATION CREATES ITs OwN PERMANENT
EsTABLISHMENT OR SuBsiDIARY IN ANOTHER
MEMBER NATION
SUBSECTION I. FURTHER FOREIGN TAX IMPLICATIONS

(a} A foreign subsidiary creates a permanent establishment
in another member nation: The direct tax problem.-The discussion in Section D, supra, indicated that export profits realized by a
subsidiary domiciled in one member nation would not normally be
taxed by other member nations to which the products were exported.
However, if the exporting subsidiary goes on to create its own
permanent establishment in the importing member nation, the latter's income tax will quite generally be applied to that part of the
total profit which is properly attributable to the permanent establishment. While there are minor variations in bilateral tax treaties
1

"' The problem associated with the "liability" question is illustrated in Rev. Rul.
s6-5o7, c.B. 1956-z, uo.
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and relevant national laws with regard to the standards which will
be applied in determining whether a permanent establishment has
been created, reference to the general discussion of definitions in
Section A of PART II and Section B of this PART must suffice for
purposes of this study. Reference is also made to Section B of this
PART for a comparison of the direct tax loads which each Common Market country would impose on such an establishment if subject to its jurisdiction.
The more important question is whether the profit of that permanent establishment will also be taxed by the quite separate domicile
of the foreign subsidiary which created it. Such a second tax is one
of the targets of bilateral tax treaties which are in force, or have
been executed but not ratified, between various European countries.
The status of those treaties is indicated in Section D, supra. Under
such treaties, where the domicile of the subsidiary has a progressive
rate structure (see PART I), the usual scheme is for that country
to take account of the foreign permanent establishment's profit only
for the purpose of determining the rate bracket on the subsidiary's
other income. In short, the applicable percentage figure is determined by reference to the total income, but is actually applied only
with reference to income other than that earned by and attributable
to the foreign permanent establishment.
In the absence of a treaty precluding double taxation, one must
look to unilateral provisions, if any, to mitigate the double tax possibility. Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands have incorporated
such in their national laws. Belgium reduces by %ths the normal
rate which it would otherwise apply under its professional tax to the
income of the foreign permanent establishment. Germany responds
to the problem by allowing a tax credit. The same could be said with
respect to the Netherlands, though relief there will normally be
more favorable, leading in most instances to an exemption of foreign profits. Theoretically, the Netherlands would compute the
amount of the credit without regard to the actual tax burden assessed on the foreign income by the other member nation. The
credit would be determined by reference to the amount of the Dutch
tax rate on the foreign income. As a practical matter, this generally
relieves the foreign profit from the Dutch tax, for the Dutch rate
schedule has little progression.
Although France does not have any specific unilateral relief provisions, the result there (and to some extent in Italy) will correspond for all practical purposes to the situation in the Nether lands,
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for in principle only profits from domestic sources are taxed by
France.
As previously indicated, any member nation in which the permanent establishment is located would apply its regular tax load to the
income attributable to the establishment. Table III N indicates the
instances where the domicile of the subsidiary which created the
establishment would free that same income from double taxation,
either through operation of a bilateral treaty or unilateral provision. The expression, "tax free," is used in Table III N in a more
or less loose sense. In the instance where the domicile of the subsidiary has a progressive tax, that expression ("tax free") is used
even though the domicile of the subsidiary would take the foreign
profit into account in determining the rate which would be applied
to the subsidiary's Dther income.
Immunity which might otherwise exist from a double tax will be
prejudiced, of course, if the two countries do not allocate the overall
profit in the same fashion. When this problem is encountered, the
matter must be thrashed out with the proper tax authorities, for
determination of a proper allocation is largely a question of fact.
(b) A foreign subsidiary creates its own subsidiary in another member nation: The direct tax problem.-If the first operating subsidiary which the American enterprise created in one of the
Common Market countries (assume country A) establishes its own
second tier subllidiary in yet another member nation (assume country B), the profits earned by the second tier subsidiary (No. 2)
will be taxed to it only by country B, its domicile. Direct taxes which
each member nation would impose on that second subsidiary if
domiciled therein are compared in Section B, supra. Account is also
taken there of differences which may arise in subsidiary No. z's own
tax load depending on whether its profits are retained in whole or
in part.
At that point when the second subsidiary distributes profits in the
form of dividends, there is the further question of whether both
countries will assess a tax against the recipient, subsidiary No. 1.
Any tax imposed on the latter by the distributing subsidiary's domicile would, of course, be handled on a withholding basis, as in the
case of other non-residents. Table III 0 indicates whether and to
what degree the two countries would seek to tax the recipient by
reference to the dividend.
In determining the total direct tax costs, the tax exacted from the
recipient of the dividend must be combined with the tax load orig-
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inally imposed on the distributing subsidiary by its own domicile.
Appraisal of the practical significance of the figures in the above
chart would require, illustratively, that account be taken of the fact
that Belgium and Germany would have assessed relatively low direct taxes against the distributing subsidiary itself, if domiciled
there. And in all circumstances, it must be remembered that the recipient's tax base-the dividend-will be in an amount less than the
distributing subsidiary's original taxable income even if the latter
company distributed all of its available profit. That portion of its
taxable income used to discharge its own tax liability to its domicile
would not, of course, be available for distribution.
TAXATION

(c) Further foreign turnover tax implications.-In keeping
with the principles discussed in Section D, supra, an export transaction from subsidiary No. I in country A to its own subsidiary in
country B will be free of the export country's turnover tax. Also as
indicated in that Section, the export subsidiary can obtain restitution
of turnover taxes previously paid the export country at earlier
stages of the product's development, this restitution being more or
less complete except in Belgium and Luxembourg. While only the
* According to a new treaty.
**According to an old treaty.
***According to a new treaty, otherwise rs%.
198
As is indicated in the next paragraph, the regular corporate income tax imposed
by France will have little impact when a French parent company receives a dividend.
However, it is true that the French withholding tax of 24% must be paid when the
dividend is received, though at a reduced rate of 12% when received from Belgium
and, when received from Luxembourg, less a credit for the Luxembourg withholding
tax. But upon immediate distribution by the French parent company to its own stockholders, the withholding tax will not again be assessed. The stockholders are even
granted a credit of the full 24% against the general income tax on their total incomes
(including the dividend in question). Since other countries, in the absence of a tax
treaty, would impose a withholding tax on this second event (see Section B, supra),
i.e., when the parent distributes the dividend, an overall comparison would lead to
the conclusion that the French withholding tax should be disregarded or treated, at
least, as a prepayment of the kind of tax due elsewhere when the parent distributes a
dividend.
As stated above, the regular French corporate income tax will have little effect
when the parent company first received the dividend. It will be levied on only 25%
of the dividends received by the parent. This tax is designed to take into account the
fact that a certain amount of the parent's overhead costs, though deducted by it from
its profits, actually related to a dividend which was not, in principle, otherwise taxable.
109
The 36% will apply if the parent company does not immediately distribute the
amount as a dividend to its own shareholder~.
-Treaty provisions between the two countries limit Luxembourg as follows: For
purposes of the Luxembourg corporate income tax, only the net amount received by the
Luxembourg corporation from the German subsidiary may be taken into account, i.e.,
the 75% which remains after the German withholding tax is applied. Only so% of
that net is then subject to the Luxembourg corporate income tax. However, the futl
net is subject to the Luxembourg business or enterprise tax.
Symbols:
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importing country's turnover tax is generally encountered under the
foregoing arrangement, the chance of multiplying that tax is greater
in this circumstance than when shipments are made from country A
direct to independent customers in country B. The import or first
taxable transaction will be followed by a second event, i.e., delivery
by the receiving permanent establishment or subsidiary to its customers; in principle, that inland delivery will usually be treated as a
second taxable event.
One might suppose that the rate applied to that second transaction would quite generally vary depending, inter alia, on whether
the operation in country B was handled by a permanent establishment or a subsidiary. Assume, e.g., that the first subsidiary in country A had manufactured the product, shipping it to its sales office, a
permanent establishment in country B. Since a permanent establishment is an extension of the manufacturing company in country A,
delivery by the sales office to its own customers would be subjected
in some countries to the rate applicable to manufacturers. A sales
subsidiary in country B would usually be treated, however, as an independent entity for turnover tax purposes as well as other legal
purposes. In other words, the rate applicable to wholesalers would
usually be applied to its delivery, assuming this was not to the ultimate consumer. The two patterns just outlined have not always
been adhered to, however, by Common Market countries.
Germany has frequently denied independent status to sales subsidiaries for the purpose of determining turnover tax rates, and in
this circumstance has frequently applied the normal 4% manufacturer's rate, rather than the I% wholesaler's rate, to the sales subsidiary's deliveries.
The Netherlands has followed the opposite tack; delivery by a
sales office, whether a permanent establishment or a subsidiary, is
deemed to have been made by a "dealer" subject to the %% rate,
assuming the sale is not to the ultimate consumer in which case delivery is free of tax. This result stems from the fact that the first
import transaction was deemed equal to a manufacturer's sale
within the Netherlands.
Italy and Belgium do not normally impose different rates on
manufacturers and wholesalers. Accordingly, the problem noted
above is not significant in that locale.
(d) Conclusion: Choosing locale of foreign parent subsidiary, as affected by foreign tax considerations.-Comparison of the
tax costs associated with the selection of a locale for a foreign subsidiary which is to create its own permanent establishment or sub-
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sidiary in another member nation will be much less complex if the
two will not be engaging in business transactions, such as exports,
with each other. If in that circumstance, a permanent establishment
is to he created in the second member nation, one need only integrate
the effect of that nation's direr! taxes with the direct taxes, if any,
of the foreign subsidiary's domicile. If the latter of these two tax
problems could be viewed in isolation, the ideal solution would he
found in a fiscally neutral country, i.e., one which \vould not impose
any direct tax on profits earned by a permanent establishment maintained elsewhere. From the chart in subtopic (a), supra) it appears,
because of bilateral treaties or unilateral provisions, that France,
Italy, and the Netherlands could provide such a neutral forum,
with Belgium and Germany providing somewhat less attractive
settings. It would be a mistake, however, to view the tax position of
the controlling subsidiary's domicile in isolation. Indeed, when the
tax costs of the two countries are integrated, a non-neutral country
may actually furnish a more attractive domicile for the controlling
subsidiary. Illustrative is the case where the controlling subsidiary's
own earned income makes up the great preponderence of the total
income earned by the two. In that circumstance, the fact that a country's tax on income earned domestically is lower than elsewhere may
be more important in choosing the domicile for the controlling subsidiary than the fact that the country does impose some tax on
income earned by a permanent establishment maintained elsewhere.
This principle is illustrated in Table III P by comparing the total
direct tax costs if non-neutral Belgium, rather than neutral Netherlands, were chosen as the site for a subsidiary which will earn
$500,000 from its own activities, its permanent establishment in
country X earning only $50,000.
The charted comparison indicates in the foregoing circumstance
that, if all other things were equal, Belgium would provide a much
more advantageous site for the controlling subsidiary. Table III Q
illustrates that a different result can be reached, however, if one
assumes the opposite facts, i.e., that the income earned by country
X's permanent establishment (say, $45o,ooo) will far exceed that
earned by the controlling subsidiary (assume $ roo,ooo) from its
own activities.
The two tables indicate that while Belgium was preferred as the
site for the controlling subsidiary in the first assumed situation, the
Netherlands would be preferred in the second, if all other things
were equal. The fact that there are varying degrees in between the
two situations suggests that absolute comparisons cannot actually
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be made; results will differ depending on the precise circumstances.
The same is true if the controlling subsidiary creates a subsidiary
in country X instead of a permanent establishment. Effective comparisons can only be made on the basis of certain assumptions, like
those noted above. Here, however, it may also be necessary to take
account of an additional tax on dividends. With reference to this circumstance, the Netherlands is the only neutral country, as is indicated in the charted comparison in subtopic (b), supra.
It was assumed throughout the foregoing discussion that the two
affiliates would not indulge in business transactions with each other,
such as exports from the parent subsidiary to the organization which
it created in country X. While the direct tax loads will remain the
same if such exports are contemplated, bilateral tax treaties, orin their absence-unilateral provisions, require that the prices
charged for products or services coincide for tax purposes with
those which would be associated with transactions entered into at
arm's length by independent companies. Turnover taxes would also
complicate the comparisons in this setting, in the manner described
in sub-topic (c), supra.
SUBSECTION 2. INTEGRATING FOREIGN AND AMERICAN
INCOME TAX IMPLICATIONS

(a) Introductory note.-The method of determining an
American company's gross income will not be further affected by the
question of whether its own operating subsidiary in one Common
Market country creates a permanent establishment or a subsubsidiary in a second member nation. The parent's gross will still
be dependent upon dividend payments from its own subsidiary.
And everything said in Section C, supra, and in PART IV, infra,
with reference to this question would be applicable here. In terms
of principles, the prime previously undiscussed complication created
by the subsidiary's extension of facilities into a second member
nation relates to the credit for foreign income taxes. Since this will
be affected in different ways, depending on whether a branch or
sub-subsidiary is created in the second Common Market country,
the two arrangements will be discussed under separate sub-topics
below.
While the succeeding Section F will then go on to compare the
principles governing these two-tier foreign arrangements with
those applicable to the American parent's own establishment of
"sister" foreign facilities, it should be noted here that the former's
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practical advantages are actually similar, though not identical on
all counts, to those associated with the use of a pure foreign holding (or "base") company created to own operating facilities.
Reference is made, therefore, to Section G, infra, for an analysis
of those practical advantages, though in the setting of a foreign
base company arrangement.
(b) Credit for foreign taxes where foreign subsidiary
crt:ates own permanent establishment in a second member nation.
-\Vhere a foreign operating subsidiary creates its own permanent
establishment (branch) in a yet different member nation, the
initial computation of the credit for foreign income taxes is not
affected. The provisions authorizing both direct and deemed-paid
credits are addressed to the income, war profits, and excess profits
taxes of "any" 201 foreign country, not, in our illustration, just to
those taxes of the first member nation in which the American
parent's own subsidiary was incorporated. Illustratively, when the
parent receives a dividend from the subsidiary, the deemed-paid
credit allowed by § 902 would be computed in the first instance
by multiplying the aggregate foreign income taxes of the subsidiary
by the traditional fraction, the dividend being the numerator, and
the pre-tax 202 accumulated profits being the denominator.
The literal language of the per-country limitation in § 904203
is not so easily applied. That provision expressly limits the total
credit for taxes paid "any country" by a fraction, the numerator
generally being the "taxpayer's taxable income from sources within
such country," with the denominator being the taxpayer's entire
taxable income. 204 Of what significance is it that the subsidiary
in our illustration would pay income taxes to more than one foreign country, while the American parent would actually derive
foreign "taxable income" (a dividend) from only one such country?
Admittedly, it was originally contemplated that the per-country
limitation would generally be applied on a country-by-country basis.
But it is equally true that the deemed-paid credit provision itself
generally contemplated that an American parent would enjoy some
credit with respect to the foreign income taxes paid by a foreign
subsidiary to u any foreign country." 205 In resolving the interpretative difficulty posed by the statutory language used in connection
201

I.R.C., §§ 901 (b) (x) and 902(a).
"""The term "pre-tax accumulated profits" is used here to mean accumulated profits
after deducting all direct taxes except those types which qualify for the credit.
""'Discussed generally in Subsection 1 (f) of Section C, supra.
'""The numerator cannot exceed the taxpayer's "entire taxable income."
""'I.R.C., § 902(a).
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with the per-country limitation, the Treasury has neutralized any
prejudice which the parent otherwise might have suffered as a
result of the fact that the dividend had its source in but one country,
that in which the subsidiary was incorporated. To that same country,
the Treasury has attributed all of the income, war profits, and excess
profits taxes paid or deemed to have been paid by that subsidiary
even though such taxes may have been imposed by and paid to
two or more different foreign countries. 206 In effect, this permits
an averaging of the foreign tax loads imposed by two or more foreign countries, thus permitting some escape from the per-country
limitation in that instance where one of the foreign countries had
a higher, and the other had a lower, effective rate than the United
States. The result is similar to that which would follow if an
overall limitation, rather than per-country limitation, were applied
to the credit. 206a
(c) Foreign operating subsidiary creates own subsidiary
in a second member nation.-Until World War II, the deemed-paid
credit allowed an American corporation was confined to the foreign income taxes of its own foreign subsidiary; neither were
"deemed," for purposes of the American credit, to have paid the
foreign income taxes of a second tier foreign subsidiary, the stock
of which was held by the first subsidiary. At that time, at least for
deemed-paid credit purposes, it made greater sense if the parent's
own foreign subsidiary created a permanent establishment instead
of a subsidiary in the second European country. Or the latter's
income taxes could also have been brought within the sweep of
the deemed-paid credit provision if the parent itself created a
second "sister" subsidiary there.
For a variety of reasons, a parent organization often preferred
to handle its affairs in the second country through an entity incorporated there. But only if the latter was an unincorporated branch
of the parent's first subsidiary was it easy to satisfy both of two
succeeding tax aims: ( 1) to use the first facility's profits to develop
and expand the second facility without having to route those profits
through the American parent's gross income; and ( 2) in a later
distribution stage, to enjoy a deemed-paid credit for the income
208

I.T. Regs.,
""'• By virtue
the same result
all" limitation.
the per-country
infra.

§ 1.902-1 (c).
of legislation enacted in late 1960, the American parent could reach
by electing to submit its foreign tax credit to the newly revived "overIts ramifications, and the differences which may arise between it and
limitation in a multiple-tier setting, are discussed in Sections F and G
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taxes of the second European country. Only the second of these
could be achieved if the parent itself formed the second subsidiary,
absent some sort of loan arrangement between the two subsidiaries.
In the middle of World War II, Congress resolved an American
corporation's planning problem by extending the "deemed-paid"
concept. It provided that a foreign subsidiary, upon receipt of
a dividend from its own foreign incorporated subsidiary, "shall
be deemed to have paid" a portion of the latter's income tax, the
fraction to be of the same type as that previously used in connection
with the parent's previously existing deemed-paid credit for the
first subsidiary's tax. 207
When initially enacted, the first subsidiary was deemed to have
paid a fractional part of the second subsidiary's tax only if the
former owned u all the voting stock (except qualifying shares)"
in the second subsidiary. 208 However, in 195o-in connection with
the tax hearings designed to give further impetus to the Point 4
Program, Congress was urged by business to relax this requirement.209 The consequent reduction coincided with a downgrading
in the proportion of ownership which the parent had to hold in
the first subsidiary in order to be deemed to have paid a fractional
part of its income taxes. A reduction to 10% in the latter situation 210 was complemented by changing the word "all" to "so%"
with reference to the voting stock which one foreign corporation
had to hold in the sub-subsidiary. 211 Indeed, these limitations were
assertedly retained only because of certain "administrative" problems.212
Under the two deemed-paid arrangements, if the profits of both
subsidiaries suffered the same amount of foreign tax, and if both
distributed all of their after-tax profits, American gross income
and the parent's deemed-paid credit would be equal to what they
would have been if the first subsidiary had earned the entire foreign
profit. Assume for example that each earned $Ioo,ooo on which
""'Rev. Act of 1942, § 131(£) (2), now as revised, I.R.C., § 902(b).
'"'"Rev. Act of 1942, § 131 (f) (2).
909
For example, see statement of Mitche.ll B. Carroll, Hearings, Committee on Ways
and Means, Sxst Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) Vol. 3, 623 at 6z6.
""'Rev. Act of 1951, § 332(a), now I.R.C., § 902(a).
211
Rev. Act of 1951, § 332(b), now I.R.C., § 902(b).
212
S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., xst Sess. 55 ( 1951). These administrative difficulties
did not appear quite so formidable to a later inquiring House committee. In 1960 the
Committee on Ways and Means proposed, and the House agreed, to reduce the so%
requirement as it related to a sub-subsidiary to 2oo/o, the sponsoring Committee stating
that this would "provide fully for any administrative problems." H. Rep. No. 2100,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960) re H.R. n,68r. When the session closed, the Senate had
not reached consideration of this bill.

52 8
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET
a foreign tax of 26% ($26,ooo by each) was suffered. The first
subsidiary would be "deemed to have paid" $19,240 of its own
subsidiary's foreign tax, computed as follows:

$ 2G,ooo X

$74,000 (Dividend)
$1
$1oo,ooo (Pre-tax Profit) =
9' 240

The first subsidiary's total foreign tax would now be $4 5,240
(own tax of $26,ooo plus deemed-paid tax of $19,240) for which
the American parent would get a deemed-paid credit of $38,480,
computed as follows:
$

4 5' 240

X

$148,ooo (Dividend
To Parent)
_ $
8 80
$174,000 (First Subsidiary's- 3 ' 4
Own Pre-tax Profit)

2 13

If the first subsidiary had earned the entire profit of $2oo,ooo,
suffering a 26% tax ( $52,000), the parent's deemed-paid credit
would be computed as follows :
$52,ooo X

$148,ooo (Dividend)
$2oo,ooo (Subsidiary's
Pre-tax Profit)

The one-tier and two-tier deemed-paid arrangements will not
give rise to like results, however, if there is a variation in the
amount of tax suffered by the two facilities. In such case, the American parent could actually enjoy a slightly greater ultimate tax advantage from the sub-subsidiary or two-tier deemed-paid arrangement than from the older single subsidiary or one-tier deemed-paid
arrangement. The reason is the same as that which was responsible
for the ultimate tax advantage which a subsidiary arrangement
enjoyed over a branch operation even in that case where all aftertax profits are remitted. 214 In a period when the subsidiary and
sub-subsidiary distribute all of their respective after-tax profits,
that portion of the sub-subsidiary's profits devoted to its own income tax never becomes gross income to the first subsidiary. Though
this exclusion is economically equivalent to a deduction for that
tax, the first subsidiary will still be deemed to have paid a part
of that tax for credit purposes.
Even if an American enterprise intended only to have one subsidiary which in turn would have but one subsidiary of its own,
"'"A somewhat ~imilar example is contained in H. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., zd
Sess. 101 (1942).
m• See discussion in Section C, supra.
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the range of possible tax patterns and rate relationships in the
Common Market is so varied as to preclude, at least in this type
of study, any really meaningful comparison of the integrated
American and foreign direct tax costs with respect to all of the location possibilities. With only the simple two-tier organizational
structure described above, there would be 36 location possibilities
within the Common Market. Comparisons, to be meaningful in
the sense of being generally applicable, would have to go on to accommodate the infinite variety in relative sizes of the two facilities.
And to the variety of rate structures which could be applied directly
on operating profits, one would have to add the variation in rate
patterns which might be applied to the inter-corporate dividendsin terms of the withholding taxes imposed by the sub-subsidiary's
domicile as well as any tax which might be imposed by the distributee's own domicile at the time it received the dividend and
again when the net was re-distributed to the American parent. On
this one count, for example, only if the sub-subsidiary is incorporated in Italy, and the parent's own subsidiary is in the Netherlands, will there be no tax on dividends as such, except that imposed
by the United States when the parent ultimately receives a distribution. But even in this setting, as in certain others, the fact that
some Italian direct taxes would not seem to qualify for the credit
further complicates the matter.
With reference to this general arrangement, however, it should
be noted that-as in the case where the first subsidiary created a
permanent establishment in the second member nation-those qualifying taxes of the sub-subsidiary deemed paid by the parent's own
subsidiary will be treated, for purposes of the per-country limitation, as though imposed on the latter by its own country of incorporation.215 Here too, then, an averaging of the foreign tax loads
is in effect substituted for the per-country approach in determining
the limitation on the credit for foreign taxes.
SECTION F. TAX IMPLICATIONS

IF

AN AMERICAN ENTER-

PRISE CREATES "SISTER" FOREIGN PERMANENT
EsTABLISHMENTS OR FoREIGN SuBSIDIARIES

(a) Introductory note.-The discussion in Section D, supra,
indicated that double taxation within the Common Market itself
would almost never arise in that instance where an American
enterprise's Common Market subsidiary exported directly to customers in other member nations. Business reasons, however,
"'" I.T. Regs., §

1.902-1

(c).

530

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

might make it desirable to have some sort of facility in the second
member nation. Accordingly, the immediately preceding Section
E considered the tax implications where the first operating subsidiary created its own permanent establishments (branches) or
subsidiaries in one or more of the other member nations. That same
Section indicated, however, that double taxation within the Common Market itself would be one cost associated with a few choices
of locale in that instance where the Common Market subsidiary
created its own permanent establishment in another member nation.
That same result would follow in a few more instances if the
first Common Market subsidiary created a subsidiary in the second
member nation instead of creating a permanent establishment. Because certain choices of locale in these last two instances would
involve double taxation within the Common Market itself, the
total European direct tax load might exceed the American rate on
dividends eventually received by the American parent. In that
event, the unilateral relief provisions (a credit) in the Internal
Revenue Code would be inadequate to avoid further double taxation.
Other difficulties may also be associated with the tier or chain
arrangement. As is more fully explained in the discussion of base
company operations in Section G, infra, the American parent might
encounter some difficulty in availing itself of the special credit
provision with respect to any royalties received from sub-subsidiaries. Also, as is more fully explained there, if the first operating subsidiary created permanent establishments in the other member nations, losses, if any, incurred by the latter would prejudice
the opportunity to take a full credit for income taxes paid in those
countries where the operations were profitable.
For the foregoing reasons, consideration might be given to a
different type of organization, as follows:

Common Market Permanent
Establishments or Subsidiaries
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(b) Foreign direct ta:us re a sister" facilities created by
an American parent.-The charted arrangement above, involving
creation by the American enterprise itself of "sister" foreign
permanent establishments or subsidiaries, would completely avoid
double taxation within the Common Market itself. The foreign
direct tax implications would be identical to those discussed supra, in
Section B.
If the American enterprise also contemplates direct exports to
customers in those same member nations, an appropriate part of
the export profit will generally be attributed to the permanent establishment located in the importing country. Sub-topic (b) of the
preceding Section B compares the differences in tax loads which
would be imposed by the various member nations in this circumstance. This same problem will arise if Common Market subsidiaries
are used to represent the American enterprise in member nations,
for in fact such a representative will usually constitute a permanent
establishment. In this connection, see the discussions in PART II
and in Section B of this PART III.

(c) American tax implications: In general.-Subject to one
basic exception which arises only if a domestic parent so elects,
the American tax implications associated with creation by a domestic parent of "sister" permanent establishments or subsidiaries in
different Common Market countries would be governed by the
principles described in the preceding Section C where discussion
actually centered on creation of but one foreign facility designed
only to serve one member nation. Illustratively, as distinguished
from the chain arrangement discussed in the immediately preceding
Section F, the profits of sister facilities in different countries would
be isolated, one from the other, in applying the per-country limitation on the credit. 216 Losses incurred by a branch in one country
would not prejudice allowance of a full credit for foreign income
taxes paid by a profitable branch in another country.217
Another advantage, where sister subsidiaries are established,
involves the American parent's opportunity, without difficulty, to
avail itself of the special credit allowed under certain circumstances
for royalties received in lieu of dividends. 217a
Tax-wise, the two most general shortcomings of this arrangement
involve, first, the fact that, absent some inter-subsidiary loan ar216

I.R.C., § 904, discussed more fully in Section C, Subsection r, supra.
Discussed more fully in the succeeding Section G.
:l17a/d.

217

53 2
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET
rangement, profits of one subsidiary could not be used to expand
another without routing that profit through the American parent's
income ledger. If branches are used, this would not be an additional
difficulty, however; their respective incomes would be includible by
the American parent whether or not remitted. The second disadvantage grows out of the application of the per-country limitation
on the credit; that limitation would prevent averaging for the purpose of leveling out the different high- and low-tax countries, such
as Germany and Belgium. However, by virtue of new legislation
enacted in late I 960, this result can be avoided if the taxpayer
chooses, by election, to substitute an "overall" limitation for the
per-country limitation, as is more fully discussed in the immediately
succeeding sub-topic.
(d) American tax implications: The alternative "overall"
limitation.-Congress has not "hewn a straight path" with reference to the kind of limitation which should be applied to the credit
for foreign taxes. The story 217 b goes back to I 9 I 8 when, for a
period of three years, a corporation's affairs were viewed on a
world-wide basis, the credit then being so designed that foreign
taxes imposed at rates exceeding those prevailing in the United
States could reduce American tax liability on domestic income. In
terms of net effect, a world-wide average rate was actually applied.
Then for eleven years, from I92I to I932, corporate affairs were
divided into two parts, domestic and foreign, with an "overall"
limitation on the credit serving to prevent total foreign taxes,
wherever paid, from reducing the American tax on domestic income.217c The net effect, with respect to the limitation, was to permit
a taxpayer to average out the high and low foreign income taxes,
a disadvantage, generally speaking, only where losses were encountered in one of the foreign countries. Then for the succeeding
twenty-two years, I932 to I954, two different sets of divisions were
applied to a corporation's affairs; its activities were first divided
into two parts, domestic and foreign, to the same end as that noted
above. Then they were re-divided on a per-country basis, the aim
being to prevent the taxes of one country which might have a higher
effective rate than the United States from being averaged with the
rates of a low-tax country in determining the limit on the credit for
foreign taxes paid the high-tax country. 217d Only this latter per217
217

"
•

2174

Discussed more fully in Section C, Subsection 1 (f), supra.

Rev. Act of I9ZI, § 238 (a).
Rev. Act of 1932, ~ 131(b).

533
country limitation survived the comprehensive revision of the Code
in 1954, the overall limitation being eliminated. 217 e The asserted
reason related to the disadvantage which some taxpayers suffered
as a result of the overall limitation, i.e., to the previously mentioned
fact that losses incurred in one foreign country were averaged with
profits in another country, thus increasing the chance of a reduction
in the American credit for taxes actually paid the foreign country
where profits had been reaped. Congress concluded that this tended
to discourage companies from using their foreign profits to open
new businesses in countries in which they had not previously carried
on business. 217f
During the period when only the per-country limitation was in
vogue (I 9 54 to I 960), it was still possible, as noted in Subsection z
of the preceding Section E, for an enterprise to organize its affairs
so as to avoid the strict impact of the country-by-country approach.
As noted there, where the American parent had its first foreign
operating subsidiary create its own permanent establishments or
sub-subsidiaries in other countries, for purposes of the per-country
limitation, the American parent's entire income from the multicountry foreign operation (dividends) was deemed to have been
derived from the country in which the first tier foreign subsidiary
was incorporated, thus permitting what was in effect an averaging
of high- and low-tax countries. The immediately succeeding Section G
indicates that a like result was reached where ownership of the
foreign permanent establishments or subsidiaries was consolidated
under one foreign holding company.
In 1960, Congress re-examined the "limitations" question. Embarrassing any mutually exclusive congressional choice between the
two methods ("per-country" and "overall") was the fact, as noted
above, that for years taxpayers had enjoyed what was tantamount
to an election between the two limitations; organizational form, not
substance, made the difference.
In late 1960, the appropriate House and Senate committees
agreed to resolve the problem by writing an election into the law
itself, giving corporations a choice to conform either to the percountry or to an overall limitation. Those which had already been
subject to the per-country limitation were given the unrestricted
right to shift, at their own election. 217 g While the Treasury DepartTAXATION

I.R.C., § 904.
S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1954).
7
"' gPub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) ~ 1, amending I.R.C., § 90f.
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ment had objected earlier to a somewhat similar proposal-primarily because of the revenue loss involved, 217 h it indicated a willingness to accept the Senate's variation on the House committee's
proposal. 2171 Whereas the House would have permitted a corporation to shift from one limitation to the other every five years, the
Senate would permit a company which invoked the overall limitation
to shift to the per-country limitation, or later again shift back to the
overall limitation, only with the consent of the Treasury. 217 J While
the Senate's restrictions were written into the law as enacted, 217k
the damaging thrust-from a taxpayer's viewpoint-will probably
be cushioned because of the Senate committee's expressed view that
such consent should be granted by the Treasury whenever there are
basic changes in the taxpayer's business, such as where taxpayers
are "about to enter substantial operations in a new foreign country
and anticipate that the operations in that country will prove risky
with the possibility of their resulting in a loss for a number of
years," 2171 in which case the taxpayer who previously had invoked
the overall limitation might now want to shift to the per-country
limitation. It was also contemplated that the shift back to the percountry limitation would be permitted where "substantial losses are
realized with respect to existing investments because of nationalization, expropriation, or war." 217m
Assuming administrative compliance with the Senate committee's
views as to when a further shift will be permitted after the taxpayer
has once elected to come under the overall limitation, such shifts,
assuming satisfaction of those standards, can presumably be accomplished on the basis of "hindsight." More specifically, assuming
Treasury consent can be obtained because there has been the type
of operational change contemplated by the Senate committee, the
shift from or back to the overall limitation may be made with
respect to any taxable year for which the statute of limitations has
not yet run on refund rights. 217n
This possibility of resorting to hindsight, i.e., making an election
retroactive where the standard requisite to further change was
actually met in an earlier year, may cushion in at least one circum217
h Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, May 6, 1959, in '59 Vol. 6 CCH para. 6469.
mTt S. Rep. No. 1393, 86th Cong., 2d SeRs. 3 (1960).
217
l I d., at 2.
217
k Note 217g, supra, subsection 1 (b).
2171
Note 217i, supra, 5·
217m Jd.
2178
Note 217g, supra, subsection I (b).
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stance another generally applicable and quite significant restriction.
While the House committee would have permitted excess unused
credits of a per-country-limitation year to be carried forward or
back into an overall-limitation year as well as into a per-country
year, though not vice versa/ 170 the Senate 217 P and ultimately the
Congress decided not to permit any such commingling between the
two different types of years. 217 q Where, at the time a basic change
in operations occurs, it is not clear that a further shift to a different
limitation should be invoked, it will be at least theoretically possible
to change later, on a retroactive basis but within the refund period,
if as events turn out the taxpayer's old limitation resulted in unused
excess credits which could have been accommodated had the other
limitation been in force.
Finally, the new bill would deny averaging under the overall
limitation to the extent foreign taxes are above those of the United
States because of the fourteen-percentage-point tax differential allowed Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations. 217 r In short, it
was not thought that the excess foreign tax on the latter type of
corporation should be allowed to wipe out U.S. taxes imposed at
the regular corporate rate on income earned in countries where the
foreign taxes involved are less than those imposed by the United
States. 217"
It was previously noted that even before enactment of the new
statutory election, taxpayers had enjoyed what was tantamount to
an election between the two types of limitation because of their
right to choose the organizational form in which foreign operations
would be housed. Whereas averaging, of the type associated with
the overall limitation, resulted if one foreign subsidiary created
its own diverse branches (permanent establishments), the strict
country-by-country approach applied if the American parent itself
created sister foreign branches or subsidiaries. There are certain
significant practical differences, as well as similarities, between what
was formerly, and remains today, only tantamount to an election,
and the new specific statutory election.
First, where business reasm~s forced a choice of organizational
form which itself led to averaging, as in the first of the two types
2170

H. Rep. No. 1358, 86th Cong., :zd Sess. 5 ( 1960).
S. Rep. No. 1393, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 ( 1960).
217
• Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., :zd Sess. (1960), § 1(d), adding subsections 904(e)
and (f) to the Code.
217
' I d.,§ 2, amending I.R.C., § 1503.
217
' S. Rep. No. 1393, 86th Con g., 2d Sess. 6 ( 1960).
2170
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of cases mentioned supra, that organizational form did not and
will not have the opportunity to invoke a strict country-by-country
approach to the limitation. The reason: averaging or an overall
approach results from the way the per-country limitation itself is
interpreted in that setting. On the other hand, under the new legislation, foreign operations involving sister subsidiaries created by
the American parent itself enjoy a real option between a strict
country-by-country approach and an overall approach.
Second, if it be assumed in the two foregoing situations that both
domestic parents had computed the limitation by reference to an
averaging technique, one because of organizational form, the other
having previously invoked the overall limitation by an election, both
could still isolate a new substantial operation to be initiated in a yet
different foreign country if there is concern over the prospect that
losses there incurred would reduce the credit for foreign taxes paid
other countries in which profitable businesses had been carried on.
The American parent which had established sister foreign facilities
would simply establish another sister facility, simultaneously revoking its election to conform to the overall limitation. 217 t The other
American parent would have to deviate from its own organizational
practice in isolating the new facility; the parent itself, rather than
its top tier foreign subsidiary, would have to create the new facility.
The per-country limitation, having previously applied to the parent's
older chain arrangement though there having an averaging effect,
would now serve to isolate the losses of the new facility.
Third, implicit in the solution of the immediately preceding problem is a yet more sweeping difference between that averaging which
is accomplished by organizational form under the per-country limitation and that which would be accomplished through invocation of
the new statutory election. The statutory election to invoke the
overall limitation affects a company's total or world-wide foreign
operations, subject only to the previously noted restriction regarding
Western Hemisphere Corporations. Averaging accomplished, on
the other hand, solely by reference to the impact of organizational
form on the per-country limitation can be applied on a selective
basis, in two different respects. The first is illustrated by a previously
mentioned example, i.e., by a case where a chain organization is
used in covering certain foreign countries, averaging being the goal,
""'It is assumed here that the standard requisite to securing the Treasury's consent
can be met by reference to the Senate committee's expressed views regarding the contemplated shape of those standards.
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with the American parent itself creating sister facilities in all other
countries where a strict country-by-country approach is desired. The
second type of selectivity is illustrated by the case where two or
more top tier subsidiaries, each with its own satellites, are created by
the parent on the same foreign continent but in different countries,
or on different continents. While the per-country limitation would
require averaging of foreign taxes within each chain, the two chains
would be dealt with separately under that limitation.
A final major difference between that averaging which is accomplished under the per-country limitation by reference to organizational form and that which could be accomplished through the
statutory election involves the opportunity, though only in the
latter case, to resort to the type of hindsight described earlier.

SEcTION

G.

TAx IMPLICATIONS RE UsE OF FoREIGN
HoLDING CoMPANY HoLDING STocK IN ONE
OR MoRE FoREIGN SuBsiDIARIES

(a) Introduction.-Various business reasons may make it
desirable to control several foreign operating subsidiaries through
a foreign holding company. Control may be more effectively exercised in this manner than through a domestic department of the
American enterprise. Financial and commercial policies may be more
easily integrated into those of the Common Market. Use of European banking facilities, including credit arrangements, may be
facilitated. Such a holding company could also be used as a buffer
to shield European profits from American taxation; profits made
by a subsidiary in one member nation could be deflected to an expanding subsidiary in another, without routing dividends through
the American parent. The advantage of this practice can be measured by the degree to which the American tax rate exceeds the
European tax load imposed on the operating facilities, provided
the foreign holding company enjoys a favorable tax regime.
The tax laws of five Common Market countries do not distinguish between a "pure" holding company and an operating
company which also holds shares in other operating companies.
Luxembourg, however, has established a most favorable tax climate
for pure holding companies. Of the others, the Netherlands provides the most attractive setting for a holding company arrangement. The tax position of other member nations and of so-called
tax havens outside the Common Market will be discussed after
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consideration of the tax implications associated with use of Luxembourg and the Netherlands as sites for the holding company.
(b) Luxembourg as a domicile for the holding company.
-For all practical purposes, a pure Luxembourg holding company,
having a paid-in capital of less than $2o,ooo,ooo (L. Fr. r,ooo,ooo,ooo), is exempt from income as well as property taxes. Moreover, dividends and interest which it pays out are also exempt
from the tax on movable capital even where payment is made to
a nonresident.
The one significant exception to the foregoing involves the situation where the Luxembourg holding company holds shares in a
local Luxembourg operating subsidiary. Dividends paid by the
latter will be subjected to the normal withholding tax on movable
capital.
In the end, Luxembourg holding companies of the type first
described will pay only three taxes, all of which are related to the
capital structure:
(I) Droit d'apport is imposed on the payment of capital
into the corporation, the rate being ·3 2 o/o. This tax is also levied
at the time the company is liquidated;
( 2) Droit de timbre is imposed at the rate of . r% on the
issuance of shares and debentures, measured by their values; and
(3) Droit d'abonnement is an annual tax on the capital of the
holding company, the rate being .r6%.
Another class of Luxembourg holding companies are those to
which a foreign corporation has paid in capital of $2o,ooo,ooo
( L. Fr. I ,ooo,ooo,ooo) or more. These, known as Societe holding
Milliardaire, are free of the above described Droit d' abonnement
as well as normal income and property taxes. They are subject,
however, to the Droit d' apport at the time capital is paid in, and
to the Droit de timbre on the issuance of shares and debentures,
both being geared m this instance to a regressive rate schedule,
as in Table III R.
TABLE

Paid-in Capital

Droit
d'apport

First $2o,ooo,ooo
Next $zo,ooo,ooo
Next $zo,ooo,ooo
Next $zo,ooo,ooo
Next $zo,ooo,ooo
Balance

·32%
.24%
.rz%
.o6%
.or%
.015%

III R

I' alue of Shares
First $zo,ooo,ooo
Next $zo,ooo,ooo
Next $zo,ooo,ooo
Next $zo,ooo,ooo
Balance

Droit
de
timbre

.Io/o
.os%
.04%

.oz%
.005%

fl alue

of Debentures
First $6o,ooo,ooo
Next $zo,ooo,ooo
Next $zo,ooo,ooo
Balance

Droit
de
timbre

.Io/o
.os%
.025%

.oz%
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From Table III R, it appears that the total tax at the time
capital is paid in, and shares or debentures are issued, will run at
least to $S4,ooo, assuming a minimum $2o,ooo,ooo is paid in.
Apart from the Droit de timbre, a special annual tax is levied on
this second class of larger holding companies, covering interest
paid on debentures issued by the holding company, dividends
paid out on its stock, and salaries or other remuneration paid
directors and managers who do not stay in Luxembourg at least
6 months out of the year. Interest paid out on debentures is taxed
at a uniform rate of 3%· The rate on dividends and the type of
remuneration described above falls, however, into two classes,
each class being determined by reference to the amount of interest
paid out, as in Table III S.
TABLE III
Amount of Interest
Paid on Debentures
Class I
$2,ooo,ooo or less
Class II
Over $2,ooo,ooo

s

Amount of
Dividends and Special
Class of Remuneration

Rate on
Dividends and
R emuneratio n

a. First $I ,ooo,ooo or less
b. Excess over $I ,ooo,ooo

.IS%
.I %

a. To the extent the
amount is less than the
amount by which interest payments exceed
$2,000,000
b. Next $I ,ooo,ooo
c. Balance

J.O%
.IS%
.I %

The minimum amount assessed under this special tax is $J2,ooo
(L. Fr. I,6oo,ooo) per year.
In analyzing the amount which could be subjected to the foregoing taxes, it must be remembered that the holding company will
not always receive the gross amount of dividends declared by the
operating facilities, for certain Common Market countries will
have imposed a withholding tax on dividends declared by operating
facilities domiciled there, as follows:
Country
Tax
Belgium
Taxe Mobiliere, 30%
France
Withholding tax, 24%
Germany
Tax on income from movable capital, 25%
Italy
No dividend tax
Netherlands
Dividend tax, 15%
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(c) Netherlands as a domicile for the holding company.The Netherlands does not confine its favorable tax climate to
"pure" holding companies. Equally attractive benefits are available
if an American enterprise chooses to have its operating subsidiary
in the Netherlands hold the shares in other European operating
companies.
Dividends received by a Netherlands corporation from foreign
companies are exempt from the regular taxes which the Netherlands
would otherwise impose if ( 1) the Netherlands corporation holds
at least 25% of the foreign corporation's shares and (2) the
foreign corporation itself was liable for a domiciliary income tax
on its profits.
By treaty, the Netherlands has also abandoned the right to
tax dividends which the Netherlands corporation would in turn
pay the American parent corporation. Thus, apart from the registration fees and stamp duties which would be imposed on the formation of the Netherlands corporation (see PART I) dividends
received by the Netherlands holding company and distributed to
the American parent would have been subjected only to the withholding taxes imposed by certain Common Market countries at the
time the operating subsidiaries distributed their profits, as follows:
Country
Belgium
France
Italy
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands

Tax
Taxe Mobiliere, 30%
No withholding tax (Treaty)
No dividend tax
Tax on income from movable capital, 25%
Tax on income from movable capital, 15%
No dividend tax

(d) Other Common Market countries as domiciles for
the holding company.-Common Market countries other than Luxembourg and the Netherlands do not offer special benefits for
holding company arrangements. For example, dividends received
by a German corporation are tax exempt only if received from a
German subsidiary, and even then the receiving company will
suffer a 36% tax if the amount received is not immediately distributed by it. Nor do France 218 and Belgium provide exemptions
=The French 24 o/o withholding tax will apply upon receipt of the dividend, though
upon re-distribution of that dividend by the holding company another withholding tax
will not be applied. Upon the receipt of the dividend, the holding company is also
allowed a 75% dividends-received deduction for purposes of the regular French corporate income tax. The 25o/o not neutralized is taxed as a means of compensating for
that portion of overhead expenses which, though deducted by the parent, were properly attributable to the dividend.
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for dividends received. However, when the holding company itself distributes profits derived from dividends, those two countries
do not again exact their respective withholding tax, and Taxe
Mobiliere, in the instance where a subsidiary had been the source
of the holding company's earnings.
Finally, on formation of a holding company, all Common Market
countries except Luxembourg exact the regular registration fees
and stamp duties imposed, as discussed in PART I, on formation
of corporations generally. Luxembourg's special arrangements were
considered in sub-topic (b), supra.

(e) Incorporation of the holding company in a so-called
"tax haven."-The term, "tax haven," is usually applied to a
country which does not exact any tax, or at most only a nominal
amount, from holding companies. As previously indicated, Luxembourg is the only Common Market country which fits that
classification, though the Netherlands also may be considered as
such. Among non-member European nations, Switzerland and
Liechtenstein are the most frequently mentioned tax havens.
Holding companies in Switzerland do not pay an income tax on
dividends received. Since cantonal (state) tax laws are generally
more burdensome than the Swiss federal income tax, it is also important to note that some cantonal laws also provide an exemption
for interest and royalties received, as well as dividends received.
On the other hand, federal, cantonal, and sometimes even local
property taxes are imposed on a holding company's net wealth
or paid-in capital. While the rates of these taxes rarely run as high
as I%, dividends paid out by the holding company to the American
parent company will suffer a withholding tax of s% provided the
American parent owns at least 95% of the holding company's stock.
Otherwise, the rate would be rs%.
Liechtenstein also frees dividends received from its income tax.
While the holding company will suffer a . I% tax on its property,
an agreement as to this can be made with the tax department
covering a 30-year period. Finally, dividends paid by the holding
company to the American parent will be subjected to a 3% coupon
tax.
When account is taken of the 5% and 3% taxes which Switzerland and Liechtenstein would impose, respectively, on dividends
paid by the holding company to the American parent, and of the
property taxes which would be assessed in each of those countries,
it should be apparent that they do not offer holding companies any
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significant tax advantage superior to those available in certain
Common Market countries. While the tax which those two countries would normally impose on dividends to the American parent
would not be incurred if the holding company retained its profits
for expansion purposes, such accumulation would serve to increase
the company's property taxes. It should also be noted that the two
countries in question do not have as many tax treaties with Common
Market countries as the latter have among themselves. In some
instances, this may further prejudice their selection, particularly
a choice of Liechtenstein, as the domicile for the holding company.
Common Market countries will assess the following withholding
taxes on dividends paid by operating subsidiaries domiciled there
to a holding company domiciled in one of those two countries as
appears in Table III T.
TABLE III T

Dividend Paid by
Operating Subsidiary
Located In:
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands

Tax Assessed by Domicile of
Operating Subsidiary on Dividends
Payable to Holding Co. In
Switzerland
Liechtenstein

30%

30%

25%

25%

24%

Comparison of these figures with those set forth in sub-topics (b)
and (c) as applied to Luxembourg and the Netherlands indicates
that in some instances the latter two countries enjoy an advantage
in this respect.
SUBSECTION

2.

AMERICAN TAX IMPLICATIONS RE USE OF
A FOREIGN BASE COMPANY

(a) Introductory note.-Following consideration of the
American tax implications associated with a base company arrangement during the operational phase, certain problems peculiarly incident to the creation of such companies will be analyzed.
(b) General tax implications.-With respect to the normal
operational stage, it is from two principles that the practical
American tax advantages of the base company arrangement arise.
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The first such principle is common to all foreign corporations,
namely, that the income which the foreign base company derives
from Common Market sources will not be included in American
gross income 219 unless distributed as a dividend to the American
parent. Thus, as indicated in the Introduction to this Section, where
the effective American tax rate is higher than the total effective
income tax rate imposed by the country which houses an operating
facility, the latter facility's profit could be deflected through the
base company to other expanding foreign facilities without suffering
what may be an expensive tax detour through the American
parent.
Fear that exchange controls will emerge in the operational country may actually be the only immediate reason for a current or
timely extraction of profits made by the operating facility located
there; these profits could be stored in a base company situated
elsewhere until such time as they are needed for expansion of
foreign facilities in yet other countries. Storing them in such a
company in this circumstance, instead of remitting them to the
United States, may also be motivated by a desire to avoid the
risks associated with the American tax on unreasonable accumulations.220 As noted in PART I, generally speaking the Common
Market countries have not resorted to this type of penalty tax.
The first principle, that a base company's income is not reachable
by American authorities until distributed as a dividend to the
American parent, also enables this type of organizational structure
to accommodate, without American tax cost, dividend requirements
of European interests which may own shares in the operational
subsidiaries. The amount which otherwise would have been distributed as the American parent's share would be deflected to the
foreign base company. Where outside interests are involved in
this way, the base company type of organizational structure would
not be so acceptable, however, if the outsiders owned more than
so% of the voting stock of one or more of the operating companies.
As is explained more fully in Subsection 2 (c) of Section E, supra,
the American parent's eventual deemed-paid credit for foreign
income taxes of an operating company will be lost unless the foreign
base company, in which the American parent must hold at least
219
I.R.C., § 882 (b). This principle is discussed more fully in Section C, supra.
""'Since the foreign profit will not have become a part of American gross income,
it would not be a part of the base to which the penalty tax attaches, i.e., "accumulated
taxable income." I.R.C., § 531.

544

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

w% of the voting stock, in turn owns at least so% of the voting
stock of the sub-subsidiary. 220 a
The second basic tax principle to which a base company arrangement's tax advantage is attributable involves another provision
bearing on the credit. As was also explained more fully in Subsection 2 of Section E, supra, when profits derived by a holding
company from two or more Common Market countries are ultimately remitted to the States, an averaging arrangement 221 is
read into the per-country limitation 222 on the credit for foreign
income taxes. Normally, this will be advantageous in the instance
where one operating facility is situated in a low income tax country
like Italy, another being in a country having a higher effective rate
than the United States. By treating the foreign income as though
derived from the one country in which the base company is incorporated, and by attributing to that single country the total foreign tax paid to the operational countries, there is less likelihood
of prejudice from the per-country limitation.
In at least one circumstance, however, the averaging arrangement
could have an unfavorable effect. This may be so where the base
company owns branch operations, as distinguished from subsidiaries, in two or more countries and one of the branches suffers
a loss, say of$ so,ooo, while the other makes a profit, say of $ IOO,ooo on which it paid $5o,ooo in foreign income taxes. In that event,
averaging will serve to make the numerator (foreign source net
or "taxable income"-$ so,ooo) of the per-country limitation less
than the profits of the one profitable branch ($roo,ooo) which
did pay a foreign tax ( $ so,ooo). The effect is to create a greater
possibility, in our illustration-a certainty, that the average effective rate of foreign taxes on foreign source income, here roo%,
will exceed the effective American rate. The consequent loss of a
current credit for part of the foreign tax, assuming a distribution
by the base company of the profitable branch's gain, would not have
been suffered currently if the operating facilities had been housed
in sub-subsidiaries, rather than branches. With a sub-subsidiary
organizational structure, averaging on a current basis could have
been avoided; foreign source income of the base company and of
""'"This difficulty will be less serious if Congress ultimately passes a bill which was
approved by the House in the 1960 session but which the Senate did not have time to
consider. That bill would reduce the required degree of ownership from 50% to zoo/o.
H.R. n,681, 86th Cong., zd Sess. (1960).
1
2:l I.T. Regs.,§ 1.902·1(c).
022
I.R.C., § 904, discussed generally in Section C, supra.
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the American parent would have been based solely on the dividend
declared by the profitable operating subsidiary, with the effective
foreign tax rate in our illustration being 50%, not IOO%.
Because of legislation enacted in late 1960 and discussed more
fully in Section F, supra, averaging can now also be accomplished
without regard to the form of organization, i.e., can even be applied where the American parent itself creates sister facilities in
two or more countries. As noted in Section F, an election by such a
taxpayer to conform to an "overall" limitation, rather than the percountry limitation, serves as the new statutory device by which that
domestic parent would shift to an averaging technique. But if
averaging in the setting of that sister-type organizational structure
is really important in order to level out high- and low-tax countries,
the parent may be confronted with a hard choice at a later point
when it contemplates opening a new facility in a yet different foreign
country from which, for a few years, it anticipates losses. As noted
in the preceding paragraph, averaging these losses in with the older
profitable foreign operations may reduce the credit allowed for
taxes actually paid those countries in which profitable operations
are conducted. Of course, this could be avoided by obtaining the
Treasury's consent to revocation of the election to conform to the
overall limitation. But the price would be a forfeiture of the right
to average the profits from those high- and low-tax countries which
house the profitable operations, for revocation would mean that a
strict country-by-country approach would be applied as a limitation
on all foreign operations. This world-wide statutory choice between
one or the other type of limitation is not required, however, where
averaging of high- and low-tax countries is accomplished solely by
reference to organizational structure because of the way the percountry limitation itself is interpreted. A parent which had enjoyed
averaging only because it had operated through a base company
could isolate what will initially be a new loss operation in a yet
different country by creating its own facility there, the per-country
limitation serving to prevent the loss there from affecting the averaging which is applied to the operations conducted through the base
company. Theoretically, and perhaps even from a practical standpoint, this too is not without a price tag. One advantage normally
associated with base company operations will be lost. Absent some
inter-company loan arrangements, if profits of the base company
operations are to be used in creating the new facility, they must first
be routed through the parent and become a part of American gross
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income, for as previously noted, isolation will be accomplished only
if the parent itself creates the new facility. The practical disadvantage of this is not likely to be very great, however, if averaging was
really important to the base company operation. That fact alone
probably means that the average foreign rate suffered by the base
company operations comes fairly close to the American rate, in
which event, because of the credit, the additional American tax is
not likely to be of overriding significance.
The final operational problem in base company settings involves
the policing problem.
Absent distributions to the American parent, transactions between the base company and the operating subsidiaries would not
be policed by the Internal Revenue Service under § 482 of the
Code. But at the point of distribution to the American parent, it
is entirely possible that the Service is free to invoke § 48 2 in
applying the American concept of "accumulated profits" to the
various organizational tiers; only in this way could it effectively
preserve the integrity of and difference between, the one-tier and
two-tier deemed-paid credit arrangements. In this connection, the
congressional adoption of an additional policing measure in late
1960 is not without meaning. A new bill clearly establishes the right
of the Treasury to obtain from domestic parents various types of
information relative to their foreign subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries, including not only balance sheets, but also data pertaining to
inter-company transactions and the make-up of the accumulated
earnings and profits of such foreign corporations. 222 a Moreover,
prior to distribution by the base company, inter-company arrangements between it and operating companies would fall within the
policing jurisdiction of the foreign countries. Also in this connection,
it should not be forgotten that most bilateral tax treaties provide
that transactions will be unscrambled for tax purposes if they are
not entered into in accordance with standards comparable to those
which would be applied by strangers.
(c) American tax problems peculiarly incident to the creation of a base company.-The first of the three prime American
tax problems immediately incident to the creation of a foreign holding company involves the sweeping response made by Congress to
a fairly limited and obviously unwarranted type of avoidance device
practiced in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Some taxpayers who
owned securities which had increased substantially in value sought
.... Note 194a, supra.
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to reduce these to cash without suffering any tax whatever. Their
first step involved a tax-free transfer of the securities in exchange
for the entire stock of a foreign corporation created in a country
which did not tax capital gains. In seeking immunity from American
tax with respect to this first step, reliance was placed upon a nonrecognition provision similar to § 35 r of the Code. The foreign
holding company would then make a tax-free sale of the portfolio
for cash which it then transferred to a newly created American
corporation in exchange for all of its stock, the latter being distributed to the original American taxpayer in reliance on the reorganization provisions. Through the new wholly owned American
corporation, the taxpayer would now control cash which had been
realized without tax cost, provided the judiciary approved the
application of the two nonrecognition provisions. In 1932, a congressional committee expressed some doubt as to what the judiciary
might do with the latter question; 223 accordingly, it proposed 224
and the Congress adopted two complementary remedies which
literally go far beyond the dimensions of the original problem.
The first such remedy, 225 as currently designed, 226 neutralized
the right under § 3 5 r to make a tax-free transfer of appreciated
property to a controlled foreign corporation unless, before the
exchange, it is established to the satisfaction of the Treasury that
the exchange is not "in pursuance of a plan having as one of its
principal purposes the avoidance of federal income taxes." A like
limitation is placed upon the reorganization and tax-free intercorporate liquidation provisions. 227
Though the practice which gave rise to this grant of administrative discretion involved attempts by taxpayers to avoid the
American capital gain tax while realizing effective control over
cash, the statutory language itself-in identifying the type of
transfers covered-is sufficiently broad to encompass any transfer
of appreciated stock in foreign operating subsidiaries to a foreign
base or holding company. Moreover, the delegation of administrative discretion would also seem to be sufficiently broad to permit
the Commissioner to deny nonrecognition if he determines that one
of the principal purposes is to avoid the American tax on future
ordinary income through use of the base company as a storehouse
223
H. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., rst Sess. 20 (1932).
""'Ibid.
205
Rev. Act of 1932, § II2 (k) .
... I.R.C., § 367.
1
"" Ibid.
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or deflection instrumentality for the profits of operating facilities.
In any event, where creation of a base company is postponed until
after one or more operating companies have expanded out of retained profits, thus increasing the value of the stock, the Commissioner's determination must first be secured if the American parent
is to have any hope for nonrecognition of what would be realized
gain on transferring the appreciated stock to the base company.
Presumably because the issue in each case is largely one of fact, the
Service has refrained from publishing any rulings which otherwise
might have served as guideposts.
The second or complementary remedy enacted by Congress in
1932 is similar to the first, 228 except as now written ( 1) it relates
only to a transfer of "stock or securities," (2) it imposes a 27%%
excise tax on any appreciation in value, and (3) it does not have
a supplementary provision which, following application of the tax,
steps up the basis of the stock received in the base company. 229 Thus
while transfer of a foreign branch operation which had appreciated
in value could be prejudiced by the Treasury only under the first
provision, 230 a transfer of stock in operating companies could be
affected by either provision.
Creation of the base company before stock of the operating
facilities has appreciated in value through retained earnings will,
of course, avoid the immediate costs described above. It should also
be clear that the above provisions will constitute less of a problem
where the operating subsidiaries are really sales organizations which
do not own substantial assets. Their future profits could be deflected
to the base company which might in turn invest them in manufacturing facilities located in the most appropriate country or countries.
But even in the two recited circumstances where nonrecognition
of immediate gain will not be a serious problem, it would be wise
to see that the holding company actually performs a meaningful
control function; otherwise, there is some risk that it may be caught
up in any drive which the Service may some day launch in an effort
to neutralize-as a recognizable tax entity-any foreign corporation which serves only as a passive receptacle of, and shield for,
profits earned by operating sub-subsidiaries. 231 While there is nothing to indicate that such a drive is about to be launched, or-assum... Rev. Act of 1932, § 1250, now I.R.C., § 1491.
"""I.R.C., § 358 complements §§ 367 and 351, but not § 1491.
330
I.R.C., § 351, on which § 367 rides "piggy-back," relates to transfers of "property."
""'Cf. Aldon Homes, Inc. 33 T.C. 582 (1959).
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ing a "tidy" arrangement-that it would be successful, the same
could have been said of Clifford trusts before the Treasury launched
what turned out to be a successful attack against them. 232
By legislation enacted in late 1960, Congress also increased the
likelihood that the Treasury would learn of the creation or reorganization of foreign corporations in which American individuals
or corporations hold a 5% interest, direct or indirect, or with respect
to which Americans will serve as officers or directors. The Treasury
is now empowered by regulation to prescribe the contents of an information return which such officers, directors, or stockholders
must submit upon the creation or reorganization of a foreign corporation with which they are associated. 232 a At this writing, the
Treasury had not yet had a chance to promulgate such regulations.
The second major American tax problem immediately incident to
the creation of a foreign holding company involves licensing arrangements. Assume that the American parent had previously
licensed its patents to one or more of the foreign operating subsidiaries. While the deemed-paid credit for foreign income taxes is
normally allowed only in connection with the receipt of dividends,
the discussion in Subsection 4 of Section C, supra, indicated, in the
absence of dividends, that a credit would be allowed under certain
circumstances upon the receipt of royalties. 233 The advantages of
that arrangement, as outlined in the previously mentioned Section,
will probably be lost if stock of the licensee-subsidiary is transferred
to the holding company. According to the Code, this unique credit
arrangement is authorized only where an American corporation
owns "directly or indirectly, 100% of all classes of stock" of the
foreign licensee-corporation. Transfer of the latter's stock to the
holding company would vest direct ownership in a foreign entity.
While the statutory provision also literally encompasses situations
where the American enterprise ((indirectly" owns all shares in the
licensee-corporation, it does not literally incorporate the precise
rules of constructive ownership reflected in other parts of the Code.
Indeed, certain conditions set forth in the provision seem to suggest
that ownership through an intermediate corporation is not conHelvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 6o S. Ct. 554 (1940).
Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), § 7, amending l.R.C., § 6046. Also
enacted was a provision preserving the opportunity to obtain the 85% dividends received deduction with respect to dividends paid out of earnings and profits which were
accumulated at a time when a corporation was domestic to the United States, but where
the dividend was actually paid after the corporation had taken on a foreign complexion through the tax-free reorganization provisions. Pub. Law 86-779, 86th Cong.,
zd Sess. (196o), § 3, amending I.R.C., § 243.
"''' l.R.C., § 902(d).
232
232

"
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templated. And if not, nothing would be gained by entering into a
substitute licensing arrangement with the holding company, the
stock of which would be ((directly" owned by an American corporation. The statute specifically prescribes that the roo% ownership
must relate to a foreign corporation engaged in ((manufacturing,
production, or mining," 234 a standard to which a pure holding
company would not conform. The difficulties just described would be
avoided, of course, if the operations were conducted through permanent establishments (branches) of the base company, rather than
through sub-subsidiaries.
The third major American tax problem incident to the creation
of a foreign holding company involves the case where stock in the
American parent is centralized in a very few persons. Viewing this
circumstance solely in practical terms, the parent's foreign holding
company would be closely akin to a personal holding company. At
least, since 1937, Congress has thought the similarity to be sufficient
in some cases to justify such an equation. The prejudicial quality of
that equation stems from the treatment accorded true foreign "personal" holding companies.
Such a company is said to exist whenever ( r) more than so%
in value of its outstanding stock is owned, "directly or indirectly," by
or for not more than five American residents or citizens, and ( 2) at
least 6o% (in some cases, so%) of its gross income is so-called
"foreign personal holding company income," i.e., is derived in the
form of dividends, interest, royalties, etc. 235 Generally speaking,
when these two standards are met, the foreign personal holding company income is taxable to the holding company's stockholders
whether or not distributed. 236 This means, when coupled with the
complementary doctrine of constructive ownership, 237 that an American parent which owns all of the stock of a pure foreign holding
company will be taxable on its undistributed earnings if over half
the stock of the parent is divided among no more than five stockholders.
This neutralization of the tax advantages otherwise associated
with foreign base companies could be avoided if the base company
itself also has an active operational function from which it derives
sufficient "gross income" to enable it to fall short of the second of
""'Ibid. Italics added.
230
l.R.C., § 552.
238
l.R.C., § 551.
231
l.R.C., §§ 554 and 544·
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the two previously enumerated definitional standards. But that the
active operational function must be truly significant is at once recognizable when account is taken of the fact that the standard is geared
to "gross income," not gross receipts. For example, if it engaged
only in a selling activity, only that part of its gross receipts in excess
of the cost of goods sold would be deemed "gross income" for this
purpose.
SECTION

H.

FuRTHER TAX IMPLICATIONS

IF A

COMMON

MARKET FACILITY ExPORTs OuTsiDE THE
CoMMON MARKET

An American enterprise may contemplate that any Common
Market facility which it creates will also export to countries outside
the Community. While sub-topic (c) of Section D, supra, indicated
that any Common Market nation in which the facility might be
located would free the export transaction itself from turnover tax,
it also noted some variation among member nations in the degree
to which any turnover tax previously paid at earlier stages in the
production process would be refunded. Comparison of the rates
which each might have applied in those earlier stages appears, supra,
in Section B.
While all Common Market countries in which the facility might
be located would more or less free the exported item from the impact of its turnover tax, all would impose an income tax on any
profit derived by the facility from the export. According to the discussion in Section D, supra, a double income tax would not normally
be suffered, however, if the goods were sold by the facility directly to
customers in another member nation. Normally, the latter's income
tax would only be applied if a permanent establishment had also
been created there. There may be cases, however, where importing
nations outside the Common Market will seek to reach the exporter's profit whether or not a permanent establishment of the type
heretofore described is maintained therein. To avoid this possibility,
Common Market nations have entered into or are negotiating bilateral treaties with a number of non-member nations. The status
of such treaties with a number of countries is indicated in Table
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PART IV. THE PROBLEM OF CONVERTING FOREIGN.
PROFITS AND TAXES INTO AMERICAN DOLLARS,
AS IT AFFECTS AMERICAN TAXES ON THOSE
ENGAGED IN FOREIGN TRADE OR BUSINESS
SECTION

A.

INTRODUCTION

Even those American businesses which engage only in domestic
activity are affected by constant changes which take place in the value
of the dollar. Cost of living adjustments in wages scales, pursuant
to labor contracts, may be matched on the tax side by realization of,
and a tax on, illusory capital gains. Again, predictions regarding
future monetary changes may well affect a choice of inventory
methods for tax as well as other purposes, leading, illustratively, to
the adoption of L.I.F.O. While choices such as this may affect the
amount of ultimate tax on a business which confines its endeavors
to the United States, from the beginning of American tax history
each stage of the computation has always been reflected in terms of
American dollars assumed to be stable.
When businesses, accustomed only to domestic activity, first began
to conduct foreign trade in countries with gold-backed, fully convertible currencies enjoying a stable rate of exchange, their accounting problems did become more involved, but in that earlier day
such complications had little American tax significance. Those businesses which paid or accrued their foreign income taxes in a stable,
easily converted foreign currency and went through the year without
having converted their foreign profits into American dollars did
have to resolve such questions as, ( 1) the choice of a date on which
conversion into American dollars would be effected, and ( 2) in the
case of a branch operation, whether the conversion would relate
only to foreign profits computed in the manner of domestic profits
or would penetrate into the net worth position of the foreign operation, reflecting a profit or loss based on a comparison-in dollar
values-of net worth at the beginning and end of the year. But taxwise these questions were of little practical significance when the
British pound was equal to $4.86 in American money, with a maximum variation of about 2¢ in each direction, and when every reasonable man had the right to believe this state of affairs would continue
as an undisputed fact of economic life.
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Foreign exchange questions became highly relevant for tax purposes, however, when the devaluation process of foreign currencies
set in.
An additional complication developed when blocked or restricted currencies became commonplace. We are familiar with a
few American tax concepts which permit deferment of taxes even
on certain domestic earnings which have been locked up and thus
rendered completely unavailable for current use. Employer contributions to pension trusts in which an employee-taxpayer has a vested
right furnish the best illustration. Foreign profits reflected in blocked
foreign currency added this question of possible deferment to those
previously enumerated. Ancillary to it was the further question of
whether a deduction for expenses associated with blocked income
should also be deferred. Finally, blocked or restricted foreign currency set the stage for three rates of exchange-the official, the
black market, and the commercial rate in the United States. The
problem of choosing from among these was added to the previous
list.
The four sections which follow deal with the more typical tax
accounting complications associated with the conversion and deferment problems. The first relates to the method by which foreign
profits will be reflected as well as to the timing question, absent
blockage or other restriction. The discussion here assumes an understanding, however, of the general tax differences noted in PARTS
II and III with respect to direct exports and other foreign operations conducted through a permanent establishment or foreign
subsidiary.
The second section concerns the possibility of deferring blocked
or restricted foreign profits, while the third focuses on the choice of
the market place which will be resorted to for the purpose of fixing
the conversion rate.
The last section explores the conversion problem as it affects the
credit for foreign income taxes which have been paid or accrued in
a foreign currency.
SEcTION

B.

METHOD AND TIME FoR CoNVERTING
FOREIGN PROFITS INTO DOLLARS, ABSENT
BLOCKAGE OR RESTRICTION

(a) Introductory note.-For tax purposes, the time and
method for converting into dollar values foreign profits tied up in
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foreign currency will differ, depending on whether the American
business is engaged only in direct exports to foreign customers or
instead operates a foreign facility through a permanent establishment or foreign subsidiary. Accordingly, the problem must be discussed separately in these three settings.
(b) Conversion problem re profits from direct exports to
foreign customers.-There is nothing to indicate that American
manufactures engaged in direct exports to foreign customers are
freed from the usual rule requiring sales to be reflected on an accrual basis for federal tax purposes. 1 Not all such vendors, however, will encounter exchange problems and possible attendant tax
complications. Such problems will be avoided, for example, if the
American enterprise sells its product to, say, a Netherlands importer
who agrees to make payment in American dollars. The need to exchange Dutch guilders for American dollars and the attendant problems associated with rates of exchange rest wholly upon the Dutch
firm. Even if the American exporter sells goods under an agreement
to accept payment in guilders, it does not necessarily follow that the
exchange problem will complicate its tax affairs. The taxpayer may
design the transaction so that accrual, payment, and conversion take
place on the same date, the overall effect being akin to payment in
dollars. In this connection, even accrual basis taxpayers engaged only
in domestic business have some control over the time when a sale
must be brought into gross receipts. According to the regulations,
"a taxpayer engaged in a manufacturing business may account for
sales of his product when the goods are shipped, when the product
is delivered or accepted, or when title to the goods passes to the
customer, whether or not billed, depending upon the method regularly employed in keeping his books." 2 If payment in a foreign currency and conversion into American dollars are normally expected
to coincide with delivery, the regulation would permit the latter to
be chosen as the occasion for accrual, but presumably only if the
taxpayer's books were regularly kept in that manner also with respect to domestic sales. Even where domestic sales have regularly
been reflected in gross receipts as of the date of sale, it still might
'The regulations do not distinguish between foreign and domestic sales. I.T. Regs.,
§ 1.446-1(c) (i) (iv) (b). The Tax Court has said that a taxpayer who accrued such
profits properly reflected the item. Foundation Co., 14 T.C. 1333 (1950), Acq., C.B.
1950-2, 2. While certain general rulings of the Service pick the time of receipt as the
pivotal dateline, it is believed that the facts to which those rulings were addressed
involved other types of income in the setting of a cash basis taxpayer. E.g., see O.D.
419, C.B. 2, 6o (1920). This was certainly the case in Rev. Rul. 291, C.B. 1953-2, 42, 48.
"I.T. Regs., § 1.446-r(c) (i) (ii). (Italics added.)
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be possible to design sales to foreign customers so that the benefits
and burdens of ownership passed only upon delivery. 3
In the absence of some such arrangements, it is possible, though
not probable, that in the course of the total transaction, three different rates of exchange may be in effect; at the time of accrual,
later at the time of payment in the foreign currency, and still later
on the date of conversion into American dollars. A change in the
conversion rate, occurring between any two of these events, will compicate the tax problem.
In one sense, the sale transaction itself is closed on the date of
accrual; the then conversion rate must be applied to the amount
thereafter receivable in foreign currency in order to determine the
amount includible in gross receipts. That same rate fixes the basis
for the foreign currency when later received. 4 The fact that the dollar value_ of the foreign account receivable may have declined as of
the end of the taxable year because of a change in exchange rates
apparently does not serve, in the eyes of the Internal Revenue Service, to justify a loss deduction for the exporter, 5 though a contrary
rule is now recognized in the case of foreign branch operations. 6
A second transaction has not yet been closed. Assuming, however,
that the American exporter does not thereafter hold the foreign
currency, when received, as an investment, subsequent conversion
of it into dollars at a different rate of exchange than prevailed at the
time of accrual will give rise to further ordinary income or to an
ordinary loss, depending on whether intervening changes, if any,
in the exchange rate were favorable or unfavorable. 7

(c) Conversion problem re profits derived through a foreign permanent establishment.-Theoretically, and certainly for
jurisdictional purposes, § 6 I of the Code has always included in the
gross income of an American corporation the gross from all sources,
foreign as well as domestic. As early as 1920, however, the In3
While treaties with 5 of the Common Market countries would guarantee immunity
of the profit from foreign income taxes, such an arrangement might lead to multiple
turnover taxes. See discussion in PART II, supra.
'Foundation Co., 14 T.C. 1333 ( 1950), Acq., C.B. 1950-2, 2. Cf. Maurice P. O'Meara,
8 T.C. 622 (1947).
6
G.C.M. 4954, C.B. VII-2, 293 (1928). Cf. O.D. 590, C.B. 3, 75 (r92o) and JoyceKoeble Co., 6 B.T.A. 403 (1927), Acq., C.B. VI-2, 4· Anderson, Clayton & Co. v.
United States, (Ct. Cl. 1958) r68 F. Supp. 542, indicates, however, that the government
has on occasion entered into an agreement with taxpayers permitting accounts to be
discounted at the end of the year by reference to shifts in exchange rates.
• See discussion in sub-topic (c), infra.
7
Foundation Co., If T.C. 1333 ( 1950), Acq., C.B. 1950-2, 2.
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ternal Revenue Service ruled in O.D. 5
that only the net result
of a foreign branch's operations need be consolidated with that of
the American enterprise in the instance where the branch kept a
separate set of records. 8 This accommodation of the jurisdictional
rule to an accounting principle was complemented in the same ruling by a more detailed outline of the accounting technique approved
by the Service in determining the net result of the foreign branch's
operation. In essence, it established what has been described as the
"profit-and-loss" method. The branch's profits were to be determined first in terms of the foreign currency, though in accordance,
of course, with American law with respect to inclusions, deductions,
capitalizable items, etc. 9 From this figure, remittances during the
year-expressed in the foreign currency-were to be subtracted,
though these were then to be picked up by the American enterprise
at the rate of conversion which applied as of the date of remittance.
The balance of the branch's net profits, expressed initially in the
foreign currency, were to be accounted for by the American enterprise as of the end of the year, the rate of exchange on that date
to be applied in converting the unremitted foreign profits into American dollars.
Under the foregoing method, a branch might show a taxable
profit though unfavorable mid-year shifts in the rate of exchange
would show that the dollar value of its current assets had declined
from the beginning to the end of the year. In just such a situation,
an American enterprise sought to reflect a foreign branch's operations in accordance with what has become known as the net worth
or balance sheet method. In short, from the branch's tentative profit
-computed first according to a profit-and-loss method, it deducted
the dollar amount which its current assets had declined in value,
from the beginning to the end of the year, solely because of unfavorable changes in exchange rates.
The government argued that this improperly permitted the taxpayer to take advantage of what was essentially an unrealized loss.
However, a court sided with the taxpayer; it rejected the notion
that foreign currency and other current assets required incident to
the operation of a branch engaged, illustratively, in a manufacturing operation should be treated like fixed assets with reference to
which an unrealized decline between the two points of time in
TAXATION
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•c.B. 2, 61 (1 92o).
• That American law controls inclusions, etc., see PART III, supra.
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American-dollar value was admittedly not recognizable for tax purposes.10 In calling for a comparative translation of the current assets
into dollar values at the two points of time, the court agreed that
the net worth adjustment was proper with respect to inventories,
accounts receivable and payable, cash, and bank deposits, but not,
of course, with respect to fixed assets such as land, buildings, and
machinery. The latter were to be carried on a dollar value balance
sheet at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of acquisition,
and to that same figure the depreciation reserve would also be responsive.
More recently the Tax Court has indicated that the taxpayer
really has a choice of methods, the profit-and-loss and the net-worth
methods being characterized as the "main approaches." 11 Since,
within limits, "the question is one of accounting and not of substantive law," 12 the overriding requirement was said to be consistency in practice. Only in this way will the various methods reflect
like amounts over the long haul. 13

(d) Conversion problem re dividends derived from a foreign subsidiary.-A dividend is not the only type of profit which an
American enterprise may derive from operations conducted through
a foreign subsidiary. Illustratively, the American parent may also
sell its own exported· products to the foreign subsidiary or treat the
latter, at least in part, as a permanent establishment in the nature of
a sales agent for those American products not manufactured by the
subsidiary. The problem of converting the latter types of profit into
American dollars has been considered, however, in the preceding
subtopics; attention here is limited to the matter of dividends.
For tax purposes, the date on which an American parent should
convert dividends declared in foreign currency is clear enough in
the limited instance where the parent otherwise keeps its books on a
cash basis. Conversion takes place on the date the dividend is actually or constructively received.H Contrary to what others have ap10

Vietor and Ache lis v. Salt's Textile Mfg. Co., (D.C. Conn. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 249•
American Pad & Textile Co., 16 T.C. 1304, 1310 (1951).
Ibid.
13
It would appear that long term liabilities should also generally be reflected at
the rate prevailing on the date the liability was incurred.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants reflects its recommendations
with respect to the net-worth method in Bulletin No. 43, Ch. 12, p. 113. A method
typically in use in also described in Munsche, Exchange and Other Problems in Taxation of Foreign Income, 17 N.Y. INST. 425, 433 (1959). In general, see HEPWORTH,
REPORTING FOREIGN OPERATIONS ( 1956).
"Mim. 5297, C.B. 1942-1, 84; Frank W. Ross, 44 B.T.A. r ( 1941) ; O.D. 419, C.B.
2, 6o ( 1920). Because of the constructive receipt doctrine, the date of payment will be the
11

12
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parently assumed/ the matter is not so clear, however, in the more
frequently recurring circumstance where the parent keeps its books
on an accrual basis. The difficulty here is not attributable to the foreign character of the dividend; it stems from uncertainty regarding
the more basic question of when a dividend derived from an American source is properly accruable.
In this latter connection, at one time the Board of Tax Appeals
looked to the declaration date. 16 And in that era, the government
failed to raise this particular question in at least one contested case
where a taxpayer had used that date in translating foreign dividends
into American incomeY Throughout that period, however, those
regulations which dealt specifically with dividends, as distinguished
from the more general provisions bearing on accounting methods,
failed to distinguish between shareholders whose books were kept
on the accrual basis rather than on the cash basis. 18 Dividends were
said to be "included in the gross income of the distributees when the
cash or other property is unqualifiedly made subject to their demands." 19 This meant the date on which the dividend was payable
except in the instance where the item could not be said to have been
constructively received on that date, 20 in which case the actual date
of receipt governed. This shotgun type of regulation led the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit to reverse in 1942 the historical
position of the Board. 21 By the previously quoted regulation, dividends were said to have been carved out for treatment which differed
from that associated with other income items, reflection of which was
generally determined by reference to the taxpayer's regular method
of accounting. The appellate court ignored the declaration and
record dates, choosing instead the date of payment and receipt
which, in this case, happened to coincide.
The Tax Court (known before 1942 as the Board of Tax Appeals) thereafter noted that "certainty of the answer" was most
critical point if the payment is then unqualifiedly subject to the parent's demand.
I.T. Regs.,§ I.f5I-2(b).
16
See Johnson, Foreign Tax Credit, INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD:
SoUTHWESTERN LEGAL FouNDATION 45, 79 ( 1959) ; Munsche, Exchange and Other FrobInns in the Taxation of Foreign Income, 17 N.Y. lNsT. 425, 427 (1959).
16
Archer M. Campbell, 6 B.T.A. 6o ( 1927), Non-acq., C. B. VI-z, 8; Tar Products
Co., 45 B.T.A. 1033 ( 1941), rev'd. (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 866.
'"Bon Ami Co., 39 B.T.A. 825 (1939). But cf. Mim. 5297, C.B. 1942-x, 84 at 86.
18
E.g., see I.T. Regs. n8, §§ 39.42-3 and 39·II5(a)-I(d).
19
I.T. Regs. n8, §39-IIS(a)-•(d).
"'The regulation included an illustration in which the constructive receipt doctrine would not be applied.
01
Tar Products Corporation v. Comm'r., (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F.(2d) 866, rev'g. 45
B.T.A. 1033 (1941).
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important; for this reason, it chose not to reconsider "the relative
merits of the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals and our own."
It adopted the view of the former. 22 Its new position was affirmed
on appeal by a quite different court of appeals, that of the seventh
circuit. 23 While the Supreme Court during the period of the 1940's
did not go beyond saying that dividends do not in any event accrue
prior to the record date, 24 it is of some significance that the previously mentioned decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, postponing inclusion to the date of payment, was selected
for publication by the Internal Revenue Service in its own Cumulative Bulletin, a fact which usually meant that the government intended to follow the result. 25
On the basis of the foregoing, one might conclude with some assurance that an accrual basis taxpayer resolves the timing question,
as it relates to inclusion of dividends, in the same manner as cash
basis distributees. The one note of caution relates to a slight change
made in the new regulations issued under the 1954 Code. While the
statute itself was not changed in any respect relevant here, and while
the new regulations do incorporate the statement previously
quoted, 26 they go on now at another point to say that the constructive
receipt doctrine is not generally applicable if, e.g., an item would be
accruable at a different date under the taxpayer's regular method
of accounting. 27 At least one writer has suggested that by this device
the government may attempt to re-open the accrual question as it
relates specifically to dividends. 28
In any event, apart from the matter of dividends and contrary to
the case where operations are conducted through a foreign branch,
the American parent will not be permitted to take advantage of any
shift, resulting from movement of exchange rates, in the dollar value
of the foreign subsidiary's current assets. 29 The two are separate entities for American tax purposes. Nor may the American corporation revalue at year's end its own accounts receivable running against
""American Light & Traction Company, 3 T.C. 1048, 1050 (1944).
23
(7th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 398.
"'Putnam Estate v. Comm'r., 324 U.S. 393, 65 S. Ct. 811 ( 1945 ).
""Ct. D. 1678, C.B. 1946-2, 135. The government also withdrew the non-acquiescence
previously published in 1944 C.B. 32 with reference to the Tax Court's decision. See
C.B. 1946-2, I.
26
l.T. Regs., § 1.451-2(b).
"'I.T. Regs.,§ 1.451-1(a).
""RABKIN AND }OHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFr AND ESTATE TAXATION § 21.04(7),
(1954) .
.. G.C.M. 4954, C.B. VII-2, 293 ( 1928), cited with approval in American Pad &
Textile Co., 16 T.C. 1304, 1310, Note 2 (1951).
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the subsidiary in order to reflect changes, since the date of sale, in
exchange rates. 30
TAXATION
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c.

TIMING THE REFLECTION OF BLOCKED OR
RESTRICTED FOREIGN PROFITS

(a) Introductory note.-Fiscal manipulations by foreign
countries have usually coincided with wars and depressions-local
or world-wide. Restrictions have run the gamut, ranging, inter alia,
from a series of varying limitations on extraction of profits by
foreigners-including American enterprises-to complete blockage
of those profits. Not until the world-wide economic crisis of the
193o's were the American tax implications of these restraints considered, however, by the judiciary. And even the cases decided in
that era were few in number; the only important conclusion was to
the effect that a total lock-up justified deferral of income which
otherwise would have been deemed realized. Later decisions during
World War II indica ted, on the other hand, that certain less severe
restrictions would not justify a deferral. That period, characterized
by restraints of all sorts, did not, however, bring forth meaningful
administrative rulings to reduce the sizeable no-man's land in between the two results; the regulations were amended only for the
purpose of assuring that deductions and credits would be linked to
income properly deferred. But post-war restrictions did bring forth
administrative guidelines as precise as could be expected.
As indicated elsewhere in this volume, currency restrictions imposed in Common Market countries today are not nearly so serious
as those of an earlier time; comparatively speaking, profits from
licensed investments enjoy unusual freedom. Nevertheless, the discussion below of the way American tax law has evolved in response
to various types of restrictions is not wholly academic, for times can
change. Moreover, there are other kinds of profits with reference
to which restrictions are more significant.
(b) Circumstances calling for deferral of income.-ln
1937, the Supreme Court concluded in one case, contrary to the usual
rule, that a domestic exchange out of which the taxpayer received
30
Ibid. Cf. Appeal of Louis Roessel & Co., Ltd., 2 B.T.A. 1141 (1925); Appeal of
Theodore Tiedmann & Sons, Inc., I B.T.A. 1077 (1925). But Anderson, Clayton & Co.
v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1958) 168 F. Supp. 542, does indicate that on occasion the
government has entered into an agreement permitting accounts between a parent and
subsidiary to be revalued at year's end by reference to the then prevailing rate of
exchange.
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certain peculiarly circumstanced stock did not furnish an appropriate
occasion for tax reckoning. 31 The decision rested on a finding that
these particular shares did not have a "fair market value, capable
of being ascertained with reasonable certainty," and "in the absence
of such value, the ownership of the shares did not lay the basis for
the computation of gain . . . . " 32 The difficulty was attributable
"to their highly speculative quality and to the terms of a restrictive
agreement making a sale thereof impossible . . . . " 33
Within 3 months, the theory embodied in that decision was applied by the Board of Tax Appeals to the first case which had come
before it involving restricted foreign profits, International Martgage and Investment Corporation. 34
A bank crisis in the early 1930's had led the German government
to prohibit the transfer of marks out of Germany. While on the next
to the last day of the taxable year, that government did establish a
procedure whereby, upon permission, blocked marks could be reinvested on a long-term basis in Germany, repayment on any such
reinvestment was also blocked. The Board of Tax Appeals also
found as a fact that no market existed within the taxable year for
such marks and "no one could form an opinion as to their value at
that time." 35
In this setting, the Board determined that an American enterprise
was not presently taxable even though it had realized a profit in German marks upon disposition of a German investment. The result
was bottomed on the fact that "income for our Federal income tax
purposes is measured only in terms of dollars," 36 and here the taxpayer's profit was simply "not measurable in terms of dollars." 37
Foreign profit realized by the same taxpayer from other dispositions which took place during the same taxable year, but prior to
the blockage, were, however, included in its gross income though,
through failure to effect a timely conversion into dollars, those
profits were also entrapped by the subsequently adopted monetary
restrictions. It was enough that the taxpayer had unrestricted power
31
Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Company, 300 U.S. 481, 57 S. Ct. 569 ( 1937).
"'Id. at 499·
33
Ibid.
... 36 B.T.A. 187 (1937).
35
!d. at 189.
80
!d. at 190.
37
Ibid. Accord, Stuart, James & Cooke, Inc., P-H B.T.A. Memo. Dec., para. 38-095
(1938}. A like result was later reached in United Artists Corporation of Japan, 3
T.C.M. 574 ( 1944) though the blocked item was actually on deposit in a San Francisco
branch of a Japanese bank. See note 47, infra.
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to convert at the moment the profit was realized in the foreign currency.
While the Internal Revenue Service did file an acquiescence to
that part of the Board's decision which allowed the taxpayer to
defer income realized in blocked German marks, 38 it took a different
view of the problem in later taxable years as the German government began to relax its currency restrictions.
In Credit and Investment Corporation/ 9 the taxpayer failed to
show that it could not have obtained permission to take out of Germany certain marks which it had realized on disposing of an asset,
which marks-because of the various uses to which they could be
put-did have some market value on the New York exchange though
in an amount less than the official blocked rate. Indeed, in that same
taxable year it had used that market place to convert certain other
restricted German marks. In deciding against the taxpayer, the
Board drew a distinction between this situation and that presented
earlier in the International Mortgage and Investment Corporation
case. In the latter case, contrary to the situation here, it had been
shown that the taxpayer could not obtain permission to transfer any
of its marks out of Germany and, because of the nature of the restrictions on their use, no outside market place catered to such
marks. 40
That the government accepted the distinction between the two
cases, and recognized that the earlier decision which was adverse to
it still retained its vitality, was demonstrated by its promulgation,
at approximately this same time, of a ruling wherein it acknowledged
that certain types of profit tied up in blocked British pounds were not
presently includible for federal income tax purposes. 41 And this
was so though the blocked profits could have been reinvested in
British securities, interest on which could have been converted.
Otherwise, however, the government did not attempt at this stage in
history to chart a more exacting line between deferable and nondeferable income insofar as the matter turned on foreign monetary
restrictions. Its more or less concurrent amendment of the regulations was confined to the other side of the ledger and was predicated
TAXATION
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Acq., C.B. 1937-2, 15.
47 B.T.A. 673 (1942).
The importance of the burden of proof was the center of the court's focus in Corn
Products Refining Co. v. Comm'r., (2d Cir. 1954) 215 F.(2d) 513 where the taxpayer
sought to include a dividend which the government claimed was blocked. The government prevailed.
01
Mim. 5297, C.B. 1942-1, 84.
89
40
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on the conclusion that, in a given case, foreign income had been
properly excluded because of "monetary exchange, or other restrictions imposed by a foreign country." In such event, the deductions
and credits attributable to such excluded items were also to be postponed, account being taken of them proportionately as and if the deferred income items properly became includible in gross incomeY
Before the government again spoke administratively, separate
arms of the judiciary evolved in one case two other reasons for
denying deferment to foreign income which suffered from some
restriction. In Phanor f. Eder/ 3 the Service assessed a deficiency
against a lawyer-stockholder by reference to the undistributed income of a foreign personal holding company domiciled in Colombia.
In connection with his practice, the lawyer-stockholder had spent
two months of the year in that Latin American country.
While the exchange laws and regulations of Colombia prohibited
the company from transferring its profits or pesos outside that
country, the "spending or investment of pesos within" the country
were not restricted. But if articles bought with pesos were sold outside the country, the vendor was obligated to return the sales proceeds to Colombia.
None of these latter circumstances, involving the exact nature of
the exchange restrictions, seemed important to the Board of Tax
Appeals. It was enough that Congress-in attempting to thwart
avoidance-had specifically called for a tax on stockholders with
reference to any undistributed income of a foreign personal holding company. 44 The fact that such income would have been blocked,
had it been distributed as a dividend, was thought to be beside the
point. The immunizing philosophy of the earlier International
Mortgage and Investment Co. case had to give way in the face of
such specific legislation.
An appellate court was not satisfied to rest only on this theory.
It denied that "inability to expend income in the United States, or
to use any portion of it in payment of income taxes, necessarily
precludes taxability." 45 Of importance was the fact that the taxpayers "could have invested, or spent, the 'blocked' pesos in Columbia and, as a result, could there have received economic satisfaction." The fact that the taxpayer himself spent a part of the year
.. T.D. 5281, July 12, 1943, C.B. 1943, 213 amending I.T. Regs. 103, §§ 19-43-1 and
19.131-6, reflected now in I.T. Regs.,§§ 1.461-1(a) (4) and 1.905-I(h).
•• 47 B.T.A. 235 (1942).
"Revenue Act of 1938, § 337, now I.R.C., § 551 et seq.
'"Eder v. Comm'r., (2d Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 27.
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in Colombia suggested that it was actually necessary for him to expend "some" pesos in Colombia.
This theory, geared to a power to obtain economic satisfaction
through foreign reinvestment or other expenditure, necessarily
called for an appraisal of the value of that potential satisfactionbut in terms of American dollars. The court suggested that this
might be accomplished through a comparison of various price indices
prevailing in the United States and Colombia. To this end, the
case was remanded to what had now been renamed the Tax Court,
and it proceeded to make the comparison in question, though account
was also taken of expert testimony the basis for which was not disclosed.46
The loosely worded suggestion by the court of appeals, to the
effect that deferment was not available if the blocked income could
be ''reinvested or spent" in the foreign country, may have contributed to the government's effort thereafter to sustain a 1938 deficiency against a corporate taxpayer the foreign profits of which
were tied up in Japanese yen. For at least part of the taxable year,
that corporation could have reinvested the yen in Japanese securities
-a practice then frowned upon by the State Department, or in
items deemed essential to Japan-such as scrap iron, provided a
permit authorizing the purchase could be obtained from that government. These circumstances did not, however, impress the Tax
Court. It distinguished the Eder case on its own original theory, to
the effect that the question of blockage was irrelevant there because
of specific legislation which called for a tax on stockholders of a
foreign personal holding company without regard to the question
of distribution. Deferment of the blocked yen here was deemed justified because the taxpayer did not have " 'unrestricted use and enjoyment' " of his gain. 47
It was after this decision, in the setting of post-war foreign monetary restrictions, that the government made it possible for taxpayers
to obtain assurance that it would not attempt to deny deferment because of a power to reinvest blocked foreign profits. The device,
established in Mimeograph 6475, 48 involved what was described
•• 3 T.C.M. 460 (1944).
United Artists Corporation of Japan, 3 T.C.M. 574 ( 1944). Later on in the same
taxable year, an agreement was reached with the Japanese government pursuant to
which the blocked yen could be converted into dollars, but these had to be placed in a
non-negotiable deposit for 3 years, without interest, with a San Francisco branch of a
Japanese bank. The Tax Court thought that deferment was still justified.
•• C.B. 1950-1, so. Subsequent amendments appear in Mim. 6494, C.B. 1950-1, 54,
and in Mim. 6584, C.B. 1951-1, 19.
47
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as a method of accounting which, under prescribed conditions, taxpayers might elect with respect to "deferable income." This classification included that income which, "owing to monetary exchange
or other restrictions imposed by a foreign country, is not readily
convertible into United States dollars or into other money or property which is readily convertible into United States dollars." 49
Such income could be deferred until the earlier to occur of any
one of three events, i.e., (I) until that point when the item no longer
satisfied the definition of deferable income, or ( 2) until the item
was in fact converted into dollars or into property readily convertible into such, or ( 3) until it was used for nondeductible personal
expenses, was disposed of by way of gift, bequest, device, or inheritance, or by dividend or other distribution, or, in the case of a
resident alien, a taxpayer terminated his residence in the United
States.
On the one hand, the first of the three possibilities demonstrated
that actual conversion into dollars of previously blocked income
was not a sine qua non to taxability. It was enough that the item
became "readily convertible." On the other hand, it was equally
clear from this mimeograph, as well as from a complementary ruling
of the same year, 5° that actual reinvestment, as well as the power to
reinvest, in foreign investment or business property did not, standing alone, serve to take blocked profits of an electing taxpayer out
of the deferable class. Nor would the mere existence of a power to
use the foreign currency for foreign personal expenses prohibit deferment, provided the amounts were not in fact so used. While no
mention is made of the circumstance where deferable income is used
to pay off foreign loans repayable in foreign currency, it could be
argued that deferment should still be allowed if the loan was obtained after blockage set in and was invested in investment or business property. In such circumstance, deferment would have been
allowed if the blocked foreign currency had been used to make the
investment in the first instance. In other circumstances, such as where
the loan was obtained prior to restrictions on foreign currency, the
government could argue that the loan transaction was a separate and
closed matter when repaid, justifying inclusion of the funds previously deferred because of blockage.
(c) Circumstances requiring deferral of deductions and
credits.-As noted supra, the regulations were amended in 1943 so
•• Ibid.
.., I.T. 4037, C.B. 1950-2, 31.
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as to require deferment of deductions and credits attributable to any
income properly deferred because of exchange controls. 51
The later promulgated Mimeograph 64 7 5 elaborated on this
principle as applied to taxpayers invoking the benefits of the method
of accounting there prescribed.
Depreciation, obsolescence, and depletion, when measured in
terms of foreign currency, were to be taken into account, like other
expenses incurred in foreign currency, in subsequent taxable years in
the same proportion as the deferable income, to which they were
linked, was includible in taxable income. Where blocked foreign
profits were reinvested abroad in investment or business property, a
complementary ruling indicated that such property originally took
on a deferred income basis measured by its cost in terms of the foregoing currency. 52 It was contemplated that an annual information
return covering blocked income would reflect that basis as well as
adjustments thereto, such as depreciation, allowed by the Code.
When the foreign currency originally used to acquire the assets took
on a non-blocked status, two steps were to be taken. First, the original amount so devoted was to be translated into American dollars at
the exchange rate prevailing when the funds became unblocked, that
amount then being includible in gross income. Second, the adjustments made in the property acquired, as well as the funds originally
used to make the acquisition, would be converted at the same rate as
that applied in fixing the amount of income; the resulting figure established the basis for the property.
The deferment principle also included costs and direct expenses
incurred in American dollars, to the extent attributable to deferable
income. As the proceeds became unblocked, the entire cost of goods
sold in a given transaction was to be recovered first, before any
amount was includible in gross income. Only after those costs were
recovered was account to be taken of other direct dollar expenses
attributable to the sale. Even then, absent permission to do otherwise, these expenses, unlike the cost of goods sold in the transaction,
were to be taken into account proportionately by reference to the
relationship which the amount included in gross income during that
taxable year bore to the transaction's total proceeds in excess of the
cost of goods sold. 53
51

See note 40, supra.
•• LT. 4037, C.B. 1950-2, 31.
63
The mimeograph provided for a special arrangement as to these costs if more
than one foreign country was involved in the transaction. See para. 7 {b) of the
mimeograph as amended by Mim. 6494, C.B. 1950-1, 54·
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Deferment of the foregoing costs and expenses incurred in dollars
will also cease, of course, if the items reflecting the deferable income
become worthless.
The mimeograph does not call for deferment of indirect expenses
incurred in dollars. Absence of any mention of them presumably
means that the taxpayer will not be required to undertake the complicated task of unscrambling these for purposes of affecting allocation to particular transactions only some of which may involve the
problem of blockage.
(d) Mechanics and effect of election under Mimeograph
647 5.-The mimeograph, as amended, calls for the election to be
made "no later than the time prescribed by law (including any extension thereof) for filing the income tax return for the first taxable
year for which the election is to be applicable." 54
Along with his regular return, the taxpayer is required to file
separate information returns, on the same type of form, with respect
to each country in which a deferable account exists. On these returns, which must be labelled "Report Of Deferable Foreign Income, pursuant to Mimeograph No. 6475," the taxpayer must enter
into two agreements: (I) that the deferable income will be included
in taxable income in that taxable year in which it ceases to be deferable under the provisions of the mimeograph, and ( 2) that no
claim will be made that such deferable income was includible in
gross income for any earlier year. While like agreement need not be
expressly entered on the return with reference to losses, the mimeograph itself does provide that taxpayers electing this method of
accounting must also treat losses in a consistent manner. 55 Finally,
once the election is made, it may not be changed without securing the
consent of the Commissioner.
By way of general summary, the taxpayer's gross receipts in
blocked foreign currency is reported, though only for information
purposes, and the cost of goods sold-in terms of such currencyare subtracted. From the resulting figure-foreign currency gross
income-expenses incurred in terms of the foreign currency are deducted in arriving at foreign currency net income.
When some part of the foreign currency net income ceases to be
deferable by reference to the standards previously indicated, that
amount is reduced by the dollar costs attributable to that transac.. Mim. 6584, C.B. 1951-1, 19, amending para. 9 of Mim. 6475.
55
That the election is binding with regard to losses even in the instance where books
regarding foreign profits are otherwise kept in accordance with the net worth method,
see Anderson, Clayton & Co v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1958) 168 F. Supp. 542.
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tion, the remainder being included in the taxpayer's gross income
from which dollar direct expenses, as previously explained, are
deducted in turn on a proportionate basis. The Service has also taken
the position that a partial remittance of unblocked income covering
several years is to be reported, as it becomes unblocked, on a first-infirst-out basis. 56

(e) Conclusion.-The foregoing discussion suggests that
Mimeograph 64 75 permits restricted foreign income to be deferred
in some instances where deferment might not have been permitted
under case law. Certainly the right to reinvest in foreign investment
or business property without loss of the deferment privilege would
not have been permitted by the court of appeals which decided the
previously discussed Eder case. It was, perhaps, because of this variation that the government characterized the mimeograph as descriptive only of a "method of accounting." While prior cases in this
precise area had approached the problem as though it involved a
question of law, other cases in related areas have stated that reflection of profits in foreign currency poses an accounting question
for which there may be more than one answer-provided the taxpayer follows a sensible practice consistently. 57 In any event, there
is also authority to the effect that taxpayers who elect to be treated
under the mimeograph must also be consistent in abiding by its
various provisions though one or more may operate to his prejudice.58
It is also true that the mimeograph provides a more comprehensive set of answers with reference to the overall method it prescribes than is available under case law. This is so even though the
Service could not be perfectly precise in resolving the most basic
of all questions. The range of conceivable variations in factual patterns quite rightly restrained it from saying anything more precise
than that deferable income consisted of that which was not "readily
convertible" into dollars.
Taxpayers remain free, of course, to ignore the mimeograph,
falling back on the less precise case law pattern. And particularly in
these cases, the question will arise: What market place is to be
chosen for valuation of foreign currency in the event deferment is
not to be allowed in a given case? This is the subject matter of the
next section.
68

Rev. Rul. 57-379, C.B. 1957-2, 299.
E.g., see American Pad & Textile Co., 16 T.C. 1304 (1951).
08
Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1958) x68 F. Supp. 542·
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SECTION D. CHOICE OF MARKET PLACE IN DETERMINING
THE CoNVERSION RATE

(a) Introductory note.-At some point, foreign profits and
the amount of foreign income taxes paid must be reflected in dollars
for American tax purposes. Particularly where a foreign country's
currency is blocked or restricted, differences may well exist between
that country's official rate of exchange, its black market rate, and the
commercial rate at which such foreign money is transferable in
the United States. Thus, if the income cannot be deferred for American tax purposes under the principles set forth in Section C, supra,
it may be necessary to determine which of these several market places
will be resorted to in fixing the conversion rate.
As indicated below, the government has not always maintained a
consistent position, though in all but two significant cases it has
fostered the official rate, a view for which the courts have generally
substituted the American commercial rate. The fact that the government has acquiesced in all of the Tax Court cases which were adverse to its position and that the matter has not been further litigated within the past five years may be some indication that it is
prepared to accept what may seem to be inevitable. On the other
hand, its most recent published ruling, as described below, is so
equivocal that it might feel free to argue, without embarrassment,
that those acquiescences rested on the peculiar facts of the litigated
items.
About half of the litigated items have concerned the estate or
gift tax, rather than the income tax, but the Tax Court has insisted
that common principles apply to all three and has indiscriminately
commingled citations.
(b) Evolution of relevant developments.-In 1920, the
Service's then Committee on Appeals and Review found the abnormal conditions associated with foreign exchange during the
World War I sufficient cause to justify authorizing a taxpayer to
"convert current assets less current liabilities payable in the foreign
currency at the current rate of exchange or at any rate less favorable
to him." 59 But it then went on to drain most of the vitality from this
notion by adding an equivocal caveat, "The Commissioner should
consider in any case applications to adopt a rate more favorable to
.. A.R.R. 15, 2 C.B. 6o (1920).
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the taxpayer or may on his own motion apply such a rate where the
facts in the particular case warrant such departure." 60
The government did not again speak for publication until I94I;
in the interval, the elasticity of its earlier position was seemingly
unchanged in such private rulings as were reported by recipients.
In one, the government is said to have called for the selection of that
market place which would most clearly reflect the income, 61 and in
another it was said that there could be no general rule, for each case
turned on its own peculiar facts. 62
The peculiar facts deemed important by it in connection with the
British government's restrictions on exchange during World War
II turned out to be the effectiveness of the British restraining orders.
Required compliance reached the point where there was said to be
"little 'free sterling exchange' " and "little difference between the
controlled 'official' exchange rate and the 'free exchange' rate on
sterling still available on open market." 63 In that circumstance, with
respect to those unblocked accounts for which the British government would permit an exchange, but only at the official rate, the
Service insisted that "the rates of exchange, both for conversion of
British current assets at the beginning and end of the taxable year
and for conversion of British taxes paid with respect to the income
involved, either for foreign tax credit purposes or deduction from ·
gross income in the taxpayer's United States return, "Should be taken
at the 'official' rate" except where actual realization had taken place
at some other rate. 64
A year later, however, the government-in LT. 3568-was still
insisting that the overall problem could not be reduced to a general
rule. In rejecting the notion that exchange rates certified by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York for customs purposes could be
used in all cases, it stated:
Notwithstanding present conditions of disturbances and
the control of trading and exchange by foreign countries,
free or open market rates lower than either official or
controlled rates were in certain cases realizable on December 3 I, I 94 I, dependent upon regulations of the particular foreign country and the degree of control which was
00

Ibid. (Italics added.)
Cohen, Tax Accounting Problems in International Operations, 18 N.Y. INST. 293,
300 (1960).
02
Roberts, Effect of Blocking of Currency on Gain or Loss, 7 N.Y. INST. 1224 (1949).
""Mim. 5297, C.B. 1942-1, 84 at 86.
"'Ibid.
61
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exercised. In any case in which conversion rates as of that
date are to be used, such rates shall be those giving a result most clearly reflecting the proper amounts of the
items to which they relate as affected by the conditions and
available means and rates of conversion as of that date.
The rates of exchange used will be subject to verification
and check upon the examination of the taxpayer's books
and records by internal revenue agents. 65
More or less simultaneous with the publication of that ruling,
the government litigated a case involving blocked German marks.
And there it sought to reduce the taxpayer's claimed loss on a sale by
arguing that his basis for the property-purchased by the taxpayer
with blocked German marks acquired from an earlier sale-should
be determined by reference to the commercial rate of exchange prevailing in New York at the time of his purchase, rather than by reference to the official rate. The Board of Tax Appeals agreed, noting
that while the marks were blocked at the time the taxpayer originally purchased the property, he would not have been prevented
from disposing of those marks on the available New York market. 66
At approximately the same time, in an effort to increase the
amount of a different taxpayer's profit, the government shifted its
support to the official rate by applying to blocked income that rate
which the foreign government itself allowed on unblocked or unrestricted income. Before the Tax Court, the taxpayer had conceded
this issue, 67 arguing only that he should not be subject to any tax. On
appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the case on the valuation issue, concluding that the value
of blocked foreign currency was not on a par with unblocked income
in the same currency. 68 In the absence of a regular New York
market, the Tax Court then accepted the testimony of a New York
banker to the effect that income so restricted was worth half of the
rate which was available for unblocked income originating in that
same country. 69
65

C.B. 1942-2, 112.
.. Credit and Investment Corporation, 47 B.T.A. 673 ( 1942). Also, Foundation Co.,
14 T.C. 1333 (1950), Acq., C.B. 1950-2, 2.
07
Phanor J. Eder, 47 B.T.A. 235, 238 (1942).
""Eder v. Comm'r., (2d Cir. 1943) 138 F.(2d) 27.
•• Phanor J. Erler, 3 T.C.M. 460 ( 1944). The same approach was made in Estate
of Anthony H. G. Fokker, 10 T.C. 1225 (1948), Acq., C.B. 1948-2, 2 and Estate of Oei
Tjong Swan, 24 T.C. 829 ( 1955), Acq., C.B. 1956-2, 8. In the latter case, the court
stated (at 88o): "In other words, if an amount had actually been realizable in United
States dollars, our holding would have been based thereon; but since there could have
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In a similar case decided by the Tax Court four months later,
the government had again espoused the cause of the official rate,
opposing application of the less attractive established New York
commercial rate. While a Brazilian administrative agency apparently had authority to redeem the taxpayer's milreis at the official
rate, the evidence indicated that this authority was seldom if ever
granted in the type of case at bar and that in fact the taxpayer had
resorted to the New York exchange in earlier dealings. The Tax
Court was now content with the statement that "Taxation is a
practical matter. We apply the commercial rate." 70 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 71
This principle was then extended by the Tax Court to gift 72
and estate tax 73 situations. In the former, for example, a California
banker appeared as an expert witness, testifying that his bank had
bought and sold such blocked currency for an amount approximating
so% of the official rate for unblocked currency of that country.
This ratio was then adopted by the court. Those decisions were
thereafter cited as authority for the resolution of income tax cases,
the Tax Court stating that the change in setting "makes no difference in the fundamental question involved." 74
Only where the taxpayer did not raise the issue, 75 or where the
higher official rate was actually available, 76 has the Tax Court accepted the government's recurring efforts to apply the official rate.
As previously suggested, the government's acquiescences to other
adverse holdings and its failure to litigate a case since 1955 may
indicate that the question is now considered settled.
been no realization of dollars in respect to the blocked assets under consideration, it
is necessary to translate foreign value into dollars for estate tax purposes by conversion at an appropriate rate of exchange which will reflect the various restrictions
and other factors impinging on value."
70
Edmond Weil, Inc., 3 T.C.M. 844, 849 (1944).
71
(2d Cir. 1945) 150 F.(2d) 950.
72
Morris Marks Landau, 7 T.C. 12 ( 1946), Acq., C.B. 1946-2, 3·
78
Estate of Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503 ( 1947), Acq., C.B. 1948-2, 2. Also, Estate of
Jan Willem Nienhuys, 17 T.C. 1149 (1952), Acq., C.B. 1952-1, 3·
7
' Ceska Cooper, 15 T.C. 757 at 765
(1950), Acq., C.B. 1951-1, 2; Foundation Co.,
14 T.C. 1333 (1950), Acq., C.B. 1950-2, 2.
75
Waterman's Estate, 16 T.C. 467 (1951), rev'd. on another issue, (2d Cir. 1952)
195 F.(2d) 244; Max Freudmann, 10 T.C. 775 (1948).
76
Estate of Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503 ( 1947) re account in Barclays Bank. The
official rate was also applied to an army officer stationed in England and France because the blocked foreign currencies which he received there at the official rate could
be converted into dollars at the higher official rate upon his departure from those
countries. S. E. Boyer, 9 T.C. u68 (1947). Cf. Ceska Cooper, 15 T.C. 757 (1950),
Acq., C.B. 1951-1, 2,
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SEcTION E. CoNVERSION PROBLEM As IT AFFECTs THE
CREDIT FoR FoREIGN INcOME TAXES

(a) Introductory note.-As explained in PART III, supra,
an American taxpayer is allowed a credit for any foreign income
taxes actually borne by him (so-called direct tax credit) 77 as well
as, in the case of an American corporation, a portion of those paid
or deemed paid by a foreign corporation at least ro% of the voting
stock of which is held by the domestic corporation (so-called
"deemed paid" tax credit) .78 In both instances, the foreign tax will
normally be payable in a foreign currency. But because the time when
the amount so paid must be converted into American dollars differs
by reference to the two types of credit, the conversion problem is
discussed separately as to each.
(b) Conversion for purposes of the direct tax credit.Shortly after the credit for foreign income taxes was established,
the Commissioner ruled that cq,sh basis taxpayers who paid such in
a foreign currency should compute the credit by converting the
amount paid into American dollars by reference to exchange rates
prevailing on the date of payment. 79
In that same period, as to a deductible domestic tax, the government was contending that accrual basis taxpayers should reflect the
item in the year in which the events occurred "which fix the amount
of the tax and the liability of the taxpayer to pay it" 80 even though
the tax might not yet be due and payable. Only then was it thought
that such a taxpayer would be reflecting his true income for the
period. This concept, as applied to accrual basis taxpayers, was
carried over by the government to the direct credit for foreign income taxes. Since the governing provision authorized an accrual of
the credit, 81 where such foreign tax had not been paid during the
year the rate of exchange in effect on the last day of the year was
said by the government to be the basis by which the foreign liability
was to be converted into American dollars. 82
77
I.R.C., § 901. As explained in PART III, this credit also includes war profits and
excess profits taxes as well as any tax paid in lieu of the~e and income taxes otherwise
generally imposed. I.R.C., § 903.
78 I.R. c., § 902.
70
I.T. 1645, C.B. Il-1, 141 ( 1923).
""United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441, 46 S. Ct. 131 (1926).
81
Revenue Act of 1921, § 238 (b), now I.R.C., § 905 (c) .
.. I.T. r645, C.B. U-1, 141 (1923),
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The earliest statutory provision, 83 like that on the books today, 84
also provided that the domestic tax for the "year or years affected"
would later be redetermined in the event the amount of foreign tax
subsequently paid by the accrual basis taxpayer differed from that
previously estimated and accrued as of the end of the original taxable year. The government concluded that this statutory arrangement
had the effect of establishing a superseding conversion rate in such
cases, the effect being to convert the earlier accrual into a "provisional or interim credit." 85 It reasoned as follows:
. . . the law having directed the adjustment of the
amount accrued to the amount actually paid, the necessary
inference is that the amount of the payment if made in
. . . [foreign] money shall be converted into American
money at the rate of exchange as of the date of payment,
since this is the only way of arriving at the amount actually
paid. To convert a payment made in . . . [a subsequent
year] into American dollars at the rate of exchange prevailing . . . [in the earlier year of accrual J would be to
allow the taxpayer a greater or less amount than he has
actually paid, depending upon whether the rate of exchange . . . [in the earlier year J is higher or lower than
that in . . . [the later year J.86
The foregoing principles, initially established by rulings, were
approved shortly thereafter by the Board of Tax Appeals. 87
In I 924, a congressional committee called attention to the fact
that many foreign countries, like our own, provided for the payment
of income taxes during the year following the year for which the tax
was imposed. 88 This meant that cash basis taxpayers were taking a
credit against the domestic tax in the year following the year in
which their foreign income was earned. To avoid any prejudice
which might result as a consequence of variation in the yearly
amount of foreign income, the· statutory provision regarding the
credit was amended at the committee's request so as to permit cash
basis taxpayers to elect to reflect the credit in the same manner as
accrual taxpayers. 89
"'Revenue Act of 1918, § 238 (a) .
.. I.R.C., §9os (c).
Texas Company (Caribbean) Ltd., 12 T.C. 925, 929 (1949), Acq., C.B. 1949-2, 3·
811
S.M. 4081, C.B. IV-2, 201 at 202 (1925). (Italics added.)
"'D. E. Brown, 1 B.T.A. 446 (1925); Mead Cycle Co., 10 B.T.A. 887 (1928), Acq.,
C.B. VII-2, 26. Also, Texas Company (Caribbean) Ltd., 12 T.C. 925 (1949), Acq.,
C.B. 1949-2, 3·
88
H. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., rst Sess. 22 (1924).
89
Revenue Act of 1924, §§ 238(c) and 222(c), now I.R.C., § 905(a).
85
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The special character of the provisions relating to accrual of
foreign taxes for purposes of the credit has led to modification of
one other doctrine which applies to accrual of domestic taxes.
In the latter circumstance, an accrual basis taxpayer must postpone accrual of any tax, liability for which he is contesting. The
accrual takes place in and for the year the contest is settled. 90
While the accrual of that part of any foreign tax being contested
must also be postponed until the matter is resolved, it has been held,
and the Service agrees, that the congressional aims permitting accrual in a foreign tax setting justify relating the accrual back to the
year for which credit would have been taken in the absence of the
contest. 91
Accrual basis taxpayers, as well as cash basis taxpayers who elect
the accrual method, may be required to post a bond on accruing the
credit prior to payment of the foreign tax. 92 In both settings, a tenyear statutory period of limitations has also been imposed on
recognition of overpayments of American tax resulting from subsequent redeterminations reflecting differences between the amount
of foreign taxes accrued and that actually paid. 93
(c) Conversion for purposes of the "deemed-paid" tax
credit.-As previously noted, an American corporation may enjoy a
credit for a proper part of any foreign income taxes paid or deemed
paid by a foreign corporation at least 10% of the voting stock of
which is held by the domestic enterprise. 94 This credit may be taken,
however, only as dividends are drawn from the foreign corporation.
Thus the question may arise as to whether, for credit purposes, the
amount of foreign taxes paid by the foreign corporation should be
converted into American dollars according to the rate of exchange
prevailing when the foreign corporation paid the foreign tax or
according to a rate later prevailing when a dividend is included in
the American corporation's gross income.
The first contested situation involved a dividend received from
a foreign corporation's earnings and profits of an earlier year the
foreign tax on which had been paid in the earlier year. The foreign
00

Dixie Pine Products v. Comm'r., 320 U.S. 516, 64 S. Ct. 364 ( 1944).
Cuba Railroad Co. v. U.S., (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1954) 124 F. Supp. 182; Rev. Rul.
58-55, C.B. 1958-1, 266.
""I.R.C., § 905 (c).
98
l.R.C., § 65II (d) (3). If the foreign tax is refunded and the American credit is
thereby reduced, interest will not be assessed by the American government with respect to the redetermination except to the extent interest was paid by the foteign country on the refund. I.R.C., § 905 (c).
"'I.R.C., § 902.
91
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corporation had always kept its accounts in terms of the foreign
currency with which it had also paid the foreign tax. The Board of
Tax Appeals noted that prior to the declaration of the dividend,
"neither the earnings nor the taxes of that foreign subsidiary had in
any way affected the income tax liability of the domestic corporation." 95 Since, prior to the dividend, there had never been any
occasion to reduce the payment of foreign taxes into American dollars, the Board, like the government, thought that it was "reasonable and logical" to effect the conversion according to exchange
rates prevailing at the time of the dividend, rather than at the time
the foreign tax was actually paid by the foreign corporation. 96
The government thought the same principle should apply even
though the foreign corporation always kept its accounts in American
dollars, using the latter to pay dividends and to purchase foreign
currency with which to pay its foreign tax. But the Tax Court
(formerly Board of Tax Appeals) 97 and the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit 98 thought otherwise. In this circumstance,
the exchange rate prevailing at the time of the dividend was thought
to have no relation whatever to the amount of accumulated earnings
and profits, to the dividend, or to the foreign taxes actually paid.
The foreign corporation itself had invoked an exchange rate at
the time it used its own American dollars to buy the foreign currency with which to pay the foreign tax. Accordingly, in this circumstance it was thought that no exchange problem arose at the
time of the dividend. Subsequently, the government acquiesced in
the distinction between the two cases. 99
"'Bon Ami Co., 39 B.T.A. 825, 827 (1939).
ld. at 828.
"'American Metal Co., 19 T.C. 879 (1953).
08
(2d Cir. 1955) 221 F.(2d) 134, cert. den., 350 U.S. 829, 76 S. Ct. 61 (1955).
99
Non-acq. to the Tax Court's opinion, in C.B. 1953-1, 7, was withdrawn in C.B.
1955-2, 3·
06

PART V. FOREIGN AND AMERICAN TAXES ON
INDIVIDUALS AS THEY AFFECT MOVEMENT
OF EMPLOYEES TO FOREIGN LANDS
SECTION

A.

INTRODUCTION

American enterprises which create foreign subsidiaries or open
permanent establishments in Common Market countries are likely
to transfer certain of their American employees to the foreign stations. The country-by-country survey in PART I, supra, furnishes
the background for the comparison in Section B, below, of the ways
and extent to which income taxes of member nations will affect
American citizens so assigned. Generally speaking, until such time
as the American becomes a resident of a particular Common Market
country as defined under its law, each nation will assert jurisdiction
only over that income for which it is the source. When residence in
a particular country is established pursuant to its law, that Common Market nation will generally increase its jurisdictional sweep
to include the resident's income from all sources. But even in this
circumstance, unilaterally and by treaty, most of those countries
have provided some form of relief to mitigate double taxation with
respect, at least, to certain types of income which the displaced
American continues to derive from sources in the United States.
In other words, to that extent, most of them acknowledge the priority of the United States over its own citizens. Moreover, unilaterally or under bilateral tax treaties between member nations,
the foreign country of residence may also grant some relief with
reference to any income which the American may derive from other
member nations.
While the notion of gross income which prevails in the United
States generally requires a citizen to include income "from all
sources" though the item may also be subject to a foreign tax,
there are circumstances in which Congress has permitted Americans
stationed abroad to immunize foreign service income from the
American tax. This concession is geared generally to establishment
of bona fide residence in a particular foreign country but pursuant
to standards fixed by American law. Alternatively, extended physical presence abroad, i.e., presence in one or more countries, for a
578
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period approximating 1 ~ years will warrant an exclusion, though
here there is a limitation on the amount. To the extent of the immunity thus granted, the United States in effect acknowledges the
sole right of the foreign country or countries to tax any "earned"
income which has its source there. The discussion of this matter in
Section C, below, is coupled with an analysis of the way in which the
foreign tax would be integrated with the American tax in the instance where the immunizing criteria specified by Congress are not
satisfied.
Other employees who are permanently stationed at the home office in the States may be called upon to make more or less brief business trips to the scene of the foreign operation. Alternatively, Americans who have been stationed abroad might be called back to the
States for a short time. Nonresident alien employees, i.e., citizens
of Common Market countries, might also be brought from their
overseas stations to the home office for consultation, etc. Within
the same taxable year, any one of these three classes might perform
services at home as well as in a foreign land. This could complicate
their tax problems, for the Code as well as bilateral treaties generally look to the place where service is performed, rather than to
the place of payment, in fixing the source of compensation for tax
purposes. And source itself is generally considered the prime basis
for asserting jurisdiction over compensation. However, Section D,
below, calls attention to a standard which has been added to the Internal Revenue Code, and to others incorporated in treaties, for the
purpose of freeing certain international business visits from such
tax complications. The device involves a modification in the rules
which generally designate the place of service as the source of
earned income. Subject to certain conditions, each country in effect
foregoes treating itself as the source of compensation even though
the business visitor actually performed services there. But this variation is only applied by each country to those business visitors who
are nonresident aliens, and then only if such persons are physically
present for a period usually not exceeding 6 months. In other words,
the United States would not forego taxability of income attributable
to services performed in the States by a business visitor who is an
American citizen, and this is so though he might then actually be a
resident of a foreign country.

580

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

SECTION

B.

CoMPARING CoMMON MARKET TAXES ON
AMERICANs AssiGNED To WoRK

IN

A

MEMBER NATION

(a) Foreign tax effect when an American establishes residence abroad: In general.-Aside from special exclusions designed
to accommodate international business visits, the income tax of almost all countries reaches earnings derived by anyone from personal
services performed locally. Common Market countries, like the
United States, go on generally, however, to consider residence there
a proper basis for asserting jurisdiction over a person's total income, from wherever derived. Absent special provision, this would
mean that at least two countries would be asserting worldwide jurisdiction over the total income of an American citizen who has taken
up residence in a Common Market country. Section C, infra, describes the two prime types of relief which have been incorporated
into the Internal Revenue Code to accommodate the plight of such
a person. The first, in the form of an inclusion, is limited to the
American citizen's foreign service income. The second, in the form
of a credit for any foreign income tax which may have been paid,
would, inter alia, accommodate that citizen's other income but only
to the extent it is derived from sources outside the United States.
In other words, America insists upon full payment of tax attributable to that part of a nonresident citizen's income which may have
been derived from sources within the United States. Many foreign
countries have unilateral statutory provisions which are designed,
in one degree or another, to protect any resident who is an American
citizen from double taxation with respect to this latter type of income. Luxembourg has one of the least attractive arrangements
of this type in that it only allows the American tax attributable to
such benefits to be deducted from gross income in computing the net
base. The other five Common Market countries are now hemmed
in by provisions in the bilateral tax treaties. As is indicated more
fully in the notes/ these fall into three general categories. The Bel1 By Article XII of the Belgian treaty, Belgium agreed (I) to reduce to ¥.;th the
Professionelle and Nationale Crisis taxes which would otherwise be levied on income
sourced in and taxed by the United States, (2) to tax income from personal and real
property having a source in the United States at a maximum rate of xzo/o, and (3) to
the personal complementary tax on the American citizen with reference
reduce to
to income sourced in and taxed by the United States.
Unilaterally, Italy does not apply its complementary progressive income tax on a
resident alien's income from other sources until it is remitted. But by Article XV(x) (b)

*

TAXATION

gian provision calls for a substantial reduction in the rate on that
income which such a person continues to derive from American
sources. Italy responds by crediting the American tax against their
own assessments. Germany, France, and the Netherlands, on the
other hand, generally provide exemptions for such income though
the latter country does not grant such in the case of dividends, interest, and royalties received by individuals.
The Common Market countries also take different approaches
in resolving the question of whether an American has become a
resident in one of the former countries for tax purposes. A person
who has resided in Germany or in Luxembourg for a period in excess of 6 months is deemed a resident and will be taxed accordingly,
beginning with the first day of his stay. While the basic period in
France is five years, a person in the service of an enterprise situated
there is likely to be considered a resident after one year and be
taxed accordingly from that moment on. At a minumum, he will be
taxed the first year on income having its source in France or on a
sum equal to five times the rental value of his house or apartment,
whichever is greater.
Theoretically, the other three member nations do not gear the
question of residence for tax purposes to any particular period of
stay. Under the taxing statutes of Belgium and the Netherlands, the
question turns on the total facts. In Italy the matter is tied to the
civil law interpretation of domicile. But as a practical matter, all
three countries will normally assert residence at least at the point
when a stay has extended beyond one year.
of the treaty, Italy agreed to reduce its tax by the amount of United States tax on income from sources in the United States where such income was not exempt from United
States tax. The formula includes an arrangement to prevent the credit from immunizing
Italian taxes on income derived from non-United States sources. Dividends sourced
within the United States are treated separately; Italy allows a credit against tax in an
amount equal to 8 o/o of the dividend itself.
By Article XIX(3) of the Netherlands treaty, the Netherlands agreed to grant a
credit, insofar as allowed by Netherlands law, for income taxes paid to the United
States. But see also the reference in Section D, infra, to an exclusion permitted by the
national law of the Netherlands.
By Article XV(I) (b) of the German treaty, Germany agreed to immunize from tax
income of an American citizen derived from the United States and not exempt from
United States tax. However, Germany reserved the right to include excluded items
for the purpose of determining the rate applicable to other income.
Article 14(B) of the French treaty governs its response. A credit is allowed against
the proportional tax on interest, dividends, and trust income, derived from the United
States. Any other income derived from the United States is exempt from that tax.
Also, Article 164 of the French General Tax Code has been frozen into the treaty, and
generally exempts U.S. income from the French general income tax when derived by
an American residing in France, providing such income was taxable in the United
States.
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(b) Comparative progressive impact of Common Market
income taxes on employment income.-The country-by-country survey in PART I contained separate descriptions of the income taxes
which each member nation would impose on individuals. Three countries-Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands-follow a
basic pattern much like that used in the United States in that only
one income tax is imposed on individuals. France's reform in late
1959 also moved it toward that same type of structure. While at
least temporarily it did retain a complementary tax in addition to
its general income tax, only the latter applies to wages and salaries.
In lieu of the former, employers pay a substitute tax which the employees may credit against their general income tax.
The two other countries-Belgium and Italy-superimpose a
progressive surtax Oli other separately scheduled income taxes which
are divided by reference to various classes of income.
Considerable variation also exists with reference to the way in
which allowances for a spouse and other dependents are handled.
The Italian approach to this problem most closely resembles that of
the United States; the matter is accommodated by deductions from
gross income in arriving at the tax base. The personal allowance for
the taxpayer amounts to $387; each dependent, including a spouse,
gives rise to an additional $81 deduction.
Belgium solves the dependency problem through credits against
tax on the first $5 ,ooo of income, as follows:
(a) 5% each for the first and second dependents;
(b) 10% each for the third and fourth dependents; and
(c) 20% for each additional dependent.
Belgium also exempts from tax a modest amount ($500 to $8oo
depending on the size of municipality in which the taxpayer resides)
but only if the total income does not exceed the exemption.
The French response involves a split-income arrangement for
computation purposes, the taxpayer and his spouse counting as one
each, other dependents being counted as 12 each.
Germany also mitigates progression by allowing the taxpayer to
split his income with his spouse for computation purposes. Allowances for children, however, are handled in a fashion similar to
that in the United States and Italy, the deductions from gross income being $214 for the first child, $400 for the second, with $428
being allowed for each additional child.
Finally, Luxembourg and the Netherlands approach the prob-
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lem through multiple rate tables, the choice of a particular table
being dependent upon the taxpayer's family situation.
As indicated in PART I, other deductions from an individual's
gross income will also vary from country to country. However,
practically all have established some kind· of minimum standard
deduction to accommodate an employee's business expenses;
amounts in excess of that must be itemized en toto. Also interesting
because of its departure from American practice is the allowance
frequently allowed for life insurance premiums, up to a certain
amount. Germany and Luxembourg add on old age, health, and accident insurance. While Belgium also allows a deduction for social
security contributions, the Netherlands even permit a deduction up
to a certain amount for premiums paid on a life annuity contract.
Life insurance, however, is not accommodated there. Germany and
Luxembourg also permit a taxpayer to take a standard personal deduction in lieu of itemizing most other personal deductions. This is
separate and apart from the standard business deduction previously
mentioned.
A final significant departure from American practice involves a
deduction of all or a part of the income tax itself. While France and
Italy permit their complementary tax and separately scheduled income taxes, respectively, to be deducted from the amount subject
to their respective progressive taxes, Belgium goes on to allow the
progressive tax of one year to be deducted from that income subject
to progressive tax in the next year.
Comparison of the relative impact of each member nation's income tax on individuals is only possible on the basis of assumed facts.
Table V A assumes that all income (salaries of $6,ooo, $I 2,ooo, and
$48,ooo) was derived from employment, a:nd reflects the effective
percentage which would be absorbed by taxes against single taxpayers and married taxpayers with two children, standard minimum
deductions also having been taken into account. It will be noted that
Italy is quite generally on the low side, with the Netherlands being
consistently on the high side. Also to be noted is the fact that the
United States would generally fall into the less demanding group,
for real progression in Europe generally starts at a lower figure
than in the United States.
Many Americans will draw an added bonus from their employers
for foreign service even though the dollar has a comparatively high
purchasing power in most Common Market countries. Foreign tax

584

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

v

A
EFFECTIVE RATES ON SALARY INCOME
TABLE

I
I

COUNTRY

I

Belgium

I
I

Salary. $6,ooo

Single
Taxpayer

Salary, $r2,000
llrfarried
and T'IJ.•a :'I Single
and Twa
Children / Taxpayer Children

I

Germany**
Italy
Luxembourg

I
I

Netherlands
United States

II

Salary, $48,000
Married
and Twa
Single
Taxpayer Children

M""''"

'
France*

~

22.37%

16. 77 %

22.33%

8.19%

"
I

36.61%

34·23%

I'II

s6.7o%

56.10%

I

28-42%

14-98%

1/

41.97%

31.22%

I

***
47·2%

4o.8o%

I

***
25.2%

16.-%

***
33·5 %

24·3 %

il

12.36%

12.05%

14·98%

14.84%

i

21.74%

21.6o%

28.53%

13.88%

39·65%

27.so%

'

36.21%

28.35%

49·07%

17·40%

10.-%

24.20%

I'

51.55%

49·06%

40·36%

I
I

64·30%

61.n%

15·40%

I

so. so%

35.6o%

I

*In comparing the French effective rate, account must be taken of the fact that
salaries are free from the 8% complementary tax, employers paying in lieu thereof a
slightly progressive tax by reference to wages paid each employee. Though paid by
the employer, this latter tax is credited by the employee against his general income tax.
The above figures take into account a 5% credit, this being the normal percentage paid
by employers.
**A church tax, usually amounting to 8% of the tax on wages, must be added.
***Figures are those applicable to taxpayers under age so.

authorities generally treat this as part of their taxable incomes.
Americans do, however, frequently receive quite favorable treatment on other scores; this varies from special allowances for expenses up to a certain percentage, to acceptance of currency exchange
rates which are lower than those officially posted. Illustratively,
where American controlled enterprises have sent employees from
the head office to establish Belgian factories or offices, those employees who are deemed to retain their tax residence in the United
States have received the benefit of a special ruling from the Belgian
authorities. If the employee's European activities are conducted
almost exclusively in Belgium, he is permitted a standard deduction
equal to so% of the salary received in Belgium.
Generalizations with respect to the circumstances in which Americans may enjoy special tax benefits are not really meaningful, however, for such matters usually depend upon negotiation in each case.
And as more and more Americans take up residence in the Common Market, it is likely to become more difficult to obtain such
privileges.
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SECTION

c.

IMPACT OF

u.s.

INCOME TAX ON AMERICAN

EMPLOYEEs AssiGNED To FoREIGN STATIONS

(a) Introductory note.-In the first income tax act passed
pursuant to the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress asserted a power
to tax an American citizen on his income "from all sources," without regard to whether he worked or resided "at home or abroad." 2
This sweeping view of jurisdictional power was sustained-as a
constitutional matter-on the theory that "government, by its very
nature benefits the citizen and his property wherever found . . . . " 3
It was equally true, however, that a citizen who derived his income
by performing services in a foreign country also benefitted from the
activities of that government and, at least to the extent of the income earned there, was usually taxed by it. 4 Congress began to respond to this double tax threat in I 9 I 6; within IO years, it had instituted three relief measures. These served as mutually exclusive
alternatives in some situations; in certain others they were complementary.
The first congressionally inspired relief against double taxation
has survived in slightly altered form to this day. It involves a deduction from gross income of most of the different types of taxes imposed by a foreign country. 5 But this deduction fell far short of
relieving the citizen of the entire burden of his foreign tax. For example, if his effective domestic rate was 33%, the American tax
was in effect reduced only by an amount equal to one-third of the
foreign tax. The taxpayer himself continued to shoulder the economic burden of the remaining two-thirds.
The consequence of this limited form of relief was re-examined
during World War I when both domestic and foreign income tax
rates were being increased. Fear was expressed that citizens were
still discouraged "from going out after commerce and business in
different countries or residing for such purposes in different countries." It was asserted that some would even "become a citizen of
another country . . . in order to escape the large and double taxa2

Rev. Act of 1913, Section II, §A, Subdiv. x.
Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56, 44 S. Ct. 444 ( 1924).
4
The prime exception to this rule of taxability today relates to immunity accorded
nonresident alien business visitors whose performance of services and stay do not
exceed a limited period, usually 6 months. See discussion in Section D, infra.
"Rev. Act of 1916, § s(a) Third, now reflected in I.R.C., § 164. The deduction does
not embrace estate, inheritance, legacy, succession, or gift taxes, nor taxes assessed
against local benefits of a kind tending to increase the value of the property assessed.
3
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tion imposed." 6 As an alternative to the deduction, it was provided
that foreign income taxes, as well as war profits and excess profits
taxes, could be taken as a credit against the American tax itself.i
The previously existing deduction arrangement now assumed a complementary as well as an alternative status. It complemented the
credit in that it was the only form of relief with regard to foreign
taxes other than income taxes, though later the credit itself was
extended to cover any foreign tax paid "in lieu of a tax on income,
war profits, or excess profits otherwise generally imposed" by a
foreign country. 8
From the earlier discussion in Section B, supra, it will be recalled
that the effective income tax rates in several Common Market countries exceed those assessed in the United States. If a taxpayer's
entire income is attributable to his foreign employment, the effect
in this circumstance would be to wipe out his American tax liability.
The taxpayer may not avail himself, however, of any excess foreign
tax as an offset against any American tax liability attributable to
income which he derived in that year from United States sources.
More accurately speaking, one's credit for income taxes paid a
foreign country may not exceed that proportion of the American
tax which his "taxable income" from the foreign country bears to
his total "taxable income." 9
The comparisons made in Section B, supra, also revealed in some
circumstances that the effective American rates were higher than
those of some Common Market countries, Italy being the most
striking example. American emphasis on the income tax was even
more noticeable when compared to many non-European countries.
In the mid-1920's, this meant that any differential in tax was always
paid over to the federal government. In that era, however, an asserted desire to help increase our exports led the House Committee
on Ways and Means to propose that under certain conditions
0

Statement of Representative Kitchen, 56 Cong. Rec. 677-678 ( 1918).
Rev. Act of 1918, § zzz(a) (r), now, as modified, I.R.C., § 901 et seq.
Rev. Act of 1942, § 158(f), amending I.R.C. (1939), § 131, now I.R.C. (195+),
§ 903. (Italics added.)
'I.R.C., § 904. For the purpose of computing this limitation, an individual's "taxable
income" must be computed without any deduction for personal exemptions. Provision
is made in § 904 for a carry-over of excess foreign taxes, but this will usually be
advantageous only if the foreign rate is reduced in future years to a point below the
American rate. For other details relating to the credit, see PART III, supra. Section F
of that Part calls attention to the new statutory election which permits the taxpayer to
substitute an "overall" limitation for the per-country limitation discussed in the text.
In effect this would permit the taxpayer to average foreign taxes paid to high- and
low-tax countries.
7

8
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Americans working abroad in connection with export sales be freed
of any such differential with regard to their salaries or commissions.
An exclusion of such benefits from their domestic gross income was
to serve as the device by which to accomplish this end. 10 While the
Senate agreed that certain conditions should be imposed, it insisted
that this third more favorable and controversial arrangement be
extended to all types of foreign earned income.
This latter exclusion was to be the repeated focus of congressional
concern for many years. Only where its constantly changing requirements could not be satisfied would a citizen assigned to a foreign
station normally fall back on the credit for foreign income taxes and
the deduction for other foreign taxes.
While the exclusionary device would obviously be most advantageous where the service was performed in a low income tax country
like Italy, it must be remembered that the advantage would be diluted in some part by the prejudice which such a citizen would otherwise suffer because of the substantial reliance by low income tax
countries on turnover taxes. The latter, normally not considered
income taxes nor imposed in lieu of such, would not usually qualify
for the credit.U Nor would they qualify for the alternative deduction to the extent such taxes were imposed on persons other than
the ultimate consumer, and this was so though in the end the economic, as distinguished from the legal, incidence of such taxes fell
on the consumer. 12
A discussion of the shifting statutory standards applicable to the
exclusion for foreign service income follows.
(b) Evolution of the present alternative standards applicable to the exclusion.-The House first proposed that the exclusion
for foreign service income be allowed if the citizen was abroad for
more than 6 months of the taxable yearY This dividing line was
seized upon because certain countries subjected an American to their
income tax if he lived there in excess of 6 monthsY
While the Senate Finance Committee thought it was enough in
such cases to grant the previously allowed credit for foreign income
taxes, 15 in the end the exclusionary principle prevailed, but only if
10

H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st. Sess. 7 (1926), § 213 (b) (14) of Committee Print No. 1.
See e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-635, C.B. 1956-2, sor.
12
The provision in I.R.C., § 164, which authorizes consumers to deduct retail sales
taxes which are actually imposed on retail vendors, does not even apply in a foreign
setting.
18
See note 10, supra.
14
Statement of Senator Reed, 75 Cong. Rec. 10410-11 (1932).
15
S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 ( 1926).
11
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the citizen was a "bona fide nonresident of the United States for
more than six months during the taxable year.'' 16
The latter condition, interpreted to require nothing more than
physical absence from the United States for over half of the taxable
year/ 7 was later thought in practice to be entirely too lax. Within
4 years, the Senate Committee discovered "to our surprise, that
. . . American ambassadors and ministers and officers of the foreign service were getting clear out of the payment of any income
tax . . . , which nobody in the world ever intended. . . . These
people do not deserve the exemption, because they are not subject
to the income taxation of the foreign countries in which they are
stationed. . . . " 18 Of course, this could be, and was, remedied by
neutralizing the exclusion in the case of amounts paid by the United
States or any agency thereofY But in 1942, the same Committee
noted that the provision had also "suffered considerable abuse in
the case of [other] persons absenting themselves from the United
States for more than 6 months simply for tax-evasion purposes." 20
There was no guarantee, of course, that such a person would stay in
one foreign country long enough to suffer its tax. This, plus the
asserted belief that the whole idea of an exclusion involved "unjust
discrimination" in favor of those earning income abroad, led the
House Committee on Ways and Means-the original sponsors of
the exclusionary principle-to call for its complete elimination. 21
But the Senate Committee thought such an elimination would "work
a hardship in the case of citizens . . . who are bona fide residents
of foreign countries," noting, for example, that "many employees
of American business in South America do not return to the United
States for periods of years. Such persons are fully subject to the
income tax of the foreign country of their residence." 22 In the end,
the Senate prevailed; the exclusion was still to be allowed, but only
if the person was a ( 1) ((bona fide resident of a foreign country or
1

"Rev. Act of 1926, § 213(b) (14). See also H. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., rst Sess. 367
( 1926} for conference amendments.
11
G.C.M. 9848, C.B. X-2, 178. This view was also adopted in Commissioner v. Fiske,
(7th Cir. 1942) 128 Fed.(2d) 487, cert. den., 317 U.S. 635, 63 S. Ct. 63 (1942).
18
Statement of Senator Reed, 75 Cong. Rec. I04IO-II (1932).
19
Rev. Act of 1932, § u6(a}, now reflected in I.R.C., § 91I. However, certain immunities are provided in the case of cost of living allowances drawn by certain government employees. I.R.C., § 912. Post World War II treaties with Common Market
countries provide immunity from foreign tax in the case of amounts paid by the
United States or its agencies.
""S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1942).
21
H. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. so (1942).
"'S. Rep. No. 163 r, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 ( 1942).
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countries" and ( 2) was such "during the entire taxable year." 23
The intended effect of this shift, according to the Chairman of the
Senate committee, was to reach those "American citizens who are
merely temporarily away from home," while preserving the exclusion "in the case of the bona fide, nonresident American citizen
who established a home and maintains his establishment and is
taking on the corresponding obligations of the home in any foreign
country. . . . " 24
To accommodate the problem which would arise under the "entire-taxable-year" rule in the case of mid-year changes of residence
back to the United States, it was further provided that if the person
had been a bona fide resident of a foreign country for at least a twoyear period before he again took up residence in the United States,
earned income attributable to the final partial year was excludable. 25
Almost a decade passed without further change. Then, in 1951,
the Senate Finance Committee moved to liberalize the exclusion on
two fronts.
To alleviate the first-year plight of one who became a bona fide
resident of a foreign country in mid-year, the ''entire-taxable-year"
rule was modified so as to allow the exclusion where such residence
was "for an uninterrupted period which includes an entire taxable
year." 26 Even more important was the establishment over the
House Committee's objections of a general standard which continues to serve today as an alternative to the bona-fide-residence rule.
This separate test involved a revival in modified form of the earlier
discarded and less demanding physical absence test.
In developing this alternative, the Senate Committee noted that
the United States was then trying to aid foreign countries under the
Point 4 foreign aid program, and that in keeping with this program
it was desirable "to encourage men with technical knowledge to go
abroad." 27 It was further asserted that because "the term 'bona
fide' residence abroad . . . [had] been construed quite strictly,"
many persons who had gone abroad to work "even for a relatively
25
Rev. Act of 1942, § 148(a), amending I.R.C. (1939), § uQ.(a).
""Hearings, Senate Finance Committee, H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. I, 743
( 1942). (Italics supplied.)
25
Rev. Act of 1942, § 148, amending I.R.C. ( 1939), § u6 (a). While the language of
the provision might not seem to limit the exclusion to income for the last partial year,
the committee's report and the catchline in the statute indicated this was the limited
purpose. S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 ( 1942 ).
26
Rev. Act of 1951, § 321(a), amending I.R.C. (1939), § 116(a), now reflected in
I.R.C., § 911 (a) ( 1 ).
27
S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1951).
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long period of time" had been unable to obtain an exclusion of their
foreign earned income. 28 They had failed to measure up on either
of two counts.
One difficulty was that the "nature of the individual's work . . .
[was] such as to make it difficult to establish a 'residence' in the
more widely accepted use of the term." 29 Others had fallen short
because they had "gone abroad only for a stated period of time.
Examples of this . . . [were] managers, technicians, and skilled
workmen who are induced to go abroad for periods of I 8 to 36
months to complete specific projects." 30
The enacted solution granted an exclusion of foreign earned income where the person was physically present in a foreign country
or countries 5 I o days (approximately 17 months) out of any consecutive I 8 month's period, though for reasons previously stated in
connection with the bona-fide-residence test, this immunity was not
to be available with regard to amounts received from the United
States government or an agency thereof. 31
Within two years, widely publicized abuses of the new alternative
standard which had been added to what is now § 9 I I of the Code
led the House Committee, in 1953, to respond to the Secretary of
the Treasury's demand for "corrective legislation" 32 by calling for
complete elimination of the new alternative. Both noted that while
the provision "was designed to encourage men with technical knowledge to go abroad in order to complete specific projects, . . . individuals with large earnings [such as movie stars] have seized
upon the provision as an inducement to go abroad to perform services, which were customarily performed at home, for the primary
purpose of avoiding the Federal income tax." 33 Equally disturbing
was the fact that in many such cases, the persons did "not pay income tax even to the foreign country or countries in which the income
is earned. This is because they are not in any particular foreign
country long enough to establish a residence or because the foreign
country in question does not impose any income tax." 34
"'"Ibid.
""Ibid.
80
/bid.
31
Rev. Act of 1951, § 32I(a), amending l.R.C. (1939), § 116(a) (2), now found in
altered form in I.R.C., §9u(a)(2) .
.. Ltr. to Chairman of the House Committee, dated April 13, 1953, 99 Cong. Rec.
3079 (1953).
33
H. Rep. No. 894, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1953) .
.. Ibid.
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In the end, a less drastic change proposed by the Senate prevailed;
it was content to limit the exclusion under this alternative standard
to $zo,ooo per taxable year, or to a pro tanto part thereof for any
period less than a taxable year. 35 This limitation, did not, however,
carry over to those persons who could satisfy the older and quite
separate bona-fide-residence test.
(c) Differences in the character of foreign status required
by the exclusionary principle's two alternative standards.-More
handsomely paid Americans who are assigned to work in a Common
Market country, particularly in one which has a low income tax
such as Italy, will derive greater advantage if they satisfy § 91 1's
foreign-bona-fide-residence test rather than its alternative 510-day
rule. Satisfaction of the former would permit avoidance of the
latter's $zo,ooo per year limitation. As we shall later see, even in
the case of those less well paid, the bona-fide-residence test will also
more effectively preserve the integrity of the exclusion with reference to certain deferred compensation plans, and will facilitate
more flexible planning with respect to vacations and business trips
back to the States. Except in the most clear cut cases, however, it
has not been easy to predict in advance whether the more liberal
bona-fide-residence test will be satisfied.
Little interpretative difficulty will be encountered, of course, in
connection with the one mathematically fixed objective criterion to
the effect that a qualified status must exist "for an uninterrupted
period which includes an entire taxable year." But in addition to
this independent requirement relating to time, a qualified status,
i.e., something more than mere physical presence in a foreign country, must also exist. Difficulty in predicting whether one has become
a bona fide resident of a foreign country under American standards
stems from the fact that it turns on "his intention with regard to the
length and nature of his stay." 36 And here one starts with two handicaps. As one court put the first, "Exemptions as well as deductions
are matters of legislative grace, and a taxpayer seeking either must
show that he comes squarely within the term of the law conferring
the benefit sought." 37 Even if the facts are stipulated, there will be
difficulty in showing that they "squarely" satisfy a rule so ill-defined.
35
8. Rep. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953). Technical Changes Act of 1953,
§ 204(a), amending I.R.C. (1939), § u6{a), now I.R.C., § 9u{a) (2).
•• I.T. Regs., § 1.9II-1 (a) (2) refers back to § 1.871-2{b) for this definition. {Italics
added.)
37
Donald H. Nelson, 30 T.C. II 51 (1958).
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Second, frequently the question is said ultimately to be one of fact
with regard to which the taxpayer bears the burden of proof. 38
And because it is a question of fact, Tax Court decisions, to which
one might otherwise look for authority, generally include a statement in the "Findings of Fact" to the effect that the particular taxpayers involved there were or were not bona fide residents of a
foreign country. 39 In most cases, however, those persons intended
to do just what they did do, and the standard to which the intention
must relate was at least closely akin to a question of law. Courts
implicitly recognized this when they made an effort in their opinions
to distinguish the cases at bar from other decisions. 40 But even when
doing this, they frequently added, because all surrounding circumstances were important in deciding such cases, that it was not possible or worthwhile to attempt to harmonize the many decisions. 41
Certainly there is general agreement that cases involving questions of residence in non-tax statutory settings are of no value; 42
"bona fide residence" for this purpose is to be determined in the
light of the congressional purpose in enacting this particular proVISIOn.

In seeking out the congressional purpose, the report of the sponsoring Committee furnished two helpful guides, one of which had
only a narrow thrust. It was to the effect that "Vacation or business
trips to the United States during the taxable year will not necessarily
deprive a taxpayer, otherwise qualified, of the exemption provided
by this section." 43 The other was to the effect that American tests
used in determining whether an alien was a resident of the States
were to be employed in deciding whether an American was a bona
fide resident of a foreign country. 44 This led courts to place great
reliance on the previously existing regulations relating to aliens,
and these administrative provisions turned the question on the taxpayer's intention "with regard to the length and nature of his
stay." 45
In general, those regulations sought to distinguish transients from
those who truly made their "home" abroad. With reference to
38

Ibid.; Leonard Larsen, 23 T.C. 599 (1955).
Burlin B. Hamer, 22 T.C. 343 ( 1954) ; Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T.C. 959 ( 1947).
••Fred H. Pierce, 22 T.C. 493 (1954); Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T.C. 959 (1947).
""Leonard Larsen, 23 T.C. 599 (1955) .
39

.,. Arthur J. H. Johnson, 7 T.C. 1040 (1946) .
.. S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1942); Seeley v. Comm'r., (2d Cir.
1951) 186 F. (zd) 541; I.T. Regs., § 1.911-1 (a) (2).
"Ibid.

"'Now in I.T. Regs., § 1.871-2(b). Henningsen v. Comm'r., (4th Cir. 1957) 243
F.(zd) 954; David E. Rose, 16 T.C. 232 (1951); Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T.C. 959 (1947).
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the projected length of stay, the taxpayer would not fall short
merely because he had a "floating intention, indefinite as to time,
to return" to the States. But he could not attain the necessary status
if, on going abroad, the purpose was one "which in its nature may
be promptly accomplished." In other words, his purpose had to be
of such a nature that "an extended stay may be necessary for its accomplishment, and to that end the . . . [person] makes his home .
. . ." abroad. This was sufficient even though the person also intended "at all times to return to his domicile [here] . . . when the
purpose" had been consummated or abandoned. 46
Obviously the difference between a purpose which may be
"promptly accomplished" and one which requires an "extended
stay" is not easily drawn. But in interpreting the further requirement that the person make his "home" in the foreign country,
though he may ultimately intend to return, some courts have been
assisted by the statement which the Chairman of the sponsoring
Committee made during the course of congressional hearings. He
said, it will be recalled, that the provision was intended to accommodate "nonresident American citizens who established a home and
maintains his establishment and is taking on corresponding obligations of the home in any foreign country. . . . " 47
It seems fairly clear from the foregoing that one might be able
to predict that there would be a meaningful difference between the
employee who lives abroad in company barracks, eats in a mess
hall provided by the employer-mingling only with other employees,48 and another who resigns from all of his American clubs,
gives up his house in the States-moving his family and furniture
abroad where he takes a long-term lease on a house, opens charge
accounts, and joins in some community activities of the foreign
country and pays income tax to it. 49 The fact is, however, that there
are no reliable rules of thumb. For example, the first man might
have been a resident from the beginning if he had intended, for

•

'"LT. Regs., § 1.871-2(b), (Italics added.) The cases agree that the person may be
a foreign resident though the United States remains his domicile. Comm'r. v. Swent,
(4th Cir. 1946) 155 F.(2d) 513; Fred H. Pierce, 22 T.C. 493 (1954). In Leigh White,
22 T.C. 585 (1954), the Court stated (at 590): "It is made clear by many decisions
that the term is not to be confused with· 'domicile,' and that it includes a temporary
residence, where an extended stay is contemplated although there is at all times an
intention thereafter to return to a former residence or to establish a new residence
elsewhere."
41
Hearings, Senate Finance Committee, H. Res. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. I,
743 (1942).
'"Cf. Ernest R. Hertig, 19 T.C. 109 (1952).
•• Cf. David E. Rose, 16 T.C. 232 ( 1951) ; Herman F. Baehre, 15 T.C. 236 ( 1950).

594

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

example, to bring his family over when housing became available. 50
And he may not have paid a foreign income tax only because he supposed, in his ignorance, that none was due because of something he
had heard about tax treaties. 51
To assure somewhat greater certainty of result, the taxpayer may
also seek to qualify under the 5 IO-days-out-of-IS-months-foreignphysical-presence test, even though it is limited by the apportionable
$2o,ooo per year limitation.
The 5 10-day requirement relates to full days (midnight to midnight) 52 actually spent in a foreign country. 53 It also includes the
time spent in going between foreign countries so long as travel over
international waters does not exceed 24 hours nor involve a detour
to the United States, its possessions, or territories. 5 4 While the 5 IO
days need not be consecutive, being broken by a vacation or business
trips back to the States, the foreign earned income attributable to a
particular day is immune only if that full day is one of 5 IO which do
fall in a consecutive IS-month's period. Because of the peculiar way
in which a taxpayer's interim return trips are scattered, in immunizing the income of a particular day, he may find it necessary to overlap different I 8-month's periods, treating one as beginning before
another ends. 55

(d) Types of benefits excluded under § 91 I's alternative
standards, and allocable deductions.-A taxpayer who is entitled to
a § 9I I exclusion with respect to foreign service income may also
avail himself of other exclusions applicable to taxpayers generally.
For example, suppose that an American employer either pays or
reimburses an old employee for expenses incurred by him in moving
60

Cf. Seeley v. Comm'r., (2d Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 541; Fred H. Pierce, 22 T.C.
493 (1954).
61
Cf. Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T.C. 959 ( 1947). Also, David E. Rose, 16 T.C. 232 (I95I);
White v. Hofferbert, (D.C. Md. I950) 88 F. Supp. 457· See Ernest R. Hertig, 19 T.C.
109 (1952).
62
I.T. Regs., § 1.911-I (b) (Io).
62
Defined to include only territory under the sovereignty of a foreign government
and the air space above. I.T. Regs.,§ 1.911-1(b) (7).
"LT. Regs., § 1.911-I (b) (Io). If he does detour to the United States, its possessions,
or territories, the period of the detour, including the day he left the foreign country
through the day on which he returned to a foreign country, would not be counted
in the 510 days.
66
For example, assume that the taxpayer first arrived in France, from the United
States, at noon, December 31, 1956. He left France for the United States at noon,
December I, 1957, arriving back in France on December 31, 1957. He again left France
on August I, I958, returning there on August gr, 1958. He left France permanently
for reassignment to the United States on July 1, 1959. Income attributable to March
I5, I957 would qualify by reference to the 18-month period, January 1, 1957 through
June 30, I958. Income earned on September 1, I958 could qualify by reference to the
overlapping period January I, 1958 through June 30, 1959·
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himself, his family, and furniture to an overseas station. This material benefit would not be covered by the § 9 I I exclusion. Practically all, if not all, of this benefit is attributable to a period prior to
the establishment of foreign residence. Nor would the 5 IO-day rule
cover this arrangement, for its springs into operation only with the
first full day in which the taxpayer is present in a foreign country.
Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service agrees that this benefit
would be excludable if the transfer was actually made for the convenience of the employer. In that circumstance, the payment is not
deemed compensatory in character and is, therefore, beyond the
reach of § 6 I which defines gross income. 56
The § 9 I I exclusion itself constitutes a sanctuary from domestic
tax only with reference to foreign "earned income"; other types of
foreign income, such as interest or dividends, will enjoy only the
advantage of the previously described credit or deduction allowed
by American law for foreign taxes. None of these cushions will be
available, however, with reference to any kind of income which has
its source in the United States. This is so even with respect to income attributable to services performed during a temporary business visit to the United States by an American citizen who has become a bona fide resident of a Common Market country. 57
""Rev. Rul. 54-429, C.B. 1954-2, 53· The same ruling calls for a different result in certain situations involving new employees. Where an employee moves from one locality
in the United States to another to accept employment with a new employer, reimbursement by the latter for those moving expenses would be includible in the employee's
gross income and could not be deducted in arriving at taxable income. Also U.S. v.
Woodall, (10th Cir. 1958) 255 F.(2d) 370, cert. den., 358 U.S. 824, 79 S. Ct. 39 (1958);
Rev. Rul. 59-236, I.R.B. 1959-28, 14. Americans hired within the United States for
re-assignment to foreign branches would normally spend a period at the home office,
being oriented. Reimbursement for their subsequent oceanic travel would probably be
excludable. But the result is less clear if a wholly owned foreign subsidiary paid
oceanic moving expenses incurred by an old employee of the American parent on the
occasion of his transfer from the parent's offices in the United States to the subsidiary's
offices in the Common Market. Technically at least, the employee is changing employers .
•, Looking only at the Code, it is clear that income from services has its source where
the services are performed. I.R.C., § 861 (a) (3). Moreover, the Code itself immunizes
income from services performed in the States only in the case of certain nonresident
aliens who are here for 90 days or less. Ibid;
The tax treaties which the United States has with 5 Common Market countries do
not immunize the American earned income of a nonresident American. The treaty
with Belgium is typical. On the one hand, it does provide that a "rrsident of Belgium
shall be exempt from United States tax upon compensation for labor or personal services performed within the United States. . . ." if he fits certain classifications. Article
XI. But in that treaty, as in the others, the United States reserved the right in the case
of its own "citizens or residents or corporations . . ." to impose its regular income tax
law as though the "convention had not come into effect." Article XII. Provisions
similar to this have been interpreted to mean that the regular Code provisions apply
to nonresident Americans. Marie G. Crerar, 26 T.C. 702 (1956).
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The Code section which establishes an exclusion for foreign
"earned income" goes on to relate it to "wages, salaries, or professional fees, and other amounts received as compensation for personal services actually rendered . . . . " 58 In some settings, difficult
questions of fact will arise in determining whether a given payment
is truly for services or for something else. Illustrative are those
situations where the taxpayer occupies a dual relationship to an
enterprise, such as where he is an employee as well as a stockholder
of a corporation or where he owns as well as manages a proprietorship with reference to which both capital and services constitute
material income-producing factors. In the former setting, a principal stockholder-knowing that dividends would be includable in
domestic gross income-may attempt to characterize a payment
as compensation for his foreign services though the amount actually
exceeds a reasonable allowance for these services. The government
has the authority, of course, to police the provision, apportioning
the excess to the dividend category. 59 And in the case of the proprietorship where capital was also a material income-producing factor,
the Code expressly includes a ceiling on that portion of the net
profits which can be considered compensation for the owner's services, the limitation being 30%. 60 A realistic apportionment may, of
course, call for exclusion of less than 30%; that figure is only a
ceiling. 61
Differences between the two forms of enterprise may also be
important with reference to the loss of an exclusion in the case of
"amounts paid by the United States or an agency thereof." For
example, because of this statutory language, it has been held that
an exclusion will not be enjoyed with reference to the distributive
share of a professional partnership's profits which arose out of a
government contract with the firm for its foreign services. 62 On the
other hand, where one is truly an officer or employee of a corporation, he will not lose the benefit of the exclusion merely because the
employer is working on a government contract. 63
While the Code excludes earned income attributable to a qualified period only if it is "received from sources without the United
States," the latter requirement is satisfied if the personal services
68

I.R.C., §9u (b).
•• Ibid.
""Ibid.
81
I.T. Regs., § 1.911·1 (a) (5).
""Leif J. Sverdrup, 14 T.C. 859 (1950). But that case did approve the exclusion with
respect to a so-called salary paid one partner.
63
Rev. Rul. 54-483, C.B. 1954-2, 168. Cf. Rev. Rul. 58-4, C.B. 1958-z, 268.
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are "performed" abroad. The "place of receipt" is immaterial. 65
But only under the bona-fide-residence test is the time of receipt
immaterial. Under that test, deferred payments which are attributable to earlier foreign service and are paid in the years following
the employee's return to the States may be excluded if the other requirements are satisfied. 66 In some instances, a contractually deferred payment of this type may completely escape taxation because
of the inability of a Common Market country to collect tax once the
American has returned to his native land. However, if the amount
in question is properly chargeable for tax purposes to a foreign
permanent establishment or is paid by a foreign subsidiary, in all
probability the withholding requirements of a particular Common
Market country at least theoretically apply. 67 But in five of the
Common Market countries this is probably not the case if the contractually deferred compensation takes the form of a "pension." It
is assumed in this connection that the American citizen abandoned
his foreign residence immediately upon returning to the United
States, concurrently re-establishing his residence in his native land,
after which the contractual "pension" payments were to be received.
Bilateral tax treaties with the five provide that private pensions paid
to American citizens residing in the United States will not be taxed
by the Common Market country even though the latter is the source
from which the pension is derived. 68 And "pensions" are generally
defined in those treaties, illustratively in the case of Belgium, to
mean "periodic payments made in consideration of services rendered
or by way of compensation for injuries received." 69
In the case of qualified funded retirement plans having their situs
in the United States, unless an American working and residing in a
Common Market country is taxed by the latter at that point of time
when contributions to the fund were made by the American employer, 70 a significant part of pension payments subsequently re64

.. I.R.C. §§ 9II and 862{a) (3), respectively. {Italics added.)
65
1.T. Regs., §1.9II-I{a){6) and (b)(5); James D. Mooney, 9 T.C. 713 (1947);
Herman A. Kollmar, 4 T.C. 727 ( 1945 ).
66
Rev. Rul. 55-294, C.B. 1955-r, 368.
67
The benefit in any event is believed to be taxable in Belgium and the Netherlands,
though difficulty in realizing upon the claim is recognized. In Germany, while so-called
"home salaries" are fully taxable, the tax authorities have held that bonuses paid an
employee after he has finished his work in Germany are not taxable.
'"'Article X of the Belgian treaty is illustrative. On the other hand, the treaty with
South Africa provides an opposite rule. Art. VIII{2). Cf. Rev. Rul. 56-235, C.B.
1956-2, 1125.
69
Ibid. {Italics added.)
wIt would be particularly surprising if a Common Market country would attempt
currently to tax the employee on the employer's contribution if the employee's rights
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ceived following the employee's return to the States will also be completely immune from tax. Such pension payments would be immune
from American tax in the proportion the payment is directly attributable to the contribution which the employer made with reference to that earlier foreign service which qualified under the foreign
bona-fide-residence test. 71 However, that portion of the pension
which represents earnings on or accretion in the value of those employer contributions will not be excludable for American tax purposes, for that part does not really constitute "earned" income
entitled to the § 9 I I treatment. 72 If the American has re-established
residence at home, the treaty provisions noted above would, of
course, foreclose the Common Market country from asserting tax
liability by reference to the pension payments themselves, even if
collection of tax were otherwise possible. The same overall degree
of tax freedom might even be enjoyed by returning American employees who are beneficiaries of certain types of funded plans which
have their situs in a Common Market country. 73
Returning employees whose foreign status qualified only under
the 5 IO-day rule will not fare so well, with reference at least to
certain deferred compensation arrangements. Their difficulty stems
from the way the government interprets the $2o,ooo limitation.
Until this limitation was added, amounts which qualified under the
5 Io-day rule, like those associated with the bona-fide-residence test,
were excludable from gross income "irrespective of when they. . . .
[were] received." 74 But in fixing the $2o,ooo ceiling, the statute
was amended to read as follows:
the amount excluded under this paragraph for such taxable year shall not exceed $2o,ooo. If the I 8-month period does not include the entire taxable year, the amount
excluded under this paragraph for such taxable year shall
not exceed an amount which bears the same ratio to
were not vested. In the Netherlands, it is not believed that the benefit will be taxed in
any event as long as the contribution is to a regular pension arrangement. Germany
will immunize contributions at least if made to a company administered fund.
71
Rev. Rul. 59-278, C.B. 1959-2, 174, indicates certain variations geared to datelines corresponding to various amendments made to § 9u's bona-fide-residence rule.
See also Rev. Rul. 56-125, C.B. 1956-1, 627; Rev. Rul. 56-571, C.B. 1956-2, 982; and
Goodman, The Unique Status Of Foreign Service Prnsions Offers Tax Advantages
II }OURNAL OF TAXATION 30 (1959).
72
Ibid.
72
I.R.C., § 402(c) and note 71, supra. The statement assumes, with reference to an
exclusion under foreign tax law for contributions made by the employer, that the
foreign trust also meets requirements that might be imposed by foreign tax law.
74
Rev. Rul. 54-72, C.B. 1954-1, II7 at n8 and I.T. Regs. (1939), § 39.II6-1(b) as
amended by T.D. 6o39, C.B. 1953-2, 162.
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$2o,ooo as the number of days in the part of the taxable
year within the I 8-month period bears to the total number
of days in such year. 75
On the one hand, Congress clearly intended to restrict the
$2o,ooo per year ceiling by a further pro-tanto type of limitation
where the period of absence in a particular year was less than the
whole year. 76 The Treasury, however, also interprets the statutory
language to mean that no exclusion will be permitted if none of the
actual payment was received in a taxable year which fell, at least in
part, within the I 8-month period. 77 According to its interpretation,
where a calendar year taxpayer qualified under the 5 10-day rule
and left Europe on July 1, 1960 for reassignment to the States, a
maximum compensation of approximately $ w,ooo would be excludable provided it was attributable to the foreign service and was
received within the taxable year 1960, a part of which did fall
within the I 8-month period. No part of any payment received in
1961 would qualify, however, even if it were the only compensation
the taxpayer received for that six months of foreign service which
fell in 1960. 78 It is quite possible that these limitations, developed
in the setting of deferred contractual payments, will also serve to
restrict immunity with regard to pension payments under funded
plans if the returning taxpayer's foreign status qualified only under
the 5 I o-da y rule.
Taxpayers who enjoy the benefit of a § 911 exclusion will not be
permitted to offset other U.S. income by deducting expenses allocable to the excluded amounts. But while the Code denies a deduction for any expense which is "properly allocable to or chargeable
against" excluded amounts, 79 so-called personal deductions, such
as personal exemptions, charitable contributions, real estate taxes
on a home, interest paid on a mortgage against the home, and medical expense are not adversely affected; these are not deemed allocable to any particular income item. 80
(e) Conclusion re Americans working abroad: Filing requirements, etc.-Traditionally, Americans have been required to
75

Technical Changes Act of 1953, § 204(a), now reflected in I.R.C., § 9II (a) (2).
(Italics added.)
"' S. Rep. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953); C.B. 1953-2, 526, 528-529.
"LT. Regs., § I.9II-I; Rev. Rul. 54-72, C.B. 1954-1, u;o.

'"I bid.
'" I.R.C., § 911. Where the $2o,ooo limitation precludes a complete exclusion of
foreign earned income, deductions chargeable to such income are lost on the same
proportionate basis. I.T. Regs., § I.9II-I (b) ( 6 ).
soi.T. Regs., §1.9II(a)(3) and (b)(6).
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file an income tax return when their gross income exceeded $6oo, or
in the case of those over 6 5 years of age-$ I 200. 81 Even before a
recent statutory amendment, this meant that many who had gone
abroad to work would still have to file a domestic return. Americans
working abroad frequently realized more than $6oo (or $I 200 as
the case may be) in other than foreign "earned income" to which
the special exclusion was confined. In fact, even with this exclusion
and a full allowance for so-called personal deductions including full
exemptions, returns of many of them could easily show that some
tax was actually owing to the United States. Tnis was so even if
the non-excluded income was also derived from a foreign source, for
the cumulative effect of the credit and deduction for foreign taxes
will not necessarily wipe out the American tax liability. The Internal Revenue Service reported to Congress, however, that many
such Americans were not even filing a domestic return, in part because they apparently supposed that their entire income was excludable.82 Certainly it is more difficult for an American working
abroad to obtain information concerning his domestic tax liability,
if any, than it is for those working in the States. In any event, absence of the information which would have been disclosed by such
returns made it difficult for the Service to pick out those taxpayers
whose affairs should be audited. Congress responded to this problem in I 9 58 by providing that even the foreign income which qualifies for an exclusion in determining tax liability will be included in
gross income but only for the purpose of determining whether the
taxpayer had an amount of gross income ( $6oo, or $I 200 if over
6 5 years of age) sufficient to require the filing of a return. 83 The
obvious effect is that practically all Americans working abroad must
now file a domestic return, though in the end many of them will not
actually owe an American tax.
Because of the difficulty in filing a return if one is abroad on the
regular filing date, the Treasury has granted an automatic extension
of 3 months to calendar year taxpayers and 2 months to taxpayers
on a fiscal year. 84 A delay of 3 months is also allowed in the case of
declarations of estimated tax, and while this extension is granted
without any charge for interest, it is otherwise in the case of the
final return.
Where a citizen, on departure from the United States, contem81 I.R.C., § 6012.
•• S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1958).
83
Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 72, amending I.R.C., § 6012 .
.. Rev. Rul. 55-171, C.B. 1955-1, 8o.

6or
plates compliance with the 5 IO-day requirement, the final return
for the taxable year during which he left will normally be due before that exclusionary standard has been satisfied. The Congress
and the Service have accommodated themselves to this problem.
The former has provided that the government's authority to grant
extensions only up to 6 months shall not be so limited in the case
of those who are abroad. 85 In turn the Treasury has issued a ruling
whereby one who desires to postpone determination of his tax liability until the exclusionary standard is met may, upon request, obtain a special extension regarding the regular filing date. 86 Otherwise
the matter will be handled on a refund basis.
TAXATION
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TAx IMPLICATIONs

OF BusiNEss VIsiTs BY

EMPLOYEES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND CoMMON MARKET NATIONS

(a) Introductory note.-The preceding discussion in Section C outlined the requirements which an American citizen working
in a Common Market country must meet if he hopes to obtain an
exclusion of his foreign service income under § 9 I I of the Code.
But even if such an exclusion is obtained, that individual may complicate his tax problem by making short intermittent visits back
to the States. Double taxation will normally be avoided, however,
for as noted in Section B, supra, most Common Market countries
will defer in one degree or another to the American tax on compensation attributable to his work in the States, with Luxembourg
having the least attractive arrangement-a deduction of the American tax from gross income.
Less tax complication will normally be encountered on similar
trips made by a Common Market country citizen who has been working in his native land for an American owned facility. The same is
true of trips made abroad by Americans who normally work at the
enterprise's head office in the United States. In these two cases,
as distinguished from the situation first mentioned, the country being visited normally forgoes its right to tax any compensation attributable to services performed there.
The aims and period of time covered by such trips may run the
gamut, from very short stays designed to enable the individual to
purchase merchandise and equipment, to longer excursions devoted
80

I.R.C., § 6o81 (a).
""Rev. Proc. 57-33, C.B. 1957-2, uo6 and Rev. Rul. 55-171, C.B. 1955-1, So.
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to an analysis of sales promotion and production techniques of the
head office, of the foreign facility, or of a foreign licensee to whom
"know-how" must be communicated. A vacation may also be thrown
in for good measure.
The extent to which arrangements have been made to simplify
the tax problems associated with trips made by the three classes
of individuals described above is indicated in the discussion which
follows.
(b) Intermittent trips to the States during the period an
American is otherwise qualified for the § 91 I exclusion.-Satisfaction of the foreign-bona-fide-residence test or the alternative 5 roday rule of § 91 I of the Code serves only to exclude an American
citizen's foreign earned income. 87 Compensation attributable to his
business trips back to the States are not affected by those statutory
tests. 88 The Code itself expressly designates the foreign country as
the "source" of compensation only with respect to services "performed" there. 89 Thus the place or origin of payment with respect
to work done on a business trip back to the States is irrelevant; 90
the amount so attributable must be included in American gross income under § 6 r.
The statutory requirement that such compensation be included is
not neutralized by the bilateral tax treaties which the United States
has entered into with five of the Common Market countries. From
a casual reading of those treaties, one might at first think otherwise
if the American has become a resident of a Common Market country for tax purposes; those treaties do open by extending to Common Market "residents" an exemption from United States tax in
the case of income earned from services performed in the States
during the course of brief business trips. 91 But those treaties close
with a reservation which accomplishes the same result which the
American treaty with the United Kingdom more directly accomplished by definition. Whereas the latter expressly defines English
"residents" for this purpose so as to exclude "a citizen of the United
States," 92 the treaties with the Common Market countries achieve
a like result through a provision which expressly reserves to the
87

See discussion in Section C, supra.
I.R.C., § 861 (a) (3) provides the only exclusion for circumstances of this type, and
it is limited to nonresident aliens. See subtopics (c) and (d), infra.
89
I.R.C., § 86z(a) (3).
"'I.T. Regs., § 1.861-4{a).
111
Articles XI, 9, XI, XI, and XVI, respectively, of the treaties with Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.
.. Article II (i) (g).
88

TAXATION

United States the right to tax its own citizens under the regular
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 93
The fact that the compensation attributable to the United States
trip is includible in his American gross income does not necessarily
mean that the citizen will actually suffer an American tax. In most
cases, of course, he would have had to file a United States returnthough perhaps showing no actual tax liability-even in the absence
of the trips in question. 94 If that compensation which is attributable
to business trips to the States is the only income he realizes other
than that excluded under § 91 1, the fact that he will be allowed full
exemptions for himself and his dependents, as well as all other
purely personal deductions, 95 may leave him with little or no American net or "taxable income." However, where the compensation is
completely neutralized for American tax purposes by offsetting personal deductions, in only one instance is it probable that such compensation will completely escape taxation. Assuming in this connection that the American citizen has become a resident of the Common Market country in which he is stationed, he will usually find
that the income attributable to his trip back to the States is also
includible in the return which he files with that member nation.
This would be so if the country were Luxembourg; and there only
a deduction in computing the tax base would be allowed for any
American tax-here assumed to be none because of exemptions, etc.
-which he might have paid. However, some of the other Com~
mon Market countries are more liberal with reference to earned
income which a resident American derived from his native land.
According to the discussion in PART I, the Netherlands would
completely exempt the compensation in question even though an
American tax is not actually suffered because of the offsetting per~
sonal exemptions, etc. 96 That income will be taken into account,
however, for the purpose of determining the Dutch rate on the taxpayer's other income.
While the bilateral tax treaties with five member nations include
a provision aimed at compensation derived by a nonresident citizen
93
Articles XII, 14, XV, XV, and XIX; respectively, of the treaties with Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands .
.. Every American citizen, as well as certain others, must file a U.S. return if he has
a gross income over $6oo, or if over age 65, of $1,200. And for this purpose, but only
this purpose, foreign service income otherwise excludable must be included. I.R.C.,
§ 6o12(c).
05
I.R.C., § 9II deprives him only of those deductions properly chargeable to the
excluded income. See discussion in Section C, supra.
'"PART I, Section F(i) (h).
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from his native land, they are not usually so liberal as is the unilateral treatment accorded by the Netherlands. 97 For example, the
rate reduction formula of the Belgian treaty which was more fully
discussed in Section B, supra, applies only where the compensation
derived from American sources was "taxed by the United States." 98
The treaty with Germany, also more fully described in Section B,
calls for an exemption, but only if the item was "not exempt from
United States tax." 99 And, of course, the credit which Italy would
allow springs into operation only if the compensation did, in fact,
suffer an American tax. 100
A vacation, rather than business, may motivate a return trip to
the States by an American who qualifies for a § 9 I 1 exclusion under
the foreign-bona-fide-residence rule. The absence of labor or services in the United States should mean that any compensation attributable to the vacation period will not have its source within the
United States, but will instead be attributable to work previously
done abroad and should then also come within § 9 I I if otherwise
qualified. 101
After a certain period of foreign service, some employers pay the
transportation expenses associated with a vacation back to the
States, covering the employee's family as well as the employee. Even
if such a benefit is deemed additional income under American tax
concepts, it would appear to be attributable to the foreign service
and, therefore, also excludable by one who is qualified under the
foreign-bona-fide-residence test. 102 The same should be true of one
97
Indeed, the treaty with Netherlands requires only a credit to the extent permitted
by its law.
98
Article XII(3).
99
Article XV. The leading commentary on Germany's tax treaties, that by KornDietz, confirms the effective taxability requirement at p. USA-35.
100
Article XV.
101
Cf. Chidester v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 322; Rev. Rul. 57-316,
C.B. 1957-2, 626. An apportionment problem may arise where a part of the vacation
is attributable to the period in which work was done in the United States.
100
It is entirely possible that one or more Common Market countries would treat
this as a taxable benefit attributable to work done there. This is believed to be the
rule in the Netherlands and in Germany. In the latter country, however, some immunity
might be obtained under § 31 Abs. I EStG (Income Tax Act) pursuant to which
those immigrating to Germany may petition the highest tax authorities of the Lander
for the purpose of obtaining by negotiation a lump sum settlement of their income tax
during each of the first xo years. While no reduction is ordinarily granted under this
provision with respect to income arising in Germany, it is entirely possible that special
treatment might be obtained for matters such as the vacation trip in question. Indeed,
in order to obtain the limited deduction allowed for life insurance premiums, a taxpayer who makes such payments to an American company must invoke the above
procedure if he is to have any chance to enjoy the deduction; the statute itself limits
such deductions to premiums paid German companies.
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qualified under the 5 I o-day rule, but in that circumstance the additional amount may run the employee over the $zo,ooo per year
limitation. In such event, as well as in the case where the employee
falls completely short of§ 9I I, it would be necessary to determine
whether such benefit is actually embraced by the American concept
of income. On the one hand, it is clear that vacation expenses paid
by an employer for a domestic employee's trip within the United
States constitutes additional income to him. 103 However, to extend
this principle to those transportation expenses which are designed
to allow the employee and his family to return for a vacation in his
native land would embarrass even the United States government itself. For, as an employer, it too pays transportation expenses associated with vacation trips to the States by foreign service officials
of the State Department. 104 The Internal Revenue Service has not
yet, however, published the position it will ultimately take in such
cases.
It is not unusual for a visiting American citizen employed abroad
to dovetail a vacation with his business trip to the States. And in
trying to keep compensation attributable to United States sources
within an amount which can be offset by his personal exemptions
and deductions, it may be important to such persons that the time
spent vacationing be isolated. To provide adequate safeguards in
the event his return is audited, it may be desirable for the employee
to have a realistic written understanding with the employer regarding the respective amounts of time to be devoted to the two different
purposes.
TAXATION

(c) American statutory exclusion designed to accommodate
intermittent trips to the States by Common Market citizens.-The
American tax problems which will be encountered by the typical
nonresident alien who is temporarily brought to the United States
for business purposes will usually be much less complex than are
those associated with like trips by American citizens residing
abroad. Congress has always drawn a sharp distinction between citiIt is doubtful that Belgium would tax the benefits associated with the vacation trip.
At least it recently immunized such payments with respect to employees returning on
vacations from what until recently had been the Belgian Congo. While such benefits
are probably theoretically taxable in France, in practice it is believed that the tax
authorities will ignore the matter unless the expense is charged to the branch or subsidiary doing business there.
08
"
Any other result could hardly be justified in the face of sweeping language like
that found in Comm'r. v. LoBue, 351 U.-S. 243, 76 S. Ct. 8oo (1956}; Rutkin v. United
States, 343 U.S. 130, 72 S. Ct. 571 (1952). See Rev. Rul. 57-130, C.B. 1957-1, 108.
04
"
22 U,S.C. §§ II36 and n48.
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zens and residents, on the one hand, and nonresident aliens on the
other, being content in the latter case to reach nothing more than
gross income which was derived from sources within the United
States. 105 Until 1936, this was enough, however, to call for inclusion
of all compensation attributable to any labor or service performed
by the nonresident alien in the States. 106 In that year, however, Congress did add a specific statutory exclusion designed to accommodate, within limits, compensation attributable to short business trips.
Later, the Senate ratified tax treaties with five of the Common
Market countries, and in some circumstances these included even
more generous exclusionary standards with respect to such income.
But alien employees from the sixth country (Luxembourg), and in
some situations those from the other five can look only to the
statutory exclusion for protection, if any. And sometimes the employee will fall short of the exclusionary corridors marked out by
both, coming face to face then with the overall statutory tax treatment of nonresident aliens. The latter pattern may also be important
for other reasons. For example, some of the treaties do not immunize a nonresident alien's capital gains which have their source in
the States. Since employees of the type in question may well own
American securities, particularly in the American enterprise with
which they are directly or indirectly associated, the statutory treatment of such may be important. Indeed the existence of such a gain
can even affect the American tax on that part of a visitor's earned
income attributable to services performed during his business trips
to the States. However, this study is confined to the exclusionary arrangements designed to accommodate international business trips.
Because the American statutory exclusion still has practical significance, it will be discussed first; an analysis of the related provisions
in the tax treaties will then follow.
Since compensation for labor or personal services performed in
the States was deemed to have its source there, without regard to
the origin or place of payment, Congress early found it necessary
to add a collection procedure requiring the nonresident alien, upon
his departure from the States, to file what was tantamount to an in·
formation return and pay a tentative tax or provide security therefor/07 notions which survive to this day. 108 This demand for payRev. Act of 1913, Section II, §A, Subdiv. x, now I.R.C., § 872.
Rev. Act of 1921, § 217(a) (3), now I.R.C., § 861(a) (3). If the trip is solely a
business trip, the service attributed to the States will presumably begin when the per·
son comes within the territorial limits. Cf. I.T. Regs., § 1.861-4(c).
107
Rev. Act of 1921, § 25o(g).
18
"
l.R.C., §6851(d). See also T.I.R. No. 225, April 21, 1960, '6o Vol, 6 CCH para.
6442.
106
108

TAXATION

ment before an alien business visitor could leave the country was
later found by a congressional committee to have "created irritation and ill will quite disproportionate to the slight revenue involved." 109 It was that committee which then pushed through a
statutory exclusion which was expressly confined to those cases
where labor or services were performed as an employee or under
contract with truly foreign entities not engaged in a trade or business
in the United States. In other words, the employee could not qualify
for the exclusion if the employer, not otherwise engaged in a trade
or business in the States, was other than a "nonresident alien, foreign partnership, or foreign corporation." 110 This had the effect,
inter alia, of rendering ineligible for the exclusion nonresident alien
employees of the foreign branch of an American corporation.m
Later, as is more fully discussed below, a like limitation was incorporated in some of the tax treaties. But still later, after those
treaties were signed, Congress extended the statutory exclusion,
qualifying also local services performed by a nonresident alien for
an office or place of business maintained in a foreign country by an
American corporation. 112
Before that amendment, as well as now, the exclusion was otherwise available only where the nonresident alien ( 1) was temporarily present in the States for periods not exceeding a total of 90
days during the taxable year, and ( 2) then only if the compensation
for the services rendered here did not exceed $J,OOO in the aggregate.113 Failure on either count results in a loss of the entire exclusionary privilege.
As is true of Americans who are employed by a foreign facility
to work abroad, it is not unusual for nonresident aliens to dovetail
vacations with business trips to the States. And in trying to stay
within the aggregate $J,OOO statutory limitation, it may also be
important to such persons that the time spent vacationing be isolated. Even though they are entitled to a so-called "paid vacation,"
compensation attributable to the period devoted to sightseeing, etc.,
is free of American tax without regard to the specific statutory exclusion. The absence of labor or services in that part of the period
devoted to vacationing means that the applicable compensation is
not from sources within the States, 114 and is, therefore, beyond the
100

8. Rep. No. 2156, 74th Cong., zd Sess. 22 (1936}.
Rev. Act of 1936, § 119(a) (3).
m I.T. 3943, C.B. 1949-1, 83.
112
I.R.C., § 861(a) (3).
110

113

Ibid.

"'Cf. the philosophy of Chidester v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 322.
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reach of the American tax gatherer under the general rule which
confines the gross income of nonresident aliens to that which has
its source within the Sta tes. 115
To facilitate a proper apportionment, for tax audit purposes,
of that compensation attributable to the vacation portion of the
trip, it may also be desirable for these employees to have realistic
written understandings with employers regarding the respective
amounts of time to be devoted to the two different purposes. It must
be remembered, however, that the quite separate 90-day limitation
relates to the aggregate physical presence in the United States without regard to purpose. But where this period is too short to accommodate all of the visitor's purposes, it may be possible to salvage
tax immunity either by resorting to what may be a more generous
provision in the governing treaty or by spreading his presence in
the States across two taxable years. The fact that the statutory 90day limitation is geared to aggregate presence "during the taxable
year" 116 means that a visitor who comes to the States in the last
quarter of a taxable year, and otherwise qualifies, can safely spread
his visit over into the first quarter of the succeeding taxable year.
Similar planning may be useful to an alien visitor who would
otherwise be entrapped by the separate statutory $3,000 limitation.
For example, one who earns $3,000 for each 30-day period and
plans to stay 45 days may qualify by starting his visit in December,
thus taking advantage of two qualifying amounts instead of one.
But it seems worthwhile to repeat that failure to satisfy either one
of the two different limitations means loss of the entire statutory
exclusionary privilege.
Many persons will not be able to take advantage of the spreading devices related above. In certain circumstances they may still
obtain refuge from the American tax by relying on more generous
standards which appear in certain of the tax treaties discussed immediately below, provided they can also meet the other treaty
specifications.
(d) Reciprocal treaty exclusions to accommodate a ComMarket
citizen's trips to the United States and an American
mon
citizen's trips abroad.-Each of the American treaties with five of
the member states provides for a specific exclusion of compensation
attributable to "labor or personal services" performed within the
United States by "residents," whether or not citizens, of the specific
115
116

I.R.C., § 872 (a).
I.R.C., § 86r(a) (3).
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Member State. The same treaty articles include a reciprocal provision, designed to accord like treatment in the case of business trips
to Europe by Americans whose normal employment stations them
in the United States.
Table V B, which appears at the conclusion of this sub-topic,
indicates the varying requirements expressly reflected in the relevant
provisions. From it, laying aside refinements, two different basic
patterns emerge.
First, all of the treaties establish a wider tax free corridor than
that made available to visiting nonresident aliens by the American
statute, provided the employer is a resident or other entity of the
traveler's own residence. Where that important condition is met,
an exclusion is allowed by the country being visited regardless of
the amount of compensation involved so long as the aggregate
periods of physical presence there do not exceed what generally approximates twice the aggregate time permitted by the Code in the
case of nonresident aliens. Under all treaties, except that with Italy,
the aggregate periods of physical presence in the country being visited may extend through 183 days during any one taxable year. The
Italian treaty is identical with the Code in restricting the periods to
a total of go days in any one year.
The second basic grouping relates to the question of whether any
exclusion at all is provided for in the instance where the employer
is other than a resident or entity of the visitor's own place of residence. One of the treaties-that with the Netherlands-like the
earlier American Code provision which existed when that treaty was
signed, does not permit an exclusion in such casesY 8 But where residents of that member nation are employed by branches of an American corporation, on visiting the States they may now look to the
amended statutory provision which does authorize an exclusion in
such cases, but then the other statutory specifications must also be
satisfied. In other words, the absence of a treaty authorization does
not prohibit reliance on statutory privileges accorded by the American Code.
Treaties with the other four countries do authorize an exclusion
in such cases, though three of the four impose an amount limitation
similar to that imposed by the American Code. The treaties with
117
Articles XI, 9, X, IX, and XVI, respectively, of the treaties with Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. American citizens, resident in such countries,
would not be eligible, however, for this exclusion. See discussion, sub-topic (b) supra.
118
The French treaty was originally so limited, but it was later amended to accommodate employees of a corporation's foreign branch.
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Belgium and Germany require that the aggregate amount of compensation in any one year must not exceed $3,000; the Italian treaty
restricts the amount to a total of $2,000. Only the French treaty
allows an exclusion in this circumstance without regard to the
amount. Moreover, in this circumstance, i.e., where the employer is
other than a resident or entity of the traveler's place of residence,
only in the French and German treaties may the aggregate period of
the visits during any one year exceed that authorized by the Code to
nonresident aliens. Those two treaties conform in this circumstance
to the time limitation applicable in the opposite situation, i.e., to
183 days in any one taxable year. The conventions with Italy and
Belgium, like the Code, contain a more confining 90-day restriction.
Finally it should be noted that certain kinds of personal activity
are ineligible for exclusions otherwise made available by treaty.
Illustratively, the treaty with Belgium specifically denies the exclusion to an otherwise qualified American who visits Belgium in order
to perform his function as a director of a Belgian corporation.
While the German treaty provides otherwise in the case of the
nonresident visiting director, it should be noted that under German
law the remuneration of nonresident directors of German corporations are taxed even if they neve·r set foot in Germany.
The prime standards set forth in the various treaties, as well as
those prescribed by the American statute to deal with the case of
nonresident aliens visiting the United States, are consolidated in
the chart which follows, insofar as they affect four situations:
( 1) The exclusion allowed by Common Market countries, pursuant to treaty, in the case of visiting American citizens who
regularly work in the States for the home office; and
( 2) The exclusion allowed by the United States where a Common Market country citizen who is regularly employed in his
native land visits the American company's home office in the
States. In this situation, the chart reflects those differences, if
any, which are dependent upon whether the visitor was regularly employed by the American company's (a) foreign subsidiary or a foreign incorporated licensee, (b) foreign permanent establishment, or (c) home office, the employee serving
regularly as a Common Market promotional representative.

INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
§ 861(a) (3)

BELGIAN TREATY-ARTICLE XI

U.S. Exemption: A liens
(French Residents) Visiting U.S. (zc)

v

B
REQUIREMENTS
TABLE

Maximum Total Period Of Physical Presence
In Country Being Visited By Nonresident
-Not exceeding 90 days ............... .
-Not exceeding 183 days .............. .

Belgian Exemption:
11 merican Citizen
Resident, Employed
by U.S. Corp., Jlisiting Belgium(2e)

Statutory Exemption
from U.S. Tax Re
Nonresident 11liens
Fisiting U.S.

Employee
of Belgian
Corporation

........ X ....... .

........ x ....... . .... x .....

Employee
of Permanent
Establishment
in Belgium

Employed
Directly by
U.S. Corp.

..... x .....

.... x ....

French Exemption:
American Citizen
Resident, Employed
by U.S. Corp., Fisiting France(2c)

Employee
of French
Corporation

Employee
of Permanent
Establishment
in France

. ....... x ...... .

.... X .....

...... X .....

IT ALlAN TREATY-ARTICLE XI

GERMAN TREATY-ARTICLE X

FRENCH TREATY-ARTICLE 9(1)

Employed
Directly by
U.S. Corp.

German ExemPtion:
11 merican Citizen
Resident,
Employed by
U.S. Corp., Visiting
Germany(2a), (2b)

. ....... x ....... .

U.S. Exemption: Aliens
(German Residents)
Visiting U.S. (2a), (2b)

Employee
of German
Corporation

Employee
of Permanent
Establishment
in Germany

Employed
Directly by
U.S. Corp.

.... X .....

...... X .....

. ... X .....

.............................. .

...... X .....

. ... X .....

Italian Exem~tion:
American C~tizen
Resident, Employed
by u.s. corp.,
Pisiting ltalJ(2b)

........ x.: ... ..

Employee
of Italian
Corporation

Employee
of Permanent
Establishment
in Italy

Employed
Directly by
U.S. Corp.

.... X .....

. ..... x .....

.. •. X .....

I

····· .... ········
...... x .....

. ....... x ....... .
. ....... x ....... .

-Unlimited ........................... .
Specifically Required Business Relationship
-Service must be performed for or on behalf of a resident, entity, or permane:lt
establishment of the visitor's place of
residence .......................... .
-Service must be performed as "an employee of, or under contract with" a
resident or entity of the visitor's place
of residence ....................... .
-Service must be performed as "an employee of or under a contract with" a
resident or entity of a foreign country
not engaged in trade or business within
the United States or for a domestic corporation "if such labor or services are
performed for an office or place of business maintained in a foreign country or
in a possession of the United States by
such corporation" .................. .
Required Locus Of Compensation Burden
-Employer located in visitor's place of residence must bear actual burden of compensation .......................... .

. ....... x ....... .

........ X ....... .

..... X .....

.... X .....

.... x ....
........ X ...... .

.... x .....

...... X .....

........ x ...... .

. ... X .....

. ..... x .....

.... X .....

. ... X .....

Netherlands Exemfrlion:
11 merican Citizen
Resident, Employed
by U.S. Corp.,,
Jlisiting Netherlands

Employee of
Netherlands
Corporation

.......... x ..... i ....

. ... X .....

Employee
of Permanent
Establishment
in Netherlands

.... X .....

. ....... X ...... .

. ... X .....

. .......•. X ......... .

. .•. X .....

........ x ....... .

. ... X .....

. ....... X.' ..... .

. ... X .....

. ......... X ......... .

. ... x .....

·····--··--1······

r

. ... x .....

(I) As amended by supplemental convention of June 22, 1956, Article I(e) (1).
(2) Specifically Enumerated Activities In The Country Being Visited In Addition To "labor or
personal services" Performed There.
(a) Specifically also including services as a director.
(b) Specifically also including exercise of a liberal profession.
(c) Specifically excluded from the general rule under the French treaty is the exercise of a
liberal profession. While Article X of that treaty goes on to provide that income from
such exercise is taxable only by the country in which the professional activity is exercised, this notion is limited by another provision to the effect that a liberal profession
will be deemed to be exercised in a country only where the professional activity bas a

........ X ....... .

.... X .....

U.S. Corp.

.......... I

. ......... x .... i·····
!

"fixed center" in that country. T.D. 5499, § 7.412 (f) of the United States regulations interprets this latter limitation to mean that a visiting French doctor, lawyer, engineer, or
other member of a liberal profession will enjoy an exclusion from U.S. tax provided he
"does not maintain within the United States an office, installation, or other fixed center
relating to the practice of his profession."
(d) Specifically excluding remuneration of officer or director of U.S. corporation.
(e) Specifically excluding remuneration of "'administrateurs,' 'commissaires,' or 'liquidateurs' of, or of other individuals, exercising similar functions in corporations created
or organized in Belgium."

Employed
Directly by

•• ••••• ••••••••• •!o••••

. ....... x ....... .

I ................. .
I ....... x ....... .

U.S. Exemption: Aliens
(Netherlands Residents) Visiting U.S.

U.S. Exemption: Aliens
(Italian Residents) Visiting U.S. (zb)

Maximum Amount Of Compensation If Exclusion Is To Apply
-$2,000 .............................. .
-$3,000

NETHERLANDS TREATY-ARTICLE XVI

1 •••• x

.... . .. ............ I

.. .... . J

PART VI. THE FUTURE TAX SITUATION AS IT
~/MAY AFFECT DOING BUSINESS IN THE
COMMON MARKET

Introductory note.-Foreign political relations aside, many businessmen are convinced there are few norms as unstable as those
embodied in tax laws. Despite the existence of an almost day-today amending process, too great attention to these amendments can
be misleading, for more often than not, it is tantamount to a "cleaning up" operation.
Revision of internal basic principles, affecting as they do the
whole economic paraphernalia of a nation, is not easily achieved.
Newly founded external relationships, such as those formed through
the establishment of the European Common Market, do, however,
tend to force each affected member nation to undertake a more
penetrating examination into the basic structure of its tax laws.
Other countries, such as the United States, who would do business
with such newly founded communities may be likewise affected.
The likelihood of basic changes in the Common Market tax picture is the subject matter of the abbreviated discussion below in
Section A. Subsequent Section B identifies the relevant major changes
which are being given thoughtful consideration in the United States.
SECTION

A.

FuTURE TAX SITUATION IN THE
COMMON MARKET

(a) Tax premises of the Common Market treaty.-Those
who framed the Common Market treaty apparently concluded that
tax aspects relevant to greater economic cooperation were too complicated to solve in the treaty itself. The latter has only a few provisions bearing on the subject (Articles 9 5-99), and these deal
only with indirect taxes (turnover taxes and excise duties). Direct
taxes (income, property, and enterprise taxes) are not specifically
mentioned; Article 220 does, however, refer to the necessity of
avoiding double taxation.
With respect to indirect taxes, all of the relevant provisions but
611
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one assume the existing tax pattern and provide only for certain
limitations. The one exception, Article 99, charges the Commission
(the Community's principal administrative body) with the responsibility of conducting a study in order to determine how these taxes
might be harmonized. The preceding Articles of the treaty assume
continuation of the existing practices with reference to exports and
imports, as more fully described in PART II, supra. In the case of
exports, refund of turnover taxes previously paid is limited to those
actually suffered by the product. In short, a refund system may not
be used as a device by which to subsidize export trade. The aim on
the import side, on the other hand, was to preclude the possibility of
disguised tariffs; thus turnover taxes imposed on imports may not
exceed the burden assessed with respect to similar products manufactured in the importing country itself.
(b) The likelihood and adequacy of harmonized indirect
tax systems.-Appraisal of the logic behind the treaty provisions
should turn on the extent to which the incidence of taxation is
actually a factor in fixing competitive conditions.
The treaty assumes that indirect taxes are in the nature of costs
which directly influence competition in that they are passed on to
the consumer. In other words, if the same article is subject to a
different tax burden, and if all other costs are equal, that which
suffers the least tax burden will be more easily sold. From this
premise, many tax specialists are led to the conclusion that in a
community like the Common Market all merchandise must bear the
same indirect taxes, without regard to the country of origin. From
this, it would follow that the exporting country must refund all
previously paid turnover taxes, and the importing country should
levy a tax identical to that imposed on locally manufactured merchandise.
Apart from the merits, an almost insurmountable practical difficulty will be encountered in effectuating this scheme unless the member nations revise the basic structure or theory of their respective
turnover taxes. As indicated in PARTS I and II, supra, five of the
six members levy a multiple stage tax, i.e., one on each succeeding
stage in the production and distribution process. This fact alone
would make it difficult to develop a refund formula which would
be accurate in each case. Each product bears different cost factors,
starting with raw materials and spreading across plant, machinery,
and overhead costs, each of which comprise a different tax element.
Theoretically, the French added-value tax ( T at-ce sur la J7 aleur
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Ajoutee) is the only one which can compensate for these difficulties.
And in Germany, where reformation of the turnover tax system is
under advisement, there are those who favor the adoption of the
French system, though experience has exposed deficiencies in the
latter system also. As indicated in Sections A and D of PART I,
supra, with reference to some products, Italy and Belgium have substituted a single transfer tax for the otherwise applicable multiplestage arrangement, but the substitution was not effected with reference to a host of products, such as raw materials, machinery, etc.
In any event, adoption of one turnover tax system by all member
nations is not to be expected in the near future. Nor would such a
move serve actually to equalize tax burdens. Three reasons, each
shading into the other, contribute to the difficulty.
First, because economic and social circumstances in the six countries differ, different systems of e.r:emptions and internal variations
in applicable rates will have to be maintained by most member nations. This, of course, makes calculation of the exact burden borne
by a given product more difficult.
Second, the Introduction to PART III, supra, indicated the differences in the degree to which each member nation relies upon
indirect taxes, as distinguished from direct taxes. The variation is
considerable and attributable to differences to be found in the tax
psychology of the member nations. Illustratively, France and Italy
would now find it almost impossible to impose higher taxes on income. On the other hand, it would be equally difficult to raise indirect taxes in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and to a lesser
extent in Germany. Admittedly, this problem would be of less significance to international trade if the amount of indirect taxes could
be accurately determined and refunded at export, while being levied
on imports in an amount exactly equal to that borne by local products. Enthusiasm for this, as a solution, has been dampened, however, by the third and final major consideration.
In this latter connection, there is growing awareness that direct
taxes-matters not really dealt with by the Common Market treaty
-also influence competition. Laying aside direct taxes on the income of individuals such as wage earners (though such might also
be shifted), greater numbers have come to the realization that enterprise taxes, such as the corporate income tax, will influence the
price of manufactured products. A common illustration in the international setting should suffice. Assume that two companies from
different countries (A and B) bid on the right to build a hydro-
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electric plant in a third country, C. Assume further that both will
pay an income tax to C, but that their respective countries of residence differ in that A provides a credit for foreign taxes while B
does not. As a consequence, the firm from the latter country must
either offer a higher bid than the other firm, thereby affecting the
former's competitive position, or take a lower profit-a prospect
which may lead it not to bid at all.
The foregoing is another way of saying that harmonization of
indirect taxes will not actually equalize tax burdens suffered by international traffic. Equality of tax burdens will be achieved only if
all taxes are harmonized, but even this would lead to ultimate equality of the burden borne by international trade participants only if
all other factors are equalized, including national incomes (in general and per capita), the percentage of national income absorbed by
tax revenues, and services rendered by the member nations to residents and business interests. Comparison and harmonization of
total tax burdens is less significant as long as differences exist in
services provided by the member nations, wherein residents of one
pay for services of a type which residents of another enjoy at the
expense of the nation.
The difficulty of establishing one economic community out of
member nations which have diverse interests is obvious enough. And
this is also true in the tax area, since, as before stated, the internal
tax philosophy of each member nation depends largely on its own
economic and social circumstances. Because the totality of its ensuing tax structure affects competitive conditions, it seems illogical
to distinguish between taxes. Yet such a distinction is the underlying
premise indulged in by those who argue in support of a system
which relies upon a refund of indirect taxes at the point of export,
with a compensatory tax being imposed at the point of import. Inter
alia, this fails to accommodate differences in the direct tax burden
borne by products.
One solution-highly theoretical-would be to refund direct as
well as indirect taxes at the point of export, compensatory taxes
being levied at the point of import. The practical difficulty of implementation is obvious and almost insurmountable.
A more practical and logical solution would call for abolition of
the refund system in recognition of the fact that all taxes of a given
member nation are inter-locked and determine together the tax burden borne by a product. This proposed solution is gaining increasing
support.
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This does not necessarily mean, however, that there will be, or
need be, great diversity in all tax rules. Many tax problems lend
themselves to a common solution, such as the matter of stock valuation, depreciation methods, loss carry-forwards, and, in the field of
turnover taxes, the question of whether a multiple stage system is
to be preferred over a single tax. These differences are largly responsible for the difficulty one encounters in trying to compare tax
burdens. It is also more feasible to obtain uniformity in these respects than with reference to total tax rates.
While changes of the type noted are feasible, the likelihood that
uniformity of this type will be achieved in the near future is quite
another question. Each country would be forced to complicate its
amending process by consulting with five other countries before
effecting changes. All too often, this is not done for internally
valid reasons. On the other hand, there is in fact some tendency toward greater uniformity. For example, France's adoption in 1948
of the lmpot sur les Socihes (corporation income tax) was a step
in the direction of those income taxes imposed by Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 1 Again, the French tax reform in late
1
Tax Reform Bill No. 6,000, dated July 27, I96o and now pending in the Dutch
Parliament, would make a few rather substantial changes in the tax pattern of that
country, as it affects corporations.
The most important change involves a proposal to discriminate in favor of distributed profits. While the present temporarily increased rate of 47% (regular rate,
43%) would continue to apply to undistributed profits, a reduced rate of 32% (or
28% if the Netherlands returns to its regular rate schedule) would be applied to
distributed profits. Subsidiaries which distribute profits to a parent would also enjoy
the lower rate, though the parent, if Dutch, would suffer an additional IS% levy if it
did not immediately re-distribute the profit. This IS% surcharge would not apply,
however, to a foreign parent, for example, one domiciled in the United States. This
means, if the pending legislation is adopted, that there could be a substantial difference
between Dutch taxation of American branches (permanent establishments), on the
one hand, and subsidiaries, on the other. The former would suffer the rate on undistributed profits (now 47%) whether or not its profits were remitted, while the subsidiary could enjoy the 32% reduced rate insofar as its profits are distributed. A quite
separate factor may at some point compensate, at least in part, for this differential.
The same legislation proposes to increase the Dutch 'U:ithholding tax on dividends from
the present Is% to zs%. At the moment, because of a treaty provision, even the IS%
does not apply to dividends paid by an American controlled subsidiary to its U.S.
parent. However, it is said that the Dutch government intends to start negotiations
leading to a revision of this immunity, substituting instead, perhaps, a 10% or IS%
rate, with the possibility of a distinction of some type being drawn if the subsidiary is
wholly owned.
The pending legislation would also enlarge the chance that a corporate distributee
would itself be immune from the regular corporate tax on dividends received from
another corporation. The proposal is to allow the immunity if the distributee owns
s% or more of the distributing corporation's capital, as distinguished from the presently required 2so/o.
Another proposal would involve abandonment of the special tax on remuneration
of corporate directors. Instead, limitations would be placed on the deduction allowed
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1959, the ultimate aim being to substitute a single income tax on
individuals for the previously existing multiple system (proportional tax and progressive tax), also brought the French tax structure into closer alignment with the income taxes imposed on individuals by the three previously mentioned countries. A year earlier, in
1958, the Belgian Minister of Finance announced that his country
would also re-study its tax structure and that it would be desirable
to adopt a system similar to that of the countries noted above.
In spite of this progress, it must be recognized that, for the reasons previously given, harmonization, which-to the foreigners who
wish to trade in the Common Market-also carries with it a welcome overtone of simplification, will not take place overnight.
(c) Harmonization through modernization of the bilateral
tax treaties among Common Market countries.-A chart in Section
D of PART III, supra, shows the present status of the bilateral
tax treaties which exist among Common Market countries. Some
of these pre-date World War II and came into being before the
dramatic increase, following that war, in international business
activity. In certain respects, some treaties are, therefore, obsolete,
as in the case of those between Germany and Italy, Belgium and
France, and Belgium and the Netherlands. Others, such as those
between France and Germany, and France and Italy, have been replaced by more modern versions. Belgium and Luxembourg chose,
on the other hand, to supplement their earlier agreement.
This tendency toward modernization will be facilitated by two
circumstances, apart from the fact that increasing business activity
necessarily makes the matter one of urgent necessity.
The first such circumstance relates to the new tax systems which
have been recently adopted, as explained in the preceding subtopic.
It is obviously easier to enter into bilateral tax treaties where the
two national tax systems coincide in terms of basic structure.
The second contributing circumstance goes beyond the Common
Market itself. It relates to the work of the Fiscal Committee set
up by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, covto the corporation, as follows: (1) remuneration of $526 (Fl. z,ooo) would be fully
deductible; (2) the excess would be deductible only up to soo/o; and (3) no deduction
would be permitted for amounts in excess of $2,630 (Fl. 10,000) per year.
In the case of individuals, instead of a variable rate, from 2oo/o to 4oo/o, on capital
gains realized from the sale of shares of stock in corporations in which the taxpayer
held a substantial interest, a flat rate of 2oo/o would be imposed.
Finally, the withholding tax on an individual's compensation from employment
will be a final levy, provided the compensation did not exceed $1,934 (instead of the
present $x,815) and other income was not in excess of $79 (instead of the present $53).
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ering all free European countries and with which the United States
cooperates to a substantial extent. The Committee is charged with
the responsibility of developing provisions which could be adopted
by all member countries, thus giving rise to the first real prospect
for a multilateral tax treaty.
Model tax treaties have been designed before; illustrative was
one drafted by the League of Nations. While some of its provisions
were incorporated in many bilateral tax treaties, a multilateral
treaty did not result. There is greater hope, however, for the product of the Fiscal Committee of the O.E.E.C. The national delegations to it are composed of those senior officials in each country who
normally have much to do with the preparation of their own national tax laws and with bilateral tax treaties. Each group of problems has been assigned to a working sub-committee composed of
two or three delegations. The proposed texts are brought into
plenary session for discussion and, if need be, amended in order to
obtain unanimity at the point of adoption. Two reports, consisting
of I 4 provisions to which rather extended official commentaries
were added, were published in 1958 and 1959. These reports recommended that each member country incorporate the articles either
in their own tax laws or in bilateral tax treaties to which they were
parties. The character of the competent membership of the committee, and the fact that the ultimate product resulted from negotiation, will contribute markedly to the acceptance of their work. In
fact, some of the proposed articles have already been included in
the newest treaties concluded by France, Germany, and the Netherlands. One can even expect that all treaties drafted in the future will
be based on the Fiscal Committee's recommendations. Because of
the extensive official commentaries appended to each article, interpretations are certain to be more uniform than are those associated
with older bilateral arrangements. Nor is it too optimistic to believe
that these recommendations will also have a harmonizing effect on
the shape of national tax laws.
(d) Illustrative effect of harmonization on American enterprises.-Harmonization will, of course, tend to simplify the problems of those foreigners, such as American enterprises, who wish
to do business in the Common Market. It will also reduce the significance of tax factors in making a choice of locale. But it may also
have an adverse effect in some instances. Illustrative is the problem
associated with taxes on inter-corporate dividends.
As indicated in the country-by-country survey in PART I, most
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countries exempt intercorporate dividends from tax if both parent
and subsidiary are residents. Even the withholding tax, if any, has
been neutralized in that circumstance. Except in France and the
Netherlands, however, such exemptions are not granted if the subsidiary is a nonresident corporation. Harmonization of the tax laws
will certainly lead to the adoption of general exemptions in this
circumstance. But the result may directly affect only the member
nations; in effect, outside countries, such as the United States, may
be prejudiced. This may make it desirable for an American company
to have "sister" subsidiaries in the member nations. While the
deemed-paid credit provisions in the American Internal Revenue
Code may give adequate relief from double taxation, it may still be
useful to transfer the shares of the "sister" subsidiaries to a European holding company situated within the Common Market, i.e., in
a country which will not impose an income tax on incoming dividends nor, in compliance with a bilateral tax treaty with the United
States, withhold tax when these are ultimately remitted to the
American parent. And if this organizational structure is ultimately
to be established, it may be desirable to make the necessary transfers
before one encounters the knotty capital gains problem which would
arise on transferring the shares to the holding company, as explained more fully in Section G of PART III.
SECTION

B.

FUTURE AMERICAN TAXATION

OF

FOREIGN INCOME

(a) Chronology of the past: A guide to the future.-An
abbreviated chronology of the past will contribute markedly to the
identification of possible statutory changes which are most likely
to receive serious consideration by those responsible for fixing the
American tax reaction to foreign income. Indeed, that so much of
the present tax pattern reaches so far back into the past during which
heavy foreign investments have been made-thus giving rise to a
"vested right" type of psychology, is the most serious, and perhaps
meritorious, obstacle confronting any major attempt at overall reVISIOn.

For 47 years, American industry has acted on the assumption
that, through use of a foreign subsidiary, American taxation of foreign income could be deferred until such income was remitted as a
dividend to the States. 2 For that same period of time, form has
• The United States has never tried to reach more than is now reached by I.R.C.,
§ 882(b), except in the case of foreign personal holding companies. See I.R.C., § 551.
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counted for much; timing-wise, American tax incidence on the foreign income of branches could not be so deferred. 3 The effect, solely
by reference to this differential, has been that one arrangement enjoyed an interest free loan of taxes denied to the other.
For a slightly shorter, but, nevertheless, a very long period-42
years, the total ultimate two-country tax on foreign income of American owned or controlled enterprises has been less in one frequently
recurring circumstance than the tax borne by domestically earned income. This has been so whenever (a) foreign operations were conducted through a foreign subsidiary, (b) the foreign country imposed an income tax, but (c) at a lower effective rate than that of
the United States. American concepts, relating to gross income and
the deemed-paid credit, combined to make it possible for foreign
income in that circumstance to enjoy both a deduction and a substantial credit for foreign income taxes; 4 as a result, the ultimate
total two-country effective rate on foreign income earned by an
American parent's subsidiary could be as low as 45.24%, compared
with 52% on domestically earned income. And because of the peculiar workings of the two concepts, American companies with subsidiaries in nations which imposed a 26% tax on the operating unit
fared better, tax-wise, than those companies which situated the unit
in countries which imposed 39% or 13% effective rates, or for that
matter o or 52% rates. 5
For I 8 years, another possible difference in ultimate total tax
costs has turned on whether foreign operations were conducted by
the parent's own subsidiary, or through sub-subsidiaries, the difference here being attributable to the peculiar way in which the deemedpaid credit works at the two-tier foreign level as distinguished from
the one-tier level. 6 Under the best of circumstances, the total effective rate under the two-tier or sub-subsidiary foreign arrangement
could drop as low as 40.18%/ contrasted with 45.24% in the best
possible circumstance under the one-tier foreign arrangement.
Again for that same period, the amount of American tax, standing alone, has differed by reference to the place where foreign income was earned. During World War II, when American trade was
necessarily confined in major proportions to its own hemisphere, en3

I.R.C., § 61. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 38 S. Ct. 432 (1918).
• Discussed more fully in PART III, Section C, Subsection r, supra.
• Statement of Jay W. Glasman, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings
on H.R. 10859 and 10860, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960) p. 3·
• Originated by Rev. Act of 1942, § 131 (f) (z), now as revised, I.R.C., § 902 (b).
7
See note 5, supra, at 4- Discussed more fully in PART III, section E, Subsection 2,
wpra.
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actment of what is now a special deduction with respect to foreign
income earned by a domestic corporation in that hemisphere-the
aim being to make American companies more competitive with international businesses which are based in Europe, 8 has meant that the
business activity of American companies in, say, South America
could enjoy more favorable tax treatment than American activity
carried on in Europe. Assuming branch operations in both cases, the
differential in American tax amounts to 14 percentage points, i.e.,
38% as against 52%. 9
For 34 years, the concept underlying the difference in American
taxes on that kind of domestic and foreign income most frequently
associated with individuals (earned income) has been out of harmony with one of the most significant concepts underlying the American tax differential on corporate domestic and foreign income. An
American citizen who works abroad while a resident there for
American tax purposes will never pay U.S. taxes on his foreign
earned income even though the applicable foreign tax is substantially lower than would be the American tax, and this immunity may
be enjoyed though the nonresident citizen ultimately remits a substantial part of his earnings to the States. 10 By way of contrast, an
American corporation's foreign income, even when earned by a foreign (i.e., nonresident) subsidiary, will always be taxed upon remission to the States as a dividend, assuming, of course, that the
foreign income tax was not so high as to wipe out American tax
liability through operation of the credit provision.
From the above, as well as from the focus of recent congressional inquiries, it appears that two different two-part problems
are most likely to attract the attention of future sessions of Congress. The first involves the question of whether foreign income
should enjoy a lower total effective tax rate than domestically
earned income, and if there is to be such a differential, to what extent should it turn on the matter of form. The second concerns the
extent to which the American tax should be deferred until foreign
income is remitted to the United States, as well as the complementary question of whether form should also make a difference here.
While the degree and direction of congressional concern with respect to these two basic problems will be considered under separate
sub-topics below, other questions which only recently have been
resolved by Congress should be noted here.
8

S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, III (1942).
• l.R.C., §§ 921 and 922.
I.R.C., §911(a), discussed more fully in PART V, Section C, supra, originated
with Rev. Act of 1926, § 213 (b) ( '4).
10
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In late 1960, Congress sought in three different respects to minimize the significance of differences which had previously turned on
the form of organization. First, it authorized even those American
corporations which operated abroad through "sister" facilities to
elect to submit their foreign tax credit to an "overall" limitation, 11
rather than to the previously applicable "per-country" limitation. 12
Because of the way the per-country limitation itself had been construed, other forms of organization-such as foreign holding company arrangements-had always enjoyed the averaging effect
associated with the overall limitation. 13 While this new legislation
did whittle down the effect of a difference which previously had
turned solely on form, certain practical differences, as noted elsewhere, do remain.H Second, Congress also adopted legislation which
clearly established the right of the government to obtain from domestic parents certain types of information relative to their foreign subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries, which information the Treasury had always had the clear right to obtain with reference to
foreign branchesY In this same connection, it also extended to
stockholders, officers, and directors a responsibility to file information returns with reference to the creation or reorganization of
foreign corporations with which they were associated. 16 Third and
finally, it also extended the 8 5% dividends received deduction to
American parent corporations with respect to dividends paid by a
foreign corporation out of earnings and profits accumulated by the
foreign facility at an earlier time when it was actually incorporated
in the United States, i.e., before the enterprise was converted into
a foreign corporation through a tax-free reorganizationY
(b) Prospect for reduction in American taxes re income
earned in the Common M arket.-As a practical matter, it seems
unlikely, in the forseeable future, that the present ultimate American
11
Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). The ramifications pertaining to the
election are discussed more fully in Section F, PART III, supra.
'"A detailed discussion of the per-country limitation appears in Subsection 1 of
Section C, PART III, supra.
'"Discussed more fully in Sections F and G, PART III, supra.

14
15

I d.

Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Con g., 2d Sess. ( 1960), adding a new § 6038 to the Code,
the old § 6038 being renumbered § 6039. Included in that which must be submitted is
information regarding accumulated profits, balance sheets, and certain inter-company
transactions.
16
Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1960), amending I.R.C., § 6046. Formerly,
only those who advised with reference to the creation or reorganization of foreign
corporations had to furnish such information. This proved to be relatively ineffective,
because attorneys apparently felt their advice was protected by the attorney-client
relationship.
11
Pub. Law 86-779, 86th Cong., 2d Ses~. ( 1960), amending I.R.C., ~ 243.
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tax load borne by income derived from the Common Market will be
changed.
In the past, the United States has tried three of the four ways
by which the ultimate American tax on foreign income could be reduced to a point below that borne by domestic income. The first, a
reduction in rates for domestic Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations,18 gave way to the second, a deduction of equivalent proportions for the same beneficiary. 19 Policy makers in the Treasury Department have made it abundantly clear that they oppose extension
of this type of benefit to investment operations even in underdeveloped foreign countries, to say nothing of extending such to
the more industrialized communi ties of Western Europe. 20
Spokesmen for the Department start from the premise that rate
discrimination between foreign and domestic income cannot be justified on grounds of tax policy; it must be justified, if at all, by reference to the requirements of foreign economic policy-a matter dictated in the end by foreign political policy. 21 And while clearly interested in an expansion of investments in the under-developed part of
the world, they have expressed doubt as to whether rate reduction
for income from those less fortunate areas would actually constitute a significant incentive, facilitating expansion of American investments in those areas. 22 As to the highly developed parts of the
world, additional "special stimulus" of this type was not thought, in
any event, to be a requisite of America's foreign economic policy. 23
Coupled with the foregoing philosophy was a banker's point of view,
to the effect that the Treasury was not prepared to accept the annual
revenue loss of $2oo,ooo,ooo which would follow extension of the
Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation concept to the rest of
the world. 24
Perhaps it was these same considerations, plus Treasury opposition, that led appropriate congressional committees to eliminate
from bills pending in the I 960 session any extension of the Western Hemisphere Corporation tax reduction formula. 25
18

The reduction involved an exemption from surtax. Rev. Act of 1942,
I.R.C., § 921. Indeed, for a short time a credit was also involved,
1950, § 121(c) amending I.R.C. (1939), § 15(a).
00
Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Chairman of the
mittee on Ways and Means, May 6, 1959, in '59 Vol. 6 CCH para. 6469.
5, supra.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
See Secretary Anderson's letter, note 20, supra.
24
Note 20, supra.
25
§ 4 of the originally proposed Foreign Investment Incentive Tax
19

§ 15 (b).
Rev. Act of
House ComSee also note

Act of 1959
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On the other hand, the President as well as the Treasury have
indicated agreement in principle with a third method of reducing
taxes on foreign income, i.e., the so-called {(tax-sparing" arrangement.26 Under present American law, a reduction by a foreign country of its own tax rates is advantageous to an American company
only as long as its profits are reinvested in that country, and this only
if the business is conducted through a foreign subsidiary; otherwise,
in terms of ultimate effect, it serves only to reduce the credit which
the American company would otherwise apply against its American
tax liability. The so-called tax-sparing principle would allow a credit
for income taxes specifically waived by a foreign country as an inducement to investment. While the Treasury agrees that the American tax pattern should not always have a negative effect on the
desire of a foreign country to make special reductions in its own tax
load as a means to attract American capital, the Treasury is not
prepared to accept any such program on "an unlimited and unilateral
basis." 27 In other words, it believes that tax-sparing "should be
implemented on a selective basis either by treaties or by negotiated
agreements authorized by statute." 28 This is probably another way
of saying, inter alia, that the program should not be extended to
the industrialized Common Market even in the unlikely event that
area manifested an interest in the kind of tax sacrifice and local
discrimination which such a program envisages; instead the focal
point would be on the under-developed parts of the world, with the
tax-sparing principle applied there only to the extent and in the
manner deemed to be in accordance with the requirements of American economic policy. In the face of these considerations and Treasury opposition, here too congressional committees eliminated from
pending bills of the 1960 session any reference to the tax-sparing
principle. 29
As previously indicated, a fourth method by which foreign income
will actually enjoy an effective rate advantage over domestic income
relates to the combined effect of the gross income and deemed-paid
credit concepts, wherein income earned through a foreign subsidiary
(H.R. 5) does not now appear in the 1960 version approved by H. Rep. No. 1282, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1960).
26
The President's original proposal in his Budget message of 1954 is still supported
in principle by the Secretary's letter, note 20, supra.
fn See the Secretary's letter, note 20, supra.
28

lbid.
.. § 6 of the originally proposed Foreign Incentive Tax Act of 1959 (H.R. 5) does
not now appear in the 1960 version approved by H. Rep. No. 1282, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960).
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arrangement in effect enjoys both a deduction and a substantial
credit for foreign income taxes. 30 The fact that a similar rate advantage is not available to branch operations obviously indicates
considerable stress on fotm. Also, the fact that the ultimate preference available to a foreign subsidiary's foreign income springs from
the operation of the gross income and credit concepts, rather than
via a uniform rate reduction, means that the degree of preference
will in fact depend "upon and fluctuate with the level and changes
in tax rates abroad on a country-by-country basis. . . . " 31 For these
reasons, the Treasury has publicly recognized that if preference is
to be given because-according to its underlying premise-of the
requirements of America's foreign economic policy, "it would appear more sound and equitable that it be granted on a uniform and
predictable basis." 32 Looking at the matter solely in terms of tax
principles, the Treasury thought (I) that the combined deduction
and credit which the subsidiary arrangement enjoyed with reference
to foreign income could not be defended, and ( 2) that it would be
more appropriate to "gross up" the parent's dividend by the amount
of foreign income taxes, a full credit then being allowed for those
same taxes, assuming a distribution of all of the foreign profit. In
other words, laying aside the question of possible differences in
timing, the foreign income of branch and subsidiary arrangements
should be taxed alike in terms of ultimate effect. But at this point
the Treasury found itself in a dilemma.
On the one hand, the Treasury fully recognized that adoption of
the "gross up" arrangement, without a compensating rate reduction
for subsidiary operations, would result in a $46,ooo,ooo tax increase 33 with respect to the latter through elimination of a preference which such arrangements had enjoyed for 42 years. On the
other hand, extension of any such wholesale rate reduction to
branches would constitute an additional inroad (I) on its underlying philosophy, namely, that preference for foreign income, over
domestic income, could be justified only by reference to the needs
of foreign economic policy, ( 2) on its factual premise, namely, a
doubt that rate reduction would really stimulate foreign investments
in any significant sense, and ( 3) on its conclusion that, in any event,
30
There are those who deny that this is a "fair" way of describing the effect. Statement of Clayton E. Turney, representing the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.,
Hearings on H.R. 10859 and xo86o, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.,
zd Sess. (1960) p. 31 at 32.
31
Note 5, supra, at 8.
32
lbid.
33
ld. at 7·
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investments in industrialized foreign markets did not need a further
special stimulus. Nor was the Treasury prepared to accept the
revenue loss which extension of a rate reduction to branches would
involve. In this connection, to be wholly fair to the "vested right"
psychology of subsidiary arrangements in the sense of avoiding
prejudice to any, it would have been necessary to effect a reduction
equal to the maximum advantage presently enjoyed by any such
arrangements, namely, by those in relatively low income tax countries.
While the House Ways and Means Committee indicated at one
point that it was prepared to adopt the "gross up" formula so as to
put branches and subsidiaries on a par, 34 reconsideration leading to
additional hearings in April, 1960 has led the committee to withhold, to date, reporting out a bill which would have accomplished
that end. 35 Indeed, in at least one sense it has moved in the opposite
direction in that it has reported out a bill 36 which is actually designed to enhance the feasibility of resorting to the advantageous
multiple tier sub-subsidiary arrangement, this being the setting in
which the combined exclusion and credit have the most exaggerated
effect.
In this latter connection, the deemed-paid credit, when first extended twenty-eight years ago to embrace a sub-subsidiary's foreign
taxes, was available only if the top tier foreign subsidiary owned
"all the voting stock (except qualifying shares)" of the subsubsidiary.37 Eight years later, in 19so, business urged that the
Point 4 Program would be furthered if Congress relaxed all of
the ownership requirements associated with the deemed-paid credit. 3s
Reduction in the proportionate interest which the parent had to
hold in the top tier foreign subsidiary, to 10%, 39 was accompanied
by reducing to so% the interest which that subsidiary had to hold
in a sub-subsidiary, 40 the overall aim being to accommodate those
cases where ownership of the subsidiary and sub-subsidiary was
divided for any number of reasons, including requirements of foreign lawY Indeed, it was then asserted that the so% limitation at
the second tier level was retained only for administrative rea'"For a statement regarding the sequence of events, see note 5, supra, at +·
""H.R. 10859 and 1086o, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1960).
"" H.R. n,681, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
'"Rev. Act of 1942, § 131(f) (z).
""See statement of Mitchell B. Carroll, Hearings, Committee on Ways and Means.
8rst Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) Vol. 3, 623 at 626.
""Rev. Act of 1951, § 332(a), now I.R.C., § 902(a).
40
Rev. Act of 1951, § 332 (b), now I.R.C., § 902 (b).
41
S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., rst Sess. 55 (1951).
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sons, the general belief being expressed that the amount of ultimate dividends received by the parent would be affected by foreign
ineome taxes irrespective of the proportion of ownership. 43 In late
I960, the House committee reported out a bill 44 which would
downgrade the required ownership at the second tier level to zo%,
arguing again that divided ownership .cases should be accommodated
subject only to limitations geared to administrative feasibility which
now, it believed, would be "fully" provided for by a zo% standard.45 While the House itself approved the proposal, 46 the Senate
did not have an opportunity to act on the matter in the I960 session.
The support which the proposal enjoyed in the House suggests,
however, that the matter is almost certain to be considered again
in the I 96 I session.
(c) Prospect for a consistent pattern re deferral of American tax on foreign income.-As also noted in sub-topic (a), supra,
the most striking and practical difference between an operation conducted through a foreign subsidiary and that handled by a branch
involves the opportunity, in the case of the former only, to defer
American taxes on foreign income until such income is remitted to
the States.
Support for deferral in the case of foreign subsidiaries rests essentially on the notion that only in this way will American controlled
foreign operations be placed on a competitive basis with foreign
controlled enterprises with which they compete. 47 It has also been
said that the deferral should terminate when dividends are distributed to the parent at which ti~e the foreign profits enter the
domestic market. 48
The same general theory is obviously just as applicable to a
branch operation as to a foreign subsidiary. Even the Treasury has
acknowledged that the stress placed on form by existing law is hard
to justify on the merits 49 though, of course, the problem itself cannot be dealt with separate and apart from such intimately related
matters as the difference between the applicable direct and deemedpaid credit provisions. Nevertheless, the Treasury has opposed
42

The character of the administrative difficulties and the reasons why so% became
the magic number were not discussed.
43
Note 41, supra.
44
H.R. n,681, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1960).
""H. Rep. No. 2100, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 ( 1960).
46
S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1951).
47
H. Rep. No. 1282, 86th Con g., 2d Sess. 1 ( 1960).
48
I d. at 2.
49
See Secretary's letter, note 20, supra.
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wholesale extension of the deferral privilege to branch operations in
general, noting that the revenue loss would run between $Joo,ooo,ooo and $5oo,ooo,ooo, and would amount at least to $1oo,ooo,ooo
even if export situations were denied the privilege. 50 On the other
hand, the Treasury has voiced approval of a more limited solution
to the differential, namely, allowance of the deferral privilege to a
new type of domestic tax entity, to be called a "foreign business
corporation," the business activities of which would be centralized
in the under-developed nations. 51
The House Committee on Ways and Means was not originally
content, however, with so limited an approach. H.R. 5, as approved
by that committee in the current session, 52 would have extended the
deferral privilege to an electing domestic corporation (then to be
known as a "foreign business corporation" or FBC) without limitation by reference to the place from which its foreign source income
was derived.
That committee apparently believed its more sweeping approach
would in fact accomplish in large measure the Treasury's aim of expanding investments in under-developed areas; for the most part,
those were the areas, according to the committee, "where the tax
rates are lower than those in the United States, and it is only to the
extent that the taxes on the same income are lower in the foreign
countries that deferral of U.S. tax results in any benefit." 53 Nevertheless, the bill encountered very rough sledding in the House itself.
Concern was expressed, for example, that adoption of the bill would
further stimulate American industry to produce in other countries
products now produced by American labor in the United States,
thus eliminating American jobs. 54 In the end, the House committee
was forced to make a substantial concession; from the floor of the
House, it proposed an amendment limiting the application of the
new concept to FBC's doing business in uless developed rountries," 55 a concept defined specifically, inter alia, to exclude most
of Western Europe, -including all Common Market nations, and
such other developed countries as Canada and Japan. 56 The House
then passed the amended bill by a scant three vote margin. In view .
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of that narrow margin and of the fact that the Senate Finance Committee has not yet indicated its own views with reference to the
total problem, it is not worthwhile here to do more than indicate the
main highlights of the House approved bill.
The House committee itself originally contemplated applying
five limitations as conditions for qu~lification as an FBC. Some of
these, as well as other restrictions bearing only on the amount which
could be deferred-as distinguished from the question of qualification itself, were originally intended by the committee to be limitations on either indirect or direct American activity of such a corporation. When the committee capitulated to the demand that the bill
be limited to less developed countries, the previously mentioned
limitations were re-designed as restrictions on indirect or direct
activity outside of the less developed countries, as distinguished
from activity solely within the United States.
The five limitations, as re-designed, follow.
(I) Certain types of corporations which already enjoy some
significant type of special tax benefit or treatment would be rendered ineligible, including tax-exempt organizations, China Trade
Act corporations, regulated investment companies, personal holding companies, life insurance companies, 57 unincorporated business enterprises taxed as corporations under § I 3 6 I, and corporations electing to have their income taxed to shareholders under
Subchapter S. 58
( 2) In order to facilitate the Treasury's determination of
whether a corporation qualifies as an FBC and has complied with
the requirements of other tax laws, the corporation, as a condition to qualification, would have to furnish the Treasury such information as may be necessary with reference to any year which
is affected by, or affects, the election. 59
( 3) While an otherwise qualified domestic corporation would
not in any event enjoy deferral with respect to income "from
sources without less developed countries," 60 qualification of the
corporation as an FBC would also carry with it a requirement
that its income be almost exclusively from foreign operations, i.e.,
90% or more of its gross income must be from sources within less
developed countries. 61 By way of contrast, deferral of the Amer57
Life insurance companies were excluded until the matter could be given further
study. Note 47, supra, at 4·
58
Proposed § 95I (a) (4).
59
Proposed § 95I (a) (5).
""Proposed § 952(a) (I) (A).
61
Proposed § 95I(a) (I).
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ican tax on a foreign subsidiary's foreign profit is not lost even if
it derives substantial income from American sources.
( 4) Qualification would also be denied if the corporation derived more than w% of its gross income from the sale of any
articles for ultimate use, consumption, or disposition in the United
States. 62 This limitation rests on a notion which is not applied to
foreign subsidiaries, namely, that deferral even with respect to a
company's foreign source profit is unwarranted if a significant
part of its products are "in competition with domestically produced or extracted products where this tax deferral is not available." 63
( 5) In order to "restrict the benefits of tax deferral largely
to an active business enterprise or to a corporation receiving income from such a corporation," 64 qualification was also made dependent upon a requirement that 90% or more of the corporation's gross income be from some combination of three specified
classes of income: 65 (a) income from the active conduct of a
trade or business; (b) dividends or other income from a qualified
payor corporation, i.e., from a corporation in which the FBC
itself held a w% stock ownership and which met substantially the
same qualifications as the FBC itself; 66 and (c) compensation
for technical, managerial, engineering, construction, scientific, or
like services performed in less developed countries and for the
right to use, in less developed countries, patents, copyrights, secret
processes and formulas, goodwill, trademarks, trade brands,
franchises, and other like properties. A royalty from patents, etc.,
but not income from services rendered abroad, is closely akin in
many circumstances to passive income as distinguished from that
derived from the active conduct of a trade or business. Accordingly, except where it does involve such active conduct or is income
other than dividends from a qualified payor corporation, the
royalty income could not be taken into account in meeting the 90%
test to the extent it exceeds 25% of the corporation's gross income.67 Illustratively, if all of the corporation's income would
have qualified under the 90% test except for the fact that 45%
was derived from royalties, the corporation would not qualify,
62
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for only So% of its gross would be deemed to satisfy the 90%
requirement.
Other limitations, while not conditions to qualification, would
also be imposed as a means of denying deferral to the extent foreign
income was actually attributable to business activity in other than
less developed countries. To appreciate the significance of the device
which would be utilized to this end, one must understand the difference between the ultimate tax treatment of a domestic FBC and
that currently associated with foreign profits earned by a foreign
subsidiary.
Whereas the United States taxes the latter's profit only to the
domestic parent, and then only to the extent of dividends receivedwith an appropriate credit for foreign income taxes, the proposal
regarding an FBC contemplates that it will be the taxable entity, 6 s
the timing to coincide with any actual or constructive distribution, 69
and if to a parent, the latter would normally enjoy what is equivalent
to a roo% dividends received deduction. 70 Loans from an FBC to a
parent holding ro% or more stock ownership would be deemed,
illustratively, a constructive distribution, 71 the theory being that the
parent "has effectively achieved the withdrawal of the funds from
the foreign operation and made them available for its own operations." 72
Moreover, in keeping with the previously stated purpose of denying deferral to the extent foreign income was actually attributable
to business activity in other than the less developed countries, a
formula, involving the ratio of investments and payroll in the less
developed countries to total investments and payroll wherever located, is to be applied to the active trade or business income from
less developed countries for the purpose of denying deferral to that
portion actually attributable to activity based elsewhere. 73 In determining the ratio, the significance of inventory would be neutralized;
the investment factor would include only real property and tangible
personal property (other than inventory) of a type ordinary and
necessary to the operation of the business, all such property being
68
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valued for this purpose by reference to the adjusted basis. The payroll factor, geared also to ordinary and necessary items, would be
given double weight. But only one-half of the product resulting from
multiplication of the ratio by active business income from less de"·eloped countries would be deemed constructively distributed, but
not-according to a de minimus rule-if the factors outside the less
developed countries are less than 10%.
When the taxpayer is engaged in two or more separate trades or
businesses, the ratio would be applied separately, provided the
trades or businesses are "clearly and distinctly separate." 74
Also deemed constructively distributed from foreign income
otherwise previously or currently deferred ("reinvested foreign income account") are those amounts invested in so-called "prohibited
property," 75 another notion which is inapplicable to the more freewheeling ordinary foreign subsidiary type of arrangement. The aim
of this restriction is to limit deferral to those cases where the funds
are being used in active foreign operations, i.e., to deny deferral to
the extent the funds (I) have been diverted, directly or indirectly,
to operations outside of less well developed countries, or ( 2) with
certain exceptions, have been converted into mere investments,
whether foreign or American. The description of the prohibited
class is accomplished by identifying nonprohibited properties, which
would include the following: (I) tangible or intangible property
which is ordinary and necessary for carrying on a trade or business,
but only where 90% of the total income for the current or preceding
year is derived from less developed countries; ( 2) securities of a
"qualified payor corporation" or of another 10% owned FBC (including one not qualifying for the current year, provided it has
elected FBC treatment); (3) bonds, etc., of foreign governments
not in excess of I 5% of the corporation's earnings and profits accumulated since I96o; (4) bonds, etc., of the United States; (5)
money; ( 6) bank deposits; and ( 7) loans to a parent holding 10%
stock ownership. Loans were excluded from the prohibited class
because of the previously described separate treatment applicable
to them. 76
Wholly apart from the action of the House in restricting the
benefits of this bill to those enterprises doing business in the "less
developed countries," it appears from the foregoing that the opporTAXATION
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tunity to defer American tax through an FBC would suffer from restrictions not applicable to an ordinary foreign subsidiary arrangement. There will also be a difference between the two arrangements
in the ultimate amount of American tax if the FBC must "gross up"
the amount includible by adding the applicable amount of foreign
taxes, a full credit then being allowed for the latter, while a foreign
subsidiary arrangement remains free of the "gross up" requirement,
thus enjoying what is tantamount to a deduction and a substantial
credit for the foreign tax.
While H.R. 5 (the proposed FBC legislation), as originally
approved by the House committee, called for the application of a
"gross up" requirement in both cases, that notion, as applied to
ordinary foreign subsidiary arrangements, was carved out for
special consideration in the separate legislation mentioned in subtopic (b) above. An ultimate difference between the two would
survive if, on the one hand, that special bill should fail of adoption
and, on the other, the House committee continued to insist, as it
did in the original version of H.R. 5, that deferral for an FBC
should not "decrease the ultimate level of combined foreign and
U.S. tax on . . . foreign income of these domestic corporations
below the level of taxation generally applicable to other domestic
corporations operating abroad through branches." 77 However, in
the final House debate regarding H.R. 5 (FBC legislation), its
sponsor noted that the House committee had not yet resolved the
separate "gross up" question as it related to foreign subsidiaries
and proceeded to suggest that the committee felt that "whatever is
done should apply across the board. . . . "
Laying aside the ultimate result with reference to that question,
there may be some companies which would prefer an FBC arrangement, using either branches abroad or using the FBC as a holding
company to own stock in qualified foreign subsidiaries. In the absence of special mitigation, those with foreign interests otherwise
presently organized might have encountered a tax at the point when
interests are reshuffled so as to make use of an FBC. With reference
to companies interested in converting foreign subsidiary operations
into branches of an FBC, H.R. 5 takes account of the prospect that
the Treasury, by reliance on § 367, might have called for recognition of gain when business property of the foreign subsidiary is
transferred to an FBC. The bill specifically neutralizes § 367 in this
case, provided substantially all of the property of the foreign sub71
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sidiary is so transferred. But in such case, the accumulated earnings
and profits of the foreign subsidiary pass into the reinvested foreign
income account (deferred income account) of the FBC and would,
upon distribution, be taxed to it. 78 It was not thought that nonrecognition should be enjoyed and deferral obtained with reference to
increments which took place in the value of inventory while held
in the United States prior to the transfer. Accordingly, H.R. 5
would add a new section to the Code calling for inclusion in gross
income of any gain realized when such property is transferred to an
FBC or to a foreign subsidiary. 79
Under certain conditions, H.R. 5 also neutralizes § 367 in that
instance where an FBC is converted into a holding company through
transfer of "foreign business property" to a foreign subsidiary. 80
But this will be so only if the FBC (holding company) owns So%
of the voting stock as well as So% of all other classes of stock in
the subsidiary. Moreover, the foreign subsidiary must be a "qualified payor corporation," i.e., it must in general meet the standards
otherwise applicable to the FBC itself. Illustratively, its income
must be derived, to the extent of 90%, from less developed countries. Again, 90% or more of its income must be derived from articles which are not imported into the United States.
Finally, but only in a fairly limited type of case, H.R. 5 would
also neutralize the possibility, under § I 49 I, that the Treasury
might apply an excise tax in that instance where an FBC transfers
stock in one foreign subsidiary to another, thereby creating a three
tier chain. 81 The tax will not be applied if (I) the transferor satisfies
the previously described control test, ( 2) the subsidiary, the stock
of which is transferred, measures up to the previously described
"qualified payor corporation" as to the transferor for the 3 preceding taxable years, and for the first subsequent taxable year, (a)
will be such as to the transferee, and (b) will derive so% or more
of its gross income from less developed countries and from the active conduct of a trade or business.
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Chapter XII

The Association of the Overseas
Countries and Territories
Peter Hay

I. INTRODUCTION

Four of the E.E.C. Member States have administered overseas
dependencies which exceed their mother countries in area. The size
and potential of the territories which have been associated with
France are, in particular, often vastly underestimated. Former
French West Africa alone is, for example, four times larger than
the Europe of the Six; if its map were superimposed on that of
Europe, its boundaries would run through Brest, Liverpool, Oslo,
Warsaw, Moscow, Bucharest, Athens, Rome, and Barcelona. The
examples could be multiplied: for instance, the former Belgian
Congo is So times larger than Belgium and Dutch New Guinea 13
times larger than the Netherlands. These present and former overseas dependencies are together almost I o times larger than the
Europe of the Six and exceed the size of the United States by more
than one-third, although their aggregate population of 55 million
amounts (roughly) to only one-third that of the Six. Indeed, the
vastness, the difficulty of access, and the climate of the African territories justifies the epithet of the Roman geographer, "Africa
protentosa." 1
The idea of European cooperation with the African territories
received its first formal impetus in a Recommendation adopted by
the Council of Europe on September 25, 1952, the "StrasbourgPlan." 2 The Recommendation was designed to promote trade relations and to assist the territories in their efforts to develop. Yet
the Messina Declaration of 195 5, charging the intergovernmental
Beaulieu, Les Investissements dans les Pays et Territoires d'Outre-M er As sociis a
Ia .c.E.E., Politique Generate et Methodes, 1958 REVUE ou MARCHE CoMMUN 39 1, 392 •
Cf. O,E,E.C., COMMENTS ON THE STRASBOURG PLAN ( 1954).
6.47
1

648

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

committee under the chairmanship of M. Spaak with the task of
drawing up a report on a European community, omitted any reference to the overseas territories. The question was not raised until
November 1956 and was solved barely a month before the Treaty
was signed in March 1957 by a special meeting of the heads of
government. 3
The need for some sort of arrangement concerning the overseas
territories arose mainly because of the special position of France.
France felt that she could not grant economic concessions to her
European partners and, at the same time, maintain a costly development program for her overseas territories. She therefore felt Community assistance was needed.
On the other hand, France found herself in a position akin to that
of the United Kingdom in the negotiations for a Free Trade Area.
She had existing economic commitments to her overseas territories
-for instance, a customs union with French West Africa-to which
was now to be added a customs union with her European partners.
As a result France felt that she was being forced to choose between
"divorce" and "bigamy" with regard to her overseas relations. 4 A
third choice, automatic extension of the E.E.C. Treaty to the overseas territories, met with opposition, particularly that of Germany,
which hesitated to undertake new overseas commitments having
long been free of them. 5 A compromise solution was therefore
reached whereby the territories were to be "associated" with the
Community.
The territories are, for purposes of association, divided into three
groups: ( r) those which are constitutionally a part of their metropolitan countries (for example, the overseas department of Reunion) ; ( 2) those which are dependent overseas countries (for
example, the Republic of Mauritania) ; and (3) independent countries which have special relations with France (Tunisia and Morocco) and Italy (Libya), as well as the autonomous parts of the
Netherlands (Surinam and Antilles). Association is qualitatively
different for each of the first two groups in regard to such matters
as trade barriers, right of establishment, movement of workers,
and availability of investment funds from the specially created over• Germany, Bundesrat, Niederschrift iiber die Sitzung des Sonderausschusses "Gemeinsamer M arkt und Euratom" vom 24. April I957, 4·
• Leduc, L' Association des Pays d'Outre-M er, 1958 REVUE o'EcoNOMIE POLITIQUE
198, 199, referring to MOUSSA, LES CHANCES ECONOMIQUES DE LA COMMUNAUTE FRANCOAFRICAINE, 193-195 (1957).
6
Germany, Bundestag, Schriftlicher Bericht des J. Sondera!Uschusses-Gemeinsamer
Markt/Euratom, Drucksache 366o, ;6 (1957).
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seas Development Fund. The third group is invited to negotiate
for association.
Association is of obvious political importance in the struggle for
the friendship of the uncommitted nations. 6 This and the economic
significance of close ties between these producers of primary products and industrial Western Europe account for the lively discussion
the association has already sparked both in the United Nations and
in G.A.T.T.
Association of the overseas territories with the E.E.C. is of immediate relevance to only a limited group of American businesses
-for example, to the extractive industries (such as mining and the
oil industry) and to American agricultural (coffee and banana)
interests in South America-which will be affected by African competition in the European market. As association becomes a reality,
however, business opportunities for a larger group of American
enterprises may develop. The territories may eventually offer opportunities for the investment of development capital and for the
establishment of companies using local raw materials and manufacturing for local consumption and export to European or other
markets.
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the legal status of the
territories, the relevant provisions of the Treaty, and some of the
legal and economic problems which association creates. The discussion will center mainly on the African territories since they make
up the most important area covered by the association provisions,
and it will give substantial attention to agricultural problems in
contrast to other chapters in this book. The rapid changes taking
place on the African Continent necessarily mean that parts of the
discussion are tentative.

II. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS
OF THE TERRITORIES
A careful distinction between the different uses of the word "territories" must be made at the outset. \Vhen the reference is in a
generic, collective sense, this chapter will refer to "territories." On
the other hand, the term "Overseas Territories" will be used to
denote those of the "territories" which are not, constitutionally, a
6

•
Germany, Bundesrat, supra note 3 at 38 j also commentary by Fischer-Menshausen,
m VON DER GROEBEN and VON BoECKH (editors), HANDBUCH FUR EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT (hereinafter cited as HANDBUCH) IA 59, 4·
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part of their metropolitan countries (as are overseas departments
of France, for example) and which are associated with the E. E. C.
under the Implementing Convention of the Treaty.
A.

THE POLITICAL RELATION TO THE METROPOLITAN
COUNTRIES
I. THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES OF FRANCE

Before the Constitution of 1958 went into effect, the French Republic consisted, in addition to metropolitan France including Algeria,7 of the overseas departments of Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique, and Reunion, of the Overseas Territories of French West
Africa (Senegal, Mauritania, Sudan (not to be confused with the
Sudan which lies south of Egypt), Guinea, Ivory Coast, Volta, Dahomey, and Niger), French Equatorial Africa (Gabon, Congo,
Ubangi-Shari and Chad), Madagascar, French Somaliland, St.
Pierre, and Miquelon, the Cornaro Archipelago, as well as the Territories in Oceania and the Antarctic. The Republic together with
the trust-territories of Togo and Cameroon made up the French
Union which, expanded by the friendly independent states of the
franc area (Tunisia, Morocco) and the Condominium of the New
Hebrides, made up the Ensemble Fran~aise.
The new Constitution does not alter the relationship of France
to its overseas departments, which were and are constitutionally
a part of metropolitan France, 9 to the trust territories, nor to the
friendly associated states. It does, however, envision a change in
France's relationship to the Overseas Territories. Even before the
constitutional changes, the administration of the Overseas Territories had been liberalized. The basic law of 1956 (loi-cadre)/ 0
had given them internal autonomy and to the territorial assemblies
the right to elect responsible ministers to Government Councils.
The Government Councils replaced the old "Great Councils" previously elected according to a class system. In July r 9 58 General
de Gaulle transferred the chairmanship of the Government Councils
from the Territorial Governors to the elected Prime Ministers.
8

7
See the discussion of the "Statut de )'Algerie" of 1947 by Naegelen, L'Algerie, in
BERNARD et al., LA FRANCE D'0UTRE·MER, SA SITUATION ACTUELLE, I at 8 (1953).
8
DE LAITRE, LA MISE EN VALEUR DE L'ENSEMBLE EURAFRICAIN FRAN <;AIS ET LA P ARTICI·
PATION DES CAPITAUX ETRANGERS 167 (1954).
• Constitution of 1958 arts. 72-73.
10
The loi-cadre of June 23, 1956 is discussed by Quermonne, 1957 RECUEIL DALLOZ
Chronique 5; cf. also, Charpentier, Les Lois-Cadres et Ia Fonction Gouvernementale,
1958 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 220.

REPUBLIC 01

r---l

..

FEDERATION OF MALl
L_____jfDouofyecf Au11u•t 20, /P601

k~ll

COUNCIL Of THE ENUNTE

,6

liUNION
UNION OF CENTliAL
AFfiiCAN liPUILICS

African Territories Associated under the E.E.C. Treaty
Not shown: (a) The former trust-territory of Italian Somaliland, which, with former
British Somaliland, now composes the Republic of Somalia, extending south from the
easternmost tip of the continent, and (b) the former French trust-territory Cameroon,
now independent and considered associated with the E.E.C., located due west of the
Central African Republic.
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The constitutional referendum of 1958 left the Overseas Territories free to choose independence or membership in a "French
Community." All, except Guinea, originally chose the latter. The new
Constitution also leaves the Overseas Territories free to choose
the form of membership in the new French Community, 11 and
provides for a procedure by which they may gain independence at any
timeP Their first alternative was to retain the status given them by
the basic law of 1956, its implementing acts, and the Decree of
1 9 58. In this case the Republic would continue to be responsible for
external relations, defense, currency, and finances, the territorial
assemblies would continue, and the governor appointed by the Republic would remain chef du territoire. French Somaliland, Oceania,
the Comores, St. Pierre, Miquelon, and New Caledonia chose this
statusY Secondly, the Overseas Territories could choose to become
overseas departments. The governor would then be replaced by a
prefect, and legislation and administration would become identical
with that of metropolitan France, except for modifications necessitated by the peculiar situation of the department.H Finally, the
Overseas Territories could choose to become member states of the
French Community.
Seven Overseas Territories of French West Africa, the four
Overseas Territories of French Equatorial Africa and Madagascar
made this choice, and their territorial assemblies became "legislative assemblies." 15 The status of a member state in the French
Community requires tran§fer of certain powers to the Community. 16
Under the Fourth Republic, these policy-making functions (in regard to foreign affairs, defense, economic, and fiscal policy and
policies concerning strategic raw materials) were attributes of the
Republic. In the Fr_ench Community, however, France is only one
of the partners, although she does enjoy some special privileges:
she provides the president; she has a majority in the senate of the
Community; she conducts affairs of common interest during an interim period; and she plays a role in the modification of the status
of any member state. 17 The organs of the Community are the
u Constitution of 1958 art. 76. For the changes made by the new Constitution, see
Massa, Die franzosische P erfassung vom 5· Oktober I958 und die iiberseeischen
Gebiete, 14 EUROPA ARCHIV 109 ff. (1959), and Silvera, Passe de !'Union fran{aise et
avenir de [a Communaute, 1958 REVUE }URID!QUE ET POLIT!QUE DE L'UNION FRAN<;:AISE,
589 ff.
12 Constitution of 1958 art. 86, para. 2.
13
Massa, op. cit. supra note II, at 112; THE STATESMAN's YEAR BooK 1959, 997·
"Constitution of 1958 art. 73·
15
Constitution of 19 58 art. 8 3·
1
" Constitution of 1958 art. 78.
17
Cf. Constitution of 1958 arts. So, 83, 79, and 86.
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Executive Council, presided over by the President of the Republic
and attended by the heads of governments of the member states,
the Senate of the Community (not to be confused with the Senate
of the Republic), and the Court of Arbitration. 18
Apart from the changes in their relationship to metropolitan
France, French West and Equatorial Africa also underwent internal
changes. Four of the seven Overseas Territories of French West
Africa established the Federation of Mali in January 1959; the
Voltaic and Dahomey Republics later withdrew leaving only Senegal and Sudan in the Federation. 19 In August 1960 internal differences developed, resulting in the dissolution of the Federation
so that Senegal and Sudan now continue as separate republics. In
September 1960, Sudan changed its name to Republic of Mali. While
the Ivory Coast, Niger, and Mauritania declined to join the Federation, they agreed to join in a customs union with the states of the
Federation on June 6, 1959.20 The Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey,
and Voltaic Republics also entered into a loose association with each
other-the Council of the Entente. 21 The three republics of former
French Equatorial Africa, the Congo-not to be confused with the
Republic of the Congo on which it borders and which was formerly
the Belgian Congo-, Central African (formerly Ubangi-Shari)
and Chad Republics, are also grouped in the Union of Central African Republics from which the Gabon Republic has remained aloof, although she maintains close economic ties with the
Union. 22
On May 1 I, 1960, an amendment to Articles 85 and 86 of the
French Constitution took effect, which permits member states of
the French Community to become independent without losing membership in the Community and independent states to become members of the French Community. Accordingly the former Mali Federation became independent on June 20, 1960; the Malagasy Republic (formerly Madagascar) on June 25, 1960. Moreover, France
signed accords on July II, 1960, pledging independence to the four
republics of the Council of the Entente (the Ivory Coast, Niger,
Dahomey, and Voltaic Republics) and on July r 2, 1960, to the
Union of Central African Republics (the Congo, Central African,
OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES
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Constitution of 1958 arts. So-84. For a discussion of these organs, see Massa, op. cit.
supra note n, at II3-II4. Also see Krebs, Die Communauti Fran(aise im Jahre 196o 3

EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT
19

ISS (1960).

'

Massa, op: cit. supra note II at n8; N.Y. Times, March 2, 19S9, 2 :s; March 18,
19s9, 2:s; Apnl 6, I9S9. w:4.
2D New York Times, June 7, I9S9, IS :2.
:U.S. Depart~ent of State, Press Release No. 602, Aug. zo, 19S9 at S·
Massa, op. czt. supra note II, at II 8.
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and Chad Republics). All should be independent by the time this
book is published.
The Gabon Republic was also negotiating with France for independence in the summer of I96o and it was expected that the Republic of Mauritania would have received its independence by I961.
2. THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES OF BELGIUM, THE
NETHERLANDS, AND ITALY

The two Belgian Overseas Territories to which the Treaty originally applied were the Belgian Congo and the trust territory of
Ruanda-Urundi. Since July 1, 1960, the Belgian Congo has been
the independent Republic of the Congo, however, and in June 1960,
Belgium informed the United Nations Trusteeship Council that
she had agreed to hold elections in Ruanda-U rundi early in I 96 I
as a prelude to discussions by the United Nations General Assembly
of independence for this Overseas Territory.
The Netherlands have three Overseas Territories, Surinam,
Netherlands New Guinea, and Netherlands Antilles. Of these, the
Nether lands could bind only New Guinea by signing the E. E. C.
Treaty. The Statute of the Realm of I954 23 gives Surinam and
the Antilles partnership status with the Netherlands as "members
of the realm." Because of this substantial autonomy, the Netherlands could not bind them with regard to the E.E.C. Treaty. A
separate agreement of association must therefore be negotiated, to
be approved by the Netherlands as well as by the parliamentary
bodies of Surinam and the Antilles. 24 Italy, finally, administered the
trust-territory of Italian Somaliland which became part of the independent Republic of Somalia on July I, 1960. A special problem
shared by all of the formerly dependent or trust territories is that
of continued association with the E.E.C. now that they are independent.25

B.

EcoNoMIC CoNDITIONs IN THE OvERSEAS TERRITORIEs

The territories in question, and most importantly those in Africa,
are still in the early stages of economic development. Incomes per
23
Cf. Van Panhuys, Das Statut des Kiinigreichs der Niederlande, in Kraft getreten
am 29. Dezember I954, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT FtiR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UNo
VtiLKERRECHT 304 (1955/56) .
.. Belgium, Chambre des Representants, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission
Speciale, 727 (1956-57), No.2, 68-69.
05
Leduc, supra note 4, at 203.
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capita are low and industry is lacking. The lack of industrial re-

sources results in a lack of investment capital and technical knowhow. Large development plans have been undertaken by the metropolitan countries, although most such plans, because of the size of
the task, can only be concerned with matters of "infrastructure,"
that is, roads, hospitals, schools, and the like.
The Netherlands pursue a policy of non-discrimination with regard to imports into New Guinea, and New Guinea exports are
granted no preferential treatment in the Netherlands. On the other
hand, the French Overseas Territories of the franc area together
with France comprise a tightly-knit economic unit (with the exception of French Equatorial Africa which hitherto has accorded
no preferences to France). 26 The greatest part of the foreign trade
of the French Overseas Territories takes place within the franc area
and at prices above the world level.
In 1956, the base year for the establishment of the E.E.C., the
total value of the exports of the Overseas Territories amounted to
roughly $1.06 billion, 27 of which 71 percent went to the E. E. C.
countries. Of all export commodities, unroasted coffee is the most
important. It amounted to 17.5 percent of the value of total exports
in r956 and to 21.1 percent of total coffee imports by the E.E.C.
countries. The next most important agricultural commodity is cocoa
which in 1956 amounted to 4·9 percent of the value of exports.
In order of importance, bananas and oil-bearing products represent
the next largest percentages of agricultural exports.
The metropolitan countries have established development programs for all the Overseas Territories to raise standards of living
and promote some degree of industrialization. The Second Modernization Plan for French Territories, for example, will result in contributions of nearly $250 million annually. 28 In the former Belgian
"'Stohler, Afrika wird curopiiischer Wirtsc!zaftspartnrr, DIE ZEIT (Hamburg} May
1959, 13.
21
See generally, U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT, Association
of non-self-governing territories with the European Economic Community, Doc.
A/3916jRev. I (1958), 5 If.
""Ibid., 13-14. The annual average of "new investments" (i.e., excluding measures
for the renewal of depreciated equipment and for the increase of supplies but including
certain "expenses equivalent to an increase in capital"} in the French territories between 1951-1953 amounted to approximately $980 million. Doucy and Pouleur-Bouvier,
Die Beziehungen zwischen einem integrierten Europa und den iiberseeischen Hoheitsgebieten seiner Mitg/ieds/iinder, in RACINE (editor), EUROPAS WIRTSCHAFTSEINHEIT VON
MoRGEN (Heft 15 der Schriftenreihe zum Handbuch f.iir Europaische Wirtschaft}
r92 at 222 (1960). Referring to LA CROIX of April 3, 1957, Rubinsky points out that 20
out of every 100 francs of tax money in France go to "Africa." Rubinsky, Imperialist
Africa Projects, 1957 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 46 at 47 (No.7). (Published in U.S.S.R.)
22,
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Congo, a Io-year development plan, designed mainly to finance "infrastructure" projects during the years I 948-I 9 58 and totaling
about $I billion went into effect. 29 The grants of the Netherlands
Government to New Guinea average $7.8 million yearly. 30 Threequarters of the cost of the Somaliland Economic Development
Plan, which envisaged a total investment of $I7.4 million between
I954 and I96o, was borne by Italy. 31
Other resources for public development have been supplied by
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Between I952 and I957 two loans of $40 million were given the Belgian Congo, one of $4.8 million to Ruanda-Urundi, and one of $30
million to Belgium to finance exports to the Congo. The second $40
million loan to the Congo involved participation by I4, to a large extent American, investment institutions to the extent of some $6 million.
During the same period, Algeria benefited from a $Io million
loan for the development of electrical facilities and French West
Africa obtained $7.5 million for the modernization of railroads. 32
In I959, a $35 million loan was extended to Comilog, a company
established in Gabon (French Equatorial Africa) for the development of extensive high-grade manganese deposits. 33 Finally, $5 million were made available by the High Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community to assist the Bureau Minier de la France
d'Outre-Mer in its five-year program of prospection for iron and
manganese ores in certain African territories. 34
The Republic of the Congo is inhabited by roughly I3 million
people of which less than one percent were, prior to its independence,
Europeans, giving it the low density of 5·5 persons per square kilometer.35 The activities of Europeans centered mainly around mining
and the raising of cash crops. The Congo has rich deposits of min29
Beaulieu, supra note r, at 394·
•• U.N., supra note 27, at If.
31
O.E.E.C., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF OVERSEAS CoUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES AsSOCIATED WITH OEEC MEMBER COUNTRIES 139 (1958).
82
See the 9th, rr-r3th Annual Reports of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development. Cf. also Krebs, Algerischer Entwicklungsplan oder "Plan von
Constantine,'' 3 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 158 (r96o). Cf., Brady, All Algeria Won to
Economic Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1960, Sec. r, r8 :r.
82
International Monetary Fund, XII INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL NEWS SURVEY 9
(No. 2, July ro, 1959) .
.. European Coal and Steel Community, HIGH AuTHORITY, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 209-210 ( 1959).
85
Adjacent Ruanda-Urundi has a density of more than So persons per square kilometer which is only paralleled in Nigeria in the agricultural areas. O.E.E.C., op. cit.
supra note 3r, at 13.

OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES

erals amounting to 6 5 percent of the export receipts with copper
being the most important. A large part of the world's reserve of
uranium is in the Congo, and it is the world's largest producer of
industrial diamonds. However, the greater part of the African population still depends on subsistence agriculture for livelihood, and
the development of the area remains uneven. In spite of technical
assistance, much of African agricultural activity is still primitive. 36
The economies of the territories of France 37 are all essentially
agricultural and progress in agricultural production is slow. In Algeria four-fifths of the population still depend entirely on agriculture, with wine, cereals, and vegetables leading other commodities.
More striking progress is being made in mining. Until recently
Algeria's mineral reserves were considered small, but new drillings
in the Sahara, particularly in the Hassi-Messaoud region, have uncovered large crude oil reserves. Indeed, this fact has been reported
to pose serious competitive problems for Venzuelan and Middle
Eastern oil since Algerian oil may eventually permit France to become self-sufficient and to supply some of her E.E.C. partners,
notably Germany. 38 Exploitation of Algerian oil is now in the hands
of the French companies C.F.P.A. and REPAL. 39 Algeria has a
fairly substantial processing industry, recent advances having been
made particularly in the foodstuffs, building materials, and chemical industries.
French Africa south of the Sahara includes the most primitive
and underdeveloped of the territories considered here. Agricultural
produce amounted to over 90 percent of the total value of exports
in I 9 55 whereas mining products represented less than 4 percent.
Coffee, peanuts, and cocoa are the most important agricultural exports. Madagascar and the Cornaro Archipelago in addition produce and export vanilla, sugar, tobacco, and cloves. Significant deposits of bauxite are found in Guinea (formerly French West
Africa) and of manganese ore in Franceville, which is reputed to
consist of up to I 50 million tons of marketable ore with so percent
manganese content.
36

at

O.E.E.C., supra note 3I, Part I, I3 If. Doucy and Pouleur-Bouvier, supra note 28,

200.

"'Ibid., Part II, 49 If. Doucy and Pouleur-Bouvier, supra note 28, at 198.
38
Carmical, Problems Posed by Algerian Oil, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, I959, Sec. 3, I :I,
7:3. Cf. Rauchfuss, Erdol in den assoziierten Gebieten, 3 EuROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFI"
406 ( I960). It was reported on October 9, I96o, that six million metric tons of Saharan
petrol have been delivered to the Algerian port of Bougie by the new pipeline since
pumping began in December of I959· Brady, supra note 32, at col. 5·
89
I958 EUROPAISCilE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCilAFT 342.
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As a result of the dependence on agricultural products these areas
are often severely affected by oscillating world prices. To remedy
this situation a number of price stabilization funds have been established. The latest, the National Equalization Fund for Overseas
Products established in 1955, alone received an initial allocation
of approximately $13.7 million under the 1956 budget.
III. ASSOCIATION WITH THE EUROPEAN
39
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY a

A.

IN GENERAL
I. THE POLICY OF THE TREATY

Integration of the Overseas Territories into the Community and
the resultant application of all provisions of the Treaty would have
been disastrous for the less developed economies of the Territories.40 Instead, the Treaty therefore extends to them most of the
trade advantages of the Common Market and provides for public
investment capital to further development, at the same time protecting them from the full brunt of European competition by permitting the retention of certain trade barriers. In many areas other
than trade the Treaty does not go beyond affirmation of a general
policy of association, leaving details to further negotiation. This
contrasts with other parts of the Treaty where the drafters took
an intermediate step, creating a legal framework (a loi-cadre) to
be filled in by the Community organs. 41 The conservatism of the
drafters in this regard is probably explained by the fear of some of
the E.E.C. partners, notably Germany, that close association with
the Overseas Territories would involve them in problems they did
not wish to face. It was this fear which prompted inclusion of a reference 42 in the substantive provisions of the Treaty to the Preamble, which in turn refers to the principles of the United Nations
Charter, the right to self-determination as a principle of the association being thereby incorporated by reference. 43 This fear should
now be alleviated by the provision in the new French Constitution
39
" See generally, COUSTE, L'AssOCIATION DES PAYS o'OuTRE-MER A LA COMMUNAUTE
ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE (1959).
40
Bourcier de Carbon, L'Association des Pays et Territoires d'Outre-M er a la Communauttf Economique, 9 REVUE ECONOMIQUE 278, at 282 (1958).
41
Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communauti Economique Europienne, 1958 REVUE nu
MARCHE COMMUN 161 at 164. Examples are arts. 135 and 136(2) of the Treaty.
.. In art. 131(3).
•• Art. 73, U.N. CHARTER. Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Schri/tlicher Bericht des
J. Sonderausschusses-Gemeinsamer Markt jEuratom-Drucksache 366o, 56 ( 1957). The
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allowing the Overseas Territories to become independent, either
leaving or remaining within the French Community. 44
The association of these areas which are producers of primary
products with industrialized nations under a treaty establishing a
system of trade preferences has been likened to the British Commonwealth 45 with its system of imperial preferences. To what extent such a system may bring about a contraction of world trade will
be discussed after consideration of the association provisions of
the Treaty.
2. THE TREATY PROVISIONS IN DETAIL

Because the legal status of the territories differs, the Treaty differentiates among them.
1) Article 227 describes the territorial scope of the Treaty and
includes in it Algeria and the French overseas departments, since
constitutionally they are part of metropolitan France. It lists the
modifications which were thought necessary.
2) A special, and separate, part of the Treaty (Articles 131136) deals with the association of the Overseas Territories and
is supplemented by an Implementing Convention annexed to the
Treaty. These provisions are then further modified by special protocols. Annex IV of the Treaty lists the Overseas Territories concerned.
3) Finally, "Declarations of Intention" open the door to negotiations for association with the autonomous parts of the Netherlands
(Surinam and the Antilles), with the independent countries of the
franc area (Morocco, Tunisia), and with Libya with which Italy
has special relations.
The association provisions will hereafter be considered without
differentiating among the types of territories, except where differences exist in the treatment of the departments and the Overseas
Territories.
Socialist Representative Metzger thought, however, that the use of the word "entspreehend" in art. 131 did not make this a self-evident incorporation by reference, but that
it was a question of extensive versus restrictive treaty interpretation. Deutscher
Bundestag, Sitzungsbericht 224. Sitzung, July 5, 1957, 13344. The extensive interpretation, however, was undoubtedly the intent of the parties. Cf. Erliiuterungen der Bundes·
regierung in Bundestags-Drucksache 3440 (2. Legislaturperiode) in HANDBUCH IA 30,
introductory comment to arts. 131-136. Cf. also Bundesrat, Niederschrift iiber die

Sitzung des Sonderausschusses "Gemeinsamer Markt und Euratom" vom 24. April
I957, 41.
44

Constitution of 1958 art. 86, para. 2.
'"Germany, Deutscher Bundesrat, supra note 43, Anlage zu Punkt 5, Report by
Senator Helmken 5·
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THE SuBsTANCE OF THE AssociATION
I. REMOVAL OF TRADE BARRIERS

a. Tariffs

One of the introductory Treaty articles states that the "objects" 46 of the association include extension to the Overseas Territories of the trade benefits which the Member States accord each
other (gradual abolition of tariffs and quotas) and extension of
most-favored-nation treatment by the Overseas Territories to the
E.E.C. Member States. It will be noted that the "objects" of this
Article concern only the Overseas Territories. Algeria and the overseas departments of France are governed by the same provisions relating to the free movement of goods as are the E.E.C. Member
StatesY The following Treaty provisions are designed to implement these "objects."
The Overseas Territories benefit from the same reductions in
tariffs as apply to trade among Member States. 48 The Overseas
Territories are also bound to abolish their customs duties with regard to imports originating in Member States or other associated
Overseas Territories in conformity with the Treaty provisions relating to the free movement of goods. 49 This obligation is modified,
however, insofar as the Overseas Territories may continue to impose duties, if this is necessitated by their level of development or
fiscal needs. This authorization extends both to protective and revenue tariffs. 50
These protectionist safeguards are limited, however. On the one
hand, the tariffs which are maintained under this authorization
must be progressively reduced to the level of duties levied on imports originating in the Overseas Territory's mother country. 5 1 New
preferences may not be granted the metropolitan country. The pace
of these reductions is to be that of tariff reductions among the
•• "Objects" is actually an incorrect heading for art. 132, since in reality it sets out
the "contents" of the association. HANDBUCH IA 59, 1 J.
47
Art. 227 (2 ).
'"Art. 133 (r).
49
Art. 133 (2). Express reference is made to the provisions of arts. 12, 13, 14, 15
and 17.
50
Because they are subject to the ordinary provisions relating to the free movement
of goods, the overseas departments may not use these safeguard measures. They may
only avail themselves of those safeguard measures which are also open to the Member
States, particularly those of arts. ro8-109, 226. Cf. Leduc, supra note 4 at 209, n. 1.
51
Art. 133 (3).
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Member States. Consequently, if the stages of the transitional period applying to tariff reductions among the Member States are
extended, 52 the progression of reduction in the Overseas Territories
will also be affected. The practical result of these provisions is, then,
that imports originating in the Member States will be accorded
what is essentially most-favored-nation treatment. On the other
hand, the continued imposition of duties by the Overseas Territories
is limited in time. They may only be imposed as long as they are
economically necessary. Theoretically, therefore, the Treaty envisages total abolition of duties for trade in both directions at a
time when the Overseas Territories are able to meet the increased
competition. The compatibility of the association provisions with
G.A.T.T. will primarily depend on whether the association is an
arrangement designed to bring about a free-trade area "within
a reasonable length of time" within the meaning of Article
24(5) (c) of G.A.T.T. 53 The creation of a free-trade area is theoretically possible, although the Overseas Territories will be able
to impose safeguards during the foreseeable future. Despite this it
is arguable that the test of "a reasonable length of time" should be
interpreted more leniently in the case of presently underdeveloped
countries than would be justifiable in the case of developed countries.
In order that the principle of non-discrimination, which forms
the basis of the tariff provisions, will not be illusory, a special paragraph 54 prohibits all other discrimination whereby preferences
could be granted a given metropolitan country by any Overseas Territory. Included in this prohibition are measures whereby duties are
established on the basis of artificial distinctions between products
to the end that a preferential tariff is established for goods from the
metropolitan country. 55
Not affected by the obligation to extend at least most-favorednation treatment to E.E.C. countries were those Overseas Territories which already had internationally established customs regimes requiring non-discriminatory treatment and which therefore
could not extend preferences to the metropolitan country. This was
•• Cf.

arts. 8 and 13. HANDBUCH IA 59, 15.
IA 59, 16. Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ghana, India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the United Kingdom however
consider the association a new preferential area which is contrary to Art. I of G.A.T.T:
See G.A.T.T., Report of the Working Party on the Association of the Overseas
Territories with the European Economic Community, Doc. L/8os/Rev. 1, par. 12,
5 (1958).
"'Art. 133(5).
65
HANDBUCH IA 59, 18.
63

HANDBUCH
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true of the United Nations trust-territories of Togo, Cameroons,
Ruanda-Urundi, and Italian Somaliland. 56 It was also true of all
Overseas Territories situated in the Congo basin (the Belgian
Congo and parts of French Equatorial Africa) which were covered
by the Act of Berlin and subsequent international agreements. 57 In
accordance with their international obligations, these Overseas Territories applied non-discriminatory duties; 58 they were therefore
not bound to make reductions since no preferences were extended to
metropolitan countries. Consequently, only those Overseas Territories which actually accorded preferences to their metropolitan
countries lowered their tariffs on January I, I 9 59, with respect to
other E.E.C. countries by IO percent of the difference between the
existing tariff and the preferential tariff. 59
Provision is also made for the possibility that association of the
Overseas Territories may cause trade diversions ("diversions of
commercial traffic"). In this case, a Member State adversely affected may request the Commission to propose appropriate measures to the other Member States. As one commentator pointed out,
this procedure may prove inadequate and consideration should
therefore be given to application by .analogy of the provisions relating to similar situations in the E.E.C. 60 Under those provisions
the Commission could authorize the Member State affected to take
protective measures.
No mention is made of the external duties of the Overseas Territories, that is, those on goods from third countries. There is no
problem if the Overseas Territory is a member of a customs union
to which the metropolitan country belongs. In this case the E.E.C.
external tariff will apply. 61 Absent such a customs union, territories,
Cf. art. 76(d), U.N. CHARTER.
"'BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, Vol. 76, 4 (r884-1885), and Vol. 82, 55
(r88<)-I89o), and LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES, Vol. 8-9, 27 (1922). See
also, Belgique, Ganga et Marchi Commun, 1958 BELGIQUE CoLONIAL ET CoMMERCE
INTERNATIONAL 13 at 25 ff.
58
E.g., in Cameroon, duties on most imports were 12% ad valorem in 1957
plus a small turnover tax. Some capital goods were admitted free of duty. Bureau of
Foreign Commerce, WTIS, Part 1, No. 57-63, 15. In the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi
duties were also levied on an ad valorem basis ranging from complete exemption to
so%, the average rate being 22%. Special provisions, often exemptions, applied to foodstuffs, farm machinery and equipment, and raw materials for local industry. No
customs surtaxes were levied with the exception of a statistical tax of o.os% ad valorem
which was imposed on all imports and exports. Ibid., Part 2, No. 57-89, r.
59
See Stohler, op. cit. supra note 26.
60
Those would be the provisions of art. us, paras. r and 3· HANDBUCH lA 59, 19.
61
HANDBUCH IA 59, 15. This would fall under art. r8 ff.
56
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other than the French departments, 62 remain free with respect
to their external tariffs. Insofar as measures adopted by them cause
diversion of trade the provision discussed in the preceding paragraph becomes applicable.
b. Effect of the Tariff Provisions

If these tari If provisions are viewed in context, it becomes apparent that the Overseas Territories enjoy a twofold benefit. The
participation in the intra-European tariff reductions and eventual
abolition of tariffs will open a larger market for raw materials
supplied by the territories. Secondly, this position is strengthened
by the protection the territories will enjoy by virtue of the E.E.C.
external tariff on goods from third countries, some of them also
suppliers of primary products. 63 This effect is quite important,
as some examples will show. The Six imported 41.6 percent of
their cocoa requirements in I 9 54 from the Overseas Territories.
While the previous tariffs will be reduced and eventually abolished
with regard to the Overseas Territories, List F of the Treaty
envisages a tariff of 9 percent on cocoa imported from third
countries. A more striking example, and one with more far-reaching
effects, is that of coffee. The Six imported only 27 percent of their
coffee needs in I956 from the Overseas Territories, 64 but envisage
an external tariff of I 6 percent on coffee. So far, the Six have mainly
imported the arabica variety of coffee from Brazil and Columbia.
Since arabica can be mixed with the robusta variety for the production of instant coffee, imports of robusta from the Overseas Territories will undoubtedly increase, especially in view of the fact that
robusta will enjoy tariff reductions in the Six (while arabica is
faced with a duty of I 6 percent). Robusta will therefore not only be
cheaper but, at the same time, protected.
A similar trade-diverting effect may occur with respect to bananas; 65 in I956 the Six imported only 2I percent (approximately)
62
Art. 227; cf. Carstens, Die Errichtung des gemeinsamen Marktes in der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Atomgemeinschaft, und Gemeinschaft fur Kohle
und Stahl, 18 ZEITSCHRIIT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UNO VoLKERRECHT
+59 at 464 and n. 15, 16 (1958) •
.., See Bourcier de Carbon, supra note 40 at 285.
"'The import figures for both coffee and cocoa were taken from Bourcier de Carbon,
id., 294, n. II. In 1956, the coffee imports from the Overseas Territories amounted only
to 21.1% of total coffee imports. U.N., supra note 27 at 7· Cf. also G.A.T.T. supra
note 53, Report on Coffee, Doc. L/8o5/Add. 2.
65
With regard to the trade-diverting effect of the Treaty on coffee and bananas,
see Report of the G.A.T.T. Working Party on Tropical Products, Press Bulletin
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of their banana requirements from the Overseas Territories, but
propose an external tariff of 20 percent on bananas from third
countries.
These potentially dislocating effects on world trade of certain
tropical products must, however, be viewed in the light of special
provisions contained in two Protocols annexed to the Treaty. These
Protocols reduce somewhat the dislocating effect of the Treaty
provisions concerning coffee and bananas, although their inclusion
was not primarily due to a desire to shield third countries from
the effect of the Treaty; it was necessitated by the economic position of several of the E.E.C. Member States. 66 Germany had been
importing large quantities of bananas duty-free from Ecuador,
Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras. The Protocol 67 therefore
provides that Germany will be entitled to continue to import dutyfree, until the end of the second stage of the transitional period, an
amount equal to 90 percent of its 1956 imports of bananas less the
amount imported from the Overseas Territories. At the end of
the third stage, the duty-free quota will be decreased to 8o percent,
and at the end of the transitional period to 75 percent. It can be
augmented by 50 percent of the difference between the 1956 imports and the increase in successive years, but will be 8o or 90 percent of the imports of the years after 1956, if the 1956 level of
imports is not attained. Similar provisions apply to imports of unroasted coffee into Italy and the Benelux countries. 68 The effect of
protection by the external tariff is also lessened by the right of the
Member States to substitute non-discriminatory internal fiscal taxes
for the reduced tariffs; such action by Germany with respect to
coffee has already caused some concern in the Overseas Territories.69
One result of these provisions is that serious changes in the existEUROPE, No. 357 item 1956 and No. 359 item 1983, March 9 and 11, 1959. G.A.T.T.,
supra note 64, and Report on Bananas, Doc. L/8os/Add. 4·
66
Cf. Rey, L'Association des Territoires d'Outre-Mer au Marchi Commun, 1958
REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 50 at 51•
67
Protocol Concerning the Tariff Quota for Imports of Bananas (Ex o8.o1 of the
Brussels Nomenclature).
68
Protocol Concerning the Tariff Quota for Imports of Unroasted Coffee (Ex 09.01
of the Brussels Nomenclature).
•• Arts. 17(3) and 95· Cf. Press Bulletin EUROPE, No. 331, item 1743, Feb. 5, 1959.
Cf. Resolution of the European Assembly of Nov. 27, 1959, [1959] Journal Officiel des
Communautes Europeennes (hereinafter cited as J.O.) 1267/59 at para. 9 (b), p.
1268/59, in which the Assembly urges Member Governments to execute the "spirit" of
the Treaty and to refrain from substituting internal charges and "obstacles" for the
tariff reductions.
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ing patterns of supply of coffee and bananas may not occur in the
near future during which the high quotas of the Protocols apply.
However, as the larger European market raises the general standard of living and results in increased consumption, the special quotas
under the Protocols will steadily decrease to fixed levels. To the extent that the high E.E.C. external tariff makes it unprofitable for
third countries to export to the E.E.C., much of the increase in consumption could be satisfied by the Overseas Territories.
c. Quotas

The Treaty provisions relating to import quotas of the territories
and to quotas applicable to their goods resemble the tariff provisions, although their effect is different because there is no quota
equivalent of the common external tariff of the Six. The provisions 70
require Member States to apply the same quota increases to imports
coming from the Overseas Territories as they apply to imports from
other Member States. To the extent that present quotas of the
Member States encompass imports both from an Overseas Territory and its metropolitan country, the percentage of the imports
from the Overseas Territory has to be determined on the basis of
import statistics. This will determine the quota of the Overseas
Territory which will then be converted into a global quota and will
follow the Treaty provisions as to annual increases. 71 The obligation imposed on the Member States, however, does not preclude
them from imposing such restrictions as are warranted by public
morals, order, security, and health, or by the protection of national
treasures or of commercial and industrial property. 72
These provisions ensure participation by the Overseas Territories
in all intra-Community trade liberalization. The Overseas Territories, on the other hand, must "globalize" the quotas open to Member States other than the metropolitan country and extend them to all
Member States. As a result, any preferences which the metropolitan
country enjoys continue in existence; yet the "global quota" open
to the other Member States will eventually reach the same degree
of liberalization because the Overseas Territories must increase the
global quotas annually by the same percentages which apply to the
liberalization among the Six, that is, an annual increase by 20 percent of total value of the quotas, but no less than 10 percent for
70

The provisions are found in arts. 9-14 of the Implementing Convention, annexed
to the Treaty.
71
Art. 12, Implementing Convention.
•• Art. 13, Implementing Convention.
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each product. 73 Where a global quota would represent less than 7
percent of a Territory's total imports of the product, a 7 percent
quota must be established and increased according to the same
scheme. 74 In the cases where the Overseas Territories had heretofore offered no quota, the Commission is to determine the size of
the quotas as well as the scale of increases.
With respect to these quota measures several points must be
noted. In the first place, the obligation of the Overseas Territories
to extend globalized quotas to the Member States is, like their obligation in the tariff field, a relatively small burden. Quotas, like
tariffs, are covered by the open-door policy of the Act of Berlin
and of the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter;
the Overseas Territories of the Congo Basin and the trust territories were therefore already required to accord non-disciminatory
treatment to the Six. Theoretically, the quota provisions go further
than the tariff provisions in that they not only require reduction of
discriminatory treatment to the level of the advantages accorded
the metropolitan country but envisage total abolition eventually.
However, considering that tariffs may only be maintained as long
as economically necessary, the end effect supposedly will be total
abolition of barriers in both cases.
Secondly, just as the tariff provisions leave the Overseas Territories free to determine their own external tariffs, so the Overseas
Territories are unaffected by the commercial policy of the E.E.C. 75 ;
they are free to determine their own quotas with regard to third
countries subject to the above-mentioned international obligations.
There is an interesting-and unexplainable-difference between the
provisions applicable to the departments on the one hand, and to
the Overseas Territories on the other. The Overseas Territories
continue to be free, from the point of view of the E.E.C. Treaty,
to set their own external quotas and tariffs. Yet, while external
73
Art. II, Implementing Convention, which refers expressly to the percentages of
art. 33· Reference is also made to art. 32; its provisions-that no new more restrictive
quotas may be imposed and that the objective is the total abolition of quotas by the
end of the transitional period-are therefore also applicable to the Overseas Territories.
"'A difficult question of interpretation has arisen. Since art. 11 of the Implementing
Convention refers to art. 33 of the Treaty, the question arises whether the 7% of
"total imports" (art. II (2)) shall replace or be added to a quota of 3% of national
output. The Commission has taken the position that it is in addition to the 3% because
of the express reference in art. 11. If the Overseas Territories are prejudiced thereby,
they can levy protective tariffs under art. 133 (3). Press Bulletin EUROPE, No. 339,
item x8xo, Feb. x6, 1959·
75
Arts. no ff.
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E.E.C. tariffs apply immediately to Algeria and the departments, 76
the provisions concerning the E.E.C. common commercial policy
apply only after the Council renders a decision by unanimous vote
within two years after the entry into force of the Treaty. 77 A third
problemxesults from the fact that the level of economic development
of the French Overseas Territories necessitates stabilization and subsidy measures by France. A special protocol ~ therefore authorizes
continued export subsidies and import charges up to the level existing
on January I, I 9 57. The Council and Commission rna y examine
these systems periodically, and, if their lack of uniformity prejudices
industry, may request France to take appropriate measures in the
areas of raw materials, semi-finished products, and finished products. Member States may take safeguard measures, if France does
not comply. Since the purpose of this Protocol is the maintenance of
an equilibrium in the balance-of-payments of the franc zone, the
Council may decide by a qualified majority vote that the system must
be discontinued, if equilibrium is reached and monetary reserves are
satisfactory. If no agreement can be reached, the Protocol-deviating from the usual procedure of the Treaty 79-envisages arbitration by a mutually appointed arbitrator, or, in case of disagreement, by an arbitrator appointed by the President of the Court of
Justice.
7

d. Problems of Third Country Preferences and
Origin of Goods

Two further problems are closely connected with each other. They
arise because some of the Member States have special relations with
countries which are independent and therefore could not be affected by the Treaty. Although the customs union between France
and Tunisia has terminated, 8 ° France accords trade preferences to,
and enjoys preferences of, Tunisia as well as Morocco, Cambodia, Laos, and the Condominion of the New Hebrides. Similarly,
7

° Cf.

Carstens, supra note 62.
Art. 227 (2 ).
7
" Part I, Protocol Relating to Certain Provisions of Concern to France. Cf. also
HANDBUCH DER MONTANUNION, A 2012, 24-26.
79
The only other use of arbitration is found in art. 8 (4) of the Treaty with respect
to the extensions of the stages of the transitional period. Otherwise arbitration of differences among Member States concerning the interpretation or application of the
Treaty is expressly precluded by art. 219, and the procedures of arts. 169 or 170 become applicable.
80
N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1959, 1 :r.
77
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Italy grants preferences to Libya, and the Netherlands to the autonomous parts of its Kingdom, Surinam, and the Antilles. These
countries could not be included in the association, but Declarations
of Intention invite those countries to negotiate for association.
Negotiations have already started with TunisiaY An interim solution was therefore necessary with respect to products entering the
metropolitan countries on a preferential basis. A special protocol 82
therefore expressly declares the provision concerning libre pratique
inapplicable to these imports. That provision 83 accords duty-free
entry into a Member State to goods which have entered another
Member State and have been subject there to imposition of duty and
have not enjoyed any drawbacks of such duties or charges on leaving this second state. Thus, the effect of the Protocol is that, because
of preferences enjoyed by these products upon entry into the metropolitan country, they cannot benefit from the removal of intraCommunity duties.
Closely connected with this is the general problem of how to determine whether a particular shipment of goods benefits from the
Treaty reductions. In the Community, including Algeria and the
overseas departments, a Certificate of Commercial Traffic (Warenverkehrsbescheinigung) must accompany all shipments. 84 For trade
with the Overseas Territories, Certificates of Origin must also accompany shipments; these will serve to certify both the fact that the
shipment is entitled to benefit from the percentage reduction currently in effect and that the goods originated in the Community or the
Overseas Territories. Since all Overseas Territories benefit from the
intra-Community reductions, this certificate must accompany all
shipments to the Community. On the other hand, it need only accompany Community shipments to the Overseas Territories where
the Member States will benefit from the preferences extended by an
Overseas Territory to its metropolitan country. Such a certificate
must therefore accompany products exported to French West
Africa, New Caledonia, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and the French
Settlements in Oceania. Since the other Overseas Territories do not
extend preferences to their metropolitan countries, other Member
81
Press Bulletin EUROPE, No. 416 item 2460, 23 May 1959. Indications are that
Tunisia is not seeking association on the basis of the Declaration of Intention but
rather under art. 238 of the Treaty.
82
Protocol Relating to Goods Originating in and Coming from Certain Countries
and Enjoying Special Treatment on Importation into One of the Member States.
83
Art. 10 of the Treaty.
"'2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 48 (1959).
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States will not benefit from reductions,
accompany shipments to those Territories.

e. Special Problems: Duration of the Association;

Relation to the Coal-Steel and Euratom Treaties
Two problems remain. One concerns the duration of the association, the other the relation of the E.E.C. Treaty to that of the
Coal-Steel Community and to that of the European Atomic Energy
Community.
While Article 227 extends the application of the Treaty, with
modifications, to Algeria and the overseas departments-and thus
for an unlimited time 86- , the association of the Overseas Territories is accomplished partly by means of provisions in the body of
the Treaty and partly by means of the Implementing Convention.
The latter expires five years after the entry into force of the Treaty
(December 31, 1962). 87 At that time, the Council must determine
by unanimous vote the form of continued association. The Council
may pass only on the form of association, however, and not on
whether to continue it. 88 The result of the two separate Treaty
sources for association is that the provisions for reduction, and
eventual abolition, of tariffs continue to be in force after five years
since they are contained in the main body of the Treaty, while the
quota increases will freeze at the point of liberalization reached
by the fifth year, pending extension by the Council. 89 The reason
for the difference in treatment was probably the desire to evaluate
the political impact of the association before entering into a longrange commitment. Nevertheless, it would seem that, except for
slight or non-existent quotas whose liberalization starts at a low
level, the annual liberalization of quotas according to the "zo percent-of-total-imports-ro percent-minimum-per-product" scheme
will have reached substantial enough proportions at the end of the
fifth year to make continued liberalization of tariffs meaningful.
The second problem concerns the effect of the association on coal
and steel products and products covered by the Euratom Treaty.
85

Ibid.
Art. 240.
87
Art. 17, Implementing Convention, art. 136 Treaty.
88
HANDBUCH lA 59, 22. The Council must take into account the principles of arts.
131 and 132.
'"Cf. art. 14, Implementing Convention; HANDBUCH IA 59, 21.
86
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Coal and steel products 90 are subject to the Coal-Steel Treaty 91
which only applies to the European territories of the Member
States. 92 The E.E.C. Treaty, moreover, expressly provides that its
provisions shall not "modify" those of the Coal-Steel Treaty. 93
A protocol promises future negotiation on the extension of the
Coal-Steel Treaty to the overseas departments. 94 The problem
therefore arises: to what extent do the movement-of-goods provisions of the association also apply to coal and steel products? In
the first place it is necessary to emphasize again that the problem
exists only with respect to coal and steel products as defined by that
Treaty; thus tin, of which the Belgian Congo supplied 9 percent
of world exports at last report, is not covered by the Coal-Steel
Treaty and can, therefore, be considered to be covered by the movement-of-goods provisions of the E.E.C. Treaty. On the other hand,
tin-plate is covered by the Coal-Steel Treaty. It is with respect to
such products that the problem exists.
The relation of the Coal-Steel Treaty to the E.E.C. Treaty is
that of a special law to a generallaw. 95 To the extent that the Member States retained powers in regard to products covered by the
Coal-Steel Treaty after the establishment of the Coal-Steel Community, they were free to delegate them in a new treaty. The general assumption must be, then, that because of the comprehensive
scope of the E.E.C. Treaty the residual powers remaining with the
Member States under the Coal-Steel Treaty were delegated by them
under the new treaty. A case-by-case analysis must determine
whether: ( 1) such residual powers exist under the Coal-Steel
Treaty, and ( 2) whether their coverage by the E.E.C. Treaty is
precluded by an express reservation in that Treaty, or (3) whether
their coverage by the E.E.C. Treaty would prejudice the Coal-Steel
Treaty. 96 For instance, the question arises whether the E.E.C. ex00

Listed in Annex x, as qualified by Annexes II-III of the E.C.S.C. Treaty.
Art. Sx, E.C.S.C. Treaty.
92
Art. 79, E.C.S.C. Treaty. Paragraph 2 of that Article obligates Member States to
extend to each other any preferential treatment which they enjoy in their Overseas
Territories. This provision is immaterial for our purposes since we are here concerned
with movement of such products from the Overseas Territories to the Six.
•• Art. 232. Author's translation from the German, since the English term used in
the extant translation seems inadequate .
.. Protocol Relating to the Treatment to be Applied to Products within the Competence of the European Coal and Steel Community in Respect of Algeria and the Overseas Departments of the French Republic .
.. Carstens, supra note 62 at 462.
96
As Carstens, ibid., 465-466, observes, the Protocol, supra note 94, does not change
this. It is merely an expression of the willingness to negotiate an agreement which
91
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ternal tariff applies to coal and steel products, given the fact that
the Coal-Steel Treaty does not make provision for an external tariff.
Since coal and steel products have been expressly excluded by the
E.E.C. Treaty, 97 the conclusion must be, however, that the external
tariff does not apply to coal and steel products in Algeria and the
departments-the only territories where the E.E.C. external tariff
applies at all. Similarly, the reduction and abolition of internal trade
barriers between the Community and the territories, including the
departments, does not apply to coal and steel products. Although
this conclusion is not based on a Treaty provision expressly dealing
with the problem, it is plainly justified since an extension of the reach
of the E.E.C. Treaty to include coal and steel products would constitute a substantial change in the Coal-Steel Treaty, and would thereby
violate Article 232 of the E.E.C. Treaty.
For practical purposes, then, the E.E.C. provisions on movement
of goods in the territories do not apply to coal and steel products.
The theoretical conclusion that it is at least conceivable that the
two treaties complement each other, is significant, however, in regard to two contingencies.
The tariff provisions, and the quota provisions upon extension
by the Council, share the E.E.C. Treaty's unlimited duration. In
contrast the Coal-Steel Treaty is limited to so years (that is, it expires in the year 2002) . 98 If the Coal-Steel Treaty should expire at
that time, the prohibition of Article 232 of the E.E.C. Treaty would
become superfluous; absent a lex specialis, the E.E.C. provisions
would apply. 99 Secondly, it has been suggested that Coal-Steel Community commercial policy will to a large extent become part of
E.E.C. commercial policy. 100 This results from the Coal-Steel
Treaty provision that the Member States remain responsible for
this policy except where the Treaty provides otherwise. 101 While
the Coal-Steel Treaty in fact regulates some details of commercial
policy, no provision comparable to the E.E.C. Treaty chapter on
commercial policy exists. When the E.E.C. institutions assume responsibility for the commercial policy of the Community-and that
OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES

would eliminate the "problems." Up to that time, the effects of the Treaties on each
other must be determined in accordance with what they themselves provide.
97
Annex I, E.E.C. Treaty: List B, position 26.01; List C, positions 7307, 731o-7313,
and 7315.
08
Art. 97, E.C.S.C. Treaty.
119
Carstens, supra note 62 at 463.
100

Ibid., szo-szz.

101

Art. 71, E. C. S.C. Treaty.
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of Algeria and the overseas departments 102 at the end of the transitional period, 103 this commercial policy will include, therefore, that
residual competence of the Member States with respect to coal and
steel products in the departments. The Council and Commission can
then conclude agreements with third countries affecting coal and
steel, after consultation with the High Authority. 104
The Euratom Treaty-also, in relation to the E.E.C. Treaty,
lex specialis 105-applies fully to all "non-European territories under the jurisdiction of a Member State." 106 It thus applies to some
very important products of the Overseas Territories, such as uranium.107 To the extent that they are to be used for nuclear purposes, other products, such as aluminum and manganese/08 may
also be subject to the Euratom Treaty. In the latter case it must be
noted that the E.E.C. Treaty is applicable until a determination is
made that the products are intended for nuclear purposes.
In contrast to the manner of association under the E.E.C. Treaty,
the Euratom Treaty contains few special rules applicable only to
the territories. This difference between the Euratom and E.E.C.
Treaties is probably accounted for by the fact that fewer protective
and transitional measures are necessary to integrate incipient
atomic industries than to achieve a common market in all sectors
of the economy. This is illustrated by the Euratom provision allowing the Overseas Territories to continue to levy revenue tariffs on
imports from the Six. 109 A counterpart of the far-reaching E.E.C.
provision 110 allowing the territories also to impose protective tariffs
is, however, lacking in the Euratom provision.
2. OTHER PROVISIONS: AGRICULTURE, RIGHT OF
ESTABLISHMENT, LIBERALIZATION OF SERVICES, AND
FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS

a. Agriculture
For purposes of trade among theM ember States, the Treaty contains two groups of provisions concerning agriculture. First, agri102 Cf. art. 227 which provides that the Council must decide within two years the
mode of application of, inter alia, the commercial policy provisions.
103
Cf. arts. uo and II3.
1
"" Arts. II3 and 114, E.E.C. Treaty; art. 75, E.C.S.C. Treaty.
100
Art. 232(2), E.E.C. Treaty.
106
Art. 198, Euratom Treaty.
107
Annex IV, List A' Euratom Treaty.
108
Annex IV, List B Euratom Treaty.
109
Art. 93, Euratom Treaty.
110
Art. 133(3), E.E.C. Treaty.
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cultural products are included in the general movement-of-goods
provisions; and second, a special part of the Treaty, applying to
agricultural products specified in Annex II of the Treaty, provides
for a common agricultural policy. This common policy is to be based
on a common organization which will differ from product to product
and might take the form of common rules of competition, or of
compulsory coordination of the various existing national market
organizations, or even of a single "European" market organization
for the particular product. Any one of these forms may comprise
price controls, production and marketing subsidies, stockpiling and
other arrangements, as well as special loan and guarantee funds.
Proposals for a common policy are under consideration by the institutions of the Community. While agricultural products are also
included in the movement-of-goods provisions relating to the overseas departments and Overseas Territories the question is whether
the special chapter on a common agricultural policy applies to them
also. The Treaty gives an affirmative answer with regard to Algeria
and the overseas departments, excluding only the provision concerning the agricultural funds and organizations mentioned above. 111 The
provisions governing the association with the Overseas Territories
do not mention the chapter; since the association extends only to matters expressly mentioned, 112 the application of that chapter is therefore precluded. Exclusion of the Overseas Territories from the common agricultural policy does not mean, however, that they cannot
be affected by it. This is true because the provisions of the special
chapter on common agricultural policy apply to the products specified in Annex II (including, for example, coffee, cocoa, cane sugar)
rather than to a particular geographic area. 113 Measures taken, for
instance, by a European marketing organization 114 or by the Member States (such as the invocation of the safeguard clause permitting, for the duration of the transitional period, the temporary suspension of imports or the fixing of minimum prices on imports) 115
may therefore affect the Overseas Territories.
b. The Right of Establishment

116

The right of companies and nationals of the Member States to
establish themselves in the Overseas Territories and overseas de111

Art. 227.
See language in art. 227 ( 3).
113
Art. 38(3). Rey, supra note 66 at 52.
114
Art. 40(2) (c).
115
Art. 44( r).
116
See generally, Lussan, Le Droit d'Etablissrment des Ressortissants et Societes
1
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partments and vice-versa is treated in three different provisions.
The right of establishment of nationals of the Member States in
Algeria, the overseas departments, and Overseas Territories 117 is
regulated by a provision in the Implementing Convention. 118 It provides that the Council, acting by qualified majority vote 119 on a
proposal of the Commission, must determine the particulars of an
extension of the right within one year from the entry into force of
the Convention (January I, I 9 58). The rna terial content of the
right of establishment will be determined by the general chapter on
the right of establishment in the Member States (Articles 5258); 120 it is limited, however, to an abolition of discrimination
between the right of establishment enjoyed by nationals of the metropolitan country of the department or Overseas Territory in that
department or Overseas Territory and the right of establishment
enjoyed by nationals of other Member States. 121 The Council took
the required action by issuing a Directive in November I959. 121 a
One difficult question of interpretation is whether the right of establishment also includes the right of investment of capital necessary
for establishment. A possible view is that, since the provision
dealing with the right of establishment in the departments and
Overseas Territories 122 refers as to substance to the general rightof-establishment provision (Article 52) which in turn expressly
excludes matters dealt with in the chapter concerning free movement of capital, the right to invest is not included in the right
to establish. Moreover, the free-movement-of-capital provisions
may be extended to Algeria and the departments by the Council
under Article 227, 123 although no such provision exists with regard
to the Overseas Territories. These facts suggest that no Treaty
right to invest capital in the Overseas Territories exists and that
the right of establishment could be virtually meaningless. It has
therefore been suggested that the limitation of Article 52 should
d'Outre-Mer dans Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, I959 REVUE nu MARCHE
COMMUN 226; Brunner, Das Niederlassungsrecht in den assoziierten iiberseeischen
Liindern und H oheitsgebieten, 2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 254 ( I959).

Cf. Art. I6, Implementing Convention.
Art. 8, Implementing Convention.
Cf. Art. I48, para. 2.
120
Art. I32(5). KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, VON DER GROEBEN AND VON
BoECKH, editors, 2 vols. (I958) (hereinafter cited as KOMMENTAR) vol. I, 550.
121
KoMMENTAR Vol. I, 55 I.
121
" [I96o] J.O. I47· The Directive envisions extension of the right of establishment
by stages according to the type of activity involved.
122
Art. I32(5).
123
This was done by decision of the Council, [I96o] J.O. 9I9-20.
117

118

119

67 5
not be applied to the right-of-establishment provision relating to
the Overseas Territories and that the provision should be interpreted extensively to include the right to invest capital as a necessary
concomitant to the right of establishment. 124
The right of establishment of nationals of the Overseas Territories in Member States is not as explicitly regulated as the right of
nationals of the Member States to establish in the Overseas Territories, and is also different from that of nationals of the departments. Article I32(5) of the Treaty provides only that
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In relations between Member States and . . . the Territories, the right of establishment . . . shall be regulated
in accordance with the provisions . . . in the Chapter relating to the right of establishment [Articles 52-58] . . . .
The absence of a specific provision like that concerning the right of
nationals of the Member States to establish themselves in the Overseas Territories has led some to conclude that no right of establishment in the Member States is given to nationals of the Overseas
Territories. 125 Another possible interpretation is that as long as
no special provision is made, the general provision of Article
I 3 2 ( 5) applies, so that the intra-Community right of establishment
as provided by Articles 52-58 extends to nationals of the Overseas
Territories. 126 Furthermore, it has been argued, that a right of establishment in the Member States could accrue to nationals of the
Overseas Territories under Article 52 of the Treaty because nationals of the French Territories have French citizenship and thus
satisfy the nationality requirements of Articles 52 and 58. 127 The
latter interpretation is preferable to one denying a right of establishment of nationals of the Overseas Territories, since the object
of the association is the furthering of the interests of the Overseas
Territories 128 and since the policy of Article I 3 2 ( 5) seems clearly
to indicate that reciprocity was desired in matters relating to the
right of establishment.
The right of establishment of nationals of Algeria and the departments in the Member States, finally, is left open by the Treaty.
Like all other matters not expressly mentioned in Article 227 ( 2),
'"' KoMMENTAR Vol. I, 550.

Cf. Lussan, supra note u6 at 227.
/bid. 228, 229; KOMMENTAR Vol. I, 489.
127
Lussan supra note u6 at 228-232. Cf., however, the impact of independence of
many Territories on this argument.
128
Arts. lH, paras. 2-3 and the Preamble.
125
128
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its extension to the departments was to have been affected by the
Council before January I, 1960.

c. Free Movement of Workers
This area is again left to further implementing action by the
Council In the cases of Algeria and the overseas departments.
In the case of the Overseas Territories, the Member States have
only affirmed a desire that free movement of workers be achieved. 129
In contrast to the procedure envisaged for the departments, implementation will not be effected by a Community institution but by
means of international conventions. Since bilateral conventions
could seriously affect non-participating Member States, every convention requires unanimous agreement of all Member States. 130

d. Freedom to Perform Services and Other Provisions
The Treaty's provisions concerning services, rules of competition,
and institutions are immediately applicable to Algeria and the overseas departments; all other provisions become applicable in the departments upon decision of the Council. 131 None of these provisions,
with the exception of some financial provisions to be mentioned later,
are applicable to the Overseas Territories nor is their extension envisaged for a later time. This difference in treatment is explainable
by the fact that the overseas departments, belonging structurally
to the metropolitan country, are to become part of the Community
subject only to those modifications which their particular economic
situations necessitate. In contrast, association alone is envisaged between the Community and the Overseas Territories. Since the main
aim of this association is to raise the level of economic development
in the Overseas Territories, the trade provisions are supplemented
by special provisions, including those noted earlier and particularly
those concerning financial assistance to be discussed presently. Since
this system of association is limited to five years, a closer association is possible thereafter. However, even if a closer association
should come about, the Treaty drafters were careful to indicate that
it is the economic interest of the Territories which will primarily
determine its form. 132
129
180

Art. 135.
HANDBUCH

IA

59, 19-21.

=Art. 227(2). Cf. also note 123 and preceding text.
132
See the implied reference in art. 136, para. 2 to the principles of arts. 131 and 132.

Cf. HANDBUCH IA 59. 22.
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FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

The two main reasons why France pressed for inclusion of the
territories were her desire to avoid membership in two competing
systems of trade preferences and her belief that she could not extend trade concessions to her European partners without receiving
their assistance in financing economic development in the territories.
The establishment of the Development Fund 133 was the response to
France's position on the second point. Demands by France and Belgium that the expenses of the territories be shared by the Member
States on a pro rata basis of national income were rejected early in
the negotiations by the other four. Similarly, it was made clear that
any assistance given should not serve to finance "sovereignty expenses" (police, administration, defense) of the powers directly involved. Thirdly-and as a further safeguard against too direct involvement-Germany demanded that any assistance given by a development fund to which she would contribute should only be given
on a project-by-project basis, and that approval of local authorities
in the territories would be required for every project. 134
Established along these lines, the Development Fund provides
for a total contribution of $58 I ,2 50,000 by the Member States, of
which Germany and France will contribute $200 million each.
Throughout its duration (geared to the five-year duration of the
Implementing Convention) France will be the major beneficiary,
receiving $5 II, 2 50,000 for her affiliated territories. The projects
to be financed fall into two categories: "economic," including "productive and specific development projects," and "social," such as
schools, hospitals and the prevention of soil erosion. 135 Each year
the Council must determine by q~alified majority vote, after consulting the Commission, what proportions of the amounts available
for the year are to be allocated to the two categories. 136 In 1958
two-thirds of the available $58 million were allocated to social, and
one-third to economic, projects. 137 In 1959 the Council changed the
133

Arts. 1-7, Implementing Convention.
""Germany, Bundesrat, Niederschrift iiber die Sitzung des Sonderausschusses
"Gemeinsamer Markt und Euratom" vom 24. April I957, 36, 42-43.
186
Art. 3 Implementing Convention; See generally, Wirsing, Politik und A rbeitsweise
des Entwicklungsfonds, 2 EuRoPXISCHE \VIRTSCHAFT 229 (1959). The types of projects
are defined in more detail in Commission Regulation No. 7, [1959) J.O. 241/ 59·
186
Art. 4, Implementing Convention. Annex B to the Convention sets out the amounts
available to each metropolitan country for its territories in each of the five years of
the association.
,., Wirsing, supra note I 35 at 233·
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percentage allocation to allow 25-30 percent of the available funds
to be used for social investments while 70-7 5 percent were to be
used for economic projects. 138 The qualified majority vote is based
upon a special weighing of votes according to the size of contribution to the Fund. Thus, France and Germany, as the two largest
contributors, command 33 votes each, Italy, Belgium, and the N ether lands 1 I each, and Luxembourg I. The qualified majority necessary for a decision constitutes 67 out of the 100 possible votesY 9
The country with the strongest political misgivings about the association, Germany, can easily prevent a vote with the support of only
one like-minded state such as Luxembourg or the Netherlands, while
only the votes of France, Germany, and Luxembourg are needed to
adopt any measure. 140
After the Council has established the yearly quotas, the Commission may consider project proposals which have been drawn up
by the competent authority in the Member State together with the
local authorities in the territories. 141 The Commission may then approve "social projects." "Economic projects" must be communicated
to the Council which may pass on them within two months by qualified majority vote; if no Member State has requested the Council to
consider the project proposal within one month, the projects are regarded as approved. 142 In fact, several projects have already been
approved. Among them are social and economic projects for the
former Belgian Congo and for Ruanda-Urundi and economic projects for the disaster-stricken Malagasy Republic (formerly Madagascar) .143 Participation in the work on these projects is open to
all nationals and companies of the Member States without discrimination.144
The provisions of the Development Fund apply both to the Overseas Territories and to the departments. 145 However, the head of
the French delegation declared that his government intended to
make project applications only for the Overseas Territories and not
"'"Press Bulletin EuROPE, No. 471, item 2909, July 27, 1959·
139
Art. 7, Implementing Convention.
140
The qualified majority feature was also included on German insistence. Bundesrat,
supra note 134 at 43·
141
Art. 2, Implementing Convention.
142
Art. 5, Implementing Convention.
143
Press Bulletin EUROPE, No. 340, item 2142, April 7, 1959; No. 388, item 2197, April
16, 1959; and No. 408, item 2386, May 13, 1959. Cf. also, Wirsing, supra note 135 at
234· Cf. Genehmigte Projekte des EWG-Entwicklungsfonds, 3 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 206 ( 1960).
144
Art. 132 (4).
115
Art. 16, Implementing Convention.
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for the departments.14 It is also the understanding that the assistance of the Fund shall not replace, but shall be complementary
to, the assistance rendered by the metropolitan countries. 147
As important as the Fund is for the economic development of the
Overseas Territories, it leaves many questions unanswered. If one
agrees with the basic political objective-that the Overseas Territories should be freed from economic dependence and should be
assisted in achieving a level of economic development which would
enable them both to maintain independence and to associate themselves with the Community as partners 148-the provisions of the
Treaty concerning investment appear to be merely a preliminary
step and, as such, insufficient. Early in 1959 the Commission had
already received approximately 200 official project applications and
was unofficially informed of several more.14 9 Moreover, the Development Fund, by its nature, provides funds only for public investment. It is not designed either to facilitate private investment
or to provide funds for it. The Treaty's provisions for the free
movement of capital have been made applicable to the departments
(Article 227), but are not applicable to the Overseas Territories
unless an extensive interpretation of the right of establishment
provisions incorporates them. The same is true of the provision 150
envisaging non-discriminatory treatment of nationals of other
Member States in matters of financial participation in national
companies. The provisions of the European Investment Bank, designed to help finance private investments, are applicable only to
the European territories of the Member States and therefore exclude both the departments and the Overseas Territories. Exceptions are possible but require unanimous agreement of the Member
States represented on the Bank's Board of Governors. 151 Some use146 Cf. France, Assemblee Nationale, Rapport Fait au Nom de Ia Commission des
Affaires Etrangeres ... , No. 5266 (I957), I04.
141
Cf. art. I, Implementing Convention which, however, is not quite clear on this
point. This is, however, the understanding in Germany and Luxembourg. Cf. Bundesrat,
supra note I34 at 43, and Erlduterungen der Bundesregierung, supra note 43, comment
to art. I of Implementing Convention; Luxembourg, Chambre des Deputes, Pro jets de
loi portant approbation du Traite instituant Ia C.E.E . ... , expose des motifs, (Nos.
636', 637', 638',-I956-I957), 28.
A further function of the Council included the establishment of rules for the transfer
of contributions to, and the budgeting and administration of, funds of the Development
Fund. Art. 6, Implementing Convention. Two regulations have already been issued.
Regulation No. 5, [I958] J.O. 68I/58 and Provisional Regulation No. 6, id., 686/58.
148
Cf. Luxembourg, Chambre des Deputes, Rapport de Ia Commission Speciale sur
les Aspects Economiques et Sociaux du Traite, No. 6375C (I956-57), I5-I6.
""Wirsing, supra note I35 at 233.
150
Art. 221.
151
Art. I8(I) Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank.
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ful suggestions have already been made as to how this situation
may be remedied. 152 One category of suggestions concerns possible
changes in territorial legislation and practice. Among them one, for
instance, calls for abolition of discrimination against foreign majority interests by the substitution of a system of guarantees to be
given by the companies to local authorities insuring to all a local
supply of raw materials. 153 Along the same lines it has been suggested that International Charter Companies should be created,
that is, companies constituted according to multilateral international
conventions between the metropolitan country and third countries. 154
Another category of suggestions aims at changes in the Treaty and
its policy of association. These suggestions are directed mainly at an
expansion of the functions of the European Investment Bank (for
instance, by eliminating the territorial limitation), and at the creation of a European Finance Company for investments in the Overseas Territories. 155 Yet another category of suggestions goes beyond
the investment needs of the territories under examination here. For
example, it has been suggested that the Community investigate the
possibilities of establishing a financial assistance program for underdeveloped areas bordering on the associated territories in order
to prevent assistance given the associated territories from resulting
in undesirable political and psychological reactions in those areas. 156
All of these proposals emanate from the same important realization
that only intelligent, generous and widely ranging assistance to the
underdeveloped areas can create a true partnership.
While any of these proposals would be a step in the right direction, the problem is actually much larger. The availability of investment funds-by itself a problem 157-is of little value if unaccompanied by adequate provisions removing discrimination
against foreign majority interests for example.
An additional problem is posed by the variations in risk insur152 Cf. also Resolution of the European Assembly of Nov. 27, 1959, para. 8, [ 1959]
].0. 1267/59 at 1268 j 59·
153
DE LA TIRE, op. cit. JUpra note 8, 70 and 91 ff.

'"'Ibid.
105
These proposals were made by the Belgian Committee of the European League
for Economic Cooperation. They were reported by Press Bulletin EUROPE, No. 409,
item 2396, May 14, 1959156 Wirsing, supra note 135 at 234•
157
Frisch indicates in SociETE o':ihuoEs ET DE DocUMENTATIONS EcONOMIQUES, INDUSTRIELLES ET SocrALES, No. 683 ( 1957} that German industrialists are interested in
principle in investing in Africa, but lack the necessary capital. The high level of German investment is achieved primarily by self-financing, leaving little for outside (e.g.
African) projects.

68I
ance of export financing. Illustratively, a German exporter is required by government regulation to assume 30 percent of the
risk in cases of economically conditioned losses and 20 percent of
politically conditioned losses. The latter category includes the stoppage of foreign currency transfers imposed by the debtor country.
In contrast, the risk assumed for losses caused by inability to convert currencies or by restrictions on the transfer of capital is only 5
percent for Dutch exporters, I o percent for French, and I 5 percent
for Belgian and Italian exporters. The effect of these variationsand the inadequacy of the insurance in some respects-is that capital goods necessitating long-term financing may not be readily available for underdeveloped areas and that Belgian, German, and Italian
exporters are at a considerable competitive disadvantage compared
with other suppliers of the underdeveloped countries. 158 As the
association of the territories becomes a reality, such problems will
become more pressing.
OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES

IV. EFFECTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE ASSOCIATION

No discussion of the territories can ignore at least three of the
major problems which association with the E.E.C. creates. The first
of these results from the fact that so many of the territories have,
or will have, attained independence since the Treaty was signed in
March I957· In a somewhat larger setting, the relationship of the
territories to the other territories in the proposed Free Trade Area
deserves mention. Finally, the objections raised by third countries,
mainly the South American and Asian producers of tropical fruit,
must be considered.
A. FUTURE AssOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES

The following countries must be mentioned under this heading,
all of which give rise to substantially the same problem: (I) the
African trusteeship territories which have gained independence, for
example, Togo (which on April 27, I96o, became the Republic of
Togoland) and Italian Somaliland (since July I, I96o, a part of
the Republic of Somalia) ; ( 2) Guinea, originally covered by the
provisions relating to French West Africa, but which has now be168

Cf. Anspach, Die Finanzierung der Ausfuhr in die Entwicklungsldnder, 2
235 ff. (1959). Cf. also, Reuss, Die Rentabi/itiit wirtschaftficher Unternehmen in Ent•uJicklungsldndern, id., at 258 If.
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come independent. Although some maintain that Guinea continues
to be covered by the Treaty/ 59 it seems probable that a new association would have to be negotiated; (3) the Republic of the Congo
(formerly the Belgian Congo) which became independent on July I,
I96o; (4) the three republics of the Union of Central African Republics and the four of the Council of the Entente plus Gabon and
Mauritania all of which are, or soon will be, independent; ( 5) independent countries like Tunisia, which were invited by "Declarations
of Intention" to associate with the E.E.C.
Having become sovereign nations, the countries of the first four
groups indicated above will probably no longer be bound by the
Treaty. No provision in the Treaty envisions the situation of these
countries, and the Member States are not in agreement as to the
attitude to be adopted. The Community is inclined to follow a pragmatic approach and to maintain the status quo ante until a new regime of association can be elaborated. On the other hand, none of
the Territories have apparently rejected the principle of association,
while several have clearly and publicly indicated favorable positions.159a Where it will be necessary to negotiate or renegotiate an
association, 160 obvious problems arise. For instance, to what extent
are the provisions of the Development Fund to apply, and to what
extent does the inclusion of the products of these independent countries necessitate a re-examination of E.E.C. internal policy, for instance agricultural policy, and of E.E.C. external policy, for instance
the common external tariff? More importantly, to what extent does
the association of independent areas necessitate a change in the
institutional structure of the E.E.C.? This point was raised as early
as I 9 57 in the Belgian Parliament. 161 The type and extent of these
institutional changes will depend on the form of association. An
association-for instance a free trade area between the E.E.C. and
these areas-may be characterized by no institutional changes in
the E.E.C.; any problems could be handled on an international
inter-institutional level. On the other hand, if the association takes
159

Metzger, Probefall: Guinea-Assoziiet·unq auch nach Erlanqunq der Souveriinitiit,

2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 255 ff. (1959).
159

• XXX., La C.E.E. et les nouveaux Etats independants d'Afrique, 1960 REVUE
DU MARCHE CoMMUN 253· Cf., also, Dale, New Nations Pose Trade Question, N.Y.
Times, Oct. II, 1960, 8 :2.
160
Preliminary contacts with Italian Somaliland have already been made. Press Bulletin EuROPE No. 484, item 2987, Aug. 26, 1959. Cf. also Resolution of the European
Assembly of Nov. 27, 1959, paras. 4-6, [1959] ].0. 1267/59 at 1268/59·
161
Speech by Mr. Scheyven, Chambre des Representants, Annates, Session of Nov.

14, 1957. 7·
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the form of adhesion
to the E.E.C. Treaty some changes may be
necessary. It would seem that representatives from these areas
would have to be seated in the European Parliamentary Assembly
(no longer being members of the contingent of the metropolitan
country) 163 and would have to participate in the work of the executive bodies of the Community. The latter would involve, for instance, a difficult re-examination of all provisions relating to
weighted voting.
OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES
162

B.

PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
PROPOSED FREE TRADE AREA

The foregoing problems would, of course, be multiplied if the
E.E.C. should become a part of a larger free trade area. Such an
arrangement would presumably increase agricultural competition,
due to the inclusion of European countries like Denmark and of
overseas areas such as the British possessions in Africa. For instance,
it is reported that under the present scheme of association of the
Overseas Territories there exists a certain equilibrium in the production and consumption of coffee in the E.E.C.; in the case of a free
trade area there may be an excess of Ioo,ooo tons. With respect to
cocoa, a deficit of 6 5,ooo tons exists presently within the E.E.C., but
a free trade area may bring an excess of 70,000 tons. 164
Other difficulties lie in the area of investments and French trade.
It is doubtful for instance, that the countries of a free trade area
would be able (in the case of Switzerland because of its neutrality)
or willing (in the case of the United Kingdom, because of her own
overseas commitments) to participate in the financing of the development of the E.E.C. Overseas Territories to the extent that increased competition would require. Yet, if they do not, some doubt
that France could commit herself to accept the burdens of a free
169

The difference is mainly one of associating such an area under art. 238 or allowing
it to adhere in a form analogous to art. 237. The latter provides only for adhesion
by any European State. Yet, the extension of the Treaty to Algeria and the overseas departments of France, by art. 227 of the Treaty, is one case where the territorial
principle is not followed. Institutional changes due to adhesion would thus become
probable if any of the departments should gain independence but desire to maintain
their present status in relation to the E.E.C.
163
In 1959 the French contingent included three representatives from Algeria. Press
Bulletin EUROPE, No. 376 Supp., April 2, 1959. For the structure and work of the Assembly, see Stein, The European Parliamentary Assembly: Techniques of Emerging
"Political Control," 13 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 233 ff. (1959).
'"'Representative Raingeard, Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne, Compte rendu
stfno{lraphique provisoire, June 25, 1958, 9 (2d part), 162-163.
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trade area in addition to those which her territories create. 165 Finally, as M. Diori, former overseas representative in the European
Parliamentary Assembly, pointed out, any compromise with respect to the above problems has to give first priority to the political
significance of the association of the E.E.C. territories. The Six
have a political responsibility to support the economic, social, and
political development of Africa and to further cooperation between
Europe and Africa. This responsibility should not be ignored, however difficult it renders any mutually satisfactory solution to the
free trade area problem. 166

c.

THE OBJECTIONS OF THIRD COUNTRIES

Serious objections to the association of the territories were raised
by Latin American and Asian countries, all of which are to a large
extent suppliers of primary products and therefore most directly
affected by the preference extended to the territories by the E.E.C.
Objections were also raised by Britain and Portugal because of the
disadvantageous position in which exports from their African territories have been placed. 167 Latin America exported 35·3 percent
of its total coffee exports to Europe in 1954-1955· 168 A study of
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America indicates gradual gains of African products in the E.E.C. market and
comparable Latin American losses. The impact of the E.E.C. Treaty
may accelerate this trend with a resulting weakening of international prices for Latin American commodities due to the characteristic inelasticity of demand for foodstuffs and tropical products,' with
a corresponding adverse effect on Latin American terms of trade. 169
The most recent report of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East shows the possible effect of the
Treaty on those regions. Thus, Indonesia exports 43 percent of its
total coffee exports to the Six; and 44 percent of the total tea exports
of the Far East go to the Community. The Far East would also be
affected with regard to its sugar, tobacco, and vegetable oil exports.
165

Ibid. I6I, I64Ibid. I 58
Olyslager, De Associatie der Overzeese Gebieden met de Europese Economische
Gemeenschap, II ECONOMISCH EN SOCIAAL T!JDSCHRIFT, I at 8 ( 1957). Cf. generally,
0LYSLAGER, DE AsSOCIATIE VON DE 0VERZEESE GEBIEDEN MET DE EUROPESE EcoNOMISCHE
GEMEENSCHAP (1958).
168
U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA, Note by the Secretariat on the
possible repercussions of the European Common Market on Latin American exports,
EjCN.IZ/449, 2I (1957).
169
Ibid. 23.
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Japan would be affected with regard to her exports of woolen, cotton, and rayon fabrics, medicines, and timber, and, in addition, would
face stiffer competition in third marketsY 0
These effects were analyzed by a recent G.A.T.T. study. 171 It
pointed out that the external tariff of the E.E.C. on tropical products-while it has the effect of a protective tariff in regard to the
products of the associated territories-is, by nature, a revenue tariff since no tropical products are produced within the E.E.C. The
result of the removal of these tariffs vis-a-vis the associated countries has a trade-diverting effect, it is argued, since it cannot displace high-cost production within the E.E.C. It is further argued
that the trade-diverting effect of the association, that is, the diversion of trade away from traditional sources of supply to the associated territories, could only be countered by an increase in total
imports from the outside, which would occur if imports from the
associated territories increased to such an extent that they offset the
displacement of imports from traditional sources.
The Six have consistently adopted the latter thesis to show that
the association will not be trade-diverting, and have argued beyond
this that the former suppliers will indeed benefit from an increase in
demand. 172 They foresee, for instance with regard to fats and vegetable oils, that imports from the associated countries will lower
Community prices. Yet, since the per capita consumption of these
products is far below that of the United States, increased demand
for these products may be expected with an increased standard of
living both in the Community and in the producing territories. For
purposes of an examination of trade effects the exportable surplus,
rather than total production, is therefore one criterion, and changing-especially increasing-patterns of consumption are another. 173
Finally, there is room for considerable doubt that the production of
the Overseas Territories will increase appreciably as a result of the
association and thus displace traditional imports. The solution of
problems of soil erosion, irrigation, transport and labor will require years, perhaps decades before the exportable surplus can
threaten to displace traditional sources of supply. 174 Thus, the posiOVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES

170

U.N. EcoNOMIC CoMMISSION FOR AsiA AND THE FAR EAST, Economic Survey of Asia

and the Far East 1958, 42-43, 46 (1959).
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G.A.T.T., TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 119-121 (1958).
Report of the G.A.T.T. Working Party on Tropical Products, Press Bulletin
EuROPE, Nos. 357-362, March 9-14, 1959.
173
U.N., supra note 170 at 43·
170
Jantzen, Die Entwicklungspolitik in Afrika siidlich der Sahara, 2 EuROPAISCHE
WIRTSCHAFT 251 at 252 (1959).
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tion of the Six in the G.A.T.T. negotiations is that the association
will not prejudice traditional imports and that, in fact, it may be
expected that third countries will, beyond this, also benefit from an
appreciable share of the increase in demand in the E.E.C.
However, while they disclaim any of the disadvantageous effects
asserted by third countries, the Six have already taken steps and
issued policy statements which are intended to ensure that third
countries will not suffer the feared adverse effects. To prevent
short-term effects, the Six extended part of their first I o percent
tariff reduction (of January I, I959) to their O.E.E.C. and
G.A.T.T. partners, as well as to those countries which enjoy mostfavored-nation treatment. 175 In formulating long-term policy, the
Six are also obligated by the Treaty to take into account the interests of third countries, 176 and the Treaty enables the Community to
negotiate trade agreements. 177 In the meantime, the E.E.C. Council has already declared its willingness to work within G.A.T.T. towards a general lowering of trade barriers.
170
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Report of the Committee
on Trade, EJCN.u/497 (E/CN.u/s), 1959, 17.
170
Arts. 18, uo, 111 (s).
177
Art. 113.

Annex

European Free Trade Association
Text of Convention and other Documents
Approved at Stockholm on
zoth November, 1959 *
I.-COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT STOCKHOLM,
20TH NOVEMBER, 1959

On behalf of their Governments, Ministers from Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom have today initialled at Stockholm the text of a Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association, to consist
of the seven founding members together with any other countries
which may accede to it.
The purposes of the Association are economic expansion, full employment, the rational use of resources, financial stability and a
higher standard of living.
The Convention will establish a free market between the members of the Association. This will be achieved by the abolition of
tariffs and other obstacles to trade in the industrial products of
members over a period of ten years, or earlier if so decided. Each
country will be free to decide its own external tariffs.
Freer trade between the participating countries will stimulate
competition a~d economic expansion. There are provisions to ensure that the effects of the removal of the barriers to trade are not
nullified by means of subsidies, practices of state undertakings, restrictive business practices and limitations to the establishment of
enterprises.
The Convention also covers agricultural goods, for which special
provisions are made and agreements concluded so as to promote
expansion of trade and ensure a sufficient degree of reciprocity to
the countries whose major exports are agricultural. To the same end
* Cmnd. 906, London.
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there are also special rules for trade in non-processed fish and
marine products.
The Convention reaffirms the determination of the seven member countries to facilitate the early establishment of a multilateral
association for the removal of trade barriers and the promotion of
closer economic co-operation between the members of the organisation for European Economic Co-operation, including the six members of the European Economic Community. To this end a special
resolution was adopted.
As world trading nations, the countries of the European Free
Trade Association are particularly conscious of Europe's links with
the rest of the world. They have therefore chosen a form of economic co-operation which, while strengthening Europe, enables them
to take full account of the interests of other trading countries
throughout the world, including those facing special problems of
development. The Association is a further expression of the postwar drive towards lower trade barriers, and reflects the principles
which have been established by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (G.A.T.T.). The individual freedom of action of
E.F.T.A. members in their external tariffs will allow each of them
to participate actively in G.A.T.T. negotiations for tariff reductions.
The Ministers were informed that the Finnish Government
wished to discuss means by which they could participate in the arrangements planned by the E.F.T.A. and warmly welcomed this
Finnish initiative.
The Convention establishes a Council charged with the supervision of the application of the Convention and the furtherance of
its objectives. Pending ratification of the Convention the Committee
of senior officials remains in being to ensure the closest contact between member governments on all matters of major importance
arising out of the Association. A Preparatory Committee has been
established to develop the institutions of E.F.T.A.
It was agreed to seek ratification of the Convention not later than
March 31st, 1960.
II.-RESOL UTION
For more than 10 years, the seven countries which are now establishing the European Free Trade Association, have co-operated
most successfully within the framework of the O.E.E.C. both with
the six countries which are Members of the European Economic
Community, and with Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Turkey and recently Spain.

ANNEX

Indeed the remarkable expansion of the European economy since
the end of the war is due, to a large extent, to the work of the
O.E.E.C. Its achievements have had beneficial effects far beyond
Europe. By preparing the convertibility of currencies, the O.E.E.C.
has created the conditions permitting its members to eliminate the
restrictions on trade progressively also toward third countries. By
promoting freer trade in Europe, the O.E.E.C. plays therefore an
important role in the liberalisation of trade on a world-wide basis.
The existence of two groups, the European Free Trade Association and the European Economic Community, inspired by different
but not incompatible principles, implies the risk that futher progress along these lines be hampered, if such a danger could not be
avoided by an agreement to which all countries interested in European economic co-operation could subscribe.
Such an agreement, based on the principle of reciprocity, should
not cause any damage to the measures taken by the European Free
Trade Association and the European Economic Community. Moreover, it should allow member States of either organisation to eliminate' in common the obstacles to trade between them, and more generally, to seek to solve the problems they share. Among those, there
is the problem of aiding the less developed countries in Europe and
in other continents, which is one of the foremost tasks of the more
advanced countries.
Common action in these fields would strengthen the already existing bonds between the European countries as well as the solidarity
arisingfrom their common destiny, even if their views on the way
in which European integration should be achieved are not always
identical.
· For these reasons, the seven Governments who will sign the Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association, declare
their determination to do all in their power to avoid a new division
in Europe. They regard their Association as a step toward an agreement between all member countries of O.E.E.C.
To this end the seven Governments are ready to initiate negotiations with the members of the E.E.C. as soon as they are prepared
to do so. Meanwhile views should be exchanged through diplomatic
channels or in any other way, on the basis upon which such negotiations may profitably be opened.
Stockholm, November 20, 1959.
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III.-cONVENTION ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION
(Text as initialled by Ministers at Stockholm on 20th
November, I 9 59)

The Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom
of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden, the
Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland:
Having regard to the Convention for European Economic Cooperation of 16th April, 1948, which established the Organisation
for European Economic Co-operation;
Resolved to maintain and develop the co-operation instituted
within that Organisation;
Determined to facilitate the early establishment of a multilateral
association for the removal of trade barriers and the promotion of
closer economic co-operation between the Members of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, including the Members of the European Economic Community;
Having regard to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;
Resolved to promote the objectives of that Agreement;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I

The Association
I. An international organisation to be known as the European
Free Trade Association, hereinafter referred to as "the Association," is hereby established.
2. The Members of the Association, hereinafter referred to as
"Member States," shall be the States which ratify this Convention
and such other States as may accede to it.
3· The Area of the Association shall be the territories to which
this Convention applies.
4· The Institutions of the Association shall be a Council and such
other organs as the Council may set up.
ARTICLE 2

Objectives
The objectives of the Association shall be:
(a) to promote in the Area of the Association and in each Member State a sustained expansion of economic activity, full
employment, increased productivity and the rational use of

ANNEX

resources, financial stability and continuous improvement in
living standards,
(b) to secure that trade between Member States takes place in
conditions of fair competition,
(c) to avoid significant disparity between Member States in the
conditions of supply of raw materials produced within the
Area of the Association, and
(d) to contribute to the harmonious development and expansion
of world trade and to the progressive removal of barriers
to it.
ARTICLE 3
Import duties
1. Member States shall reduce and ultimately eliminate, in accordance with this Article, customs duties and any other charges
with equivalent effect, except duties notified in accordance with
Article 6 and other charges which fall within that Article, imposed
on or in connexion with the importation of goods which are eligible
for Area tariff treatment in accordance with Article 4· Any such
duty or other charge is hereinafter referred to as an "import duty."
2. (a) On and after each of the following dates, Member States
shall not apply an import duty on any product at a level exceeding
the percentage of the basic duty specified against that date:
1st July, 1960 ....
1st January, 1962
1st July, 1963 ..... · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ist January, 1965
........ .
I st January, 1966 .............. .
Ist January, 1967
. · .. · .
Ist January, 1968
Ist January, 1969

8o percent
70 percent
6o percent
so percent
40 percent
30 percent
20 percent
10 percent

(b) On and after 1st January, 1970, Member States shall not
apply any import duties.
3· Subject to Annex A, the basic duty referred to in paragraph 2
of this Article is, in respect of each Member State and in respect of
any product, the import duty applied by that Member State to the
imports of that product from other Member States on 1st January,
1960.
4. Each Member State declares its willingness to apply import
duties at a level below that indicated in paragraph 2 of this Article
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if it considers that its economic and financial position and the position of the sector concerned so permit.
5· The Council may at any time decide that any import duties
shall be reduced more rapidly or eliminated earlier than is provided
in paragraph 2 of this Article. Between rst July, 1960, and 31st
December, 1961, the Council shall examine whether it is possible so
to decide in respect of import duties applied on some or all goods by
some or all of the Member States.
ARTICLE

+

Area tariff treatment
r. For the purposes of Articles 3 to 7, goods shall, subject to
Annex B, be accepted as eligible for Area tariff treatment if they
have been consigned to the territory of the importing Member State
from the territory of another Member State and if they are of Area
origin under any one of the following conditions:
(a) that they have been wholly produced within the Area of the
Association;
(b) that they fall within a description of goods listed in the
Process Lists which form Schedules I and II to Annex B and
have been produced within the Area of the Association by
the appropriate qualifying process described in those Lists;
(c) that in the case of goods other than those listed in Schedule
II to Annex B, they have been produced within the Area of
the Association, and that the value of any materials imported from outside the Area or of undetermined origin
which have been used at any stage of the production of the
goods does not exceed
percent of the export price of the
goods.
2. For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, materials listed in the Basic Materials List
which forms Schedule III to Annex B which have been used in the
state described in that List in a process of production within the
Area of the Association shall be deemed to contain no element imported from outside the Area.
3· Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Member State
from accepting as eligible for Area tariff treatment any goods imported from the territory of another Member State, provided that
the like goods imported from the territory of any Member State
are accorded the same treatment.
4· Provisions necessary for the administration and effective application of this Article are contained in Annex B.

so
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5· The Council may decide to amend the provisions of this Article and of Annex B.
6. The Council shall from time to time examine in what respect
this Convention can be amended in order to ensure the smooth
operation of the origin rules and especially to make them simpler
and more liberal.
ARTICLE
1.

5

Deflection of trade
For the purposes of this Article, trade is said to be deflected

when

(a) imports of a particular product into the territory of a Member State from
.mcreasmg,
.

the territory of another Member State are

(i) as a result of the reduction or elimination in the importing Member State of duties and charges on that
product in accordance with Article 3 or 6, and
( ii) because the duties or charges levied by the exporting
Member State on imports of raw materials or intermediate products, used in the production of the product
in question, are significantly lower than the corresponding duties or charges levied by the importing Member
State, and
(b) this increase in imports causes or would cause serious injury
to production which is carried on in the territory of the importing Member State.
2. The Council shall keep under review the question of deflections
of trade and their causes. It shall take such decisions as are necessary
in order to deal with the causes of deflection of trade by amending
the rules of origin in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 4 or by
such other means as it may consider appropriate.
3· If a deflection of trade of a particularly urgent nature occurs,
any Member State may refer the matter to the Council. The Council
shall take its decision as quickly as possible, and, in general, within
one month. The Council may, by majority decision, authorise interim measures to safeguard the position of the Member State in
question. Such measures shall not continue for longer than is necessary for the procedure under paragraph 2 above to take place, and
for not more than two months, unless, in exceptional cases, the Council, by majority decision, authorises an extension of this period by
not more than two months.
4· A Member State which is considering the reduction of the ef-
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fective level of its duties or charges on any product not eligible for
Area tariff treatment shall, as far as may be practicable, notify the
Council not less than thirty days before such reduction comes into
effect, and shall consider any representations by other Member
States that the reduction is likely to lead to a deflection of trade.
Information received under this paragraph shall not be disclosed to
any person outside the service of the Association or the Government of any Member State.
5. When considering changes in their duties or charges on any
product not eligible for Area tariff treatment, Member States shall
have due regard to the desirability of avoiding consequential deflections of trade. In such cases, any Member State which considers
that trade is being deflected may refer the matter to the Council in
accordance with Article 3 1.
6. If, in the consideration of any complaint in accordance with
Article 3 I, reference is made to a difference in the level of duties or
charges on any product not eligible for Area tariff treatment, that
difference shall be taken into account only if the Council finds by
majority vote that there is a deflection of trade.
7. The Council shall review from time to time the provisions of
this Article and may decide to amend those provisions.
ARTICLE 6
Revenue duties and internal taxation
I. Member States shall not
(a) apply directly or indirectly to imported goods any fiscal
charges in excess of those applied directly or indirectly to
like domestic goods, nor otherwise apply such charges so as
to afford effective protection to like domestic goods, or
(b) apply fiscal charges to imported goods of a kind which they
do not produce, or which they do not produce in substantial
quantities, in such a way as to afford effective protection to
the domestic production of goods of a different kind which
are substitutable for the imported goods, which enter into
direct competition with them and which do not bear directly
or indirectly, in the country of importation, fiscal charges of
equivalent incidence,
and shall give effect to these obligations in the manner laid down in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.
2. Member States shall not introduce new fiscal charges which
are inconsistent with paragraph 1 of this Article, and shall not vary
an existing fiscal charge in such a way as to increase, above the level
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in force on the date by reference to which the basic duty is determined in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 3, any effective protective element in the fiscal charge, that is to say, the extent to which
that charge is inconsistent with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3· (a) In the case of any internal tax or other internal charge,
Member States shall eliminate any effective protective element on or
before 1st January, 1962.
(b) In the case of any revenue duty, Member States shall either
( i) progressively eliminate any effective protective element
in the duty by successive reductions corresponding to
those prescribed for import duties in Articles 3, or
(ii) eliminate any effective protective element in the duty
on or before 1st January, 1965.
(c) Each Member State shall, on or before Ist July, 1960,
notify to the Council any duty to which it will apply the provisions
of sub-paragraph (b) ( ii) of this paragraph.
4· Each Member State shall notify to the Council all fiscal
charges applied by it where the rates of charge, or the conditions
governing the imposition or collection of the charge, are not identical in relation to the imported goods and to the like domestic goods,
as soon as the Member State applying the charge considers that the
charge is, or has been made, consistent with sub-paragraph (a) of
paragraph 1 of this Article. Each Member State shall, at the request of any other Member State, supply information about the application of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article.
5. Each Member State shall notify to the Council the revenue
duties to which it intends to apply the provisions of this Article.
6. For the purposes of this Article:
(a) "fiscal charges" means revenue duties, internal taxes and
other internal charges on goods;
(b) "revenue duties" means customs duties and other similar
charges applied primarily for the purpose of raising revenue;
(c) "imported goods" means goods which are accepted as being
eligible for Area tariff treatment in accordance with the provisions of Article 4·
ARTICLE 7
Drawback
1. Each Member State may, on and after 1st January, 1970, refuse to accept as eligible for Area tariff treatment goods which benefit from drawback allowed by Member States in the territory of
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which the goods have undergone the processes of production which
form the basis of the claim that the goods in question are of Area
origin. In applying this paragraph, each Member State shall accord
the same treatment to imports from the territories of all Member
States.
2. Similar provisions shall apply to drawback in respect of imported materials of the kinds listed in Annex D and in Annex E.
3· Before 31st December, 1960, the Council shall decide what
provisions are to be applied to deal with drawback in the period
after Jist December, 1961, and before 1st January, 1970.
4· The Council may at any time after their decision under paragraph 3 consider whether further or different provisions are necessary to deal with drawback after 3 I st December, 196 I, and may
decide that such provisions are to be applied.
5. For the purposes of this Article :
(a) "drawback" means any arrangement for the refund or remission, wholly or in part, of duties applicable to imported
materials, provided that the arrangement, expressly or in
effect, allows refund or remission if certain goods or rna
terials are exported, but not if they are retained for home
use;
(b) "remission" includes exemption for materials brought into
free ports and other places which have similar customs
privileges;
(c) "duties" means ( i) all charges on or in connection with importation, except the fiscal charges to which Article 6 applies
and (ii) any protective element in such fiscal charges;
(d) "materials" and "process of production" have the meanings
assigned to them in Rule I of Annex B.
ARTICLE 8
Prohibition of export duties
I. Member States shall not introduce or increase export duties,
and, on and after I st January, I 962, shall not apply any such duties.
2. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any Member
State from taking such measures as are necessary to prevent evasion,
by means of re-export, of duties which it applies to exports to territories outside the Area of the Association.
3· For the purposes of this Article, "export duties" means any
duties or charges with equivalent effect, imposed on or in connection
with the exportation of goods from the territory of any Member
State to the territory of any other Member State.
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ARTICLE 9
Co-operation in customs administration
Member States shall take appropriate measures, including arrangements regarding administrative co-operation, to ensure that
the provisions of Articles 3 to 7 and of Annexes A and B are effectively and harmoniously applied, taking account of the need to reduce as far as is possible the formalities imposed on trade and of
the need to achieve mutually satisfactory solutions of any difficulties
arising out of the operation of those provisions.
ARTICLE IO

Quantitative import restrictions
I. Member States shall not introduce or intensify quantitative
restrictions on imports of goods from the territory of other Member States.
2. Member States shall eliminate such quantitative restrictions
as soon as possible and not later than JISt December, I969.
3· Each Member State shall relax quantitative restrictions progressively and in such a way that a reasonable rate of expansion of
trade as a result of the application of Articles 3 and 6 is not frustrated and that no burdensome problems are created for the Member State concerned in the years immediately preceding Ist January,
I970.
4· Each Member State shall apply the provisions of this Article
in such a way that all other Member States are given like treatment.
5· On Ist July, I96o, Member States shall establish for all goods
subject to quantitative restriction global quotas of a size not less
than 20 percent above the corresponding basic quotas. In the case of
quotas which may be available also to States which are not Members, the global quotas shall include, in addition to the basic quotas
increased by not less that 20 percent, an amount not less than the
total of the imports from such States in the calendar year I959·
6. If a basic quota is nil or negligible, Member States shall ensure
that the quota to be established on Ist July, I96o, is of appropriate
size. Before or after the establishment of any such quota, any Member State may initiate consultations about its appropriate size.
7. On I st July, I 96 I, and on I st July in each succeeding year,
Member States shall increase each quota established in accordance
with paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Article by not less than 20 percent
of an amount equivalent to the basic quota as already increased pursuant to this Article.
8. If any Member State considers that the application of para-
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graphs 5 to 7 of this Article to a product would cause it serious difficulties, that Member State may propose to the Council alternative
arrangements for that product. The Council may, by majority decision, authorise that Member State to adopt such alternative arrangements as the Council considers appropriate.
9· Member States shall notify to the Council details of the quotas
established in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
IO. The Council shall, not later than Jist December, I96I, and
from time to time thereafter, review the provisions of this Article
and the progress made by Member States in the application of its
provisions, and may decide that further or different provisions are
to be applied.
I r. For the purposes of this Article:
(a) "quantitative restrictions" means prohibitions or restrictions on imports from the territory of other Member States
whether made effective through quotas, import licences or
other measures with equivalent effect, including administrative measures and requirements restricting import;
(b) "basic quota" means any quota or the total of any quotas
which have been established, together with the total of any
imports which are otherwise subject to quantitative restriction, in respect of goods imported from the territory of
other Member States in the calendar year I959; or in the
case of global quotas which are open to States which are not
Members, the total of the imports under such quotas from
Member States in the calendar year I959;
(c) "global quota" means a quota under which licences or other
authorities to import allow the holders to import any of
the products covered by quota from all Member States and
other States to which the quota applies.
ARTICLE I I

Quantitative export restrictions
Member States shall not introduce or intensify prohibitions or
restrictions on exports to other Member States, whether made effective through quotas or export licences or other measures with
equivalent effect, and shall eliminate any such prohibitions or restrictions not later than 3 rst December, I96 r.
2. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any Member
State from taking such measures as are necessary to prevent evasion,
by means of re-export, of restrictions which it applies to exports to
territories outside the Area of the Association.
I.
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ARTICLE I2

Exceptions
Provided that such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between Member States, or as a disguised restriction on trade between Member States, nothing in Articles IO and I 1 shall prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member State of measures,
(a) necessary to protect public morals,
(b) necessary for the prevention of disorder or crime,
(c) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations relating to customs enforcement, or to the classification, grading or marketing of goods, or to the operation of monopolies
by means of state enterprises or enterprises given exclusive
or special privileges,
(e) necessary to protect industrial property or copyrights or to
prevent deceptive practices,
(f) relating to gold or silver,
(g) relating to the products of prison labour, or
(h) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic,
historic or archaeological value.
ARTICLE I3

Government aids
I. Member States shall not maintain or introduce
(a) the forms of aid to exports of goods to other Member States
which are described in Annex C, or
(b) any other form of aid, the main purpose or effect of which
is to frustrate the benefits expected from the removal or
absence of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade between Member States.
2. If the application of any form of aid by a Member State, although not contrary to paragraph I of this Article, frustrates the
benefits expected from the removal or absence of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade between Member States and provided
that the procedure set out in paragraphs I to 3 of Article 3 I has
been followed, the Council may, by majority decision, authorise any
Member State to suspend to the Member State which is applying
the aid, the application of such obligations under this Convention as
the Council considers appropriate.
3· The Council may decide to amend the provisions of this Article and of Annex C.
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ARTICLE 14

Public undertakings
1. Member States shall ensure the progressive elimination, during the period from 1st July, 1960, to 3 Ist December, 1969, in the
practices of public undertakings, of
(a) measures the effect of which is to afford protection to domestic production which would be inconsistent with this Convention if achieved by means of a duty or charge with equivalent effect, quantitative restriction or Government aid, or
(b) trade discrimination on grounds of nationality in so far as
it frustrates the benefits expected from the removal or absence of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade between Member States.
2. In so far as the provisions of Article 15 are relevant to the activities of public undertakings, that Article shall apply to them in
the same way as it applies to other enterprises.
3· Member States shall ensure that new practices of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article are not introduced.
4· Where Member States do not have the necessary legal powers
to control the activities of regional or local government authorities
or enterprises under their control in these matters, they shall nevertheless endeavour to ensure that those authorities or enterprises
comply with the provisions of this Article.
5. The Council shall keep the provisions of this Article under review and may decide to amend them.
6. For the purposes of this Article, "public undertakings" means
central, regional, or local government authorities, public enterprises
and any other organisation by means of which a Member State, by
law or in practice, controls or appreciably influences imports from,
or exports to, the territory of a Member State.
ARTICLE 15
Restrictive business practices
1. Member States recognise that the following practices are incompatible with this Convention in so far as they frustrate the benefits expected from the removal or absence of duties and quantitative
restrictions on trade between Member States:
(a) agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of
enterprises and concerted practices between enterprises
which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Area of the
Association;
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(b) actions by which one or more enterprises take unfair advantage of a dominant position within the Area of the Association or a substantial part of it.
2. If any practice of the kind described in paragraph I of this
Article is referred to the Council in accordance with Article 3 I, the
Council may, in any recommendation in accordance with paragraph
3 or in any decision in accordance with paragraph 4 of that Article,
make provision for publication of a report on the circumstances of
the matter.
3· (a) In the light of experience gained, the Council shall consider not later than 3 I st December, I 964, and may consider at any
time therafter, whether further or different provisions are necessary
to deal with the effects of restrictive business practices or dominant
enterprises on trade between Member States.
(b) Such review shall include consideration of the following matters:
( i) specification of the restrictive business practices or
dominant enterprises with which the Council should
be concerned;
( ii) methods of securing information about restrictive
business practices or dominant enterprises;
(iii) procedures for investigations;
( iv) whether the right to initiate inquiries should be conferred on the Council.
(c) The Council may decide to make the provisions found necessary as a result of the review envisaged in sub-paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this paragraph.
ARTICLE I6

Establishment
Member States recognise that restrictions on the establishment and operation of economic enterprises in their territories by
nationals of other Member States should not be applied, through
accord to such nationals of treatment which is less favourable than
that accorded to their own nationals in such matters, in such a way
as to frustrate the benefits expected from the removal or the absence of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade between Member States.
2. Member States shall not apply new restrictions in such a way
that they conflict with the principle set out in paragraph I of this
Article.
3· Member States shall notify the Council, within such period as
I.
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the Council may decide, of particulars of any restrictions which
they apply in such a way that nationals of another Member State
are accorded in their territories less favourabletreatment in respect
of the matters set out in paragraph 1 of this Article than is accorded
to their own nationals.
4· The Council shall consider not later than 31st December,
1964, and may consider at any time thereafter, whether further or
different provisions are necessary to give effect to the principles set
out in paragraph 1 of this Article, and may decide to make the necessary provisiOns.
5· Nothing in this Article shall prevent the adoption and enforcement by a Member State of measures for the control of entry, residence, activity and departure of aliens where such measures are
justified by reasons of public order, public health or morality, or
national security, or for the prevention of a serious imbalance in the
social or demographic structure of that Member State.
6. For the purposes of this Article:
(a) "nationals" means, in relation to a Member State,
( i) physical persons who have the nationality of that
Member State and
( ii) companies and other legal persons constituted in the
territory of that Member State in conformity with the
law of that State and which that State regards as having its nationality, provided that they have been
formed for gainful purposes and that they have their
registered office and central administration, and carry
on substantial activity, within the Area of the Association;
(b) "economic enterprises" means any type of economic enterprise for production of or commerce in goods which are of
Area origin, whether conducted by physical persons or
through agencies, branches or companies or other legal persons.
ARTICLE 17

Dumped and subsidised imports
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent any Member State
from taking action against dumped or subsidised imports consistently with its other international obligations.
2. Any products which have been exported from the territory of
one Member State to the territory of another Member State and
1.
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have not undergone any manufacturing process since exportation
shall, when reimported into the territory of the first Member State,
be admitted free of quantitative restrictions and measures with
equivalent effect. They shall also be admitted free of customs duties
and charges with equivalent effect, except that any allowance by way
of drawback, relief from duty or otherwise, given by reason of the
exportation from the territory of the first Member State, may be
recovered.
3· If any industry in the territory of any Member State is suffer~
ing or is threatened with material injury as the result of the import
of dumped or subsidised products into the territory of another
Member State, the latter Member State shall, at the request of the
former Member State, examine the possibility of taking such action
as is consistent with its international obligations to remedy the in~
jury or prevent the threatened injury.
ARTICLE IS

Security exceptions
I. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent any Member State
from taking action which it considers necessary for the protection of
its essential security interests, where such action
(a) is taken to prevent the disclosure of information,
(b) relates to trade in arms, ammunition or war materials or to
research, development or production indispensable for de~
fence purposes, provided that such action does not include
the application of import duties or the quantitative restric~
tion of imports except in so far as such restriction is per~
. mitted in accordance with Article I 2 or is authorised by de~
cision of the Council,
(c) is taken to ensure that nuclear materials and equipment
made available for peaceful purposes do not further mili~
tary purposes, or
(d) is taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations.
2. Nothing in this Conventi01i shall prevent any lVlember State
from taking action to carry out undertakings into which that Mem~
ber State has entered for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security.
ARTICLE 19
I.

Balance of payments difficulties
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 10, any Member
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State may, consistently with its other international obligations, introduce quantitative restrictions on imports for the purpose of safeguarding its balance of payments.
2. Any Member State taking measures in accordance with paragraph I of this Article shall notify them to the Council, if possible
before they come into force. The Council shall examine the situation
and keep it under review and may at any time by majority vote,
make recommendations designed to moderate any damaging effect
of these restrictions or to assist the Member State concerned to overcome its difficulties. If the balance of payments difficulties persist
for more than I 8 months and the measures applied seriously disturb the operation of the Association, the Council shall examine the
situation and may, taking into account the interests of all Member
States, by majority decision, devise special procedures to attenuate
or compensate for the effect of such measures.
3· A Member State which has taken measures in accordance with
paragraph I of this Article shall have regard to its obligation to resume the full application of Article IO and shall, as soon as its
balance of payments situation improves, make proposals to the
Council on the way in which this should be done. The Council, if
it is not satisfied that these proposals are adequate, may, by majority vote, recommend to the Member State alternative arrangements to the same end.
ARTICLE 20

Difficulties in particular sectors
1. If, in the territory of a Member State,
(a) an appreciable rise in unemployment in a particular sector
of industry or region is caused by a substantial decrease in
internal demand for a domestic product, and
(b) this decrease in demand is due to an increase in imports from
the territory of other 1\llember States as a result of the
progressive elimination of duties, charges and quantitative
restrictions in accordance with Articles 3, 6 and IO,
that Member State may, notwithstanding any other provisions of
this Convention,
( i) limit those imports by means of quantitative restrictions to a rate not less than the rate of such imports
during any period of twelve months which ended within
twelve months of the date on which the restrictions
come into force; the restrictions shall not be continued
for a period longer than eighteen months, unless the
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Council, by majority decision, authorises their continuance for such further period and on such conditions
as the Council considers appropriate; and
(ii) take such measures, either instead of or in addition to
restriction of imports in accordance with sub-paragraph ( i) of this paragraph, as the Council may, by
majority decision, authorise.
2. In applying measures in accordance with paragraph I of this
Article, a Member State shall give like treatment to imports from
the territory of all Member States.
3· A Member State applying restrictions in accordance with subparagraph ( i) of paragraph I of this Article shall notify them to
the Council, if possible before they come into force. The Council
may at any time consider those restrictions and may, by majority
vote, make recommendations designed to moderate any damaging
effect of those restrictions or to assist the Member State concerned
to overcome its difficulties.
4. If at any time after Ist July, I96o, a Member State considers
that the application of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 of Article 3 and paragraph 3 of Article 6 to any product would lead to the
situation described in paragraph I of this Article, it may propose to
the Council an alternative rate of reduction of the import duty or
protective element concerned. If the Council finds that the proposal
is justified, it may, by majority decision, authorise that Member
State to apply an alternative rate of reduction, provided that the
obligations relating to the final elimination of the import duty or
protective element in accordance with sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of Article 3 and paragraph 3 of Article 6 are fulfilled.
5. Before I st January, I 970, if the Council considers that some
provision similar to those in paragraphs I to 3 of this Article will be
required thereafter, it may decide that such provisions shall have
effect for any period after that date.
ARTICLE 21

Agricultural goods
In view of the special considerations affecting agriculture the
provisions in all the foregoing Articles of this Convention, except
Articles I and I7, shall not apply in relation to the agricultural
goods which are listed in Annex D. The Council may decide to amend
the provisions of this paragraph and Annex D.
2. The special provisions which shall apply in relation to those
agricultural goods are set out in Articles 22 to 2 5.
1.
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ARTICLE 22

Agricultural policies and objective
I. In regard to agriculture, Member States recognise that the
policies pursued by them are designed
(a) to promote increased productivity and the rational and economic development of production,
(b) to provide a reasonable degree of market stability and adequate supplies to consumers at reasonable prices, and
(c) to ensure an adequate standard of living to persons engaged
in agriculture.
In pursuing these policies, Member States shall have due regard to
the interests of other Member States in the export of agricultural
goods and shall take into consideration traditional channels of trade.
2. Having regard to these policies, the objective of the Association shall be to facilitate an expansion of trade which will provide
reasonable reciprocity to Member States whose economies depend
to a great extent on exports of agricultural goods.
ARTICLE 23

Agricultural agreements between Member States
In pursuit of the objective set out in paragraph 2 of Article
22 and as a foundation for their co-operation in respect of agriculture, certain Member States have concluded agreements setting out
measures to be taken, including the elimination of customs duties on
some agricultural goods, in order to facilitate the expansion of trade
in agricultural goods. In so far as any two or more Member States
may at a later date conclude such agreements, they shall inform the
other Member States before the agreements take effect.
2. Agreements concluded in accordance with paragraph I of this
Article, and any agreement modifying these agreements which is
made by the parties to them, shall remain in force as long as this
Convention. Copies of such agreements shall be transmitted immediately after signature to the other Member States, and a certified copy shall be deposited with the Government of Sweden.
3· Any provisions regarding tariffs contained in such agreements
shall apply in favour of all other Member States, and the benefit of
those provisions shall not, as a result of any modification, be withdrawn from Member States without the consent of all of them.
I.

ARTICLE 24
I.

Export subsidies on agricultural goods
A Member State shall not cause damage to the interests of
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other Member States by granting directly or indirectly any subsidy
on a product listed in Annex D which results in an increase of that
Member State's exports of that product compared with the exports
which that Member State had in the product in question in a recent
representative period.
2. It shall be the object of the Council, before 1st January, 1962,
to establish rules for the gradual abolition of subsidised exports
detrimental to other Member States.
3· The exemption of an exported product from duties, taxes or
other charges borne by the like product when destined for domestic
consumption or the remission of such duties, taxes or other charges
in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be
deemed to be a subsidy for the purpose of this Article.
ANNEX

ARTICLE

25

Consultations on trade in agricultural goods
The Council shall keep the provisions of Articles 2 1 to 25 under
review, and it shall once a year consider the development of trade
in agricultural goods within the Area of the Association. The Council shall consider what further action shall be taken in pursuit of the
objective set out in Article 2 2.
ARTICLE 26
Fish and other marine products
1. The provisions in all the foregoing Articles of this Convention, except Articles 1 and 17, shall not apply in relation to the fish
and other marine products which are listed in Annex E. The special
provisions which shall apply to those fish and other marine products
are set out in Articles 27 and 28.
2. The Council may decide to delete products from the list contained in Annex E.
ARTICLE 27
Objective for trade in fish and other marine products
Having regard to the national policies of Member States and the
special conditions prevailing in the fishing industry, the objective
of the Association shall be to facilitate an expansion of trade in fish
and other marine products which will provide reasonable reciprocity
to Member States whose economies depend to a great extent on exports of those products.
ARTICLE 28
Trade in fish and other marine products
The Council shall before 1st January, 1961, begin an examination
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of arrangements relating to trade in products listed in Annex E
having regard to the objective set out in Article 27. This examination shall be concluded before I st January, I 962.
ARTICLE

29

Invisible transactions and transfers
Member States recognise the importance of invisible transactions
and transfers for the proper functioning of the Association. They
consider that the obligations with regard to the freedom of such
transactions and transfers undertaken by them in other international
organisations are sufficient at present. The Council may decide on
such further provisions with regard to such transactions and transfers as may prove desirable, having due regard to the wider international obligations of Member States.
ARTICLE 30

Economic and financial policies
Member States recognise that the economic and financial policies
of each of them affect the economies of other Member States and
intend to pursue those policies in a manner which serves to promote
the objectives of the Association. They shall periodically exchange
views on all aspects of those policies. In so doing, they shall take
into account the corresponding activities within the Organisation
for European Economic Co-operation and other international organisations. The Council may make recommendations to Member
States on matters relating to those policies to the extent necessary
to ensure the attainment of the objectives and the smooth operation
of the Association.
ARTICLE 3 I
General consultations and complaints procedure
1. If any Member State considers that any benefit conferred
upon it by this Convention or any objective of the Association is
being or may be frustrated and if no satisfactory settlement is
reached between the Member States concerned, any of those Member States may refer the matter to the Council.
2. The Council shall promptly, by majority vote, make arrangements for examining the matter. Such arrangements may include a
reference to an examining committee constituted in accordance with
Article 33· Before taking action under paragraph 3 of this Article,
the Council shall so refer the matter at the request of any Member
State concerned. Member States shall furnish all information which
they can make available and shall lend their assistance to establish
the facts.
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3· When considering the matter, the Council shall have regard
to whether it has been established that an obligation under the Convention has not been fulfilled, and whether and to what extent any
benefit conferred by the Convention or any objective of the Association is being or may be frustrated. In the light of this consideration
and of the report of any examining committee which may have been
appointed, the Council may, by majority vote, make to any Member State such recommendations as it considers appropriate.
4· If a Member State does not or is unable to comply with a
recommendation made in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article and the Council finds, by majority vote, that an obligation under
this Convention has not been fulfilled, the Council may, by majority
decision, authorise any Member State to suspend to the Member
State which has not complied with the recommendation the application of such obligations under this Convention as the Council considers appropriate.
S· Any Member State may, at any time while the matter is under
consideration, request the Council to authorise, as a matter of urgency, interim measures to safeguard its position. If it appears to
the Council that the circumstances are sufficiently serious to justify
interim action, and without prejudice to any action which it may
subsequently take in accordance with the preceding paragraphs of
this Article, the Council may, by majority decision, authorise a
Member State to suspend its obligations under this Convention
to such an extent and for such a period as the Council considers
appropriate.
ANNEX

ARTICLE 32

The Council
1. It shall be the responsibility of the Council
(a) to exercise such powers and functions as are conferred upon
it by this Convention,
(b) to supervise the application of this Convention and keep its
operation under review,
(c) to consider whether further action should be taken by Member States in order to promote the attainment of the objectives of the Association and to facilitate the establishment
of closer links with other States, unions of States or international organisations.
2. Each Member State shall be represented in the Council and
shall have one vote.
3· The Council may decide to set up such organs, committees and
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other bodies as it considers necessary to assist it in accomplishing
its tasks.
4· In exercising its responsibility under paragraph I of this Article, the Council may take decisions which shall be binding on all
Member States and may make recommendations to Member States.
5· Decisions and recommendations of the Council shall be made
by unanimous vote, except in so far as this Convention provides
otherwise. Decisions or recommendations shall be regarded as unanimous unless any Member State casts a negative vote. Decisions and
recommendations which are to be made by majority vote require
the affirmative vote of four Member States.
6. If the number of the Member States changes, the Council may
decide to amend the number of votes required for decisions and
recommendations which are to be made by majority vote.
ARTICLE 33
Examining committees
The Examining Committees referred to in Article 3 I shall consist of persons selected for their competence and integrity, who, in
the performance of their duties, shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any State, or from any authority or organisation
other than the Association. They shall be appointed by the Council
on such terms and conditions as it shall decide.
ARTICLE 34
Administrative arrangements of the Association
The Council shall take decisions for the following purposes:
(a) to lay down the Rules of Procedure of the Council and of
any bodies of the Association, which may include provision
that procedural questions may be decided by majority vote;
(b) to make arrangements for the Secretariat services required
by the Association;
(c) to establish the financial arrangements necessary for the administrative expenses of the Association, the procedure for
establishing a budget and the apportionment of those expenses between the Member States.
ARTICLE 35
Legal capacity, privileges and immumtles
1. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities to be recognised
and granted by the Member States in connection with the Association shall be laid down in a Protocol to this Convention.
2. The Council, acting on behalf of the Association, may conclude with the Government of the State in whose territory the head-
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quarters will be situated an agreement relating to the legal capacity
and the privileges and immunities to be recognized and granted in
connection with the Association.
ARTICLE

36

Relations with international organisations
The Council, acting on behalf of the Association, shall seek to
establish such relationships with other international organisations
as may facilitate the attainment of the objectives of the Association.
It shall in particular seek to establish close collaboration with the
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.
ARTICLE 37
Obligations under other international agreements
Nothing in this Convention shall be regarded as exempting any
Member State from obligations which it has undertaken by virtue
of the Convention for European Economic Co-operation, the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other international agreements to which it is a party.
ARTICLE 38
Annexes
The Annexes to this Convention are an integral part of it and
are the following:
Annex A.-Basic duties.
Annex B.-Rules regarding Area origin for tariff purposes.
Annex C.-List of Government aids referred to in paragraph 1
of Article 13.
Annex D.-List of agricultural goods referred to in Article 2 I,
paragraph I.
Annex E.-Fish and other marine products.
Annex F.-List of territories to which paragraph 2 of Article
43 applies.
Annex G.-Special arrangements for Portugal in regard to import duties and quantitative export restrictions.
ARTICLE 39
Ratification
This Convention shall be ratified by the signatory States. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of
Sweden which shall notify all other signatory States.
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ARTICLE 40

Entry into force
This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by all signatory States.
ARTICLE 4I

Accession and association
1. Any State may accede to this Convention, provided that the
Council decides to approve its accession, on such terms and conditions as may be set out in that decision. The instrument of accession
shall be deposited with the Government of Sweden which shall
notify all other Member States. This Convention shall enter into
force in relation to an acceding State on the date indicated in that
decision._
2. The Council may negotiate an agreement between the Member States and any other State, union of States or international organisation, creating an association embodying such reciprocal rights
and obligations, common actions and special procedures as may be
appropriate. Such an agreement shall be submitted to the Member
States for acceptance and shall enter into force provided that it is
accepted by all Member States. Instruments of acceptance shall be
deposited with the Government of Sweden which shall notify all
other Member States.
ARTICLE 42

Withdrawal
Any Member State may withdraw from this Convention provided
that it gives twelve months' notice in writing to the Government of
Sweden which shall notify all other Member States.

43
Territorial application
1. In relation to Member States which are signatories, this Convention shall apply to the European territories of Member States
and the European territories for whose international relations a
Member State is responsible, other than those listed in Annex F.
2. This Convention shall apply to the territories listed in Annex
F, if the Member State which is responsible for their international
relations so declares at the time of ratification or at any time thereafter.
3· In relation to a Member State which accedes to this Convention in accordance with paragraph I of Article 4 I, this Convention
shall apply to the territories specified in the decision approving the
accession of that State,
ARTICLE
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4· Member States recognise that certain Member States may
wish to propose at a later date that the application of this Convention should be extended to those of their territories and the territories for whose international relations they are responsible to which
it does not already apply, on terms and conditions then to be determined, and that arrangements creating reciprocal rights and obligations in relation to those territories should be established.
5· In that event, in order to give effect to paragraph 4, there
shall, in due course, be consultations among all Member States. The
Council may decide to approve the terms and conditions in accordance with which the application of this Convention may be extended
to those territories and may decide to approve the specific terms and
conditions of such arrangements.
6. If a territory, for whose international relations a Member
State is responsible and to which this Convention applies, becomes
a sovereign State, the provisions of this Convention applicable to
that territory shall, if the new State so requests, continue to apply to
it. The new State shall have the right to participate in the work of
the institutions of the Association and, in agreement with the new
State, the Council shall take the decisions necessary for adopting arrangements to give effect to such participation. The Convention
shall continue to apply to the new State on this basis either until
its participation ceases in the same manner as that provided with
regard to a Member State or, if its accession as a Member State is
approved in accordance with paragraph r of Article 41, until that
accession becomes effective.
7· The application of this Convention to any territory pursuant
to paragraphs 2, 3 or 5 of this Article may be terminated by the
Member State in question provided that it gives twelve months'
notice in writing.
8. Declarations and notifications made in accordance with this
Article shall be made to the Government of Sweden which shall
notify all other Member States.
ARTICLE 44
Amendment
Except where provision for modification is made elsewhere in
this Convention, including the Annexes to it, an amendment to the
provisions of this Convention shall be submitted to Member States
for acceptance if it is approved by decision of the Council, and it
shall enter into force provided it is accepted by all Member States.
Instruments of acceptance shall be deposited with the Government
of Sweden which shall notify all other Member States.
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In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto, have
signed the present Convention.
Done at Stockholm the
day of
, 1959, in
a single copy in the English and French languages, both texts being
equally authentic, which shall be deposited with the Government
of Sweden, by which certified copies shall be transmitted to all other
signatory and acceding States.

ANNEX A
Basic duties
I. In paragraph 3 of Article 3 and in this Annex, the import duty
applied to imports of a product on any date means the rate of duty
actually in force and levied on imports of that product on that date.
Where, however, specific quantities or consignments are allowed to
be imported under a special administrative licensing or control
scheme at a rate of duty lower than that otherwise levied on imports
of that product, that lower rate shall not be considered to be the
duty applied to that product. But where a lower rate of duty is applied unconditionally without quantitative limitation to imports of a
product by reason of the purpose for which it is imported, that rate
shall be considered to be the duty applied to that product when imported for that purpose.
2. Where, in a Member State, the import duty on any product is
temporarily suspended or reduced on 1st January, 1960, that Mem
ber State may, at any time before 3 rst December, 1964, restore the
import duty on that product, provided that
(a) the industry within its territory has committed itself to substantial expenditure on the development of manufacture of
the product in question before the date of signature of this
Convention; and
(b) the circumstances are such that it is reasonable to assume
that competition affecting that product from other Member
States was an essential element in the calculation of the industry in making its investment; and
(c) either the product is included in a list which has been notified
before the date of signature of this Convention, to the other
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States signatory to this Convention, or the Council has authorised such restoration by majority decision.
3· A Member State may restore the import duty on a product
otherwise than in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Annex, provided it has informed all other Member States at least one month
before the duty is to be restored. If, however, during that time or
later any other Member State has a practical interest in the product, i.e., that it produces and exports that product in significant quantities and so declares to the Member State which is proposing to restore or has restored the duty, that Member State shall not restore
or shall remove that duty. The Council may decide, by majority
vote, that a Member State does not have a practical interest in the
product.
4· From the date of restoration of a duty in accordance with
paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 of this Annex, the duty shall not exceed
that permitted under Article 3, on the assumption that the basic
duty is the duty which would have been applied on 1st January,
1960, if the duty had not been temporarily suspended or reduced on
that date.
S· For Denmark, the basic duty for any product shall be that
applied to imports of that product from other Member States on
Ist March, 1960.
6. For Norway, the basic duty on each of the following items
shall be the rate specified against that item or such lower rate as
may be specified at the relevant time in Schedule XIV to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
ANNEX

Product

Rate of duty
Norwegian
Kroner per
kg. or ad
valorem

Cigars
Cigarettes
Varnishes and polishes . . . . . . .
Articles of faience, not coloured
or decorated
Articles of faience, coloured or
decorated.
Decorated glassware for table

20:20:1212%
2212%, but not
less than o.So
2212%, but not
less than 1.20
zo%, but not

Norwegian Tariff
number

24.02 B
24.02 c
ex 32.09 C
69.12Ar

ex 70.13 B
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Norwegian Tariff
number

ex 73· I7 B
ex 73.20
85.03 A
ex 92. I

I

Rate of duty
Norwegian
Kroner per
kg. or ad
valorem

Product

and kitchen purposes
Soil-pipes . . .
Soil-pipes fittings . . .
Galvanic dry cells weighing up
to I So grams
Tape-recorders

less than 2.40

5%
I 5%
I 5%, but not
less than o. 55
I 5%
I

7· For the United Kingdom, the basic duty shall be 33% percent
ad valorem for the following products:Brussels nomenclature number
ex 32.05 Synthetic organic dyestuffs (including pigment dyestuffs) other than such dyestuffs dispersed or dissolved
in cellulose nitrate (plasticised or not); synthetic organic products of a kind used as luminophores, other
than such products consisting of synthetic organic dyestuffs (including pigment dyestuffs) dispersed or dissolved in artificial plastic material; and products of the
kind known as optical bleaching agents, substantive to
the fibre.
ex 32.09 Synthetic organic dyestuffs in forms or packings of a
kind sold by retail.
The provisions of this paragraph will take effect on the understanding that the duty of 33 Ya percent ad valorem will be introduced not
later than Ist July, 1960.
8. The Council may decide to authorise a Member State to adopt
any rate of duty as the basic duty for any product.
9· The provisions of this Annex apply only to duties on imports
of goods eligible for Area tariff treatment.

ANNEX B
Rules regarding area origin for tariff purposes
For the purpose of determining the origin of goods under Article
4 and for the application of that Article, the following Rules shall
be applied. The Schedules to this Annex are in the English language
only.

ANNEX

Rule

I

.-Interpretative Provisions

r. "The Area" means the Area of the Association.
2. In determining the place of production of marine products and
goods produced therefrom, a vessel of a Member State shall be regarded as part of the territory of that State. In determining the
place from which goods have been consigned, marine products taken
from the sea or goods produced therefrom at sea shall be regarded
as having been consigned from the territory of a Member State
if they were taken by or produced in a vessel of a Member State and
have been brought direct to the Area.
3· A vessel which is registered shall be regarded as a vessel of
the State in which it is registered and of which it flies the flag.
4· "Materials" includes products, parts and components used
in the production of the goods.
5. Energy, fuel, plant, machinery and tools used in the production
of goods within the Area, and materials used in the maintenance of
such plant, machinery and tools, shall be regarded as wholly produced within the Area when determining the origin of those goods.
6. "Produced" in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph I of Article
4 and "a process of production" in paragraph 2 of that Article include the application of any operation or process, with the exception of any operation or process which consists only of one or more
of the following:
(a) packing, wherever the packing materials may have been
produced;
(b) splitting up into lots;
(c) sorting and grading;
(d) marking;
(e) putting up into sets.
7. "Producer" includes a grower and a manufacturer and also a
person who supplies his goods otherwise than by sale to another
person and to whose order the last process in the course of the
manufacture of the goods is applied by that other person.

Rule 2.-Goods wholly produced within the Area
For the purposes of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph I of Article 4, the following are among the products which shall be regarded
as wholly produced within the Area:
(a) mineral products extracted from the ground within the
Area;
(b) vegetable products harvested within the Area;
(c) live animals born and raised within the Area;
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(d) products obtained within the Area from live animals;
(e) products obtained by hunting or fishing conducted within the
Area;
(/) marine products taken from the sea by a vessel of a Member State;
(g) used articles fit only for the recovery of rna terials, provided
that they have been collected from users within the Area;
(h) scrap and waste resulting from manufacturing operations
within the Area;
(i) goods produced within the Area exclusively from one or both
of the following:
(I) products within sub-paragraphs (a) to (h) ;
( 2) materials containing no element imported from outside
the Area or of undetermined origin.
Rule ].-Application of Percentage Criterion
For the purposes of sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph I of Article 4:
(a) Any materials which meet the conditions specified in subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph I of that Article shall
be regarded as containing no element imported from outside
the Area;
(b) The value of any materials which can be identified as having
been imported from outside the Area shall be their c.i.f.
value accepted by the customs authorities on clearance for
home use, or on temporary admission, at the time of last
importation into the territory of the Member State where
they were used in a process of production, less the amount
of any transport costs incurred in transit through the territory of other Member States;
(c) If the value of any materials imported from outside the
Area cannot be determined in accordance with sub-paragraph (b) of this Rule, their value shall be the earliest
ascertainable price paid for them in the territory of the
Member State where they were used in a process of production;
(d) If the origin of any materials cannot be determined, such
materials shall be deemed to have been imported from outside the Area and their value shall be the earliest ascertainable price paid for them in the territory of the Member
State where they were used in a process of production;
(e) The export price of the goods shall be the price paid or pay-
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able for them to the exporter in the territory of the Member
State where the goods were produced, that price being adjusted, where necessary, to a f.o.b. or free at frontier basis
in that territory;
(f) The value under sub-paragraphs (b), (c) or (d) or the
export price under sub-paragraph (e) of this Rule may be
adjusted to correspond with the amount which would have
been obtained on a sale in the open market between buyer
and seller independent of each other. This amount shall also
be taken to be the export price when the goods are not the
subject of a sale.
Rule 4.-Unit of Qualification
I. Each article in a consignment shall be considered separately.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Rule:
(a) where the Brussels Nomenclature specifies that a group, set
or assembly of articles is to be classified within a single heading, such a group, set or assembly shall be treated as one
article;
(b) tools, parts and accessories which are imported with an article, and the price of which is included in that of the article or
for which no separate charge is made, shall be considered as
forming a whole with the article, provided that they constitute the standard equipment customarily included on the
sale of articles of that kind;
(c) in cases not within sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), goods shall
be treated as a single article if they are so treated for purposes of assessing customs duties by the importing Member
State.
3. An unassembled or disassembled article which is imported in
more than one consignment because it is not feasible for transport
or production reasons to import it in a single consignment shall, if
the importer so requests, be treated as one article.
Rule s.-Segregation of materials
I. For those products or industries where it would be impracticable for the producer physically to segregate materials of similar
character but different origin used in the production of goods, such
segregation may be replaced by an appropriate accounting system,
which ensures that no more goods receive Area tariff treatment than
would have been the case if the producer had been able physically to
segregate the materials.
2. Any such accounting system shall conform to such conditions
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as may be agreed upon by the Member States concerned in order to
ensure that adequate control measures will be applied.
Rule 6.-Treatment of mixtures
I. In the case of mixtures, not being groups, sets or assemblies of
separable articles dealt with under Rule 4, a Member State may refuse to accept as being of Area origin any product resulting from the
mixing together of goods which would qualify as being of Area
origin with goods which would not so qualify, if the characteristics
of the product as a whole are not essentially different from the characteristics of the goods which have been mixed.
2. In the case of particular products where it is, however, recognised by Member States concerned to be desirable to permit mixing
of the kind described in paragraph I of this Rule, such products
shall be accepted as of Area origin in respect of such part thereof as
may be shown to correspond to the quantity of goods of Area origin
used in the mixing, subject to such conditions as may be agreed upon.
Rule 7.-Treatment of Packing
I. Where for purposes of assessing customs duties a Member
State treats goods separately from their packing, it may also, in
respect of its imports from the territory of another Member State,
determine separately the origin of such packing.
2. Where paragraph I of this Rule is not applied, packing shall
be considered as forming a whole with the goods and no part of any
packing required for their transport or storage shall be considered
as having been imported from outside the Area, when determining
the origin of the goods as a whole.
J. For the purpose of paragraph 2 of this Rule, packing with
which goods are ordinarily sold by retail shall not be regarded as
packing required for the transport or storage of goods.
Rule B.-Documentary Evidence
I. A claim that goods shall be accepted as eligible for Area tariff
treatment shall be supported by appropriate documentary evidence
of origin and consignment. The evidence of origin shall consist of
either( a) a declaration of origin completed by the last producer of the
goods within the Area, together with a supplementary declaration completed by the exporter in cases where the producer is not himself or by his agent the exporter of the
goods; or
(b) a certificate given by a governmental authority or authorised
body nominated by the exporting Member State and notified
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to the other Member States, together with a supplementary
declaration completed by the exporter of the goods.
These declarations, certificates and supplementary declarations shall
be in the form prescribed in Schedule IV to this Annex.
2. The exporter may choose either of the forms of evidence referred to in paragraph I of this Rule. Nevertheless, the authorities
of the country of exportation may require for certain categories of
goods that evidence of origin shall be furnished in the form indicated in sub-paragraph (b) of that paragraph.
3· In cases where a certificate of origin is to be supplied by a
governmental authority or an authorised body under sub-paragraph
(b) of paragraph r of this Rule, that authority or body shall obtain
a declaration as to the origin of the goods given by the last producer
of the goods within the Area. The governmental authority or the
authorised body shall satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the
evidence provided; where necessary they shall require the production of additional information, and shall carry out any suitable
check. If the authorities of the importing Member State so require,
a confidential indication of the producer of the goods shall be given.
4· Nominations of authorised bodies for the purpose of subparagraph (b) of paragraph I of this Rule, may be withdrawn by
the exporting Member State if the need arises. Each Member State
shall retain, in regard to its imports, the right of refusing to accept
certificates from any authorised body which is shown to have repeatedly issued certificates in an improper manner, but such action
shall not be taken without adequate prior notification to the exporting Member State of the grounds for dissatisfaction.
5. In cases where the Member States concerned recognise that it
is impracticable for the producer to make the declaration of origin
specified in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph I or in paragraph 2 of
this Rule, the exporter may make that declaration, in such form as
those Member States may for the purpose specify.
Rule Q.-Ferifiration of E'vidence of Origin
1. The importing Member State may as necessary require further
evidence to support any declaration or certificate of origin furnished
under Rule 8.
2. The importing Member State shall not prevent the importer
from taking delivery of the goods solely on the grounds that it requires such further evidence, but may require security for any duty
or other charge which may be payable.
3· Where, under paragraph I ,of this Rule, a Member State has
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required further evidence to be furnished, those concerned in the
territory of another Member State shall be free to produce it to a
governmental authority or an authorised body of the latter State,
who shall, after thorough verification of the evidence, furnish an
appropriate report to the importing Member State.
4· Where it is necessary to do so by reason of national legislation,
a Member State may prescribe that requests by the authorities of
importing Member States for further evidence from those concerned i11 its territory shall be addressed to a specified governmental
authority, who shall after thorough verification of the evidence
furnish an appropriate report to the importing Member State.
5· If the importing Member State wishes an investigation to be
made into the accuracy of the evidence which it has received, it may
make a request to that effect to the other Member State or States
concerned.
6. Information obtained under the provisions of this Rule by the
importing Member State shall be treated as confidential.
Rule Io.-Sanctions
I. Member States undertake to introduce legislation, making
such provision as may be necessary for penalties against persons
who, in their territory, furnish or cause to be furnished a document
which is untrue in a material particular in support of a claim in
another Member State that goods should be accepted as eligible for
Area tariff treatment. The penalties applicable shall be similar to
those applicable in cases of untrue declarations in regard to payment of duty on imports.
2. A Member State may deal with the offence out of court if it
can be more appropriately dealt with by a compromise penalty or
similar administrative procedure.
3· A Member State shall be under no obligation to institute or
continue court proceedings, or action under paragraph 2 of this
Rule,
(a) if it has not been requested to do so by the importing Member State to which the untrue claim was made; or
(b) if, on the evidence available, the proceedings would not be
justified.
SCHEDULE

I

List of qualifying processes with alternative percentage
criterion
SCHEDULE

II

List of qualifying processes with no alternative percentage
criterion
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SCHEDULE

III

Basic materials list
SCHEDULE

IV

Forms of documentary evidence of ongm
[These Schedules will be published as Cmnd. 906-I]

ANNEX C
List of Government aids referred to m paragraph I of
Article 13
(a) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which
involve a bonus on exports or re-exports.
(b) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to exporters.
(c) The remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct
taxes or social welfare charges on industrial or commercial enterpnses.
(d) The remission or repayment, in respect of exported goods,
of indirect taxes, whether levied at one or several stages, or of
charges in connection with importation, to an amount exceeding the
amount paid on the same product if sold for internal consumption.
(e) In respect of deliveries by governments or governmental
agencies of imported raw materials for export business on different
terms than for domestic business, the charging of prices below
world prices.
(f) In respect of government export credit guarantees, the
charging of premiums at rates which are manifestly inadequate to
cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the credit insurance
institutions.
(g) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled
by governments) of export credits at rates below those which they
have to pay in order to obtain the funds so employed.
(h) The government bearing all or part of the costs incurred by
exporters in obtaining credit.
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ANNEX D
List of agricultural goods referred to m Article
paragraph 1

21,

No. in
the Brussels
N omenclaturc

Chapter
Chapter

I

2

Description of Goods

Live animals
Meat and edible meat offals except whalemeat

*

(ex

02.04)

Chapter 4
Chapter 5
- 05.04

Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey

Guts, bladders and stomachs of animals (other than
fish), whole and pieces thereof
ex 05.15 Animal products not elsewhere specified or included
except blood powder, blood plasma and salted fish
roes unfit for human consumption; dead animals
of Chapter I or Chapter 3, unfit for human consumption
Chapter 6 Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the
like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage
Chapter 7 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers
Chapter 8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of melons or citrus fruit
Chapter 9 Coffee, tea, mate and spices except mate ( 09.03)
Chapter IO Cereals
Chapter I I Products of the milling industry; malt and starches;
gluten; inulin
Chapter I2
I 2.01
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit, whole or broken
I 2.02
Flours or meals of oil seeds or oleaginous fruit, nondefatted (excluding mustard flour)
I2.03
Seeds, fruit and spores, of a kind used for sowing
I 2.04
Sugar beet, whole or sliced, fresh, dried or powdered; sugar cane
I 2.0 5
Chicory roots, fresh or dried, whole or cut, unroasted
12.06
Hop cones and lupulin
ex I 2.07 Basil, borage, mint (excluding dried peppermint and
pennyroyal), rosemary and sage
*Annex E.
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12.08

I 2.09
I2.IO

Locust beans, fresh or dried, whether or not kibbled
or ground, but not further prepared; fruit kernals
and other vegetable products of a kind used primarily for human food, not falling within any
other heading
Cereal straw and husks, unprepared, or chopped but
not otherwise prepared
Mangolds, swedes, fodder roots; hay, lucerne,
clover, sainfoin, forage kale, lupines, vetches and
similar forage products

Chapter IJ
Pectin
ex IJ.OJ
Chapter I 5
Lard and other rendered pig fat; rendered poultry
I5.0I
fat
Unrendered fats of bovine cattle, sheep or goats;
I5.02
tallow (including "premier jus") produced from
those fats
Lard stearin, oleostearin and tallow stearin; lard
15.03
oil, oleo-oil and tallow oil, not emulsified or mixed
or prepared in any way
Other animal oils and fats (including neat's-foot oil
15.06
and fats from bones or waste)
Fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, refined or
purified
ex r 5· I 2 Animal or vegetable fats and oils, hydrogenated,
whether or not refined, but not further prepared,
except those wholly of fish and marine mammals
Margarine, imitation lard and other prepared edible
I5.IJ
fats
Chapter 16
I 6.0I
Sausages and the like of meat, meat offal or animal
blood
I 6.02
Other prepared or preserved meat or meat offal
ex I6.03
Meat extracts and meat juices, except whalemeat
extract*
Chapter 17
I7.0I
Beet sugar and cane sugar, solid
17.02
Other sugars; sugar syrups; artificial honey
(whether or not mixed with natural honey) ;
caramel
*Annex E.
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17.03
ex 17.04

-

17.05

No. in
the Brussels
Nomenclature

Molasses, whether or not decolourised
Fondant, pastes, creams and similar intermediate
products, in bulk, with an added sweetening matter content of 8o percent or more
Flavoured or coloured sugars, syrups and molasses,
but not including fruit juices containing added
sugar in any proportion

Description of Goods

Chapter 18
- 18.or Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted
Cocoa shells, husks, skins and waste
18.02
Chapter 19
Preparations of flour, starch or malt extract, of a
19.02
kind used as infant food or for dietetic or cu1inary
purposes, containing less than 50 percent by
weight of cocoa
Macaroni, spaghetti and similar products
Tapioca and sago; tapioca and sago substitutes obtained from potato or other starches
Bread and ordinary bakers' wares except ships' biscuits, crumbs and rusks
Pastry and other fine bakers' wares, whether or not
containing cocoa in any proportion, except biscuits, wafers, rusks, "slab-cake," "sand-cake" and
"Danish pastry"
Chapter 20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit or other parts of
plants except tomato pulp or paste in airtight containers with a dry weight content of not less than
25 percent tomato, wholly of tomato and water,
with or without salt or other preserving, seasoning or flavouring ingredients (ex 20.02)
Chapter 21
ex 2 r.o6 Pressed yeast
ex 21.07 Food preparations not elsevvhere specified or included, with a substantial content of fats, eggs,
milk or cereals except ice-cream powder and pud·
ding powder

ANNEX

Chapter
-

22

72.04

22.os
22.06
-

22.07

ex

22.09

-

22.10

Chapter

23

-

2J.02

-

2J.OJ

-

2J.04

ex

23.06

ex

23.07

Chapter

Grape must, in fermentation or with fermentation
arrested otherwise than by the addition of alcohol
Wine of fresh grapes; grape must with fermentation
arrested by the addition of alcohol
Vermouths, and other wines of fresh grapes flavoured with aromatic extracts
Other fermented beverages (for example cider,
perry and mead)
Ethyl alcohol, undenatured, with an alcohol content
of less than So degrees; spirituous beverages except the following: whisky and other spirits distilled from cereals; rum and other spirits distilled
from molasses; aquavit, genever, gin, imitation
rum and vodka; alcoholic beverages based on the
foregoing spirts; wine brandy and fig brandy;
liqueurs and cordials; compound alcoholic preparations (known as "concentrated extracts") for
the manufacture of beverages
Vinegar and substitutes for vinegar
Bran, sharps and other residues derived from the
sifting, milling or working of cereals or of leguminous vegetables
Beet pulp, bagasse and other waste of sugar manufacture; brewing and distilling dregs and waste;
residues of starch manufacture and similar residues
Oil-cake and other residues (except dregs) resulting
from the extraction of vegetable oils
Vegetable products of a kind used for animal food,
not elsewhere specified or included, except seaweed meal
Sweetened forage and other preparations of a kind
used in animal feeding, except fish solubles

24

Unmanufactured tobacco; tobacco refuse
Chapter 35
ex 35.01
Casein, caseinates and other casein derivatives
-

24.0 I
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ANNEX E
Fish and other marine products
No. in
the Brussels
Nomenclature

ex 02.04
ex 03.01
03.02
ex 03.03

ex

I

6.03

Description of Goods

Whale meat
Fish, fresh (live or dead) chilled or frozen; except
frozen fillets
Fish, salted, dried or smoked
Crustaceans and molluscs; except frozen peeled
prawns other than Dublin Bay prawns
Whale meat extract

ANNEX F
List of territories to which paragraph
applies
Faeroe Islands
Greenland
Gibraltar
Malta

2

of Article 43

ANNEX G
Special arrangements for Portugal in regard to import
duties and quantitative export restrictions
I. Special arrangements in regard to the reduction and elimination of import duties on certain products imported into Portuguese
territory covered by the Convention, and in regard to the application by Portugal of quantitative export restrictions are provided in
this Annex.

I
Import duties
2. The provisions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of this Annex shall be
substituted for paragraph 2 of Article 3 in relation to any products
of which there is production in Portuguese territory covered by the
Convention on rst January, I960, and which are not referred to in
paragraph 3 of this Annex.
3.- (a) The products excepted from paragraph 2 of this Annex
are
( i) goods the export of which to foreign countries

ANNEX

amounts to 15 percent or more of the production
in Portuguese territory covered by the Convention
on the average of the three years ended 31st December, 1958; or
( ii) other goods notified by Portugal, even though the
industries concerned are not exporting industries
covered by sub-paragraph ( i) of this paragraph.
(b) Before 1st July, 1960, Portugal shall notify to the Council
the products to which sub-paragraphs ( i) and ( ii) of this paragraph
will apply.
4.-(a) On and after each of the following dates Portugal shall
not apply an import duty on any product referred to in paragraph 2
of this Annex at a level exceeding the percentage of the basic duty
specified against that date:
Ist
Ist
Ist
Ist

July, 1960
So
January, 1965 ............... 70
January, 1967
6o
January, 1970
50

(b) The Council shall decide before 1st January, I 970, the timetable for the progressive reduction of import duties on such products
which remain after that date, provided that those duties shall be
eliminated before 1st January, 1980.
5. If on the average of the three years ending 31st December,
1959, or of any subsequent three years before Ist January, 1970,
exports of any product to foreign countries amount to 15 percent or
more of production in Portuguese territory covered by the Convention, and provided that this level of exports is not due to exceptional circumstances, the elimination of the remaining duty on such
products shall be achieved by annual reductions of 10 percent of the
basic duty, unless the Council decides otherwise.
6.-(a) Portugal may, at any time before Ist July, 1972, increase the import duty on a product or establish a new import duty
on a product not then produced in significant quantities in Portuguese territory covered by the Convention, provided that the import
duty so applied
(i) is necessary to help to promote the development
of a specific production; and
( ii) is not on an ad valorem basis higher than the
normal level of customs duties applied in the most
favoured nation tariff of Portugal at that time to
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.

similar products produced in Portuguese territory
covered by the Convention.
(b) Portugal shall notify to the Council any duty to be applied
in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph not less
than 30 days before its introduction. If any Member State so requests, the Council shall examine whether the conditions in that paragraph are fulfilled.
(c) Portugal shall, before 1st January, 1980, eliminate import
duties applied in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph. Such duties shall be reduced at an even and progressive rate.
Portugal shall notify to the Council the programme of reduction to
be applied. The Council shall, at the request of any Member State,
examine the programme notified, and may decide to modify it.
II
Quantitative export restrictions
7. The provisions of Article II shall not prevent Portugal from
applying quantitative restrictions on exports of an exhaustible mining product if, taking into account the quantities of the product available, the supplies necessary for domestic industries would be endangered by the export of such a product to the territories of Member States. Portugal, if it applies restrictions in accordance with this
paragraph, shall notify them to the Council, if possible before they
come into force, and shall enter into consultations with any Member
State concerned.
IV.-PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE
CONVENTION ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN FREE
TRADE ASSOCIATION TO THE PRINCIPALITY OF
LIECHTENSTEIN
The Signatory States of the Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association and the Principality of Liechtenstein,
Considering that the Principality of Liechtenstein forms a customs union with Switzerland pursuant to the Treaty of 29th March,
1923, and that according to that Treaty not all the provisions of
the Convention can without further authority be applied to Liechtenstein, and
Considering that the Principality of Liechtenstein has expressed
the wish that all the provisions of the Convention should be applied
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to it, and, to this end, in so far as this is necessary, proposes to give
special powers to Switzerland,
Have agreed as follows:
I. The Convention shall apply to the Principality of Liechtenstein as long as it forms a customs union with Switzerland and
Switzerland is a Member of the Association.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, the Principality of Liechtenstein shall be represented by Switzerland.
3· This Protocol shall be ratified by the signatory States. The
instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of Sweden which shall notify all other signatory States.
4· This Protocol shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by all signatory States.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto, have
signed the present Protocol.
ANNEX

Done at Stockholm, the
day of
, 1959, in
a single copy in the English and French languages, both texts being
equally authentic which shall be deposited with the Government of
Sweden, by which certified copies shall be transmitted to all other
signatory and acceding States.
For the Republic of Austria:
For the Kingdom of Denmark:
For the Principality of Liechtenstein:
For the Kingdom of Norway:
For the Portuguese Republic:
For the Kingdom of Sweden:
For the Swiss Confederation:
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
V.-NOTE ON PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

When Ministers from Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom met in Stockholm on
19th and zoth November, 1959, to approve the Convention establishing a European Free Trade Association, they decided to set up a
Preparatory Committee to deal, before the entry into force of the
Convention, with the following matters:
( 1 ) drafting of rules of procedure of the Council;
( 2) proposals concerning arrangements for the secretariat services of the Association, including the Staff regulations;
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( 3) drafting of regulations on financial arrangements necessary
for the administrative expenses of the Association, including
the procedure for establishing a budget and the apportionment of expenses between the Member States;
( 4) a draft protocol on the legal capacity, privileges and immunities to be granted by the Member States in connection with
the Association;
( 5) such other questions in connection with preparations for the
establishment of the Association, as the signatory states may
agree.
Stockholm, 20th November, 19 59·

